On July 14, 2026, the UK Supreme Court handed down a unanimous judgment on directors’ duties in Saxon Woods Investments Limited and others v Francesco Costa [2026] UKSC 21. The decision has attracted attention for its clarification of the scope of a director’s duty of good faith under s.172(1) of the Companies Act 2006 (the CA 2006). While the facts did not involve a restructuring scenario, it has important practical implications for directors of distressed companies who find themselves at odds with fellow board members over the best course of action for the company to take. It provides a cautionary tale for directors navigating the distressed sales of a business or assets.
At its core, the case concerned a director who genuinely believed that he was acting in the best interests of the company, notwithstanding that in doing so he deceived and concealed matters from the rest of the board and excluded them from a sales strategy, despite a pre-agreed sale process having been in place. The Supreme Court’s unequivocal conclusion was that the duty of good faith under section 172 of the CA 2006 imposes a standard of conduct to which directors should adhere, and is not merely concerned with a director’s state of mind. It is not sufficient for a director who thinks he knows best to simply override the board’s collective strategy by covert means, however sincerely he believes that he is acting in the company’s best interests.
The decision has implications for directors generally but is also likely to be of particular importance where competing views as to a company’s strategy arise in the context of shareholder exits, pre-pack administrations, distressed M&A, and the management of competing stakeholder interests in financially distressed companies.
Background
Spring Media Investments Limited (SMIL) was the English holding company of a creative services group operating in the fashion, beauty, and luxury brand sectors. Mr Francesco Costa was SMIL’s chairman and a director of the company, whilst Saxon Woods Investments Limited (Saxon Woods) held 22.33 percent of SMIL’s shares.
In May 2016, SMIL, its shareholders (including Saxon Woods), and SMIL’s founder entered into a new shareholders’ agreement (the SHA). Clause 6.2 of the SHA required SMIL and its investors to work together in good faith towards an “Exit”, being a sale of SMIL or its shares, by December 31, 2019. The board delegated conduct of that process exclusively to Mr Costa.
However, Mr Costa believed that delaying a sale beyond 2019 would generate a better return for SMIL and its investors. Rather than raising his disagreement with the board or seeking to revisit the agreed strategy, he unilaterally pursued his preferred course.
Decision in the High Court
The trial judge made factual findings that Mr Costa:
- kept all but one of his fellow directors in the dark about the Exit process;
- aggressively rebuffed the other directors’ attempts to obtain information about the sale process;
- misled the board into believing the company was complying with the SHA when he knew that it was not;
- failed to disclose that his instructions to the company’s advisers did not include achieving an Exit in 2019; and
- employed various delaying tactics to push any sale beyond the deadline agreed in the SHA.
Critically, the trial judge accepted that Mr Costa “sincerely believe[d] he was acting in the best interests of the Company and its investors.” In essence, his position was that the board “wouldn’t like it now if they knew, but they will thank me in the long run.”
They did not thank him: the Covid-19 pandemic subsequently destroyed any prospect of a profitable Exit after 2019.
Saxon Woods petitioned for relief from unfair prejudice under sections 994 - 996 of the CA 2006. The trial judge upheld the unfair prejudice claim but found that Mr Costa had neither breached his directors’ duty nor acted dishonestly. He therefore made only a conditional buy-out order, requiring Mr Costa to purchase Saxon Woods’ shares at their end-of-2019 value, if Saxon Woods could establish that a final offer exceeding US$75 million net of debt would have been received by then (the Offer).
The Court of Appeal’s decision
The Court of Appeal went further. It dismissed Mr Costa’s appeal, allowed Saxon Woods’ cross-appeal, and ordered an unconditional buy-out. In doing so, it held that Mr Costa had breached his directors’ duties, particularly as his deception was dishonest, when assessed objectively.
The Supreme Court’s decision
The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed Mr Costa’s appeal. Lord Briggs, giving the judgment of the court, approached the issue more broadly than the Court of Appeal, focusing on the nature of the section 172 directors’ duty itself, rather than solely on whether Mr Costa’s conduct was objectively dishonest.
The court reaffirmed the principle that courts will not substitute their own view of a company’s best interests for the genuine business judgement of its directors (Re Smith and Fawcett Ltd [1942] Ch 304). However, that principle protects the collective business judgement of the board: it does not entitle an individual director to pursue their own strategy by covertly subverting the intention of the board as a whole.
The Supreme Court held that a director’s duty not to covertly subvert the board’s collective management falls within the scope of section 172 of the CA 2006. Effective board governance requires directors who disagree with an agreed strategy to bring that disagreement to the attention of the rest of the board, allowing it to reach a collective decision. A director cannot instead conceal their position and pursue an alternative strategy behind their colleagues’ backs.
The sincerity of Mr Costa’s belief could not save him. Good faith did not permit him to pursue his preferred strategy through “lies, cheating, deception, dishonesty or disloyalty”. As Lord Briggs observed, the contrary conclusion would be “a recipe for chaos and paralysis in corporate governance, and destructive of the collegiality of the board.”
Importantly however, the Supreme Court did not endorse the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the SHA conclusively determined the route to SMIL’s success. Lord Briggs left open that question, observing that the mere fact that a company has contracted to pursue a particular route cannot “altogether close off” the subsequent consideration by its directors of whether changed circumstances mean that the company would be better served by changing course. The critical point being that any such change was a matter for the business judgement of the board, and Mr Costa was not entitled to subvert its previous collective determination by covert means.
The Supreme Court therefore upheld the unconditional buy-out order. This meant that, even though the directors were not signatories in their personal capacities to the SHA, Mr Costa was required to buy out Saxon Woods at the pro rata, undiscounted value of its shares in SMIL as at December 31, 2019.
What does the decision mean for directors in practice?
The decision has the following important implications, which are of general application.
- Strategy: Where a director disagrees with an agreed board strategy, a genuine belief that an alternative course would better serve the company’s interests does not entitle them to pursue it unilaterally and covertly. The proper course is to put that view to the board and allow it to be considered collectively.
This has particular relevance to exit processes and distressed sales, where circumstances can change rapidly. An agreed exit timetable does not prevent directors from reassessing whether a different course would better serve the company’s interests. However, any change of strategy should be addressed openly through proper processes. The Supreme Court was clear that the essence of Mr Costa's breach was not that he had formed a different view, but the way in which he had sought to implement it.
- Delegated authority: SMIL's board had entrusted the conduct of the sale process exclusively to Mr Costa, but responsibility for management of the company remained with the board collectively. Where conduct of a sale or restructuring process is delegated to an individual director or committee, clear reporting lines, appropriate board oversight and full disclosure of material developments is required.
- Personal liability: By upholding the unconditional buy-out order, the Supreme Court left Mr Costa personally liable to acquire Saxon Woods’ shares at their pro rata, undiscounted value as at December 31, 2019, without Saxon Woods having to establish that the Offer would in fact have been received. While the facts in this case involved an unfair prejudice application by shareholders rather than a claim in insolvency proceedings, the decision serves as an example of the personal exposure that may arise where a director departs from the board’s collective strategy by covert means.