Overview
The United States has long been recognised as a leading forum for corporate restructuring. Its status rests on a distinctive combination of flexible insolvency law, a deep and experienced judiciary, a mature market for distressed debt and a sophisticated ecosystem of restructuring professionals. Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code is often described as the “gold standard” of restructuring regimes, offering a distressed entity the attraction of a debtor-in-possession model that keeps incumbent management in control (subject to court oversight), a worldwide automatic stay upon filing, the ability to sell assets free and clear of liens and other encumbrances, the power to reject burdensome contracts and leases, a broad cross-class cram-down that prevents hold-out creditors from blocking value-maximising transactions, and access to super-priority debtor-in-possession financing.
In recent years, however, other jurisdictions have positioned themselves as alternative restructuring hubs, fuelled by a desire to attract large, complex, high-value cross-border insolvency cases amid a rapid expansion in global debt markets and rising rates of corporate distress.
This has created incentives – including for US-incorporated multinational groups – to consider restructuring outside Chapter 11, using offshore regimes as an alternative pathway. Singapore's scheme process (itself modelled on Chapter 11), the United Kingdom's Part 26A restructuring plan, Germany's StaRUG, the Netherlands' WHOA and Italy's concordato preventivo now offer alternative, internationally recognised mechanisms that can achieve outcomes comparable to Chapter 11, often at lower cost. For debtors with US assets or operations, these foreign proceedings can, in turn, be recognised in the US under Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code.
Over the past year, a growing number of US-headquartered groups have restructured through a UK restructuring plan followed by Chapter 15 recognition, rather than filing for Chapter 11. There have been compelling incentives to do so, including the ability to depart from the absolute priority rule in Chapter 11 and, most significantly, the availability of nonconsensual third-party releases of the kind ruled by the US Supreme Court1 to be invalid as part of a Chapter 11 reorganisation plan.
In the Fossil2 and New Fortress Energy (NFE)3 restructurings, the US Bankruptcy Court granted Chapter 15 recognition to non-consensual third-party releases approved as part of UK restructuring plans, even though such releases would not be available in a Chapter 11 case and notwithstanding the fact the relevant debtors had deliberately manufactured a jurisdictional connection with the UK to take advantage of a UK restructuring plan. In Fossil, this was achieved by incorporating a new English guarantor entity and changing the relevant notes’ governing law to English law. In NFE, the jurisdictional connection was established by incorporating a new English plan company just weeks before the restructuring proceedings commenced.
While the enhanced flexibility offered by UK restructuring plans in implementing complex cross-border restructurings for US debtor groups can maximise value for creditors in appropriate circumstances – an example of so-called “good” forum shopping in that it benefits creditors – it has also come under scrutiny. Left unchecked, there is a risk of cross-border forum shopping of the “bad” type – compromising the claims of creditor groups and securing broad third-party releases without a sufficient countervailing benefit and without protective carve-outs, in ways that would not be permitted under Chapter 11's stricter framework.
In NFE, Judge Glenn sitting in the US Bankruptcy Court offered some valuable “rules of the game” and cautionary guardrails that indicate Chapter 15 recognition of a UK restructuring plan incorporating non-consensual releases or other features not available under Chapter 11 should not assumed as a “rubber stamp” outcome. Notably, in Fossil and NFE, the UK restructurings and the Chapter 15 recognition proceedings took place without creditor dissent. In a contested matter raising fairness, participation and value concerns for creditors, Judge Glenn indicated the court may take a different approach to UK courts, closely scrutinising both a manufactured connection to the UK on the part of a US debtor and the underlying substantive fairness of the relevant restructuring plan sought to be recognised in Chapter 15 proceedings.
Judge Glenn’s remarks, building on the cautionary notes provided in earlier decisions in Mega Newco,4 should cause US debtors to pause before assuming a UK restructuring plan with Chapter 15 recognition will sidestep qualifying conditions of a Chapter 11 reorganisation plan. The risk that recognition may be declined in a contested matter, coupled with an understanding that a UK restructuring plan may have comparative disadvantages as well as advantages that must be considered as part of a debtor’s commercial assessment, may cause a US debtor or group to go back to the drawing board in the design and scope of a proposed restructuring. Moreover, we may well see alternative jurisdictions explored as a means to implement a complex multi-group cross-border restructuring for US entities.
The attraction of the UK restructuring plan
The statutory framework
The UK restructuring plan under Part 26A of the Companies Act 2006 was introduced by the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020. A restructuring plan is a court-sanctioned compromise or arrangement between a company and its creditors and/or members, typically requiring only two court hearings – a convening hearing and a sanction hearing. Therefore, it is capable of implementation fairly speedily, in the space of 8-12 weeks.
A company may propose a restructuring plan if it can establish:
- it is experiencing, or is likely to experience, financial difficulties affecting, or that may affect, its ability to carry on business as a going concern;
- the plan constitutes a compromise or arrangement with the relevant creditors or members (or a class of them) intended to eliminate, reduce, prevent or mitigate the effect of those financial difficulties; and
- in the case of a foreign debtor, the company has a “sufficient connection” to the UK – as the relevant jurisdictional threshold.
Comparative advantages of a UK restructuring plan
A UK restructuring plan can be deployed flexibly to restructure complex, multi-layered capital structures. It can potentially be used as something of a “blank canvass” to implement outcomes ranging from debt-for-debt and debt-for-equity swaps, to amending and extending facilities and bonds, injecting new money, and managing solvent wind-downs. A plan can also be used to implement surgical restructurings by targeting particular creditor constituencies, rather than purporting to deal with all creditor claims as part of a “one stop shop” solution.
Apart from this significant structural flexibility, a restructuring plan also has the following key advantages:
- No numerosity requirement – a plan requires only 75 percent in value of a voting class to approve the plan, with no requirement as to the number of creditors assenting. A Chapter 11 plan, by contrast, requires approval by 2/3 in value and more than 50 percent in number of voting creditors in a class – meaning that small-value holdouts will not have the potential to derail a UK restructuring plan, in contrast to the impediment they pose in a Chapter 11 plan.
- Low jurisdictional threshold – as noted above, a restructuring plan is available where a company has encountered, or is likely to encounter, financial difficulties that affect its ability to continue as a going concern. There is no need for a company to be balance sheet or cash flow insolvent, or even to be facing imminent administration or liquidation. However, for non-UK companies, there must be a “sufficient connection” with the UK. While this connection generally requires a higher bar than is required under Chapter 11, typically UK assets or debts will suffice. Moreover, the sufficient connection can be manufactured by changing the governing law of the debt to English law either on a consensual basis or under the majority provisions in the relevant debt instruments, or by incorporating a new English co-obligor to assume existing obligations, as occurred in both Fossil and NFE.
- No absolute priority rule – a restructuring plan permits a departure from the ordinary priority treatment of creditors on insolvency, provided the UK court considers the departure to be fair. As such, shareholders or junior creditors may be able to retain value even where senior creditors are not paid in full (which occurred in Fossil, where some equity holders retained their interests). In a Chapter 11 plan, equity holders can only receive value if all creditors are paid in full or consent – mainly, the absolute priority rule.
- Availability of third-party releases – perhaps most significantly, English courts upheld non-consensual third-party releases when assessing the fairness of a plan on a holistic basis. Specifically, third-party releases against guarantors have been upheld on the basis that doing so can prevent “ricochet” or subrogation claims that might bounce back against the plan company once the primary debt has been compromised, thereby undermining the efficacy of the plan. In contrast, as a result of the determination of the US Supreme Court, nonconsensual third-party releases are no longer an option in a Chapter 11 plan.
- Cost – a UK restructuring plan is perceived to be cheaper than a Chapter 11, with it involving fewer court hearings and fewer parties seeking to claim their costs from the debtor company. However, contested restructuring plans such as Thames Water call this perception into question and there is some uncertainty currently as to the position the Court will take on costs where a restructuring plan is contested.
Comparative disadvantages of a UK restructuring plan
A UK restructuring plan also has its limitations. Notably, unlike Chapter 11, the statutory framework does not expressly contemplate debtor-in-possession finance, therefore requiring a debtor company to fund the process from existing cash or via its existing debt arrangements or negotiated new money (by no means a given).
There is also no automatic stay while a plan is being negotiated, although the court has discretion to stay specific matters while the plan is formulated. The Court of Appeal’s decision in Adler5confirmed that while a UK restructuring plan is not subject to the absolute priority rule, plan companies must have regard to the pari passu principle when negotiating a restructuring plan and seeking to implement a cross-class cram down. Any departure from that principle (that each class should be treated equally amongst themselves) is only permissible where there are good reasons for doing so. Further, it was emphasised in Adler that the court has a broad discretion when determining whether to sanction a plan involving a cross-class cram down, and that strong support from assenting classes is irrelevant to assessing whether the plan is fair for dissenting classes.
In another significant limitation, the decisions of the Court of Appeal in Petrofac6 and Thames Water7 confirmed that the views of creditors who would be “out of the money” in the “relevant alternative” to a restructuring plan (which may be liquidation, or whatever the court considers thew most likely outcome should the plan not be sanctioned) cannot simply be ignored. Their interests and contribution to the benefits generated by the restructuring (even where that involves merely the relinquishing of debt rather than the injection of new money) must be considered and meaningfully accounted for when allocating benefits of the plan. These restrictions can, in practice, dilute the advantages of having no absolute priority rule and availability of nonconsensual third-party releases.
Recent case studies
Fossil
Fossil Group Inc is a United States-headquartered global design, marketing, distribution and innovation company that specialises in lifestyle accessories. By mid-2025, facing weak trading performance and a looming maturity wall of approximately US $150 million in senior unsecured notes due in November 2026, Fossil Group looked for options to restructure its outstanding debt.
Around 60 percent of the notes were held by two institutional investors, with the remaining 40 percent held by non-institutional retail investors. Fossil Group ultimately considered a Chapter 11 filing to be undesirable due to:
- the requirement, for a plan confirmation, that at least one impaired class of creditors accepts the plan, with acceptance determined by both two-thirds in value and more than 50 percent in number of voting claims. It was anticipated that the numerosity requirement would not be met due to a large number of small-value retail claims not providing consent; and
- the inability to include nonconsensual third-party releases in a Chapter 11 plan, when it was desired to secure releases for non-debtor note issuers and related parties.
A UK restructuring plan was attractive to Fossil Group in part due to the absence of a numerosity requirement and the potential availability of nonconsensual releases.
With that in mind, in September 2025, Fossil Group announced an exchange offer, under which it offered to exchange all of its outstanding senior notes due in November 2026. Noteholders were given the opportunity to participate in a US $32.5 million new money offering (backstopped by the majority note holders) of 9.5 percent first-out senior secured notes due January 2029, while noteholders who did not participate would receive 7.5 percent second-out secured notes due June 2029. The exchange offer was conditional on at least 90 percent participation (by principal value) from consenting noteholders. If that threshold was not met, the notes would be restructured under a UK restructuring plan.
Concurrently with the exchange offer, with the consent of the two majority institutional investors, Fossil Group changed the governing law of the notes from New York law to English law, openly conceding that it was doing so specifically to strengthen the jurisdictional connection with the UK should a restructuring plan became necessary. To bolster the connection, a new indirect subsidiary of Fossil Group, Fossil UK, was incorporated in the UK, which acceded as the guarantor of the notes.
Only around 72 percent by value of noteholders sought to participate in the exchange offer, so that the 90 percent minimum threshold under the notes was not met. As a result, a UK restructuring plan was initiated. Importantly, while only 72 percent by value of total noteholders consented to the exchange offer, Fossil Group knew that the UK restructuring plan threshold would be obtained if it could secure the support of 75 percent in value of noteholders actually present and voting at the plan meeting of creditors.
Fossil UK was nominated as the plan company. Under the plan, all outstanding senior notes due in November 2026 were cancelled in full and replaced by the issue of US $182.5 million in new notes due in 2029, backed by the new money provided by the majority noteholders. The plan also provided for non-consensual releases for Fossil Group (as the non-debtor parent entity) and for Fossil UK’s directors and advisers to have releases with respect to any claims arising in connection with the negotiation and implementation of the plan.
At the Fossil UK plan meeting, holders of around $125 million of the unsecured notes voted, with 99.99 percent voting in favour of the plan.
On November 10, 2025, Mr Justice Richards sitting in the English High Court sanctioned the restructuring plan.8 Relevant to exercising his discretion to do so was the expert opinion from former US Bankruptcy Court Judge James Peck, submitted to the High Court as expert evidence to demonstrate that the UK restructuring plan likely would be recognised and given effect under Chapter 15 of the US Bankruptcy Code.
Judge Peck characterised the use of a UK restructuring plan, followed by intended Chapter 15 recognition in the US – explicitly to avoid a Chapter 11 filing – as an example of “good forum shopping”, in that it provided a better outcome for creditors as a whole than what would have been available under Chapter 11. According to Judge Peck, this would “be going with the grain of US bankruptcy legislation rather than violating any public policy considerations that underpin it.”9
Two days later, Chapter 15 recognition was obtained by Fossil UK at an uncontested hearing before Judge Lopez in the US Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas.10
Judge Lopez accepted Fossil UK’s evidence that its COMI was in the UK. Even though the operations and management of Fossil Group (as the parent entity of Fossil UK) were principally in the US, Fossil UK was incorporated in the UK and there was no competing evidence to suggest its COMI was elsewhere. Judge Lopez therefore recognised the UK proceeding as the foreign main proceedings and entered an order giving full force and effect to the UK restructuring plan.
NFE
In NFE, the English court sanctioned two inter-conditional restructuring plans that extinguished approximately US $9.6 billion of debt across the NFE Group. Creditors were divided into seven classes for the purpose of voting on the plans, with each of those classes voting in favour (six classes unanimously and the final class by 99.84 percent). As a result, the plans could be sanctioned without the need to impose a cross-class cram down on any dissenting creditor classes.
The plans were proposed by two English companies within the NFE Group – NFE Global Holdings Limited, which had been incorporated in 2021, and NFE Brazil Newco Limited, which was incorporated in April 2026 specifically for the purpose of pursuing the UK restructuring. The incorporation of those entities, and their assumption of liability for relevant NFE Group debts as guarantors (NFE Brazil Newco’s role as guarantor coming shortly after its incorporation, and as part of the positioning undertaken before the UK restructuring plan process was formally commenced), gave the NFE Group the required “sufficient connection” to the UK to satisfy the eligibility threshold.
Unlike in Fossil, there was no change of governing law of the debt from New York law (albeit several key agreements were governed by English law).
As part of the restructuring plans, existing shareholders were able to retain an equity stake. One of the new operating entities was 65 percent owned by creditors, with existing shareholders retaining 35 percent of the equity.
In sanctioning the plans on June 18, 2026, Cawson J referred to the restructuring as an example of “good forum shopping”, insofar as it was not designed to enable the NFE Group to avoid the consequences of bankruptcy and evade creditors.11 The fact the newly incorporated UK special purpose vehicle (and its assumption of certain liabilities of the NFE Group) was designed specifically to support a jurisdictional nexus to the UK did not create a bar to sanction.
Subsequently, on June 26, 2026, Chief Judge Martin Glenn of the US Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York recognised the UK proceedings as foreign main proceedings under Chapter 15 of the US Bankruptcy Code, and also recognised the English Court’s sanction order, giving full force to the restructuring plans.
Judicial guardrails on recognition
Chief Judge Glenn followed his recognition orders with a detailed 57-page written opinion that was issued on July 14, 2026. The opinion sets out important guardrails for future attempts by US debtor entities to pursue a UK restructuring plan followed by Chapter 15 recognition as a deliberate “workaround” to Chapter 11.
Judge Glenn commenced by categorising what the NFE Group had done – mainly where “a foreign debtor that is an affiliate of a US-based corporation was established specifically for the purpose of pursuing a foreign restructuring solution followed by a Chapter 15 case” – as a form of “COMI tourism” and proceeded to determine whether that alone was a basis to “deny recognition and enforcement” under Chapter 15.12
In considering that question, Judge Glenn drew a distinction not substantively addressed in Fossil: eligibility for a UK restructuring plan turns on the plan company's “sufficient connection” to the UK, but this is not the same as the jurisdictional connection required for recognition as a foreign main proceeding under Chapter 15, being the debtor’s centre of main interests (COMI).13
Judge Glenn made the important point that it is one thing to establish a sufficient connection in the UK and have a restructuring plan sanctioned in the UK, but that would still leave the debtor company facing the hurdle of Chapter 15 – and “if the US court then declined to recognise the COMI in the UK of the plan company, the restructuring would fail.”14
Judge Glenn noted that, while the distinction was not canvassed in substance in Fossil, in future matters the US Bankruptcy Court should be alert to the potential for “bankruptcy tourism” and the opportunity for abuse invited by “COMI manipulation”.15 Chapter 15 would be “stripped of meaning” if recognition followed as a matter of course simply when a new subsidiary was established by a US debtor group in the UK to assume the parent entity’s obligations.16
Judge Glenn identified that, apart from having regard to the risk of COMI manipulation, a court considering whether to exercise the discretion to grant recognition to a UK restructuring plan (or any other foreign proceeding) should also scrutinise the provisions of the sanctioned plan. In that regard, the court should pay “particular attention” to the requirements in section 1522(a) of the US Bankruptcy Code,17 under which Chapter 15 relief is conditioned on the interests of creditors being “sufficiently protected.”
Judge Glenn noted that this standard has been interpreted to require “the just treatment of all holders of claims against the bankruptcy estate, the protection of US claimants against prejudice and inconvenience in the processing of claims in the [foreign] proceeding, and the distribution of proceeds of the [foreign] estate substantially in accordance with the order prescribed by US law.”18 In NFE, the interests of creditors were found to be sufficiently protected on the basis of the “overwhelming support” for the restructuring plans by plan creditors, the fact that liquidation (as the relevant alternative to the plan.
Judge Glenn also referred to the public policy exception to recognition under the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, as enacted in section 1506 of the US Bankruptcy Code.
While recognising that UK-approved plans “often include releases of non-debtor affiliate guarantees of the original debt, as well as broad exculpation protection…[that] push the boundaries of available relief in a Chapter 11 case”, Judge Glenn held that the US Bankruptcy Court can enforce foreign plan releases “even if those provisions could not be entered in a plenary Chapter 11 case.”19 This was on the basis that invalidity under Chapter 11 rests on the statutory interpretation of that particular component of the US Bankruptcy Code, whereas Chapter 15 is structurally independent. As such, the US Bankruptcy Courts retain broad discretion to enforce foreign restructuring plans containing releases that would not be available under domestic law, provided the foreign proceeding satisfies basic standards of procedural fairness and comity.
According to Judge Glenn, this means that recognition of a foreign restructuring plan which includes nonconsensual third-party releases does not, of itself, violate public policy under US law.
The fact that the operative releases in NFE were subject to boilerplate carve-outs for acts involving fraud, gross negligence or wilful misconduct was also significant in Judge Glenn’s determination, further supporting the “sufficiently protected” standard in section 1522(a). Judge Glenn also acknowledged the logic of UK courts sanctioning plans providing for nonconsensual third-party releases to ensure the restructuring is effective: “if so-called ‘ricochet’ claims against affiliate guarantors remained possible, the schemes or plans would fail.”20
Judge Glenn also found no basis to refuse recognition simply because the plans permitted equity holders to retain a 35 percent interest in one of the continuing operating entities in the NFE Group, even though this would have contravened the absolute priority rule in an alternative Chapter 11 process.
A trend towards closer scrutiny
Judge Glenn's guardrails in NFE echo, and build on, concerns raised in Mega Newco. In that matter, an originally Mexico-based debtor with New York-law-governed debt incorporated a new English subsidiary – Mega Newco Limited – as a co-obligor, implemented a UK scheme of arrangement (rather than a restructuring plan) and then sought recognition of that proceeding under Chapter 15.
In granting recognition to the English scheme proceeding as a foreign main proceeding under Chapter 15, Judge Wiles expressed concern about the fact that the Mexico-based parent entity had no substantial business operations or facilities in the UK, and had openly acknowledged that “Mega Newco was created, and then voluntarily subjected itself to the parent’s liabilities under the US notes, just so that the US notes issued by the parent could be restructured in a jurisdiction that was not otherwise available.”21
Judge Wiles was also concerned that “Mega Newco has engaged in restructuring activities in the UK … [and] these restructuring activities apparently are the only activities in which Mega Newco has ever engaged”. 22
Judge Wiles noted that there are “significant risks” with such a structure as a general principle. Notably:
“Chapter 15 is premised on the idea that a debtor who seeks to restructure an obligation is actually the subject of a foreign proceeding, and that the foreign proceeding is located in the country where that debtor has its COMI …
If we were routinely to allow this structure in all cases, no matter what the circumstances, the ordinary predicates for Chapter 15 relief could be stripped of meaning. Any debtor company could restructure its obligations anywhere it chose … The parent company's COMI would no longer be relevant to the parent's restructuring of its debts. The laws of the chosen jurisdiction would govern a restructuring, no matter how those laws might affect the legitimate expectations of creditors and regardless of whether the debtor had chosen a particular jurisdiction for the purpose of favouring insiders or for other improper reasons.”23
Nevertheless, it was material in the matter at hand that, as in Fossil and NFE, the underlying restructuring in the UK was not subject to creditor dissent, and no party had objected to the Chapter 15 recognition either on the basis the debtor’s COMI was not in the UK or on substantive fairness grounds.
It was also significant that the actual restructuring arrangements effected by the UK scheme “will improve creditor recoveries, strengthen the finances of the parent, and preserve the value of the operating business”. 24
However, Judge Wiles indicated that in other matters, where the underlying restructuring or recognition is contested, and “there [is] an actual contention or evidence that the structure at issue … had been used in an unfair way and had thwarted third-party expectations”, there would be “serious questions” as to whether recognition would be granted.25
The decision provides a further note of caution to US debtor groups that, unless a UK restructuring and Chapter 15 recognition pathway in substance constitutes “good” forum shopping, maximising value for creditors as a whole, there will be a material risk that the arrangement will not be given effect by a US court.
Practical implications
While a UK restructuring plan, followed by Chapter 15 recognition in the US, offers a flexible means for US debtor groups to restructure their affairs, whether this pathway becomes entrenched as a genuine alternative to Chapter 11 proceedings remains to be seen.
What is clear is that the strategy has limits: a UK restructuring plan used to engage in “bad” forum shopping – to avoid or defeat creditor claims, including through releases of third parties that diminish creditor recoveries without discernible benefit – is unlikely to survive scrutiny in the US (albeit obtaining sanction in the UK would also be problematic).
It is notable that in Fossil and NFE, as well as the earlier decision in Mega Newco, the underlying UK restructuring plans (or scheme in the case of Mega Newco) and subsequent recognition applications in the US were not opposed by creditors.
Both the US and English courts may prove considerably more reluctant to grant the necessary relief where a restructuring is contested. In particular, creditor opposition could give rise to real challenges to the recognition of nonconsensual third-party releases under Chapter 15.
Judge Glenn's remarks in NFE now provide a framework for scrutinising Chapter 15 recognition petitions in the event of creditor opposition, putting US Bankruptcy Courts on notice to be alert to “bankruptcy tourism”. Justice Glenn’s opinion is also a timely reminder that a US debtor satisfying the “sufficient connection” jurisdictional test to access the UK restructuring plan regime is different and entirely separate to the (higher) threshold of COMI required to achieve recognition as a foreign main proceeding under Chapter 15.
Where creditor opposition exists – for example, where a UK plan requires cramdown of a dissenting class that continues to oppose the restructuring in the Chapter 15 recognition proceeding – a US court will need to:
- scrutinise carefully the COMI of the new relevant entity being used as the vehicle for the UK restructuring; and
- consider the substantive fairness of the underlying plan, and whether it provides reasonable protection and the maximisation of value for creditors in return for any releases or other concessions, such that the plan is consistent with both the “sufficiently protected” standard and the public policy requirements of the US Bankruptcy Code.
The importance of these lines of enquiry – and the obstacles to recognition they can create for debtors – are apparent in the creditor challenge currently being raised by Skillz in the Papaya Gaming Chapter 15 recognition petition. In that case, the Israeli-headquartered debtor’s COMI is allegedly in the US, and the debtor is allegedly using the recognition pathway to frustrate enforcement of a US $719 million New York judgment.
US debtor groups should carefully consider the risk of recognition not being granted if creditor opposition is anticipated or there are doubts about either the ability to establish sufficient links to the UK to support a COMI finding, or there is demonstrable negative value to creditors as a result of the relevant restructuring plan.
US debtors should also take into account the potential disadvantages of UK restructuring plans compared with Chapter 11 proceedings. The grass is not always greener, and recent decisions by the English Court of Appeal confirm the safeguards inherent in the court’s discretion to sanction a plan, which temper the absence of an absolute priority rule.
Further, having so far received less international attention than the UK restructuring plan recognition pathway, other restructuring jurisdictions may also offer an appealing alternative to Chapter 11. For example, non-consensual releases can be available under the Canadian Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, as can “reverse vesting orders” – which essentially enable an entity to purchase a distressed debtor with only the assets and liabilities it wishes to retain. Here, excluded assets and liabilities are vested in a ResidualCo. The purchased company, holding only the assumed assets and liabilities as desired by the purchaser, may then exit the insolvency proceeding with the ResidualCo being added as a debtor to the proceeding. The appeal of such orders, and their capability of being recognised and enforced under Chapter 15, was noted by Chief Judge Glenn in his recent decision in Lovate.26
There is also the potential practical obstacle to the “dream” of COMI tourism. Obtaining the court’s sanction for a UK restructuring plan, followed by Chapter 15 recognition, is no guarantee of achieving a successful restructuring. Recognition merely validates the process but does not secure the result. In Mega Newco, despite the promise of the transatlantic restructuring route, the COMI tourism dream ended in a nightmare as the English subsidiary incorporated for the restructuring ended up in liquidation. The promise of an alternative restructuring route to Chapter 11 – on its face providing more flexibility and greater optionality – will not overcome the stark reality of a failing business, where financial distress may be endemic. In some cases, liquidation ultimately may be a better option rather than delaying the inevitable through “pie in the sky” creative forum shopping.
In conclusion, while the UK restructuring plan/Chapter 15 recognition pathway is rightly regarded as a flexible and broad-based restructuring tool that can be added to the armoury of US debtors, it is not a panacea. The enforcement and recognition risks involved may, in some cases, require debtors in appropriate cases to go back to the drawing board by modifying the scope of the contemplated restructuring and pursuing a Chapter 11 route after all. Bespoke, tailored advice will be essential in selecting the correct pathway for a debtor’s specific circumstances.
Footnotes
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Harrington v Purdue Pharma L.P., 603 U.S. 204 (2024).
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In re Fossil (UK) Global Services Ltd., Case No. 25-90525 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Nov 12, 2025).
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In re NFE Global Holdings Ltd., Case No. 26-11268 (MG), (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2026).
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In re Mega Newco Ltd., Case No. 24-12031 (MEW) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2025).
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Re AGPS Bondco Plc [2024] EWCA Civ 24.
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In the matter of Petrofac Limited and Petrofac International (UAE) LLC [2025] EWCA Civ 821.
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Kington S.A.R.L. & Ors v Thames Water Utilities Holdings Limited & Anor [2025] EWCA Civ 475.
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Re Fossil (UK) Global Services Ltd [2025] EWCH 3058 (Ch).
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Idem, para 52.
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In re Fossil (UK) Global Services Ltd., No. 25-90525 (Bankr. S.D. Tex).
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Re NFE Global Holdings Limited [2026] EWHC 1620 (Ch).
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In re NFE Global Holdings Ltd., Case No. 26-11268 (MG), (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2026), 3.
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Idem, 48.
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Ibid.
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Ibid.
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Idem, 49.
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Idem, 51.
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Ibid, referring to In re Atlas Shipping A/S, 404 B.R., 740.
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Idem, 39.
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Idem, 38.
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In re Mega Newco Ltd., Case No. 24-12031 (MEW) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2025), 6.
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Ibid.
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Idem, 6-7.
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Idem, 2.
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Idem, 9.
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In re Iovate Health Sciences International Inc.] (Case No. 25-11958),