I. Introduction

Under Chapter 15 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, a foreign debtor, trustee, liquidator, or similar person (i.e., a “foreign representative”) may obtain recognition of a foreign bankruptcy, insolvency, liquidation, or restructuring proceeding (i.e., a “foreign proceeding”). Upon recognition, a foreign representative will generally be able to obtain a host of relief from a US court to “aid” the foreign proceeding, including a stay of actions against the debtor or its assets in the US, turnover of assets, discovery, and orders enforcing foreign court’s orders or a foreign restructuring plan in the US.

In 2025, there were 58 new Chapter 15 cases filed (after factoring in cases that were jointly consolidated for procedural purposes). These Chapter 15 cases were filed in connection with foreign proceedings pending in: Australia (2), Austria (1), Bermuda (2), Brazil (8), British Virgin Islands (2), Canada (20), Cayman Islands (6), England (2), France (1), Germany (1), Hong Kong (1), Korea (1), Luxembourg (1), Malta (1), Mauritius (1), Mexico (1), New Zealand (1), Panama (1), Peru (1), Singapore (1), Sweden (1), Switzerland (1), and the United Kingdom (1). The majority of the Chapter 15 cases were filed in the Southern District of New York (20) and the District of Delaware (12). The remaining 26 cases were filed across thirteen other districts.

This article highlights some of the significant decisions issued in 2025:

  • First, we discuss the Delaware and New York bankruptcy courts’ decisions enforcing nonconsensual third-party releases in Chapter 15 cases.
  • We then discuss three decisions in which bankruptcy courts concluded that US companies may have the center of their main interests in Canada.
  • We turn next to a New York bankruptcy court’s decision recognizing a Brazilian restructuring proceeding after finding that the Dutch and Spanish members of a Brazilian group had their center of main interests in Brazil.
  • We then discuss a Texas court’s decision denying recognition to a Maltese liquidation after finding that the debtor lacked sufficient connections to Malta.
  • Next, we describe a New York bankruptcy court’s consideration of a proposal by a newly formed company to enforce an English restructuring of New York law governed notes issued by its Mexican parent company under Chapter 15 in the US.
  • We also discuss a decision that analyzes the scope of the public policy exception to Chapter 15 relief.
  • Finally, we discuss the New York bankruptcy court’s decision elaborating on the standard for terminating Chapter 15 recognition.

US Courts may enforce foreign third-party releases under Chapter 15

In June 2024, the US Supreme Court held that Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code does not currently permit nonconsensual releases of claims by creditors of a debtor against a non-debtor outside of the asbestos context. Foreign laws, however, may permit these so called “third-party releases” against non-debtors. Prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling, US bankruptcy courts generally enforced such foreign third-party releases under Chapter 15. Following the Supreme Court’s ruling, there was some question as to whether US courts would continue to enforce foreign third-party releases. In 2025, two bankruptcy courts issued decisions distinguishing their authority to enforce foreign third-party releases under Chapter 15 from the limitations imposed under Chapter 11.

In a matter of first impression, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware held that a US court may enforce nonconsensual third-party releases contained in a foreign restructuring plan under Chapter 15. In re Crédito Real, S.A.B. de C.V., SOFOM, E.N.R., 670 B.R. 150 (Bankr. D. Del. 2025). Following a liquidity crisis and competing liquidation and bankruptcy proceedings in Mexico and the US, Crédito Real, S.A.B. de C.V., SOFOM, E.N.R., its Mexican liquidator, and an ad hoc group of unsecured creditors entered into a restructuring support agreement, pursuant to which Crédito Real would restructure its liabilities through a Mexican concurso plan.

The Concurso Plan provided for, among other things, the monetization of Crédito Real’s assets and the distribution of proceeds to creditors in accordance with the priority scheme set forth under Mexican law. In addition, the Concurso Plan contained exculpatory and release provisions that protected certain parties that played a role in negotiating the restructuring, including Crédito Real’s former directors and officers, the ad hoc group, the indenture trustee for certain notes, and the Mexican liquidator.

Having obtained the requisite votes from creditors in favor of the Concurso Plan, Crédito Real submitted the plan to the Mexican court for approval. Over the objection of the United States International Development Finance Corporation (“DFC”), the Mexican court approved the plan. Thereafter, Crédito Real’s foreign representative filed a petition under Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code with the Delaware Bankruptcy Court seeking recognition of the Mexican proceeding and an order enforcing the Concurso Plan, including the releases.

The Delaware court, noting that the request for recognition of the Mexican proceeding was unopposed, summarily granted the request for recognition of the proceeding, finding that the foreign representative had satisfied all of the Chapter 15 recognition requirements. However, the DFC objected to the request to enforce the plan in the US on two principal grounds.

First, according to the DFC, the nonconsensual release of non-debtors as provided in the Concurso Plan is not authorized under either section 1507 or section 1521 of the Bankruptcy Code, which are the two sections that govern relief after recognition. In particular, those sections authorize relief concerning a debtor and its relationship to its creditors. They do not, according to DFC, address a third party’s relationship with a creditor and thus, would not be the basis of enforcing a nonconsensual release under Chapter 15. Second, according to the DFC, the nonconsensual release was “manifestly contrary” to US public policy and thus should not be approved under the Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy court rejected both arguments.

The bankruptcy court noted that section 1521 permits a court, upon recognition of a foreign proceeding, to grant “any appropriate relief, including” seven specific examples. Given that the examples followed the word “including,” the court found that the list was illustrative and not exhaustive. Thus, the absence of nonconsensual releases from the list was not dispositive. The court further noted that section 1521(a)(7) expressly allows a court to grant any “additional relief that may be available to a trustee” with limited exceptions. Therefore, the court was not limited to relief concerning a debtor and its relationship to its creditors, as argued by DFC and could grant relief available to a trustee: “By establishing boundaries, Congress allowed relief that does not exceed those boundaries.” As the exceptions mentioned in section 1521(a)(7) do not include nonconsensual third-party releases and given existing precedent authorizing nonconsensual releases in Chapter 15 cases, the US court concluded that section 1521 authorized the enforcement of such releases.

The US court further noted that section 1507(a) of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes a court to grant “additional assistance to a foreign representative.” In general, relief under section 1507 must be “consistent with principles of comity” that would satisfy certain factors set forth in section 1507(b) including: (1) just treatment of creditors, (2) protection of US creditors against prejudice and inconvenience, (3) prevention of preferential or fraudulent transfers, and (4) distributions of proceeds of a debtor’s property substantially in accordance with the priority scheme set forth in the US Bankruptcy Code. By including these factors, “Congress again established boundaries for court in granting relief under chapter 15 and directed courts on how to determine if it is appropriate to grant relief.” Such boundaries were not limited to the debtor or its relationship to its creditors. Moreover, it was not limited to relief available in a US bankruptcy case. Because the Mexican proceeding satisfied the applicable factors set forth in section 1507(b) and enforcement was consistent with principles of international comity, the court held that it had authority to enforce the nonconsensual releases under section 1507.

Section 1506 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a court may refuse to take any action that “would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of the United States.” According to the US court, despite the Supreme Court’s prohibition of nonconsensual releases in Chapter 11 cases, the enforcement of nonconsensual releases in a Chapter 15 case is not manifestly contrary to US public policy. The public policy exception is narrow and only applies where the (1) “the procedural fairness of the foreign proceeding is in doubt or cannot be cured by the adoption of additional protections,” or (2) “recognition would impinge severely a U.S. constitutional or statutory right.” Here, neither the Mexican proceeding nor the plan implicated either concern.

As US courts have frequently done, the court concluded that the Mexican proceeding offered a full and fair process before a court of competent jurisdiction “under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice between the citizens of its own country and those of other countries.” In addition, it concluded that Mexican law provides for due process and an opportunity for creditors to object to a plan. Here, the bankruptcy court found that the DFC actively participated in the Mexican proceeding where it objected to the plan. Given that the releases were permissible under Mexican law and the product of arms’ length negotiations among the debtor and stakeholders, including creditors, and that the plan was approved by the requisite majorities of creditors in a process that provided creditors with an opportunity to be heard, the court concluded that the Mexican proceeding was procedurally fair.

In addition, the US bankruptcy court concluded that the releases did not impinge on any fundamental US constitutional or statutory right. While the Supreme Court has held that the Bankruptcy Code does not currently authorize nonconsensual third-party releases in Chapter 11 cases, Congress has expressly permitted them in the asbestos context and may later permit them in other contexts. Therefore, it cannot be said that enforcing a nonconsensual release would be manifestly contrary to US public policy. “Lack of specific availability in U.S. courts does not equate to manifest contrariness to U.S. public policy, especially where, as here, the contested relief is available in other contexts and could be made available more broadly by a simple act of Congress.” Accordingly, the Delaware bankruptcy court issued an order enforcing the Mexican concurso plan, including the nonconsensual third-party releases in the US. On March 31, 2026, the United States District Court for the District of Delaware affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision concluding that “[i]t is well settled that U.S. bankruptcy courts can give effect to foreign orders in recognized foreign proceedings pursuant to the authority granted in Chapter 15, even when those orders contain relief unavailable under U.S. law.”.

Shortly after the Crédito Real decision, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York issued a similar ruling in the Chapter 15 case of In re Odebrecht Engenharia e Construção S.A. - Em Recuperação Judicial, 669 B.R. 457 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2025). In June 2024, following two prior restructurings, a subset of the OEC Group, one of the largest construction companies in the world, filed a Brazilian recuperação judicial (“RJ”) proceeding to implement a comprehensive restructuring of the OEC Group’s liabilities under a Brazilian plan of reorganization.

Following a “resounding vote in favor of the RJ Plan,” a Brazilian court approved the RJ Plan, which provided, among other things, that the payment under the plan would result in a discharge of certain claims against the OEC debtors and their officers, directors, agents, employees and representatives. Thereafter the debtors filed a Chapter 15 petition seeking recognition of the RJ proceeding and an order enforcing the RJ plan with the New York bankruptcy court. The Office of the United States Trustee objected to the proposed order enforcing the RJ plan on the basis that, among other things, it contained “impermissible nonconsensual third-party releases.”

In particular, the UST argued that the provision in the proposed Chapter 15 order that enjoined all persons and entities from “taking any action … that is inconsistent with, in contravention with, or would interfere with or impede the administration, implementation and/or consummation of the RJ Plan, the Brazilian Confirmation Order or the terms of this Order” was an impermissible nonconsensual third-party release. The bankruptcy court questioned whether the provision was a third-party release at all because the third parties were identified “on the plaintiff’s side of the ‘v.’” and not necessarily protected by the injunction. However, assuming the provision was a third-party release, the court, citing the Crédito Real decision and existing precedent under Chapter 15 and its predecessor, former section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code, found that it could issue such a release under Chapter 15.

Unlike in the Crédito Real case, there was no third-party release in the RJ Plan or in the Brazilian order confirming the RJ plan. The purported release was contained in the Chapter 15 order enforcing the RJ Plan in the US. The court explained that there is no “meaningful difference” between enforcing a foreign plan that contains a third-party release and issuing a recognition order that includes such a release: As long as statutory requirements of section 1507 or 1521 were satisfied, the court could grant the release unless doing so would be manifestly contrary to US public policy.

The court was satisfied that the statutory requirements discussed in Crédito Real were also satisfied in this case. In particular, the third-party release would enable the distribution of the OEC debtor’s estates under the RJ Plan in a manner that enabled the just treatment of all creditors substantially in accordance with US law. Moreover, for the same reasons as discussed in Crédito Real, third-party releases were not manifestly contrary to US public policy. Indeed, the bankruptcy court noted that US courts have historically enforced non-consensual third-party releases in support of a foreign restructuring plan under Chapter 15 and its predecessor. Therefore, the bankruptcy court concluded that it could issue an order effectively enjoining creditors on a nonconsensual basis from taking actions against non-debtors in the US even where the foreign plan did not contain such a nonconsensual release or injunction.

In 2025, other courts similarly extended comity to foreign third-party releases. However, many of those requests were unopposed and did not result in a written opinion. For example, the US Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas extended comity to the third-party releases provided in the UK Restructuring Plan of Fossil (UK) Global Services. Consequently, it appears that, at least for the time being, nonconsensual third-party releases are available in the US under Chapter 15.

II. Court finds that US companies can have their center of main interests in Canada

Under Chapter 15, a US bankruptcy court may recognize a foreign proceeding only if it is a “foreign main proceeding” or a “foreign nonmain proceeding.” A foreign main proceeding is a foreign proceeding pending in the country where the debtor has the center of its main interests or “COMI.” Chapter 15 does not define a debtor’s COMI, but it provides a rebuttable presumption that a debtor’s registered office is its COMI. A foreign nonmain proceeding is one pending in a country where the debtor has an “establishment,” which is defined as “any place of operations where the debtor carries out a non-transitory economic activity.” Courts will generally determine a debtor’s COMI (or establishment) as of the Chapter 15 petition date. In 2025, there were several instances in which a US court concluded that the COMI of a US company was or likely was in Canada.

Prior to the hearing on its petitions for recognition of Canadian receivership proceedings, the foreign representative of Giftcraft Ltd. and its affiliates asked the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District Court of New York for provisional relief, among other things, staying actions against certain of Giftcraft debtors, some of which were incorporated in the US, and their assets in the US. The Office of the United States Trustee opposed the request as to the US debtors. According to the UST, the US debtors did not have their COMI or an establishment in Canada and therefore they were not entitled to relief under Chapter 15. Instead, the UST argued that the debtors should pursue relief under either Chapter 7 or 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. The New York court disagreed with the UST and concluded that the US debtors likely had their COMI in Canada and granted the provisional relief over the UST’s objection. In re Giftcraft, Case No. 25-11030 (MG), 2025 WL 1583480 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2025).

Section 1519(a) of the Bankruptcy Code permits a bankruptcy court to grant “relief [that] is urgently needed to protect the assets of the debtor or the interests of creditors.” Such provisional relief is typically subject to traditional injunction standards. Under the traditional injunction standards, a court may grant a provisional stay in a Chapter 15 case if: (i) there is a likelihood of success on the petition for recognition; (ii) there will be “imminent irreparable harm” to the debtor if provisional relief is not granted; (iii) the “balance of harms” tips in favor of the movant; and (iv) “public interest” weighs in favor of granting provisional relief. Further, a court may grant relief under section 1519 “only if the interests of the creditors and other interested entities, including the debtor, are sufficiently protected” as required by section 1522 of the Bankruptcy Code.

The court granted provisional relief to the debtors that requested the relief, including the US debtors, finding that they had satisfied the traditional injunction standards. First, the court determined that the foreign representative was likely to obtain recognition of the receivership as a “foreign main proceeding.” The court noted that the receivership proceeding “is a judicial proceeding overseen by a foreign (Canadian) court, authorized under various relevant Canadian statutes, including the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Courts of Justice Act, and pursuant to which the receiver has been provided the ‘authority to operate or manage the debtor’s business in place of the existing management,’ and potentially also ‘shut down the business’ or sell the assets and custody of the debtor,” and was therefore a foreign proceeding as defined under the Bankruptcy Code. Moreover, each of the debtors, including the US debtors, had their COMI in Canada. Giftcraft Canada was registered in Canada and thus, its COMI was presumed to be Canada. All employees of Giftcraft Canada were Canadian, further supporting a finding of COMI in Canada. The other three Giftcraft debtors were incorporated in the US. However, the evidence supported finding Canada to be their COMI.

The order appointing the receiver, who was based in Canada, provided that they were “vested with all property, assets, and undertakings of [the US debtors] with broad power and authority over such assets and the management and operation of [the US debtors’] business.” According to the court, the restructuring activities of the receiver suggested that the US debtor’s COMI was Canada as of the time of the filing of the Chapter 15 petitions. Therefore, the court found that the foreign representative would likely succeed on the merits of the petition for recognition of the Canadian proceedings as foreign main proceedings.

The court noted that irreparable harm will typically occur in cross-border insolvencies “where local actions could hinder the orderly process of a foreign proceeding and the goal of the fair distribution of assets.” The presence of assets and creditors in the US and a legal demand by one creditor was sufficient to establish “irreparable harm” that could diminish the debtors’ value to the detriment of creditors. The court further found that the “balance of harms” favored the Giftcraft debtors, and that provisional relief would be in the “public interest” because it would redound to the benefit of US creditors by maximizing assets for distribution “minimiz[ing] interjurisdictional inconsistencies.”

In so ruling, the court rejected the UST’s allusion to the similarities between the Giftcraft case and last year’s decision by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware in In re Black Press Ltd. et al. (Case No. 24-10044) (Bankr. D. Del., Feb. 8, 2024), where the Delaware court declined to find that the US-based debtors had their COMI in Canada. The Giftcraft court noted that unlike the Giftcraft debtors, the Black Press US-based debtors operated “independently” of the Canadian debtors. Shortly after granting provisional relief in Giftcraft, the court granted recognition to the receiverships as foreign main proceedings, finding that the US debtors’ COMI was indeed Canada.

Approximately three months after the court granted recognition to the Giftcraft debtors’ receiverships as foreign main proceedings, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York granted provisional relief to another group of debtors, including US companies, finding that it was likely that each of the debtors had their COMI in Canada and thus that their Canadian proceedings would likely be recognized as foreign main proceedings. In re Iovate Health Sciences Int’l Inc., 673 B.R. 516 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2025). The Iovate court observed that “[t]his is the third recent Chapter 15 case before this Court in recent months which has involved Canadian entities in a Canadian insolvency proceeding where one of the entities in the debtor group was an American corporation and the Court determined that COMI of the American companies were in Canada.”

Iovate Health Sciences International Inc. and its affiliates, Northern Innovations Holding Corp. and Iovate Health Sciences USA Inc., commenced restructuring proceedings in Canada under Canada’s Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and filed Chapter 15 petitions seeking recognition of the Canadian proceedings as foreign main proceedings. Two of the debtors were registered in Canada. Iovate Health Sciences USA was registered in the US. In addition, the Iovate debtors requested provisional relief in the form of a stay of actions against the debtors and their assets in the US pending the hearing on recognition. The request was unopposed. Nevertheless, as it did in Giftcraft, the court applied the traditional injunctive standards in determining whether to grant the relief.

In this instance, the court was satisfied that the debtors would succeed on the merits of their petitions for recognition of the Canadian proceedings:

First, the court found that each of the Iovate debtors was eligible to be a debtor under section 109(a) the Bankruptcy Code which, according to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, is a prerequisite to recognition of a foreign proceeding under Chapter 15. See Drawbridge Special Opportunities Fund LP v. Barnet (In re Barnet), 737 F.3d 238, 247 (2d Cir. 2013).1 All of them had property in the US in the form of a retainer with their New York-based counsel, which courts have routinely held is sufficient to satisfy section 109(a)’s eligibility requirement. Moreover, Iovate USA also had funds in a separate account in a New York bank, which further supported its eligibility as a debtor.

Second, according to the court, the Canadian proceeding under Canada’s Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act “is a judicial proceeding overseen by a foreign (Canadian) court, authorized under various relevant Canadian insolvency statutes, including the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, which is collective in nature, and subjects the Debtors’ assets and affairs to the supervision of the foreign court” and is likely a foreign proceeding as defined under the Bankruptcy Code.

Third, each of the debtors had their COMI in Canada. Two of the three debtors were registered in Canada. Thus, their COMI was presumed to be Canada, and there were no facts that rebutted the presumption. The third debtor, Iovate USA, was incorporated in Delaware, and thus its COMI was presumed to be the US. However, the evidence demonstrated that its COMI was likely Canada. In particular, Iovate USA was “run out of Ontario, along with the rest of the Iovate group,” and the Iovate debtors “share management, headquarters, and accounting/finance/HR functions, all of which occur in Canada.” Thus, it was likely that Iovate USA’s Canadian proceeding would be recognized as a foreign main proceeding. As in Giftcraft, the court concluded that there was a significant risk of irreparable harm resulting from creditor enforcement action absent provisional relief. Further, according to the court, the balance of harms and public interest favored granting provisional relief because the relief sought protected the debtors’ estates and benefitted creditors by preserving the value of the debtors’ estates and facilitating cooperation with the Canadian court. Accordingly, the court granted provisional relief. Weeks later, the court granted recognition to the Canadian proceedings as foreign main proceedings.

In 2025, other courts similarly recognized Canadian proceedings involving US companies, finding that their COMI was in Canada. For example, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York overruled the UST’s objection and recognized the Canadian restructuring proceedings of three US companies as foreign main proceedings, finding that each of their COMIs were in Canada. In re Li-Cycle Holdings, Case No. 25-10991-pb, Oral Bench Ruling (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 25, 2025) (Dkt. No. 114). In coming to this conclusion, the court noted that the US debtors had no US operations as of the petition date. According to the court, the debtors’ only activity was to participate in the Canadian proceeding, which included managing a sale process and raising post-petition financing. Moreover, the US debtors were managed by the officers and board of the Canadian debtor, which were almost entirely located in Canada. Li-Cycle (transcript filed at Dkt. No. 122).

III. Court finds the COMI of spanish and dutch companies to be in Brazil

InterCement Brasil S.A. and certain affiliates filed Brazilian recuperação judicial (“RJ”) proceedings to restructure certain liabilities, including notes issued by InterCement Financial Operations B.V., a special purpose financing vehicle incorporated in the Netherlands. Thereafter, the debtors, including the Dutch special purpose financing vehicle and InterCement Trading e Inversiones S.A., a company incorporated in Spain, filed Chapter 15 petitions with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, seeking recognition of the RJ proceedings as foreign main proceedings. The bankruptcy court granted recognition over the objection of certain noteholders, finding that the COMI of the debtors, including the Dutch and Spanish companies, was Brazil. Intercement Brasil S.A., 668 B.R. 802 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2025).

The court noted that the COMI of the Dutch entity was presumed to be the Netherlands. Moreover, there were facts that would support finding the COMI somewhere other than Brazil. For example, the Dutch entity held board meetings in the Netherlands, it almost exclusively engaged with Dutch contractors, and it had minimal connections to Brazil. However, the court emphasized that where “a debtor is a special purpose financing vehicle (SPV) with no operations other than managing relationships with creditors and paying off obligations on behalf of a larger corporate parent, the debtor’s COMI should be determined by the location of the corporate nerve center.” In addition, the Dutch entity’s activities prior to the Chapter 15 filing date bolstered the court’s conclusion that the Dutch entity’s COMI as of the filing date was Brazil. In particular, as of that date, the Dutch entity’s activities were limited to repayment of the notes, which entailed participating in a prior restructuring proceeding and meditation in Brazil. In contrast, there were “no restructuring activities with the capacity to materially impact [the Dutch entity’s] ability to conduct its business operations occurred in the Netherlands during this timeframe.” Thus, according to the court, the Dutch entity’s active participation in Brazil established “conclusively” that Brazil was its COMI as of the Chapter 15 filing date.

The court reached the same conclusion regarding the Spanish entity on similar grounds. The court noted that the Spanish entity guaranteed debentures issued by two debtor affiliates. Consequently, its primary business activity at the time of the Chapter 15 filing was restructuring its obligations under the debentures, “which predominantly occurred in Brazil.” In particular, the Spanish entity actively participated in a prior restructuring proceeding and meditation in Brazil. Despite its COMI being presumed to be Spain, the court concluded that the factual circumstances were sufficient to rebut the presumption and demonstrated that the Spanish entity’s COMI was Brazil.

IV. Bankruptcy Court denies recognition to maltese foreign proceeding

Geden Holdings, Ltd., a Malta registered shipping company, was the target of a “windup application” by certain creditors in Malta. Upon that application, a Maltese court ordered the dissolution and winding up of Geden and appointed a liquidator for Geden in 2017. Approximately a year later, the liquidator resigned from his position with the Maltese court’s approval. In 2023, the Maltese court appointed a second liquidator for Geden, who thereafter filed a Chapter 15 petition for recognition of the Maltese liquidation with United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas.

A creditor objected, arguing that the liquidator failed to show that Geden’s COMI was Malta. The bankruptcy court ultimately denied the Chapter 15 petition, finding that the liquidator failed to demonstrate that Geden had its COMI or an establishment in Malta as of the filing of the Chapter 15 petition. In re Geden Holdings, Ltd., Case No. 25090138, 2025 WL 2484883 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Aug. 28. 2025).

The court began its analysis by noting that it was undisputed that (1) the Maltese proceeding was a “foreign proceeding,” (2) the liquidator was a “foreign representative,” and (3) all of the procedural requirements for recognition had been satisfied. The only issue to determine was whether the Maltese proceeding was a “foreign main proceeding” or a “foreign nonmain proceeding,” which would require it to determine whether the debtor had its COMI or an establishment in Malta, respectively.

Geden was registered in Malta. Thus, Malta was presumed to be Geden’s COMI. However, “Geden’s complicated operational history” prevented the court from relying on the presumption. Instead, the court had to examine the relevant facts. According to the court, the determination must be made as of the petition date for the Chapter 15 case, and that “consideration of Geden’s entire operational history and/or COMI determination based on the date of the initiation of the Maltese Proceeding is not the proper inquiry for the Court.” Because Geden had essentially ceased operating in 2017, the only operations that could reasonably make Malta Geden’s COMI would be the actions of the Second Liquidator, who worked in Malta.

The Court reviewed the factual record and determined that the Second Liquidator had not engaged in enough “material activities” to establish Geden’s COMI in Malta. Indeed, the majority of the liquidator’s activities appeared to be focused on litigation in the US. He did not, for example, pay taxes on behalf of Geden in Malta, convene meetings of Geden’s creditors in Malta, or contact any of Geden’s former directors or officers in Malta. In sum, the liquidator’s activities in Malta were insufficient to demonstrate that Malta was Geden’s COMI, and therefore the proceeding could not be recognized as a foreign main proceeding.

In addition, there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate that Geden had an establishment in Malta. There was no evidence that Geden had a place of operations or was conducting any business in Malta as of the Chapter 15 Petition Date. The court noted that the definition of an establishment required a “showing of a local effect on the marketplace, more than mere incorporation and record-keeping and more than just the maintenance of property.” Here, the liquidator had failed to make such a showing. Therefore, the Maltese proceeding could not be recognized as a foreign nonmain proceeding.

V. US Court enforces UK restructuring of US notes issued by a mexican company

Facing a novel structure, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York recognized an English proceeding of a company formed for the purpose of restructuring the debts of its Mexican parent as a foreign main proceeding and issued an order enforcing its scheme of arrangement in the US. In re Mega Newco Ltd., Case No. 24-12031(MEW), 2025 WL 601463 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2025). However, the New York court expressed serious concerns that this structure could be abused in future cases.

Operadora de Servicios Mega, S.A. De C.V., SOFOM, E.R. (“Parent”), a financial services company incorporated and based in Mexico, issued certain notes governed under New York law. Facing liquidity concerns, Parent had to restructure its obligations, including the New York notes. However, Parent could not restructure the New York notes outside of a bankruptcy case without the unanimous consent of all of the holders, which was not possible given that Parent could not negotiate with some of the holders who were subject to sanctions by the US, EU, UK, or individual EU member states.

Parent created Mega New Limited (“Newco”), a wholly owned subsidiary incorporated under the laws of England and Wales, which agreed to become an obligor under the New York notes. Newco thereafter proposed a scheme of arrangement under English law, pursuant to which holders of the New York notes would receive either cash payments from Parent or equity in the Parent in exchange for the New York notes. Holders that were entitled to vote on the scheme unanimously approved its terms, including releases against Parent, and the English court issued an order sanctioning the scheme. Newco effectively conducted a “surgical restructuring” of the New York notes where a traditional bankruptcy case of the Parent would require a court to address all of the Parent’s assets and liabilities.

Newco filed a Chapter 15 petition with the New York bankruptcy court, requesting an order granting recognition to the English proceeding and an order enforcing the scheme in the US. The New York court noted that Newco had only engaged in restructuring activities and those were conducted in England. However, those activities were insufficient to find that Newco had an establishment in England, which is a prerequisite to concluding that the English proceeding was a foreign nonmain proceeding.

According to the court, restructuring activities alone are insufficient to demonstrate that a debtor has an establishment. “If restructuring activities alone were sufficient, then any proceeding in which a debtor sought relief would automatically qualify as a ‘foreign nonmain proceeding,’ and the requirement of an ‘establishment’ would be deprived of any meaning.” Instead, the New York court found that Newco’s COMI was in England. The court noted that Newco was registered in England and therefore its COMI was presumed to be in England. Moreover, there was no evidence to rebut the presumption. Indeed, all of Newco’s activities were conducted in England, which supported the conclusion that its COMI was England. Therefore, the court granted recognition to the English proceeding as a foreign main proceeding.

In coming to its conclusion, the court noted that Newco and the structure were created to permit the restructuring of the New York notes issued by the Parent, which was not party to the English proceeding. Moreover, the Parent’s COMI was Mexico and not England. However, the New York court was willing to recognize the English proceeding and enforce the English scheme because it would “enable a broader restructuring” and “enhance all parties’ recoveries.” The court nevertheless cautioned that similar structures could potentially be used to frustrate the legitimate expectations of creditors. In this case, there was no evidence of impropriety. Instead, it appeared that the English proceeding and the scheme were pursued for “laudable objectives.”

Critically, no creditor objected to recognition of the English proceeding or enforcement of the scheme. Accordingly, the court concluded, it would be “absurd” for it to “thwart creditors’ constructive desires and expectations” by denying Newco’s request. Ultimately, the court issued an order granting recognition to the English proceeding and enforcing the scheme in the US.

VI. Court elaborates on public policy exception

Under Chapter 15, a foreign proceeding shall be recognized if: (1) the foreign proceeding is a foreign main or foreign non-main proceeding, (2) the petition for recognition was filed by a foreign representative, and (3) the petition satisfies certain procedural requirements. If all three criteria are satisfied, recognition should be denied only if it would be “manifestly contrary to the public policy of the United States.” Last year, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York affirmed a bankruptcy court’s decision granting recognition to a Cayman proceeding and overruling an objection premised on violations of US public policy. Winczura v. Scott (In re Canterbury Securities, Ltd.), Case No. 25 Civ. 2502, 2025 WL 3227681 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2025).

Canterbury was an investment firm that became the subject of liquidation proceedings in the Cayman Islands. Following their appointment, the liquidators of Canterbury obtained certain orders and judgments, including a freezing order and a default judgment, against the debtor’s founder and former owner. Thereafter, the liquidators filed a petition under Chapter 15 for an order granting recognition to the Cayman liquidation as a foreign main proceeding with the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. In addition, the liquidators requested orders enforcing the freezing order and authorizing discovery from the founder and former director in the US. The bankruptcy court granted the relief over the objection of the founder/former director, who appealed to the district court. The former director argued that section 1506 of the Bankruptcy Code required that the court deny the relief requested because granting the relief would bless a “massive fraud,” which itself would be manifestly contrary to US public policy.

According to the district court, section 1506 requires a court to analyze whether (1) “the foreign proceeding was procedurally unfair,” and (2) “the application of foreign law or the recognition of a foreign main proceeding under Chapter 15 would severely impinge the value and import of a U.S. statutory or constitutional right, such that granting comity would severely hinder United States bankruptcy courts’ abilities to carry out the most fundamental policies and purposes of these rights.” Here, there was no evidence that recognition or the relief requested was manifestly contrary to US public policy.

According to the district court, a foreign proceeding would be procedurally fair as long as it met “fundamental standards of fairness.” There is no requirement that a foreign proceeding be conducted exactly like a US proceeding. Here, there was no doubt that the Cayman proceedings were procedurally fair. For years, the founder had an opportunity to (and actually did) participate and be heard in the Cayman proceedings. Moreover, “the sophistication of the Cayman legal system reinforced the finding of procedural regularity.” Indeed, the founder did not challenge the procedural fairness of the Cayman proceedings.

The founder argued that granting the relief requested would be manifestly contrary to US public policy by enabling money laundering and market manipulation. According to the founder, the Cayman court incorrectly ignored the evidence of another entity’s securities fraud in issuing certain orders, which the foreign representative was asking the US court to enforce under Chapter 15. By enforcing the Cayman orders, the US court would be assisting the foreign representative in violating US anti-money laundering laws by allowing the distribution of the product of securities fraud to creditors. The district court rejected such a broad reading of § 1506, characterizing the objection as an impermissible collateral attack on the Cayman court’s judgment. The court emphasized that the founder’s recourse was in the Cayman courts. Accordingly, the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s recognition of the Cayman proceedings and emphasized that the public policy exception set forth in § 1506 is limited to “exceptional circumstances concerning matters of fundamental importance for the United States.”

VII. US Court elaborates on standards for terminating recognition

Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code anticipates that the status of the ancillary foreign proceeding may change during the pendency of a Chapter 15 case. For example, section 1508 of the Bankruptcy Code requires a foreign representative to promptly notify the US bankruptcy court of “any substantial change in the status of such foreign proceeding.” Moreover, section 1517(d) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that recognition may be modified or terminated if the basis for granting recognition has “ceased to exist.” In 2025, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York denied a foreign representative’s request to terminate recognition finding that the status of the foreign proceeding had not changed sufficiently to justify termination of recognition. In re Oi S.A., 674 B.R. 175 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2025).

Oi S.A. and its affiliates, which operate primarily in Brazil, are one of the world’s largest telecommunications services companies. In 2016, certain members of the Oi Group filed their first Brazilian recuperação judicial (“RJ”) proceeding that resulted in a confirmed RJ plan to restructure certain liabilities in 2018. The Oi Group also filed an ancillary Chapter 15 case in which the court issued an order enforcing its RJ plan in the US. Following confirmation of that plan, the Oi Group continued to face financial distress and filed a second RJ proceeding in Brazil and a second Chapter 15 case in New York in 2023. The first Chapter 15 case was closed at the time of the filing of the second case. The second RJ proceeding resulted in another RJ plan, which the NY bankruptcy court also enforced under Chapter 15 after recognizing the second RJ proceeding as a foreign main proceeding, finding that each of the Chapter 15 debtors had its COMI in Brazil.

Following confirmation of the second RJ plan, the Oi Group continued to face liquidity constraints and could not meet all its debt obligations as they became due. The Oi Group explored different amendments to the RJ plan, but they were insufficient to address the group’s outstanding obligations. Further, the Oi Group was prohibited by Brazilian law from filing a new RJ proceeding for five years following confirmation of the second RJ plan, which prevented it from achieving a comprehensive restructuring under Brazilian law. According to the Oi Group, its only remaining option in Brazil was to convert the RJ proceeding to a falêmcia (i.e., liquidation), but that would be “value-destructive and lead to job losses.” As such, the Oi Group was considering restructuring under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. However, section 1528 of the Bankruptcy Code restricts the effects of a Chapter 11 case commenced after recognition of a foreign main proceeding to the debtor’s assets that are within the territorial jurisdiction of the US. The foreign representative therefore moved to terminate recognition of the RJ proceeding to allow the Oi Group to pursue a global restructuring under Chapter 11 in the US.

According to the foreign representative, recognition should be terminated under section 1517 of the Bankruptcy Code because the reasons for recognition no longer existed and the debtors no longer needed further relief under Chapter 15. In particular, the debts outstanding at the time of recognition had been restructured, and the only purpose of the RJ proceeding was to “supervise” the Oi Group. Further, termination would allow the debtors to reorganize under Chapter 11, and no creditors that relied on recognition would be negatively impacted by termination of recognition. According to the foreign representative, termination would maximize value for all stakeholders by ensuring “a fair and orderly alternative to a liquidation.” Alternatively, the foreign representative argued that the Chapter 15 case should be dismissed under sections 305 or 1521 of the Bankruptcy Code. Dismissal of the Chapter 15 cases would allow the Oi Group to pursue a restructuring under Chapter 11, which, according to the foreign representative, would be in the best interest of creditors and the debtors and would be consistent with the purposes of Chapter 15, including the fair and efficient administration of cross-border insolvencies that protects the interest of all stakeholders.

Two creditors objected to the foreign representative’s request arguing that the grounds for recognition remain and they would be prejudiced by dismissal because they had relied on the New York court’s recognition order when they extended financing to the Oi Group. Moreover, according to the objectors, termination or dismissal would prejudice creditors and offend comity by allowing the Oi Group to file for Chapter 11 and derail the restructuring under the RJ plan. The New York Court disagreed with the foreign representative and refused to terminate recognition or dismiss the Chapter 15 case.

According to the New York court, section 1517(d) of the Bankruptcy Code “is the exclusive standard governing the modification or termination” of recognition and consists of a three-part test. First, a court must consider whether the grounds for recognition are lacking or have ceased to exist. Second, a court must consider what, if any, prejudice will result to parties that have relied upon recognition. Third, a court must consider whether there are any other reasons to refuse to terminate recognition. In this instance,, the foreign representative had failed to demonstrate that it satisfied the first component of section 1517(d) (i.e., that the grounds for recognition have ceased to exist). The court noted that the debtors’ financial condition and the status of the RJ proceeding had changed. However, those changes, including the debtors’ deteriorating liquidity and supervisory role of the Brazilian court in the RJ proceeding, were not sufficient to justify terminating recognition. Because the foreign representative failed to demonstrate that the grounds for granting recognition had ceased to exist, the court did not need to analyze the other components of the test.

The New York court denied the motion to dismiss, finding that there is no statutory authority for dismissing a properly-filed Chapter 15 case. In particular, section 305(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, which allows a court to dismiss or suspend a bankruptcy case if (1) a Chapter 15 petition has been filed and (2) the purposes of Chapter 15 would be best served by such dismissal or suspension, does not allow a court to dismiss or suspend a Chapter 15 case. Instead, section 305(a)(2) allows a court to dismiss or suspend a plenary US bankruptcy case (e.g., a Chapter 11 case) in favor of a foreign bankruptcy case. Further, section 1521, which allows a court to grant “any appropriate relief” after recognition does not contemplate dismissal. Moreover, relief under section 1521 could only be granted “where necessary to effectuate the purpose of [Chapter 15] and to protect the assets of the debtor and the interests of creditors.”

In this instance, dismissal would conflict with the purposes of Chapter 15. Among other things, the New York court noted that the Brazilian court had previously highlighted that the Chapter 15 case was “essential and important” to the RJ plan. Thus, dismissal would not foster cooperation between the courts or the fair and efficient administration of the RJ plan, two of the key purposes of the RJ plan. In addition, there was no certainty that the Oi Group would file Chapter 11 cases in the US, in which case dismissal would not advance the Chapter 15 objectives of protecting and maximizing a debtor’s assets or facilitating the rescue financially troubled business. Thus, the New York denied the motion to dismiss the Chapter 15 case.

VIII. Conclusion

2025 marked the twentieth anniversary of the enactment of Chapter 15. Despite the passage of time, US courts continue to analyze many of the traditional issues that the courts faced at the time of its inception, including matters related to COMI and the scope of the public policy exception. The courts, however, are routinely called upon to address novel issues as is evident from the requests to approve nonconsensual third-party releases in Chapter 15 cases discussed above or to clarify the scope of the section 546(e) safe harbor in Chapter 15 cases (see re Fairfield Sentry Ltd., 147 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 2025), holding that section 546(e) applies extraterritorially in Chapter 15 cases). Only time will tell what interesting issues the courts will encounter this year in the Chapter 15 context.

Footnotes

  1. 1

    Section 109(a) states that “only a person that resides or has a domicile, a place of business, or property in the United States. . . may be a debtor” in a US bankruptcy case. 11 U.S.C. § 109(a).

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