This article was co-authored by Samuel Milross-Rose
Summary
On 7 October 2026, the High Court handed down its decision in MACH Energy Australia Pty Ltd v Denman Aberdeen Muswellbrook Scone Healthy Environment Group Inc [2026] HCA 35 (MACH Energy Decision). This is the High Court’s first substantive climate change decision.
By a 3:2 majority, the High Court dismissed MACH Energy’s appeal and held the Independent Planning Commission’s consent to the expansion of the Mount Pleasant coal mine in the Upper Hunter Valley was invalid.MACH Energy Decision at [206] (Gordon J); [260] (Edelman J); [320]–[321] (Beech-Jones J).
The decision did not turn on whether consent authorities must consider the local impacts of climate change. The Court unanimously rejected the NSW Court of Appeal’s reasoning on that point. Instead, the majority held that the Independent Planning Commission failed to consider whether to impose conditions to minimise the project’s Scope 3 greenhouse gas emissions “to the greatest extent practicable”, as required by the State Environmental Planning Policy (Resources and Energy) 2021 (NSW) (Resources SEPP). Those emissions were projected to make up 98 per cent of the project’s total emissions.MACH Energy Decision at [169] (Gordon J); [215] (Edelman J); [318] (Beech-Jones J).
This decision has significant implications for proponents of, and consent authorities assessing, mining, petroleum and extractive industry developments in NSW.
Background
MACH Energy Australia Pty Ltd (MACH) owns the Mount Pleasant coal mine (Mine). In January 2021, MACH lodged a State significant development application, with an environmental impact statement (EIS), to extend the life of the Mine by 22 years to December 2048 and increase its production from 10.5 to 21 million tonnes of coal per year.MACH Energy Decision at [88]–[89] (Gordon J).
Almost all of the project’s greenhouse gas emissions (860 of 876.07 million tonnes) would be Scope 3 emissions, being emissions from sources not owned or controlled by MACH, principally the burning of the coal by customers in export markets.MACH Energy Decision at [208] (Edelman J).
On 6 September 2022, the Independent Planning Commission of NSW (Commission) granted consent subject to conditions.MACH Energy Decision at [119] (Gordon J). The conditions addressing greenhouse gas emissions were extensive, but they dealt only with Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions. The Commission reasoned that Scope 3 emissions are “appropriately regulated and accounted for through broader national policies and international agreements (such as the Paris Agreement)”.MACH Energy Decision at [122], [132] (Gordon J).
The Denman Aberdeen Muswellbrook Scone Healthy Environment Group Inc (DAMSHEG) sought judicial review of the consent in the Land and Environment Court (LEC). The LEC dismissed their application.MACH Energy Decision at [9] (Gageler CJ and Jagot J).
On appeal, the NSW Court of Appeal (NSWCA) rejected DAMSHEG’s argument that the Commission had failed to comply with the Resources SEPP. However the NSWCA held that the consent was invalid because the Commission had failed to consider the likely impacts of the development “in the locality”, as required by section 4.15(1)(b) of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) (EPA Act).MACH Energy Decision at [143]–[147] (Gordon J).
MACH obtained special leave to appeal to the High Court.
Issues before the High Court
MACH appealed on three grounds, each challenging the NSWCA’s construction of section 4.15(1)(b) of the EPA Act. MACH contended that the NSWCA erred in:MACH Energy Decision at [11] (Gageler CJ and Jagot J).
- “construing s 4.15(1)(b) of the EPA Act as if it imposed a requirement to consider likely impacts of a development on the built and natural environment ‘in the locality’” (Ground 1);
- “construing s 4.15(1)(b) of the EPA Act as if it imposed a requirement to conduct a causal inquiry as to the impacts of climate change” (Ground 2); and
- “concluding that the impact of climate change is capable of being a likely environmental impact in the locality of the development within the meaning of s 4.15(1)(b) of the EPA Act” (Ground 3).
DAMSHEG, by an amended notice of contention, raised two further grounds for upholding the NSWCA’s orders:MACH Energy Decision at [12] (Gageler CJ and Jagot J).
- that the Commission failed to comply with clause 2.20(1)(c) of the Resources SEPP, which required it to consider “whether or not the consent should be issued subject to conditions aimed at ensuring … that greenhouse gas emissions are minimised to the greatest extent practicable” (Contention 1); and
- that, in any event, the material before the Commission, including the EIS, required it to consider the likely impacts of climate change in NSW and the Hunter Valley (Contention 2).
Put simply, the High Court had to decide whether section 4.15(1)(b) requires a focus on local impacts, and whether the Commission had performed its separate duty under the Resources SEPP to consider conditions on all greenhouse gas emissions, including Scope 3 emissions.
High Court finding
The majority (Gordon, Edelman and Beech-Jones JJ) dismissed MACH’s appeal with costs. Gageler CJ and Jagot J dissented and would have allowed the appeal.MACH Energy Decision at [72], [206], [260], [321].
The Court’s findings on each issue may be summarised as follows:
| Issue | Outcome | High Court analysis |
| Ground 1: Locality | Upheld (unanimous) | Section 4.15(1)(b) does require consideration of “the likely impacts of [the] development”. Impacts in the locality may form part of those impacts, but they are not the exclusive or central focus of the provision.¹ |
| Ground 2: Causal inquiry | Not decided | The ground did not arise because Ground 1 succeeded.² |
| Ground 3: Climate change as a local impact | Not decided | The ground did not arise. Gordon J observed that it would not have been appropriate to decide it, as the issue was not raised below and scientific evidence might have been adduced.³ |
| Contention 1: Resources SEPP | Upheld (3:2) | The majority held the Commission failed to consider whether to impose conditions to minimise Scope 3 emissions to the greatest extent practicable (as required by the Resources SEPP), and the error was material. The minority found that the Commission did consider the issue.⁴ |
| Contention 2: Evidence before the Commission | Rejected (unanimous) | The Commission complied with section 4.15(1)(b) of the EPA Act. The Commission was not required to consider every climate impact at the level of particularity of the EIS or the submissions.⁵ |
Table references: ¹ [32]–[36] (Gageler CJ and Jagot J); [149]–[152] (Gordon J); [246] (Edelman J); [276] (Beech-Jones J). ² [58] (Gageler CJ and Jagot J); [148] (Gordon J); [277] (Beech-Jones J). ³ [205] (Gordon J). ⁴ [169] (Gordon J); [215] (Edelman J); [318] (Beech-Jones J); cf [66]–[71] (Gageler CJ and Jagot J). ⁵ [41]–[42] (Gageler CJ and Jagot J); [158]–[159] (Gordon J); [256] (Edelman J); [277] (Beech-Jones J).
Application of the Resources SEPP
The majority held that clause 2.20(1)(c) of the Resources SEPP extends to all greenhouse gas emissions, including Scope 3 emissions, and requires specific consideration of conditions to minimise them.MACH Energy Decision at [171], [178] (Gordon J); [227]–[228] (Edelman J); [289]–[290] (Beech-Jones J). The minority agreed on this point of construction.MACH Energy Decision at [63]–[65] (Gageler CJ and Jagot J).
The majority found that the Commission’s reliance on the Paris Agreement did not answer that obligation. As Gordon J explained, “scopes” is an accounting concept under the Paris Agreement, and how emissions are accounted for is a different question from whether they can be minimised.MACH Energy Decision at [182]–[183] (Gordon J). Edelman J described the Commission as having been “…distracted by the accounting concepts of the scopes into which greenhouse gas emissions are divided”.MACH Energy Decision at [239] (Edelman J). Beech-Jones J characterised clause 2.20(1)(c) as imposing “…a much sharper obligation than simply considering whether scope 3 GHG emissions are appropriately regulated or accounted for by reference to an international treaty”.MACH Energy Decision at [309] (Beech-Jones J).
The Commission is required to consider conditions, not necessarily to impose them. Gordon J noted that imposing such conditions “will not always be possible or desirable”, contrasting Mullaley Gas and Pipeline Accord Inc v Santos NSW (Eastern) Pty Ltd, where the Commission expressly considered and declined to impose Scope 3 conditions and was found to have complied with the Resources SEPP.MACH Energy Decision at [173], [184] (Gordon J).
Climate change in the locality: still open
The question of whether climate change can be an environmental impact “in the locality” of a development was not considered.MACH Energy Decision at [58] (Gageler CJ and Jagot J); [205] (Gordon J); [277] (Beech-Jones J). However, in obiter comments, Edelman J observed that “there is a strong argument that matters that have a ‘likely impact’ on natural and built environments should be broadly interpreted to include matters that make non-trivial contributions to a process that has such an impact”.MACH Energy Decision at [217] (Edelman J).
Implications for proponents and consent authorities
The decision confirms that, for mining, petroleum and extractive industry developments in NSW, Scope 3 emissions cannot be discounted on the basis that they are accounted for elsewhere. It does not, however, mean that such projects can no longer be approved. The Court did not undertake a merits review or decide what conditions, if any, should be imposed.MACH Energy Decision at [80], [202] (Gordon J); [264] (Beech-Jones J).
Importantly, the majority placed responsibility back on the proponent. Gordon J held that the statutory scheme “…placed responsibility on MACH, as the development proponent, to propose conditions to mitigate adverse environmental effects”, and Edelman J noted that the Commission’s approach was “…founded on the very reasoning that had been urged by MACH”.MACH Energy Decision at [196] (Gordon J); [236] (Edelman J). Beech-Jones J observed that the absence of submissions about Scope 3 conditions can, in some cases, “…make it harder to establish…” that whatever consideration a decision maker gave was inadequate.MACH Energy Decision at [313] (Beech-Jones J). Had MACH addressed Scope 3 minimisation in its EIS, the outcome may well have been different.
The decision sits alongside KEPCO Bylong Australia Pty Ltd v Bylong Valley Protection Alliance Inc (2021) 250 LGERA 39, in which the NSWCA upheld the refusal of a coal mine where the proponent had not proposed any conditions addressing its Scope 3 emissions.MACH Energy Decision at [198] (Gordon J).
A proponent preparing an application for a mining, petroleum or extractive industry development in NSW should ask itself the following questions:
- Has the EIS identified all of the project’s greenhouse gas emissions, including upstream and downstream Scope 3 emissions?
- Does the EIS propose measures to minimise Scope 3 emissions to the greatest extent practicable, or explain why such measures are not practicable?
- Have potential Scope 3 conditions been considered? The High Court’s judgment refers to examples such as washing coal before export, limiting exports to high-calorific coal or to countries with Paris Agreement commitments, requiring carbon capture and storage, and offsets.
MACH Energy Decision at [199] (Gordon J).
For consent authorities, the decision underscores that the required consideration must be manifest in the reasons for decision.~~MACH Energy Decision at [225] (Edelman J).~~Where Scope 3 conditions are not imposed, the reasons should record that they were considered and why they were not imposed.
Broader implications
Although there has been a lot of commentary about the impact of this decision, the Court made clear it was not deciding the broader question of the merits of the Commission’s decision ([202] Gordon J and [264] Beech Jones J).
The outcome turned on the construction of NSW specific legislation, namely cl 2.20(1)(c) of the Resources SEPP, a provision with no direct equivalent in other states. Clause 2.20(1)(c) requires a consent authority, before granting consent for mining, petroleum production or extractive industry, to consider conditions to ensure "that greenhouse gas emissions are minimised to the greatest extent practicable". The majority read "greenhouse gas emissions" to include Scope 3 emissions largely because of features of the NSW scheme and NSW decisions applying the Resources SEPP, in particular Mullaley Gas and Pipeline Accord Inc v Santos NSW (Eastern) Pty Ltd, which remains directly relevant to the clause. The Court did not determine what, if any conditions should be imposed, only that the Commission’s consent was invalid because it did not engage in the relevant consideration.
The case will now be remitted back to the Land and Environment Court to enable it to consider what orders should be made.
Whether the case has implications for approval processes in other Australian jurisdictions will turn largely on the wording of the relevant instrument. It is possible other jurisdictions may move to amend their legislative instruments to clarify the extent to which GHG emissions need to be considered in similar scenarios.
The general administrative law principles are broadly applicable to any situation where a decision-maker must "consider" a mandatory matter:
- The obligation to consider is an obligation to engage in "an active intellectual process" directed at the actual question posed. Addressing a related question, such as how emissions are accounted for under the Paris Agreement, is not enough. ([174] (Gordon J), [228] (Edelman J), [290] (Beech-Jones J).
- Where a decision-maker's reasons are otherwise comprehensive, silence on a mandatory matter may support an inference that it was not considered.
- The decision maker’s duty to consider an issue is not obviated by a failure of the parties to expressly address the relevant subject matter, particularly where the decision has the capacity to affect the broader environment [at [313], [315], Beech Jones J].