Kirk v Moreton Resources: Are we out of the woods yet?
The recent unanimous decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal in Kirk v Moreton Resources Pty Ltd [2026] QCA 186 has provided important clarity for secured lenders relying on all-assets security interests under the Personal Property Securities Act 2009.
Kirk v Moreton Resources: Are we out of the woods yet?
Queensland Court of Appeal clarifies attachment of security interests to after-acquired property — but questions remain

Introduction

The recent unanimous decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal in Kirk v Moreton Resources Pty Ltd [2026] QCA 186 (delivered 25 September 2026)Accessible here. has provided important clarity for secured lenders relying on all-assets security interests under the Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth) (PPSA), following the rather unsettling first instance decision in April.Kirk v Moreton Resources Limited [2026] QSC 66 (First Instance Decision). Note that the Court of Appeal handed down its decision only 5 months after the First Instance Decision (ie 24 April 2026), and a mere 10 days after hearing arguments That said, some questions did not arise before the Court and accordingly remain open.

In essence, the case concerned a priority dispute relating to a company’s (Moreton’s) future tax refunds claimed in proceedings before the Administrative Review Tribunal. The priority dispute was between:

  1. a perfected all-assets security interest granted by Moreton under a general security agreement (Secured Debenture Deed) to First Samuel Ltd (later assigned to Melgear Pty Ltd (Melgear)), and
  2. a later equitable assignment for value by Moreton of future property that included those tax refunds. Importantly, it was not suggested that the assignment was a security interest to which the PPSA applied.

Both documents were entered into well before the refund claims were lodged in the Administrative Review Tribunal.

The Queensland Court of Appeal has held that the prior in time all-assets security holder had priority over the later assignment. This reversed the first instance decision of Wilson J which had caused some concern in the market and quickly attracted academic criticism.Anthony Duggan “Competing Claims to After-Acquired Property: A Note on Kirk v Moreton Resources Limited & Ors” available via SSRN at the time of writing: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=7175560

Issues of the first instance decision addressed

The Court of Appeal firmly rejected the reasoning at first instance that:

  • the refunds were not “Secured Property” under the Secured Debenture Deed because they were at relevant times a mere expectancy, and not property (although we note this key point had to some extent been conceded by counsel, even though the issue is a complex one);~~See Re Mondin; Ex parte Bradshaw (1985) 6 FCR 430; Re Evans; Ex parte Sweeney v Evans and Others (1995) 61 FCR 556; and Resilient Investment Group Pty Ltd v Barnet and Hodgkinson [2023] NSWCA 118 at [199] per White JA who posited that prior to administration R&D tax refunds constituted a ‘contingent asset which could be characterised as property’.~~and
  • a later equitable assignment would create a bare trust in favour of the later assignee at the instant of materialisation, preventing the refunds from ever becoming property of Moreton and thus preventing attachment of Melgear’s prior in time interest (thereby defeating Melgear’s claim). First Instance Decision [113].

Thomson JAJ (Boddice JA and Crowley J agreeing) instead reasoned that:

  • if the proceedings brought by Moreton led to the tax refunds becoming payable, Moreton would obtain “an enforceable right to payment, which would be property.”Kirk v Moreton Resources Pty Ltd [2026] QCA 186 [43].Accordingly, both “[t]he right to be paid the refunds, and the actual refunds once paid, would … be ‘Secured Property’ in terms of the Secured Debenture Deed…[both] would be ‘personal property acquired by the grantor after a security agreement is made’, and therefore within the definition of ‘after-acquired property’. The distinction between an expectancy and after-acquired property does not … bear upon this conclusion”;Ibid [44].
  • attachment of security interests under the provisions of the PPSA is automatic. Section 18(3), read in conjunction with sections 19 and 20, of the PPSA has the effect that “a security interest in after-acquired property takes effect automatically when the grantor of the security acquires rights in the collateral”;~~Ibid [46].~~and
  • the later assignment did not interfere with this attachment. In reversing the first instance decision on this point, the Court observed that, if it were otherwise, “paradoxically, this would … create a ‘last in time’ priority rule in a competition for after-acquired property between a security and an outright assignment”.Ibid [68].The Court of Appeal (with respect, correctly) identified that this error in the first instance decision stemmed from a misapplication of equitable maxims, and also from the treatment of the later assignment as limiting the rights that the company would acquire and would become subject to the prior security, a conclusion that was based on certain (inapplicable) cases concerning what constitutes the “property of the company” for insolvency law purposes. Those cases were not concerned with competition between two third parties.Ibid [63]. It might be said the cases relied on in first instance are also inconsistent with other High Court authority, see D.K.L.R Holding Co. (No. 2) Proprietary Limited v The Commissioner of Stamp Duties (New South Wales) 149 CLR 431.

Are we out of the woods?

The first instance decision raised significant questions about the extent to which certain future property may be captured by security interests under the PPSA. However, not all of those questions were considered by the Court of Appeal, Thomson JAJ saying that “the distinction between an expectancy and after-acquired property does not seem to me to bear upon [the] conclusion…"Kirk v Moreton Resources Pty Ltd [2026] QCA 186 [44].

Yet having certainty around these matters is important — in the years since the PPSA came into effect, enormous amounts of finance have been provided in reliance on general security interests over all the grantor’s assets, on the understanding that those security interests covered all the grantor’s present and future property (replicating the advantages of old fixed and floating charges under common law, pre-PPSA).

Significantly, the Court of Appeal also held that while the term “after-acquired property” was not a defined term in the Secured Debenture Deed, inferentially the PPSA definition of this phrase applied as “obviously” the Secured Debenture Deed was “drafted to harmonise with the terms of the PPSA and, in any event, the definition corresponds with the ordinary meaning of the term ‘after-acquired property’”.Ibid [12]. This is potentially unsettling when one considers that:

  • the definition of after-acquired property in section 10 is limited to “personal property acquired by the grantor after a security agreement is made” (emphasis added); and
  • the first instance decision held that “all present and after acquired property” did not include any expectancy as it was not personal property (and there was little explanation of the reasons for this, beyond a reference to this PPSA definition).

A restrictive application of the PPSA definition of “after-acquired property” to references to that phrase as they appear in the Secured Debenture Deed, would have the surely unintended consequence that the security agreement may capture the grantor’s interest in present real estate at the date of the security agreement, but not interests in later (after) acquired real estate. On reflection, it is very unlikely that the Court of Appeal intended this outcome; rather, its adoption of the PPSA definition was appropriate insofar as the collateral in question (the tax refunds) was personal property, and there is no indication that the Court thereby intended to imply that the terms of the deed excluded later acquired non-PPSA property such as real estate.

It is a shame that the Court of Appeal did not deal with the question of whether the PPSA definition of “after-acquired property” includes an expectancy but, as mentioned above, that appears not to have been contested before it, and it was not necessary for that to be decided to dispose of the appeal.

Finally, there is no discussion in either decision of wording in the Secured Debenture Deed that included, in the definition of secured property, “anything in respect of which the Security Provider has at any time sufficient right, interest or power to grant a Security Interest”. Following the Court of Appeal reasoning, and given this wording in the definition, we see no reason why an equitable security interest arising under the terms of a prior in time Secured Debenture Deed in respect of after acquired “non-PPSA” property should also not prevail over any later equitable assignment of such non-PPSA property (subject to the usual rules concerning disentitling conduct in a competition between equitable interests).

Next steps

Several years ago, several firms in the market (including Norton Rose Fulbright Australia) circulated model language for use in general security agreements.

The model language is in terms similar to the language in the case (both refer to “after-acquired property”). Although the model clauses were expressly and deliberately drafted so as not to incorporate wholesale PPSA language and definitions (save for specific terms in particular instances such as references to chattel paper), the Court of Appeal’s decision suggests that PPSA definitions may still be applied in some circumstances.

Notwithstanding this, we still consider the model language sufficiently broad to cover non-PPSA property (including where it is acquired later). For a start it defines Collateral to cover anything in respect of which the grantor can grant a security interest (where security interest is not defined by reference to the PPSA). However, careful consideration of any interpretation provisions that are used in connection with the model clauses (and not otherwise the subject of the model clauses) is always a good idea.

While at the time of writing it remains possible for the respondents to seek special leave to appeal to the High Court, for now we consider the Court of Appeal has provided much-needed clarity.

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