On 22 July 2026 the Supreme Court handed down its judgment in Great Asia Maritime Limited v Orion Shipping and Trading LLC (the “Lila Lisbon”). In a decision providing welcome certainty for the market, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld the Court of Appeal’s finding that:
“If a Memorandum of Agreement on the SALEFORM 2012 form is lawfully cancelled by a buyer under Clause 14 because the vessel is not delivered by the cancelling date as a result of the seller’s “proven negligence”, the buyer is entitled to recover loss of bargain damages even though there has been no accepted repudiatory breach of contract”.
This mirrored the arbitral tribunal’s original award and confirms the long-standing, widely accepted interpretation of clause 14 of the Norwegian Saleform 2012 (“NSF 2012”). We previously reported on the Court of Appeal’s decision in this case (read here); this update focuses on the Supreme Court’s reasoning, while setting out some background for readers who are new to the case.
Background
The facts
The case concerned the M/V LILA LISBON, sold under a Memorandum of Agreement (“MOA”) dated 4 June 2021 on amended NSF 2012 terms for USD 15 million. The Cancelling Date under the MOA was 20 August 2021. On 12 August 2021 the Sellers notified the Buyers that the vessel would not be ready for delivery by the Cancelling Date, and on 14 August 2021 the Buyers agreed to a revised Cancelling Date of 15 October 2021. The vessel was still not ready for delivery by the revised Cancelling Date, and on 18 October 2021 the Buyers arrested the vessel, which the arbitrators later held amounted to a purported termination of the MOA.
The question which the Supreme Court had to decide was whether the Buyers were entitled to loss of bargain damages amounting to USD 1.85 million, after the termination.
Clause 14 of the MOA, headed “Sellers’ default”, provided:
“[A] Should the Sellers fail to give Notice of Readiness in accordance with Clause 5(b) or fail to be ready to validly complete a legal transfer by the Cancelling Date the Buyers shall have the option of cancelling this Agreement. […] In the event that the Buyers elect to cancel this Agreement, the Deposit together with interest earned, if any, shall be released to them immediately.
[B] Should the Sellers fail to give Notice of Readiness by the Cancelling Date or fail to be ready to validly complete a legal transfer as aforesaid they shall make due compensation to the Buyers for their loss and for all expenses together with interest if their failure is due to proven negligence and whether or not the Buyers cancel this Agreement.”
Procedural history
The arbitral tribunal found that the Sellers had failed to give notice of readiness by both the original and the revised Cancelling Dates as a result of their negligence. They held that clause 14 entitled the Buyers to recover loss of bargain damages.
On appeal under section 69 of the Arbitration Act 1996, the Commercial Court found that the Buyers were not entitled to loss of bargain damages. This was on the basis that “due compensation” under clause 14B meant compensation applying ordinary common law principles of causation, remoteness and mitigation, but that recoverable losses and expenses had to flow from the specific failure to give notice of readiness or to complete by the Cancelling Date, and did not, on the natural and ordinary meaning of the clause, extend to loss of bargain without an accepted repudiatory breach.
The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the Buyers’ appeal and restored the arbitrators’ award, finding that: (i) the natural and ordinary meaning of “loss” in clause 14 extended to the Buyers’ loss of bargain, (ii) there was no difficulty over factual causation, and (iii) there was no principled reason why the Buyers’ recoverable losses should be confined to those crystallised at the point of cancellation. For further detail on the Court of Appeal decision, please read our previous article here.
Following the Court of Appeal’s decision, it was common ground that the Sellers were under an obligation to exercise reasonable diligence to be ready to deliver by the Cancelling Date, and that their failure to do so involved “proven negligence”. The sole live issue was therefore whether, on a proper construction of clause 14, the Buyers were entitled to loss of bargain damages despite the lack of an accepted repudiatory breach by the Sellers.
The Supreme Court’s reasoning
The Supreme Court reached its conclusion for the following reasons, broadly mirroring the approach taken by the Court of Appeal.
Firstly, and fundamentally, the Court found that the word “loss” in clause 14 is general and unqualified, therefore being wide enough to cover loss of bargain damages on a natural and ordinary reading.
Secondly, this conclusion was supported by the symmetry between clauses 13 and 14. Clause 13 (Buyers’ default) entitles the Sellers to compensation “for their losses and for all expenses”, materially the same wording as clause 14B. It would be surprising, as a matter of contractual symmetry, if loss of bargain damages were recoverable by the Sellers under clause 13 but not by the Buyers under clause 14.
Thirdly, the Buyers’ cancellation and claim for compensation under clause 14 is, in substance, akin to a claim for non-delivery under a contract for the sale of goods, for which the normal measure of damages under s51(3) Sale of Goods Act 1979 is the difference between the contract price and the market price at the time the goods ought to have been delivered.
The Supreme Court considered that past decisions of the courts, and the established meaning of clause 14 of the NSF 2012, support this conclusion. Since the 1980s, case law has recognised that loss of bargain damages are recoverable under clause 14, and that position has not changed despite various amendments to the clause. The Supreme Court also cited leading textbooks and authorities emphasising the importance of certainty, such that established construction of standard form contracts should not be disturbed. Whilst the parties’ objective intention remains relevant, they should be taken to have contracted on the established basis, unless it can be shown otherwise.
The Supreme Court then tested its conclusion by considering alternative interpretations. If loss of bargain damages were not recoverable, Sellers who negligently fail to deliver could retain the benefit of a rising market by keeping the vessel following the Buyers’ cancellation, leaving the Buyers out of pocket despite the Sellers’ default. Sellers might also be perversely incentivised to delay completion in a rising market in the hope that Buyers would lose patience and cancel. In the Court’s view, this was not a “sensible commercial outcome.”
Sellers’ arguments
The causation principle
The Sellers’ main submission, drawing on previous case law, was that loss of bargain damages are not recoverable where a party exercised a contractual termination right that is not dependent on there having been a repudiatory breach. They argued that such damages fail for lack of causation, as it is the Buyers’ election to terminate, rather than the Sellers’ (non-repudiatory) breach, that was the effective (legal) cause of the loss of the bargain, since a non-repudiatory breach itself does not destroy the bargain.
The Court rejected this submission. First, it was inconsistent with the well-established principle that an unaccepted repudiatory breach has no effect on the contract unless and until it is accepted by the innocent party. On the Sellers’ logic, there would be no distinction between electing to terminate for repudiatory breach or exercising a contractual right to terminate. Secondly, where the event triggering an express right to terminate is itself a breach, that breach is very likely to be the effective legal cause of the resulting loss, and the innocent party’s decision to terminate does not break the chain of causation. Thirdly, and in any event, even if a causation explanation could justify Financings in relation to a bare termination clause, it could not justify departing from an express compensation clause such as clause 14B, which was intended to give the Buyers a right to compensation going beyond a bare right to terminate.
The “clear words” principle
The Sellers also argued that the “clear words” principle applies to this case in inverted (or “converse”) form. It is a well-established principle that a party wishing to contract out of its common law rights or remedies arising by operation of law must use clear words. The Sellers argued that clear words should equally be required before clause 14B could be read as conferring on the Buyers a right to loss of bargain damages that would not otherwise arise at common law. The Court rejected this argument, emphasising that taking away rights is materially different from conferring additional rights: it is not inherently unlikely, nor indicative of unfairness, that parties would agree to confer additional rights beyond those available at common law. Taken to its “absurd logical conclusion”, the Sellers’ argument would subject almost every contractual clause to the clear words principle, since most contracts confer rights beyond the common law default position.
The Court drew a distinction with previous leading authorities on the clear words principle, which was applied to compensation clauses where no loss needs to have been suffered in order to obtain compensation, such that a compensation clause in that context would operate arbitrarily. By contrast, the Buyers here had in fact suffered a loss of bargain. Since it was not unlikely that parties would agree to compensation where actual loss has been suffered, clause 14B was not subject to the clear words principle.
Conclusion / Key takeaways
The Supreme Court’s decision provides welcome certainty for the market. It confirms that, where a buyer lawfully cancels an MOA under clause 14 of NSF 2012 because the seller has failed to deliver by the Cancelling Date due to its own proven negligence, the buyer can recover loss of bargain damages measured by reference to any rise in the vessel’s market value, without needing to show that the seller’s breach was repudiatory.
For practitioners, the judgment also illustrates the limits of a causation-based reading of previous cases and of the “clear words” principle where a clause confers, rather than takes away, a valuable right. Parties negotiating clause 14 or drafting equivalent compensation provisions in other standard forms should bear in mind that clear express wording will now be needed if they wish to displace this established position.
With thanks to Mary Fraser for her assistance in preparing this post.