Key takeaways
Weight-of-the-evidence opinions require transparency
The Eleventh Circuit joined other courts in holding than an expert using the weight-of-the-evidence methodology (such as inferring from a broad range of evidence the best explanation for a causal association) must explain how epidemiological studies are selected, evaluated and weighed for their opinion to be reliable.
A cursory Bradford Hill discussion will not suffice
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed that district courts have considerable discretion to exclude a general causation expert who relies on the Bradford Hill factors but who fails to address each factor in some depth, requiring more than “cursory description.”
Proximity to a contaminated site is not sufficient to infer exposure
The Eleventh Circuit upheld exclusion of the a general causation opinion that compared the mortality rates in different zip codes—one near the defendant’s site and one farther away—because the expert had no information regarding the exposure levels to volatile organic compounds in the compared populations.
Background
In Davis v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 2026 US App. LEXIS 22499 (11th Cir. July 28, 2026), plaintiffs alleged that volatile organic compounds from Lockheed’s facility contaminated the surrounding soil, groundwater and air, causing individuals to develop multiple sclerosis, Parkinson’s disease and other neurodegenerative injuries. The appellants alleged that five compounds caused their injuries: trichloroethylene, perchloroethylene, toluene, xylene and styrene. To establish general causation, the plaintiffs relied on Dr. Daniel Kantor, who offered an epidemiology-based opinion using a weight-of-the-evidence approach, and Dr. Ronald Kendall, who offered opinions based on a background-risk theory informed by statistical work from another expert.
Plaintiffs’ expert opinion on general causation
Dr. Daniel Kantor served as the plaintiffs’ principal epidemiology-based general-causation expert and opined that, “based on the weight of the evidence,” the compounds emitted by Lockheed, both individually and in chemical mixtures, were capable of causing the diseases and injuries alleged by the plaintiffs. He later asserted in rebuttal that his review satisfied the Bradford Hill criteria and very briefly illustrated how those criteria might apply to a single cited study.
Dr. Ronald Kendall offered two related general causation opinions: first, that volatile organic compound exposure could have caused the plaintiffs’ illnesses, and second, that zip codes nearest Lockheed’s facility showed higher mortality risks from those illnesses than zip codes farther away.
District court ruling
The district court excluded the plaintiffs’ general-causation experts and then granted summary judgment. The district court found Dr. Kantor’s opinion unreliable because he did not adequately explain his study-selection and weighting process or meaningfully address the Bradford Hill factors. The district court also found Dr. Kendall’s opinion unreliable because his report largely adopted other experts’ opinions. Once those opinions were excluded, the district court entered summary judgment because no reliable general-causation testimony remained.
Eleventh Circuit analysis
The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the Rule 702 rulings for abuse of discretion and emphasized the district court’s broad leeway in deciding how to assess expert reliability. It then affirmed across the board.
Eleventh Circuit requires methodological transparency
The Eleventh Circuit joined other courts in holding that an expert using weight of the evidence methodology must explain how he or she weighed the evidence for the methodology to be reliable. Applying that principle, the Court agreed that Dr. Kantor did not adequately explain all of the search terms he used to find his studies, how he used the Bradford Hill factors to analyze the studies, how he sorted the studies, how he ranked rival explanations or how he used his professional judgment to identify the best explanation. The Court treated those omissions as a sufficient basis for the district court to conclude that Dr. Kantor had not reliably applied his methodology.
The Bradford Hill analysis was too thin
The Court agreed that Dr. Kantor’s Bradford Hill discussion did not reliably support a causation opinion, explaining that the Bradford Hill factors are “viewpoints” that can guide an epidemiologist’s causal judgment and that experts frequently, though not always, use them as part of a weight-of-the-evidence analysis. At the same time, the Court made clear that a district court is within its discretion to require an expert who invokes Bradford Hill to discuss the factors in some depth, particularly where the expert also has not otherwise explained the weighting process.
Dr. Kantor’s discussion was too cursory because it amounted to a sentence-level recital of conclusions for three of the nine factors and applied those factors to only one study. The Court noted that, under its prior cases, district courts may exclude expert testimony where the Bradford Hill analysis is “hasty,” “cursory” or limited to only brief statements rather than a meaningful causal assessment.
Background risk assessments must compare risk of disease without exposure to risk of disease with exposure
The Eleventh Circuit also held that Dr. Kendall’s second opinion was not a proper background risk assessment. The Court explained that a valid background-risk assessment must compare the risk of disease without exposure to the risk of disease with exposure. The Court expressly rejected the premise that it is enough to infer exposure based on geographic proximity alone, reasoning that it is not sufficient simply to guess that people in a nearby zip code were exposed while people farther away were not. Dr. Kendall’s opinion also erroneously compared mortality rates in a zip code near Lockheed’s facility to mortality rates—not disease rates. These errors and omissions rendered his general causation opinion unreliable.
Conclusion
The Davis decision is a practical reminder that, in toxic tort and other expert-driven cases, courts are required to look closely at how a general causation expert applies their stated methodology, not simply whether the expert invoked familiar concepts such as weight of the evidence or Bradford Hill. For litigators, the opinion underscores scrutinizing an expert’s methodology, challenging the causal significance of the literature and forcing an expert to link their statistical analysis to actual exposure evidence.