Introduction

Cyber security incidents are costly, not only in terms of containment and managing the regulatory obligations that they trigger, but also in terms of managing complaints, claims and litigation risk.  Cyber incidents expose organisations to potential litigation on multiple fronts and those who are custodians of large quantities of sensitive customer data are particularly exposed as public awareness is commonly followed by at least threatened or actual mass or group litigation.

Even putting the mass or group litigation threat to one side, it is trite to state that cyber incidents can be reputationally damaging and leave organisations facing personal data claims from affected individuals and breach of contract claims from those same individuals and corporate customers/counterparties.

Engaging with and defending these claims is expensive, as are the costs of dealing with the incident more generally as forensic investigators are engaged, resources are diverted and workarounds are put in place. Indeed, the sheer costs associated with dealing with and recovering from a cyber incident is bringing cost recovery front of mind.

There are various factors currently combining to increase the overall litigation risk in this country. These include recent enforcement actions by the regulators; evolving data breach compensation case law that is certainly not having a dissuasive effect on potential claimants; the growing presence in the UK of ‘claimant’ group action law firms and funders; and some very high profile ransomware attacks that have caused very significant outages at major corporations resulting in, potentially, hundreds of millions in losses.   This article examines the key risks and practical steps organisations can take to manage them effectively.

UK Litigation Landscape

There are, broadly, two main types of litigation/claims that organisations can face when they fall victim to a cyber incident.  Firstly, corporate/company to company claims, such as those made by corporate customers who may have been adversely impacted by a cyber incident suffered by a supplier or service provider or other contractual counterparty.  The adverse impacts can include things like service disruption, inability to access data, loss of its confidential information, personal data of its employees or its customers being compromised by the impact of the incident on its contractual counterparty, etc. This can include corporate customers/counterparties who have also incurred regulatory and/or legal costs in dealing with the impact of the incident.

Secondly, claims by individuals (which may include consumer customers or other affected data subjects) mainly for alleged personal data/GDPR breaches but potentially also claims of contract breach.

Understanding the interaction between these claims is increasingly important as cyber incidents become more complex and costly.

Corporate and supply chain claims

Cyber incidents not only have the potential to be operationally disruptive and reputationally damaging, but they can also be costly, particularly once the costs of outages, diversion of resources and external advisers are thrown into the mix. Organisations may seek to recover losses from third parties whose acts, omissions, products or services are alleged to have caused or contributed to the incident. Alternatively, organisations that experience a cyber incident may themselves become the target of claims from customers, suppliers and other commercial counterparties who suffer loss as a result of any operational disruption caused by the incident.

Recovery claims against suppliers and third parties

Insofar as recovery claims relating to the cause of the incident are concerned, it is often the organisations facing the personal data claims who are the claimants, seeking recovery against a supplier or service provider that has been the ‘cause’ of the incident.  Questions commonly arise as to how the incident occurred in the first place: what system, product or service was impacted, and how; or what system, product or service was otherwise not operating as it should have been. However, as containment and restoration efforts are the first priority during a crisis, and these efforts themselves require supplier/vendor cooperation and support, supply chain claims can often be sidelined and compromised as organisations prioritise reputational and regulatory stresses.

Handled effectively, there is no immediate time pressure for supply chain claims to be brought.  At least in the UK, claimant organisations will generally have six years from the date of any contractual breach to bring a claim, and six years from the date the cause of action accrued for torts.  As such, although it may feel counter-productive at the time to have commercial and technical discussions overseen by in- house or external legal support during a crisis, such input should be sought, as organisations should take care to ensure that they do not waive any rights they might have to recover losses and costs as they prioritise their own customers and regulatory engagements.

Reservations of rights aside, while it is common for supply chain agreements to contain unlimited indemnities in relation to breaches of data protection obligations, other supply chain claims can often be limited by the terms of the underlying contracts themselves. While perhaps not originally established to deal with cyber incidents, or indeed cyber incidents of the scale that organisations face today, it is not uncommon for contracts to provide service credits for failures to hit service levels during times of operational disruption. More often than not, these service credits do not begin to scrape the surface of the cost of the impact caused by the system or product being unavailable while the incident is being contained and restored. In circumstances where damages are available, organisations are often faced with broad exclusion and limitation of liability clauses, again hindering their ability to recover against the significant costs they will inevitably incur. Insofar as claims are based in tort, although factually dependent, it remains to be tested whether pure economic loss arising from a cyber incident is recoverable.

Operational disruption claims

At the same time, organisations that are forced to suspend services, isolate networks, shut down systems or operate under contingency arrangements may face claims from customers, suppliers and other contractual third parties who suffer loss as a result. Such claims may arise regardless of whether the organisation was itself the victim of a cyber-attack.

Recent incidents, including the 2025 disruption impacting Jaguar Land Rover, demonstrate that cyber incidents can have significant downstream consequences for commercial third parties. Delays in service delivery, inability to access systems, disruption to supply chains and failures to meet contractual service levels can all give rise to breach of contract claims. These claims may include allegations that an organisation failed to maintain adequate resilience measures, failed to deliver contracted services, or failed to comply with business continuity obligations.

The extent of exposure will depend on the contractual framework between the parties. Service level agreements, force majeure provisions, business continuity obligations and limitation and exclusion clauses frequently become central issues when assessing such liability following a cyber incident. Therefore, while organisations may be considering recovery actions against suppliers and other third parties, they must also assess and manage potentially claims brought against them by those affected by the operational consequences of the incident.

Individual and customer claims

Insofar as personal data of individuals is impacted by a cyber incident, individuals are entitled to claim compensation from data controllers or data processors, or both, under Article 82 UK GDPR for any material or non-material damage as a result of a breach of data protection laws.  While the Court of Appeal has confirmed in the case of Farley v Paymaster1 that there is no threshold of seriousness that needs to be overcome for claims relating to Article 82 UK GDPR to be brought, this position will be tested when the Supreme Court hears the final appeal in that case in October this year.

Although an individual’s ability to claim damages for a breach of any contractual obligation that mimics or incorporates Article 82 UK GDPR will be subject to how the Supreme Court resolves the Farley issue in October, it is becoming increasingly common for individuals who have personal data impacted by a cyber incident to also pursue contractual claims in parallel to their statutory rights. There has also been an increase in claims brought that also assert breaches of confidence, and breaches of contractual provisions that may require organisations to provide services in accordance with good industry practice or with reasonable care and skill.

While breach of confidence claims usually require some action to have been taken by the alleged wrongdoer in order to be engaged, and the courts are often critical of claimants who seek to create complexity in low value claims to justify issuing them in the High Court rather than the County Court (which remains generally the most appropriate court for data breach claims to be commenced given that the quantum of the claims tend to be low), organisations should undertake a review of their existing and standard terms and conditions to ensure that they are not exposing themselves to unnecessary risk. For example, although the UK GDPR requires controllers to include certain mandatory terms in their contracts, including those that require any processor to ensure that they process data under an obligation of confidence and implement appropriate technical and organisational measures, it is not uncommon for customer contracts to include terms that go above and beyond UK GDPR requirements, particularly when it comes to notification requirements.  To the extent possible, these discrepancies should be avoided; at the very least, they add unnecessary administrative pressures in a time of crisis.

Finally, one further trend we are seeing in this area of cyber litigation risk is the growing use of genAI drafting tools by legally unrepresented individual data breach claimants, which can prepare legal claims and responses very quickly. Whereas a potential claimant might have taken several weeks to digest a letter of defence sent by, say, a data controller in response to an allegation of breach of GDPR and a claim for compensation for the anxiety and stress caused, are now sending responses back within, sometimes, just a few minutes or hours.  This can make managing a large volume of individual claimants an extremely time consuming and challenging issue.

Mass action risk

The Supreme Court’s ruling in Lloyd v Google2 has played its role in shaping the litigation landscape for data breach claims in two respects. First, it confirmed that claimants can have the “same interest” in a legal issue (such as whether there was a breach), meaning that it is possible that if an organisation is the victim of a cyber incident, it could face a representative action simply on the question of whether or not it had appropriate technical and organisational measures in place, for example. Secondly, it confirmed that the “same interest” requirement of the representative action regime will only be satisfied if the damages claimed (but not necessarily suffered) by all claimants is the same.

While there was initial hype around Lloyd v Google leaving the door open for proceedings to be “bifurcated” with the court first dealing with the common breach question then the individual group members then bringing their own claims for damages if the issue is determined in their favour, there is speculation around whether this bifurcation risk presents a real risk, not least because structuring a claim in that way would leave little scope for a litigation funder to obtain a return.

Another vehicle is the ‘opt in’ Group Litigation Order (GLO) route, which effectively enables those with common or related issues of fact and law to sign up on a group register to be a party to the claim.  Regardless of the way the Supreme Court decides the appeal in Farley, the administrative hurdles and upfront costs incurred by claimant law firms in assembling a class can be administratively prohibitive, although there have been some notable data breach claims brought via this route, including Various Claimants v Wm Morrison Supermarkets3, for example.

Notwithstanding the hurdles involved in bringing representative actions and GLOs, claimant firms and litigation funders continue to view cyber incidents as an area of opportunity, particularly where a significant amount of data, or numbers of affected individuals are involved. It is now fairly common to see some of the data breach claimant law firms ‘advertising’ for data breach subjects within a few days of a major data breach incident entering the public domain.

Key battlegrounds: Personal data and supply chain claims

Insofar as personal data claims are concerned, key battlegrounds often concern whether the impacted organisation had appropriate technical and organisational measures in place; whether the system or product was fit for purpose; whether the organisation acted in accordance with good industry practice, or whether the supplier/vendor acted with reasonable care and skill; or whether the service the supplier/vendor was supplying was supplied with reasonable care and skill. Contractual provisions around fitness for purpose, good industry practice, and reasonable care and skill are similarly in the spotlight when it comes to supply chain contractual claims.

Across all these battlegrounds, common questions that arise are:

  1. Pre-incident:

    1. What policies and procedures were in place, and were they followed?

    2. If responsibilities have been delegated:

      1. did the organisation do their due diligence and ensure that customer information was adequately protected?
      2. were there procedures in place to ensure that the terms of the vendor/supplier agreement were adhered to?
  2. Post-incident:

    1. How quickly did the organisation contain the incident?
    2. How did the organisation notify and engage with individuals/customers/regulators?
    3. What loss has been caused by the incident, and how can it be quantified?

These are typically complex questions to answer, and more often than not, we see parties seek to resolve these issues commercially, particularly on the supply chain front where both parties wish for the relationship to continue.  We are also seeing parties recognise the difficulties with establishing and evidencing breach, loss and causation when it comes to cyber incidents at the outset of entering into commercial contracts, and looking to implement commercial workarounds, such as by negotiating liquidated damages clauses into their contracts before the relationship begins or renews.

Cases to watch

Key cases which will impact the trajectory of the personal data claims litigation landscape in the UK are:

  1. As previously mentioned, Farley v Paymaster – scheduled to be heard by the Supreme Court on 7 and 8 October 2026 on the issue of “[d]oes a threshold of seriousness apply to claims for damages under the [UK GDPR] and [DPA 2018]”?
  2. Spurgeon & Ors v Capita PLC – a mass claim being brought by around 4,000 claimants following a cyber-attack which resulted in unauthorised access to the personal data of employees and pension scheme members. A hearing is yet to be scheduled following Capita’s failed attempt to have the mass claim struck out over standardised distress hearings.

Conclusion

Cyber incidents can affect organisations across all sectors, but those responsible for large volumes of personal or sensitive data with the potential for significant privacy exposure, face heightened cyber risks.  To stay ahead, organisations should keep a watchful eye on Farley, and review their data protection compliance frameworks, customer and vendor/supplier contracts, and insurance coverage.

Footnotes

  1. 1

    [2025] EWCA Civ 1117.

  2. 2

    [2021] UKSC 50.

  3. 3

    [2020] UKSC 12.

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