On 7 July 2026, the Dubai Financial Services Authority (DFSA) published Consultation Paper No. 173 (CP173), setting out wide-ranging proposals to enhance its collective investment fund regime in the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC).
To appreciate the significance of the proposed reforms, it is helpful to take a step back and revisit the regime's origins. The DFSA’s Funds regime was originally established in 2006 and has not been comprehensively reviewed since 2010. CP173 represents the first holistic re-examination of the framework, aiming to align it more closely with international standards and regulatory best practices, streamline the regime to improve clarity and reduce unnecessary regulatory burden, and maintain investor protection through a proportionate, risk-based approach.
This article summarises the core proposals identified in CP173. Unless otherwise defined in this article, capitalised terms have the meanings given to them in the DFSA rules.
Key proposals
Move away from specialist fund classes towards a risk-based approach
In one of the most significant structural changes proposed in CP173, the DFSA has signalled a move away from prescriptive specialist class requirements for Exempt Funds and Qualified Investor Funds (QIFs). Under the current regime, Funds within these categories are subject to fixed classifications (such as Money Market Fund, Private Equity Fund, or Credit Fund), each carrying a defined set of requirements. Market feedback has indicated that these rigid classifications are overly restrictive and do not accommodate hybrid or multi-strategy investment approaches that are increasingly common in practice.
The DFSA proposes to replace this model with an approach focused more directly on the activities undertaken by a Fund, the associated risks, and the safeguards needed to manage those risks. Specifically, the DFSA proposes to remove specialist class requirements for Exempt Funds constituted as Money Market Funds and Private Equity Funds, and to remove specialist class requirements for Exempt Funds and QIFs constituted as Credit Funds.
In parallel, the DFSA proposes to apply certain requirements horizontally to all Fund Managers:
- enhanced risk management system and Fund risk profile requirements;
- a requirement for QIFs and Exempt Funds to calculate borrowing limitations on a reasonable and prudent basis, with disclosure of expected maximum borrowing levels; and
- extension of existing prime broker requirements (on pooling, re-hypothecation and use of Fund assets as collateral) to QIFs and Exempt Funds that use prime brokers in this manner.
This shift represents a meaningful liberalisation for Fund Managers pursuing diversified strategies, while maintaining proportionate investor protections aligned to actual risk profiles.
Clarification on authorisations for delegated investment management
CP173 addresses a longstanding area of uncertainty for firms operating under delegated investment management arrangements. Where a Fund Manager delegates discretionary investment management of Fund Property to an Authorised Firm, that firm must hold an authorisation to Manage Assets. However, in practice, an investment manager managing Fund Property on a delegated basis would likely also be Arranging Deals in Investments or, on occasion, Dealing in Investments as Agent. These are activities which, under the current framework, would require additional separate authorisations.
The DFSA views these activities as integral to the investment management function and proposes to clarify that both Arranging Deals in Investments and Dealing in Investments as Agent are covered by an authorisation to Manage Assets, to the extent that they are necessary for the investment management of Fund Property under a delegation from a Fund Manager. This is a pragmatic and welcome clarification that reflects established market practice.
Firms that currently hold separate authorisations used exclusively for this delegated management purpose should consider applying for the removal of those authorisations once the proposed change takes effect in order to streamline their regulatory footprint.
Fund structure changes: Master fund definition and feeder fund eligibility
CP173 proposes several changes to the rules governing Master-Feeder Fund structures. First, the DFSA proposes to broaden the definition of Master Fund to allow subscriptions from non-Feeder Fund investors (such as institutional or professional investors subscribing directly) alongside subscriptions from Feeder Funds. Under the current framework, a Fund only qualifies as a Master Fund if it issues Units solely to other Funds dedicated to investing in it. This narrow approach prevents Master Funds from receiving direct investment, a feature that is common internationally and that the DFSA acknowledges is operationally and commercially desirable.
Second, the DFSA proposes to simplify the eligibility criteria for Master Funds of public Feeder Funds by removing two requirements that have proven difficult to satisfy in practice and are considered duplicative or disproportionate:
- the requirement that a Master Fund's Units be offered for purchase or sale regularly by at least three market makers (which the DFSA views as duplicative of existing liquidity management and disclosure obligations); and
- the requirement that a Feeder Fund cannot hold more than 20% of the Master Fund's Units (which was introduced in 2010 to address concentration risk but is now considered unnecessary given a Feeder Fund's sole objective is investing in the Master Fund).
Together, these reforms should facilitate greater flexibility in structuring Master-Feeder arrangements in the DIFC and align the DFSA’s approach with international norms.
Amendments to the fund manager definition
The DFSA proposes amendments to the Collective Investment Law (CIL) and related Collective Investment Rules (CIR) provisions to clarify that a person falls within the definition of a Fund Manager even if that person is not legally accountable directly to Unitholders. This addresses a practical issue that has arisen in global Fund structures, particularly those involving the management of Foreign Funds in or from the DIFC, where a Fund Manager’s contractual obligations typically run to the Fund vehicle or its Governing Body (such as a Board, Trustee, or general partner) rather than directly to investors.
The DFSA's benchmarking exercise found that other comparable jurisdictions do not apply a concept of “legal accountability to Unitholders” as a prerequisite for being classified as a Fund Manager. The proposed amendment is intended to prevent the definition being interpreted too narrowly, which could otherwise exclude firms that, in substance, perform the Fund Manager function. Importantly, the DFSA has confirmed that a Fund Manager will remain subject to the CIL obligation to act in the best interests of Unitholders when exercising its powers and duties. The amendment is not intended to reduce investor protection standards.
This is a significant change for firms managing Foreign Funds from the DIFC under delegation structures and should provide greater certainty as to the regulatory perimeter, and enhance the attractiveness of the DIFC as a manager-friendly jurisdiction.
CIL modifications
Notably, CP173 proposes to grant the DFSA the power to waive or modify provisions of the CIL itself, mirroring the DFSA’s existing power under the Markets Law. This is a significant proposal, as it would give firms a direct mechanism to seek relief from certain statutory requirements under the CIL and provide the DFSA with greater flexibility to apply the regime in a proportionate and pragmatic manner.
Removal of the External Fund Manage regime
CP173 also proposes the removal of the External Fund Manager (EFM) regime. The DFSA notes that demand for direct DFSA authorisation has increased in recent years, and that the EFM model, under which non-DIFC-based entities manage Domestic Funds, presents limitations on supervisory reach.
DIFC-based Fund Managers will continue to be able to manage External Funds (i.e., Funds established outside the DIFC) under their existing authorisations. Firms currently operating under the EFM regime will need to consider their options in light of a proposed three-month transition period for the changes to take effect.
Conclusion
Sixteen years after the regime was last reviewed, CP173 marks a foundational recalibration rather than an incremental update. Taken as a whole, the proposals point towards a more streamlined regulatory framework, reducing reliance on rigid fund classifications and instead focusing on risk, transparency and disclosure. The proposed reforms are well thought out and address a number of shortcomings in the current framework, while preserving the DFSA's overarching investor protection objectives.
However, one notable omission from the proposals is that there has been no relaxation of the restrictions on non-DFSA authorised persons making offers of Funds to persons in the DIFC. Given the very broad scope of the DFSA definition of an “Offer of a Unit”, and the very limited exceptions to making such offers in CIR, investors in the DIFC (such as family offices, fund of funds) are in effect subject to restrictions on investing in foreign funds, unless they deal through a DFSA-licensed entity. For example, there is no exception for a foreign fund manager to promote a fund to a Market Counterparty in the DIFC. This burdensome regulatory barrier seems all the more inappropriate given that anyone can promote a complex derivative product to a DIFC-based Market Counterparty without restriction.
Further, there is no exception for execution-only transactions where the person executing is not a DFSA-licensed entity. The result is that a DIFC investor cannot instruct a foreign fund manager or broker to execute a transaction in a foreign fund. These unnecessarily high hurdles serve only to put DIFC investors at a disadvantage compared to their non-DIFC peers.
CP173 invites comments from the public and industry stakeholders on all proposals. The deadline for submitting comments is 7 September 2026. Given the breadth and significance of the proposed reforms, we would encourage Fund Managers and other stakeholders operating in the DIFC to engage with the consultation process and consider the potential implications of the proposals for their existing structures and operations.