Antitrust and competition law is an essential component of any effective compliance strategy, irrespective of sector. However, in recent years, consumer markets have emerged as among the most actively targeted sectors by competition law authorities globally.

Several factors may explain this trend, including the increasing political pressure to address cost-of-living concerns and the regionalisation of consumer goods markets, leading to local market concentration. Taken together, these dynamics have made competition law compliance a strategic priority for companies operating in the consumer goods sector.

This article examines the principal areas of competition law risk affecting consumer goods companies, analyses recent enforcement trends across key jurisdictions and identifies practical compliance priorities.

1. Consumer markets as an enforcement priority

The following examples of recent competition law investigations illustrate the breadth and intensity of enforcement activity in consumer markets across multiple jurisdictions.

European Commission

At the EU level, the European Commission imposed fines totalling €157 million on luxury brands Gucci, Chloé and Loewe in October 2025 concerning vertical price fixing. This was the Commission's first resale price maintenance (RPM) decision in seven years. Notably, the Commission explicitly rejected the argument that brand image or premium positioning could justify RPM, reinforcing the principle that RPM remains a serious restriction of competition regardless of the market segment in which it occurs.

Italy

In December 2025, the Italian Competition Authority (ICA) launched a sector inquiry into large-scale retail and the agri-food supply chain (IC58), examining buyer power, trade spending and private label dynamics. The trigger was food price inflation: the ICA observed that food prices rose 24.9 per cent against a general Consumer Price Index increase of 17.3 per cent between 2021 and 2025, and the inquiry aims to identify where that divergence sits in the value chain.

In March 2026, the ICA fined Morellato €25.9 million for RPM and discriminatory marketplace restrictions (I876), a decision that illustrates how vertical restraints enforcement has become a consistent priority.

The ICA has also opened three other significant cases in the past twelve months, against DJI/Nital (I878), Citizen and Swatch (I879–I880). In each case, the conduct under investigation involves RPM, price monitoring, benchmarking, supply interruptions and marketplace restrictions.

Other EU Member States: France, the Netherlands and Germany

The scale of enforcement in France has been particularly significant. In December 2024, the French Competition Authority (FCA) imposed fines totalling €611 million on ten manufacturers and two distributors in the household appliances sector – the largest RPM fine in French history. This followed a €470 million fine for electrical equipment RPM just two months earlier. Both cases involved mainstream consumer goods brands, sophisticated monitoring systems designed to track online pricing deviations, and retaliatory measures against retailers who discounted below recommended levels.

The Netherlands has launched a market investigation into supermarket pricing. In Germany, in May 2025, the Bundeskartellamt fined audio product manufacturers Sennheiser and Sonova for RPM conducted via monitoring tools. The pattern of enforcement across these jurisdictions confirms a consistent regulatory focus on vertical restraints in consumer goods.

United States

Outside Europe, a Presidential Executive Order designated agriculture as a top enforcement priority in the US and, in November 2025, a dedicated task force was established to investigate the agri-food supply chain. This initiative signals that concerns about competition in consumer-facing industries extend well beyond Europe.

2. Risks and implications for companies

Companies active in consumer markets face a range of risks when competition law is infringed.

Investigations and dawn raids. There is, first, the risk of involvement in protracted and costly investigations by competition authorities, including unannounced inspections (dawn raids), which cause significant disruption to the ordinary course of business.

Fines. Fines for competition law infringements can reach up to 10 per cent of worldwide annual group turnover and are therefore potentially very significant. By way of illustration, the ICA alone, in September 2025, imposed approximately €936 million in fines regarding the fuel companies cartel (I864) and €289 million on Ryanair. The scale of fines imposed by the ICA is now comparable to European Commission-level enforcement.

Reputational damage and commercial risk. For consumer-facing brands, reputational damage and commercial risk can be even more damaging than any fine. A competition investigation becomes public at the time of any dawn raid, with the identities of parties under investigation potentially also becoming public then or shortly after. From that point, parties must manage media exposure, retailer and supplier relationship disruption and investor reaction simultaneously, all before any legal assessment of liability has even begun.

Follow-on damages claims. Any infringement decision carries the risk of follow-on damages claims, including potential collective claims, which are especially significant in consumer markets. With the implementation of the EU Antitrust Damages Directive (2014/104/EU), European courts – including Italian courts – are developing substantial expertise in this area. Furthermore, litigation funders have been investing significantly in European private antitrust enforcement in recent years, and their involvement is making damages claims economically viable on a scale that would not have been possible even a few years ago.

3. Information exchange, hub-and-spoke and algorithmic coordination

The risk that, in the ordinary course of business, management or personnel may exchange commercially sensitive information with competitors, thereby exposing the company to potential competition law violations, is a well-known area of risk. However, compliance frameworks traditionally address this risk primarily regarding direct exchange scenarios, for example, two or more competitors having a conversation about prices or other sensitive information at a formal or informal meeting.

Often less well-governed are indirect scenarios, namely, where competitors share commercially sensitive information via a third party. In consumer goods, indirect scenarios are very common due to the significant interactions that suppliers have with retailers, distributors, trade associations, industry bodies, logistics partners, category management consultants and other supply chain players. Moreover, the types and level of complexity of these interactions are constantly changing, making it more difficult to keep the various information flows under control.

Each of those interactions is a potential channel for the exchange of commercially sensitive information and each can create competition law exposure without any direct contact between competitors. EU Court of Justice case-law confirms that indirect contact via a common intermediary is sufficient and that no direct competitor communication is required for an infringement. Key rulings establishing this principle include Suiker Unie v Commission (1975), Anic Partecipazioni v Commission (1999), T-Mobile Netherlands (2009), AC-Treuhand v Commission (2015), Eturas and Others (2016) and VM Remonts (2016).

A recent example is the ICA’s fuel companies decision of September 2025 (I864), in which fines of €936 million were imposed – among the largest fines in recent years – on the basis of simultaneous pricing behaviour facilitated by indirect contacts through a sectoral publication.

4. Algorithmic pricing and AI-facilitated coordination

Algorithmic pricing and AI-facilitated coordination represent, in many ways, the “new frontier” of competition law risk with regard to information exchange, as they can result in convergent pricing without any direct or indirect communication between competitors. The key question is: at what point does that convergence constitute a prohibited concerted practice?

The legal framework has not yet provided a clear answer, but the enforcement risk is real and growing. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), algorithmic collusion involves any form of anti-competitive agreement or coordination among competing firms that is facilitated or implemented through means of automated systems1.

On a practical level, algorithms can operate in three principal ways. First, they can act as supporters or facilitators of collusion, even if the collusion is implemented through human behaviour. Algorithms can signal price changes that other competitors read as collusive indicators, monitor market behaviour, detect deviations and enable retaliation, especially when used as repricing tools. Second, algorithms can act as autonomous architects of collusion, as in the case of self-learning systems that may lead to common or collusive pricing strategies without direct human intervention. This is the most concerning scenario for businesses, as companies usually have little to no control over the autonomous behaviour of the algorithm. Nonetheless, companies can still be held liable regardless of whether the algorithm acted autonomously. Third, there is the scenario of collusion through intermediaries, which falls within the traditional hub-and-spoke model discussed in section 3 above. Here, third-party intermediaries, such as software providers, can facilitate indirect agreements between competitors. If these providers knowingly enable coordination, they too may be held accountable under competition law.

These risks are particularly relevant for businesses because they are difficult to identify and assess, yet at the same time they are increasingly concrete given the expanding use of AI systems by companies and third-party business partners.

As of today, there has not been a clear-cut case applying Article 101 TFEU theories of harm to AI-powered algorithmic collusion. However, there have been a number of cases involving the use of algorithms in conduct found to breach Article 101 TFEU, from which valuable insights can be drawn. Three cases merit particular attention.

The ETURAS case

The ETURAS case is considered the most tangible example of how authorities might tackle hub-and-spoke algorithmic collusion. In this case, 30 Lithuanian travel agencies were using a common online booking platform. The platform administrator sent a message to all users suggesting that online discounts should be limited to a maximum of 3 per cent. This message was both communicated and implemented by the platform on the same day.

The Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania requested a preliminary ruling from the EU Court of Justice on what factors should be considered when determining whether economic operators using a shared digital system have engaged in a concerted practice under Article 101 TFEU. On 21 January 2016, the Court of Justice ruled in Case C-74/14 that economic operators who were aware of the message could be presumed to have participated in a concerted practice, unless they publicly distanced themselves or reported the conduct to the relevant authorities.

The two key takeaways from this judgment are as follows. First, passive acceptance of anti-competitive conduct resulting from the use of third-party algorithms may be enough to establish liability. Second, intermediaries, such as platform administrators or software providers, can play a central role in facilitating collusion even if the coordination is indirect. The ETURAS case therefore serves as a clear warning that companies must be vigilant not only in how they use algorithms, but also in how they interact with shared digital tools and third-party platforms.

The Asus, Denon & Marantz, Philips and Pioneer decision

A further instructive case is the European Commission’s 2018 decision fining four consumer electronics manufacturers – Asus, Denon & Marantz, Philips and Pioneer – for breaching EU competition law (AT.40465, AT.40469, AT.40181, AT.40182). These companies were found to have imposed fixed or minimum resale prices on their online retailers, intervening when retailers offered products at lower prices. This conduct restricted retailers' ability to set their own prices freely, undermining competition in the online marketplace.

What made this case particularly significant was the role of pricing algorithms. Many online retailers used automated tools that adjusted prices based on competitors' pricing. According to the Commission, this amplified the anti-competitive effects of the manufacturers' conduct. The manufacturers also used monitoring tools to track resale prices across their distribution networks, allowing them to quickly detect and respond to deviations. All four companies cooperated with the Commission and received fine reductions of between 40 and 50 per cent.

This case illustrates how digital tools, when misused, can reinforce anti-competitive practices and underscores the need for companies to ensure that their pricing technologies are fully compliant with EU competition rules, particularly in retail markets where the use of third-party algorithmic tools is widespread.

The ICA's inquiry into algorithmic pricing in air transport

A further example is the ICA's inquiry into algorithmic pricing in air transport (IC56, closed in November 2023), which represents the first structured ICA investigation into algorithmic pricing. Its methodology is directly transferable to consumer goods markets.

Enforcement developments outside Europe

Outside Europe, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Brazil’s Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE) and Canada's Competition Bureau have all launched algorithmic pricing investigations in 2024–2025. In the United States, the DOJ and FTC have filed statements of interest in algorithmic pricing cases. Brazil’s CADE has launched an investigation into algorithmic pricing tools at petrol stations. Canada’s Competition Bureau has opened a probe into real estate pricing algorithms. These developments confirm that enforcement attention to algorithmic coordination is a global phenomenon, not limited to European authorities.

5. AI screening tools in competition investigations

The Michelin v. Commission case (T-188/24) marks a significant step forward in how competition law is enforced in data-rich markets. The European Commission suspected Michelin of price signalling through public statements in the tire industry and adopted a decision ordering an inspection at Michelin's premises. The inspection took place on 30 January 2024 and involved the use of AI-powered tools: the Commission applied algorithmic screening tools to analyse hundreds of thousands of documents, including earnings calls and public communications.

Michelin challenged the inspection. On 9 July 2025, the General Court issued its judgment, partially annulling the inspection decision by limiting its temporal scope, but – importantly – implicitly endorsing the use of AI tools by the Commission to process large volumes of public data. This sets a significant precedent: algorithmic analysis is now a legitimate and powerful component of the Commission's enforcement toolkit, particularly in markets where public communication plays a strategic role.

6. Key takeaways on algorithmic compliance

Five practical takeaways emerge for consumer goods companies seeking to ensure that their use of AI and algorithmic tools remains compliant with competition law.

First, companies should assess third-party tools carefully. Before adopting pricing tools provided by external vendors, companies should check whether the outputs produced by these tools might reflect or reveal sensitive competitor information or lead to unintended price alignment.

Second, companies should seek legal advice. It is essential to consult legal counsel before implementing tools that are also used by competitors, in order to mitigate risks of indirect coordination or hub-and-spoke collusion.

Third, companies should protect confidential data. Non-public, current or forward-looking data should not be shared with third-party vendors. Such information could be misused or inadvertently facilitate anti-competitive behaviour.

Fourth, companies should document safeguards and intentions. Clear documentation should be maintained on the nature of data inputs (for instance, whether they are aggregate or historic), the logic behind the algorithm, the intended use of outputs and the pro-competitive benefits of the tool.

Fifth, companies should train staff and implement controls. Relevant personnel should be trained on competition law risks and internal controls should be in place to monitor algorithmic behaviour and vendor interactions.

Conclusion

The competition law enforcement landscape in consumer markets has intensified significantly in recent years and shows no signs of abating. The combination of record fines, an expanding range of theories of harm – particularly in relation to algorithmic coordination – heightened scrutiny of buying group structures and unresolved tensions between sustainability objectives and antitrust prohibitions demands a proactive and carefully structured approach to compliance.

For consumer goods companies, competition law compliance is not a static exercise. It requires continuous adaptation to evolving enforcement priorities, the rapid adoption of new digital tools across the industry and emerging regulatory expectations at both the national and EU level. Companies that invest in robust compliance frameworks – encompassing algorithmic governance, supply chain transparency and sustainability risk assessments – will be best positioned to navigate this complex and evolving regulatory environment.

Footnotes

  1. 1

    See OECD, Algorithms and Collusion, Competition policy in the digital age, available at the following link: https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2017/05/algorithms-and-collusion-competition-policy-in-the-digital-age_02371a73/258dcb14-en.pdf

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