Introduction

Mass arbitrations—in which dozens or hundreds of legally identical arbitrations are filed against a corporate respondent—can result in multi-million-dollar upfront fees before an arbitrator ever sees the case. This recent development has disrupted US arbitration, and its implications reach any practitioner representing a business client with US-facing contracts, employment relationships or consumer operations.

Mass arbitrations are the most recent development in a 20-year push and pull concerning class actions and arbitration in the United States. The players have been businesses, their employees and their customers. In the first volley, companies used arbitration clauses to stave off high-stakes, expensive class action lawsuits. They achieved this by including arbitration clauses in all contracts, requiring employees and customers to resolve disputes through individual arbitration only, effectively barring many class actions.

Plaintiffs' counsel responded by turning this regime against businesses: if a consumer’s or employee’s dispute could not proceed as a class, lawyers instead filed mass campaigns of dozens, hundreds, or (on occasion) thousands of individual arbitration claims. As a result, businesses faced sometimes crippling upfront arbitration fees, assessed on a per-claimant basis.

To help guide planning and drafting of appropriate dispute resolution regimes, this article sketches the history of mass arbitrations in US courts, the mechanics that make them uniquely powerful, business and arbitration-institution responses, and the implications for practitioners advising clients with US-facing operations.

The rise of mass arbitration

The rise of mass arbitrations can be traced back to AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011). AT&T’s service contract required all disputes to be arbitrated and prohibited class-wide arbitration. Despite this, customers brought a class action lawsuit in California federal court against AT&T. They claimed AT&T's offer of a free phone to new customers was fraudulent because AT&T charged sales tax on the retail value of each free phone.

AT&T moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration clause. The federal district (first-instance) court denied AT&T’s motion because California state law barred class-wide waivers as unconscionable. The appeals court, for the Ninth Circuit, upheld that decision. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that federal law (the Federal Arbitration Act, or FAA) preempts state law that allows enforcement of an arbitration agreement only when class-wide arbitration procedures are available.

Seven years later, in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U.S. 497 (2018), the Supreme Court allowed enforcement of agreements that required employees to resolve disputes with their employer solely through individual arbitration.

These decisions cleared the path for companies to draft arbitration agreements that required disputes to be resolved individually—rather than as a class. The corporate bar embraced this opportunity. Mandatory individual arbitration clauses proliferated across consumer contracts, employment agreements and terms of service nationwide. What followed, however, altered the dispute resolution landscape in ways no one anticipated.

Anti-class action arbitration agreements engendered an unforeseen consequence: law firms representing employees and consumers began to advertise for and collect hundreds or even thousands of claimants. They file these hundreds or thousands of arbitrations, on an individual basis, at one time. As detailed further below, the result for respondent companies is immediately apparent: a coordinated filing effort of hundreds of individual cases generates enormous exposure to filing fees.

This dynamic is largely peculiar to the United States because the FAA preempts state laws that prohibit class action waivers, institutional fee structures require the respondent company to pay initial filing fees in consumer and employment arbitrations, and an active plaintiffs' bar is incentivized by contingency fees.

Funding mass arbitrations

As noted, a mass arbitration is a coordinated filing of large volumes of substantially identical individual arbitration demands against a single respondent company, usually in the consumer or employment contexts.

Filing fees are the pressure point. Institutional rules require respondent companies to pay significant per-case filing and administrative fees, which at scale can reach tens of millions of dollars before a single hearing takes place. In addition, under some state laws, the deadline to pay these fees can be extremely tight. In California, if fees are not paid within 30 days of a due date, the company has effectively waived its right to enforce its arbitration agreement, opening itself up to potential class actions in court (Cal. Code of Civil Procedure § 1281.98). The speed and financial scale of this exposure can overwhelm even large companies’ legal and finance departments.

Plaintiffs' law firms and increasingly, third-party litigation funders, are the critical players. Preparing a mass arbitration is labor-intensive: potential claimants must be funneled to a single law firm (if allowed by that state’s bar, potentially through advertising), the claims must be vetted, and hundreds of demands drafted and filed. This process is both administratively burdensome and financially challenging. Often, a plaintiffs' firm works on a contingency fee basis and is paid only upon a successful resolution. In some cases, litigation funders have stepped in to finance these firms through the early administrative phases. The involvement of third-party funders has become an increasingly significant feature of the landscape, providing the capital necessary to sustain plaintiff firms through the resource-intensive pre-hearing phase—but raising significant questions about conflicts of interest, disclosure obligations and control over settlement decisions.

The institutional response: AAA and JAMS Rules

The AAA and another arbitration provider, JAMS, have already responded to the rise in mass arbitration. In 2023, the AAA published its Mass Arbitration Supplementary Rules, which were amended in 2024, as “intended to provide parties and their representatives with an efficient and economical path toward the resolution of multiple individual disputes.”

It is the AAA that decides whether or not those rules are to be applied.

The AAA’s 10-page supplementary rules provide guidance on filing requirements, serving of documents, notices, and communications, answers, counterclaims, and amended claims, fixing of locale, process arbitrator, appointment of merits arbitrator(s), scheduling, mediation, and administrative fees, compensation and expenses of the arbitrator(s).

Importantly, the AAA has three fee schedules for mass arbitrations:

  • Non-Consumer/Non-Employment Mass Arbitration and Mediation Fee Schedule
  • Consumer Mass Arbitration and Mediation Fee Schedule
  • Employment/Workplace Mass Arbitration and Mediation Fee Schedule

The Consumer Mass Arbitration and Mediation Fee Schedule, for example, sets the per-case initiation fee for the business at $325 for the first 500 cases or $162,500 in total, before a single arbitrator is assigned.

JAMS has likewise implemented mass arbitration procedures, which, in contrast to AAA, require all parties to consent to proceed. The consent requirement meaningfully limits JAMS’ mass arbitration rules as a tool for respondents, since plaintiffs’ counsel are unlikely to agree to a procedure that reduces their leverage (thus, businesses that want to use JAMS rules have to re-visit their arbitration agreements and act accordingly).

The response to mass arbitrations

Companies have responded to the increase in mass arbitrations in a number of ways, some effective, some not.

Refusing to pay initiation fees

Some respondents have purposefully refused to pay the initiation fees altogether.

In California, this is seen as a material breach of the arbitration agreement that carries serious consequences. The most important is waiving the right to compel arbitration under California Code of Civil Procedure Section 1281.97. The California Supreme Court confirmed that the FAA does not preempt Section 1281.97, which thus likely governs arbitration seated there (Hohenshelt v. Superior Court, 18 Cal.5th 310 (2025)). In Hohenshelt, the court noted that the Legislature enacted these provisions specifically to address “a concerning and troubling trend” in employment cases;  companies faced with large numbers of individual arbitration demands “failed to timely pay arbitration fees, thereby frustrating adjudication of employees’ claims,” (Hohenshelt, 18 Cal. 5th, at 329).

The consumer or employee then “may withdraw the claim from arbitration and proceed in a court of appropriate jurisdiction," potentially restoring the ability to pursue collective relief. California law also imposes automatic monetary sanctions on respondents who materially breach arbitration agreements through fee-payment failures, in the form of “reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees and costs, incurred by the employee or consumer as a result of the material breach.” Beyond monetary sanctions, courts may impose evidence sanctions prohibiting the drafting party from conducting discovery in subsequent civil actions, unless the respondent “acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” These sanctions serve both compensatory and deterrent purposes, as the Legislature intended to prevent companies from “strategically withholding the payment of arbitration fees,"(Hohenshelt v. Superior Court, 18 Cal.5th 310 (2025)). “If the failure to pay the initial fees is not willful, grossly negligent, or fraudulent, or is excused by mistake, inadvertence, excusable neglect, impossibility, illegality, or impracticability, then courts may excuse late payment or nonpayment.” Id.

In other instances, a corporate respondent has refused to pay registration fees to arbitrate, resulting in the arbitral institution terminating the arbitration, thus leaving the claimants free to proceed in court (for example, Wallrich v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 106 F.4th 609 (7th Cir. 2024)).

Seeking class treatment in court

Others have gone to the courts seeking class treatment to bypass arbitration, but judges have not looked favorably on this approach, given that the companies mandated individual arbitration (Heckman v. Live Nation Entertainment, Inc., 120 F.4th 670 (9th Cir. 2024)). Courts have been particularly unsympathetic, viewing this as procedural gamesmanship; companies benefit from individual arbitration agreements when facing isolated claims but seek the very class consolidation they contractually forbade when those agreements generate inconvenient scale.

Revising the arbitration agreement

Revisions to the arbitration agreement itself may be a more effective option, although they too have faced recent court challenges. Both batch and bellwether provisions adopt the concept of trying either a single case (bellwether) or a small number of cases (batch) before returning to the settlement table.

Results have been mixed. In Achey v. Cellco Partnership d/b/a Verizon Wireless, No. MID-L-6360-22 (N.J. Super. Ct., Law Div. 2023), plaintiffs successfully challenged an arbitration agreement as unconscionable because it permitted only 10 claims at a time and no more than 20 per year, which would force some claimants to wait 156 years to be heard. The court’s analysis makes clear that while staged proceedings are not per se invalid, provisions that effectively deny claimants any realistic prospect of resolution within a reasonable timeframe will not survive judicial scrutiny. Similarly, in Rios v. HRB Digital LLC, 807 F. Supp. 3d 975, 990 (N.D. Cal. 2025), the court held that an agreement limiting the number of arbitrations raising similar claims represented by the same or coordinated counsel to 25 at a time—until every case in the prior round had been resolved—was substantively unconscionable. The court noted that, “Although the mass arbitration provision encourages arbitrators to resolve cases within 120 days, even that idealistic timeline could impose a 13-year timeline to resolve a batch of 2,000 Notices.” Id. at 990; see also MacClelland v. Cellco P’ship, 609 F. Supp. 3d 1024, 1041–42 (N.D. Cal. 2022).

In Heckman v. Live Nation Entertainment, Inc., 120 F.4th 670 (9th Cir. 2024), the reviewing court ruled that certain provisions governing three bellwether cases—the results of which would be applied to all similar cases—had “stacked the deck” with unconscionable terms. Heckman is particularly significant because it suggests that bellwether provisions will be scrutinized not merely for their facial structure but for the manner in which they are actually administered—a searching level of review.
In short, the response to mass arbitrations is coalescing. No single defense strategy has proven reliably effective, and the case law is developing rapidly across multiple circuits with no Supreme Court resolution on the horizon.

Emerging issues and the road ahead

The increasing popularity of mass arbitrations has raised several important questions for US legal practitioners, including those advising multinational companies. Each of the following issues is likely to significantly shape the trajectory of mass arbitration practice in the coming years.

Can mass arbitration awards be enforced outside the United States under the New York Convention?

A central question for international practitioners is whether mass arbitration awards can be enforced outside the US under the New York Convention. Individual arbitration awards arising from mass proceedings are, in theory, awards like any other, but enforcement courts in civil law jurisdictions may scrutinize the mass nature of the proceedings, the compressed timelines and the limited individualized attention given to each claim.

Practitioners advising foreign companies with US operations should analyze both the enforceability of the arbitration clause in the relevant jurisdiction and the likely receptivity of enforcement courts to awards rendered in US mass arbitration proceedings.

Will proposals in Congress to limit or reform mandatory arbitration succeed?

Congressional proposals to limit or reform mandatory arbitration have gained renewed attention during the same time frame as the rise of mass arbitration. The Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021, which became FAA Chapter 4 in 2022, demonstrated that Congress is willing to carve out specific subject matters from the FAA's reach. Legislation targeting consumer and employment arbitration more broadly has often been proposed in Congress but has not advanced. The outcome of future legislative efforts will depend heavily on the composition of Congress and the political salience of high-profile mass arbitration cases.

Will the AAA and JAMS adapt their rules further, and could international institutions follow?

Whether the AAA or JAMS will further adapt their rules—and whether international institutions might follow—remains an open question.

The ICC, LCIA, and SIAC have not yet implemented mass arbitration-specific procedures. As multinational companies increasingly incorporate US-style individual arbitration clauses into cross-border agreements, international institutions may face pressure to address the same dynamics that drove the AAA and JAMS to act. Practitioners should monitor rule amendments at both domestic and international institutions closely.

Will mass arbitration remain limited to US-based parties?

Companies from outside the United States doing business in the US have already faced mass arbitrations and will likely continue to do so. An example makes the point.
Korean electronics giant Samsung faced an AAA mass arbitration in 2022, when consumers complained that Samsung unlawfully collected and stored sensitive biometric data through its devices. Samsung refused to pay the $4 million in registration fees, and the arbitration was terminated, leaving the consumer claimants free to proceed in court. However, instead of suing in court, the plaintiffs sought a court order compelling Samsung to arbitrate and pay the fees. The first-instance court ordered Samsung to do so, but a court of appeals reversed, stating it could not re-examine the AAA’s termination of the case because the parties had given the AAA that authority. Samsung avoided paying the fees but would have to face any claims in court (Wallrich v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 106 F.4th 609 (7th Cir. 2024)).

What will be the effect of increasing third-party funder involvement?

The increasing involvement of third-party funders in mass arbitration raises significant questions about conflicts of interest, disclosure obligations and control over proceedings. Funders typically have a financial interest in maximizing aggregate recoveries rather than optimizing outcomes for individual claimants, which can create tension with attorneys’ professional duties. US courts and arbitral institutions have not yet established uniform disclosure requirements for funder involvement in mass proceedings. This is an area where regulatory or rule-based intervention appears likely.

What are the practical limits of institutional administration at scale?

The practical challenges faced by the AAA and JAMS in administering thousands of cases simultaneously are significant and unresolved. Process arbitrators, consolidated case management and administrative staff have all been stretched by large-scale filings. The institutions have thus far borne the burden well. However, if institutional capacity constraints become severe enough, they may generate their own form of undue delay raising due process concerns and potentially providing grounds to challenge the arbitration proceedings themselves.

Conclusion

Mass arbitration has turned mandatory arbitration clauses—intended as a shield against class actions—into a sword, crippling companies through filing fees. The irony is almost complete: the very agreements designed to eliminate aggregate litigation exposure have, at sufficient scale, recreated it in a forum that offers companies far fewer procedural protections than a federal court.

For international practitioners, understanding the US mass arbitration landscape is no longer optional—it is essential for advising any client with US-facing contracts, employment relationships or consumer operations. The case law is evolving rapidly, institutional rules continue to be updated and Congress has demonstrated a willingness to act on discrete issues.

The most important takeaway for practitioners is proactive: no defense strategy developed after mass arbitration demands have been filed will be as effective as a well-drafted arbitration clause reviewed with mass arbitration exposure specifically in mind. The time to address this risk is at the contract-drafting stage, not at the moment the invoice arrives.

Issue 24

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