Introduction

When the Paris Agreement was signed in 2015, its aims were clear: reduce carbon emissions and limit global warming to no more than 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. Over a decade later, this ambition remains—though sometimes more honored in the breach than in observance. Amid rising geopolitical tensions, a fundamental challenge faced by governments is reconciling net-zero targets with more immediate concerns as to energy security. What “energy security” entails is changing; a complex network of international suppliers is not as reliable as it once was. What energy security demands is also different. As it was put a few years ago, “critical minerals, semiconductors and data are the oil, steel and electricity of the 21st century.”

In this article, we focus on the minerals powering the green technologies which the world needs to deploy urgently and at vast scale to have a chance of achieving net-zero, and whose supply Western states are determined to secure. We will examine what makes some minerals critical, why demand for them is increasing, how states in the West are seeking to secure supply, and the implications for the energy transition.

What makes a mineral critical?

“Critical mineral” is not a term of art—it depends on the perspective and context, and it changes. The definition accepted in the US is that a non-fuel mineral is critical if it is essential to economic or national security or the manufacturing of a product that affects economic or national security and its supply is vulnerable to disruption, whether due to production constraints, abrupt growth in demand or geological scarcity.

There are now 50 minerals on the US’ List of Critical Minerals, up from 35 in 2018, which shows that what makes a mineral critical is not static. The EU’s equivalent began with 14 in 2010 and is now at 34. They range from aluminium, used in virtually all sectors of the economy, to zirconium, used in nuclear reactors and aerospace components due to its corrosion and heat resistance properties.

Why are they in demand now?

Minerals have long been important to the digital transition. Modern smartphones contain, on average, 42 different types of minerals, used to power their displays, electronics and batteries. As competition among AI technologies intensifies, minerals will be needed to fuel the likely rapid advancement of consumer electronics, in particular advances in components such as screens, high-performance chips and motors.

What has driven more recent demand, however, is green technology—in particular, renewables. Minerals play a vital role in renewable energy, and the focus and great hope of the green transition to date has been expanding renewables capacity. Among the more disconcerting statistics: to meet net-zero targets, renewables capacity needs to triple by 2030; the record-breaking 14 percent increase in 2024 fell far short of the 16.4 percent increase required every year until then. Renewable energy is much more mineral intensive than hydrocarbons. An onshore wind farm needs nine times more minerals than a gas-fired plant. An electric vehicle (EV) requires six times more minerals than a petrol/gas car.

It is not only the quantity of minerals used in renewables, but also the variety—wind farms and EVs use seven types of minerals, whereas a gas plant or a conventional car use just two: copper, plus chromium and manganese, respectively. With minerals required for electrification—EVs, battery storage and grids—demand from EVs alone is expected to grow 30 times by 2040. As a result, the International Energy Agency estimates that demand for critical minerals used to produce clean energy technology could be more than 3.4 times current levels within the same period.

There is another important driver. The response of most states to the war in Ukraine and conflict in the Middle East has been to increase defense spending. Modern advanced weaponry requires vast quantities of minerals—for example, gallium in radar systems, cobalt for radar-deflecting stealth capability and rare earths for magnets and guidance systems. Just one F-35 jet requires over 900 pounds (around 400 kilograms) of rare earth metals.

The factors driving increased demand point to a central issue: energy security. While demand continues to increase, supply remains uncertain. This uncertainty stems from the fact that mineral production is concentrated—and processing even more so—giving a handful of states disproportionate influence over global supply chains. South Africa produces 92 percent of the world’s platinum-group metals and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is responsible for over 70 percent of cobalt production. China is the world’s top mineral producer, accounting for around 60 percent of global mining output in 2024. Importantly, China also dominates refining—its share of global refining includes around 44 percent for copper, 70-75 percent of lithium and cobalt, and 90 percent of rare earth elements and battery-grade graphite. Ultimately, this means that, even if not mined in China, minerals are still sent there to be processed, making it the linchpin in global supply chains.

The response

Concerned by the risk posed by China’s virtual hegemony, including recent restrictions as to the export of gallium, graphite, antimony and several rare earth elements, states in the West have started to respond. Now, for the first time in 40 years, there is a shift away from reliance on the free market and the introduction of new industrial and mineral policies. Generally, these policies share the same aims, that is, to shore up supply and reduce dependency on China, but the means differ.

The UK was initially content to rely on international collaboration, likely because, in its own words, it has “limited natural resources” and depends on “relatively concentrated, opaque global supply chains.” However, amid criticism that its strategy lacked ambition, targets and funding, the UK launched a new Critical Minerals Strategy in November 2025, with the intention of meeting at least 10 percent of annual demand through domestic extraction and refining, achieving a 20 percent recycling target and a "60% Rule" to prevent over-reliance on any one single country.

The EU aims to achieve mineral independence by 2030. It therefore requires member states to extract at least 10 percent of their annual mineral consumption domestically, process 40 percent or more within EU borders and recycle at least 25 percent. In December 2025, it launched the RESourceEU Action Plan in which it backed its targets with €3 billion in funding and a "matchmaking" platform for buyers and suppliers.

Canada has adopted a different approach, likely influenced by the fact that, unlike the UK or EU, it is mineral-rich. Canada has moved to level the playing field by tightening environmental and labor regulations and restricting foreign investment, aiming to keep resources under its own or its allies’ control.

Prior to the current administration, the US had adopted a diversification strategy, as well as subsidies and tariffs aimed at jumpstarting domestic production. The focus was onshoring and “friendshoring”—entry into international partnerships to reorient supply chains—for example, the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) with Australia, India, Japan, the UK and the EU. Now, however, the US has declared dependence on China a “national emergency,” enacting a plan to “Unleash America’s Offshore Critical Minerals and Resources”, by: (i) removing environmental barriers to accelerate domestic investment; and (ii) creating a US$12 billion minerals stockpile in addition to its national defense stockpile.

The impact

There is ongoing debate over whether these policies have been or are likely to be effective. There has been some progress; recently, European Investment Bank agreed to provide €250 million in financing for Vulcan Energy’s Phase One Lionheart Project in Germany, a €2 billion project to build integrated battery-quality lithium supply chain. This is Europe’s first project to combine Direct Lithium Extraction with renewable generation. There are also signs of increased private investment. However, despite these efforts, China’s share of both production and processing is going up, not down. Part of the problem is that strategies and policies are just that—however effective on paper or backed by funding, they are insufficient on their own. Mines take an average of 16.5 years from discovery to first production, which makes it difficult to expand supply quickly and, of course, even if domestic production increases, there is precious little processing capacity in the West, and China’s position as an indispensable cog in global supply chains is maintained.

Moreover, if mining and refining minerals is not commercially viable, private enterprise will not do it unless there are material economic incentives. Green technology changes quickly, demand fluctuates even more rapidly, and mineral prices are extremely volatile, all of which is unattractive to international mining companies interested in stable long-term investments. The logical next step might be state intervention in the form of tax credits, subsidies, guaranteed price floors and state participation but that takes time to produce results and can, of course, create problems of its own. There is also an argument that these policies might be counterproductive on their own terms because, even if successful in diversifying supply, they could lead to fragmentation of a distorted, but largely functioning, market.

Some of the debate has focused on recent climate change policy shifts, particularly the withdrawal of tax credits and green subsidies in the US, which has already had a measurable impact on new and existing renewables projects. As renewables are a major driver of critical mineral demand, and new projects have been postponed while others have been cancelled, that might translate into weaker demand for certain minerals used in wind and solar such as nickel, zinc and manganese. If that trend were to continue, it has been suggested that the mineral demand would be overstated and Western states’ policy would no longer be as urgent and vital as they are made to seem.

However, that disregards that the US’ recent shifts go hand-in-hand with a renewed focused on domestic manufacturing, particularly in the electronics, defense and heavy industry sectors, all of which are mineral-intensive. Critical minerals are often discussed as if they were one homogenous commodity but the reality is that each has its own application and market—indeed, they are distinguished by their different and unique properties—and the main feature they have in common is that they are all important in some way to the economy and prone to supply chain disruption.

Is the West willing to pay the price?

A big problem for Western states is whether they are prepared to pay the price in terms of the environmental impact of increasing domestic production and processing. The aim of these policies is, explicitly, to counter China’s dominance. But that was not always the case. If one goes back just 30 years, the US controlled the rare earth market; its mine, Mountain Pass in California’s Mojave Desert, accounted for 50 percent of global production. The reason for China’s present dominance is not (or not only) complacency in the West, but the environmental impact. Despite the name, rare earth elements are relatively abundant but they are diffuse and extracting them is both difficult and environmentally hazardous. The question is how can Western states balance a desire for commercially viable domestic mineral production with their strict ESG standards?

It is perhaps one of the most difficult challenges facing policymakers; there is little freedom to legislate. It leads to two potential ironies. First, states may be prevented from producing the minerals required to power the green transition and thereby, from achieving net-zero because of laws introduced to protect the environment. Secondly, by seeking to secure and domesticate the supply of minerals critical to the green transition, states risk causing the very environmental damage that such technologies are intended to prevent.

Western states’ complex permitting regimes and the need to coordinate between multiple agencies make it unlikely that production can ramp up as quickly as the policies anticipate or grow to the levels envisaged. Even if, as the US is proposing, key barriers to licensing are removed, local opposition in Western democracies can often delay projects materially, or make them more expensive. The West’s current strategy is to level the playing field for overseas investors by imposing strict environmental and other standards that they may not be able to meet. However, while that may bolster the domestic market, it is unlikely to affect markets globally. The West’s other focus has been the circular economy—cutting producers out of the supply chain by recycling, reusing and encouraging urban mining.

Impact around the globe

One of the consequences of the West’s efforts to ensure energy security is a likely uptick in resource nationalism. Usually defined as a state’s assertion of control over the resources in its sovereign territory, it can take many forms. Expropriation and nationalisation are two obvious examples, but, more commonly, it manifests as export bans, changes to the legislative, fiscal or regulatory environment and enhanced local content and participation requirements. The reasons for it differ country to country but are often: (1) political instability—locally and at a geopolitical level; (2) inflation and price volatility; (3) domestic constraints on funding; and (4) local demand for increased value from indigenous resources.

However, nothing provokes protectionism like interventionism. As importing states compete to shore up supply, mineral-rich countries are incentivized to adopt measures aimed at exerting greater control. There are many recent examples: (1) Chile and Mexico have nationalized their lithium industries; (2) in 2023, the DRC forfeited 29 (mostly cobalt and copper) mining licenses; (3) in 2024, Niger revoked several uranium mining licenses; and (4) in 2025, Guinea canceled several exploration permits and mining licenses. Unsurprisingly then, more than half of new treaty cases in 2024 related to extractive industries, including cases involving critical minerals such as manganese and rare earth elements.

Importantly, however, the push to secure energy supply extends beyond “the usual suspects”—it is happening everywhere. To take just one example, Germany dropped from 154th  in 2020 to 32nd in Maplecroft’s 2025 Resource Nationalism Index, mostly on account of seizing assets from Russian oil companies and windfall taxes on energy profits. As part of their industrial policies, Western states have introduced foreign investment restrictions, made changes to the regulatory environment and sought to domesticate production at the expense of overseas investors. These measures can come perilously close to resource nationalism. Indeed, in 2022, Canada ordered three Chinese companies to divest their interests in Canadian lithium miners; albeit it then retracted that decision under much criticism—forced divestiture being a hallmark of resource nationalism.

It is not therefore beyond the realms of possibility that we may see an increase in contentious renegotiations involving, and FET-standard treaty claims against, Western states. At the very least, there is a risk that foreign investors will hesitate before investing in states with robust mineral policies which may then frustrate the purpose of those policies, as many require private enterprise to achieve their aims.

Conclusion

States are increasingly alert to the risk of leaving control of mineral supply chains in the hands of those who may not share their strategic interests. However, the race to secure supply of critical minerals exposes a fundamental tension at the heart of Western energy policy. States cannot achieve the green transition without increasing mineral supply, yet the environmental protections that underpin the transition constrain the West’s ability to do so domestically and weakening them risks causing the damage that the green transition aims to prevent.

The consequence of seeking to address the imbalance now is that the resulting race for supply incentivizes producers to tighten their grip by adopting measures to improve their take. That only increases as importing states adopt further measures of their own aimed at securing supply, and there are then the makings of a vicious cycle in which the interests of states and their investors increasingly diverge, the private investment on which these strategies depend is deterred and contractual and other protections are ignored, making commercial and investor-state arbitrations arising out of international mining projects more likely.

Issue 24

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