On 21 April 2026, the UK government published the Reformed National Pricing (RNP) Delivery Plan, setting out its plans for reforming the wholesale electricity market following conclusion of the Review of Electricity Market Arrangements (REMA) in July 2025 with the decision to retain a single national GB-wide wholesale market price and introduce a package of reforms designed to strengthen locational signals, reduce system costs, and improve system operability and efficiency.
The Delivery Plan marks the first step towards implementing REMA and provides greater certainty for investors while signalling meaningful changes to siting and investment levers, network constraint management, and balancing and settlement arrangements over the remainder of the decade. The proposed reforms build on the strategically planned approach introduced by the Clean Power 2030 Action Plan, published by DESNZ in December 2024, but with the aim of achieving even further reaching and ambitious changes that go beyond 2030.
Key takeaways
We provide more colour on the government’s proposals below, but the key takeaways are as follows:
- While the single national price is here to stay, it is government’s clear intention to ensure that projects are built when, where and as much as needed to the benefit of the system as a whole. Developers and investors should therefore expect stronger locational incentives for new projects, with siting and investment decisions increasingly being shaped by the new SSEP. Projects that are well-located and strategically aligned are likely to benefit the most.
- When it comes to changes to charges, legacy and transitional projects might be spared, although this will likely depend on the extent to which different assets can reasonably respond to such changes, taking into account their technology, commercial arrangements and stage of development. Absent transitional or grandfathering arrangements, the general direction of travel of RNP would be relatively less favourable than the status quo, particularly for generation concentrated in the north of Great Britain, far from centres of demand, and for large, inflexible demand located in the south, reflecting the policy objective of strengthening locational signals and reducing whole system costs. The actual impact will depend heavily on the final design of transitional measures, although wider reforms made as part of RNP are also likely to have an impact. It is reassuring though that the government wants to preserve investor confidence with whatever decisions it makes.
- Smaller generators, storage providers and flexible demand may see increased revenue opportunities due to the widening of the Balancing Mechanism to smaller market participants. Similarly, flexible and strategically located projects (including large industrial customers and data centres) may benefit from opportunities to provide flexibility and constraint management services, while poorly located projects may be negatively impacted through tighter operational signals.
- Existing support schemes (such as CfDs) remain central to new investments, but their design may change to better align with the SSEP, including potential locational elements. While the deemed CfD model has been ruled out, a capacity based model remains under consideration.
- RNP is not a settled framework. Many important design decisions are yet to be made, giving the industry the opportunity to shape the outcomes, so interested parties should engage early and proactively. In the immediate future, the deadline for responding to Ofgem’s Call for Input on charges is 26 May 2026 and to the government’s consultation on siting and investment levers – 2 June 2026. But there are other linked consultations that are either ongoing or yet to come.
- While the government remains committed to moving fast, this will largely depend on the parliamentary process as it will need more flexible powers to change industry codes and licences and thereby bring about change at the desired pace.
The three pillars of reform
Siting and investment levers
The government is advancing a set of reforms designed to influence the timing and location of new assets, steering investment in line with the Strategic Spatial Energy Plan (SSEP). The SSEP is a forthcoming strategic geographical plan for generation and storage that will align with government objectives and inform other spatial plans, including the Centralised Strategic Network Plan (CSNP), which will define the required transmission infrastructure. The National Energy System Operator (NESO) has been tasked with developing the SSEP, with the initial document identifying the geographical zones (onshore and offshore), capacities and timing of electricity and hydrogen generation and storage infrastructure required to meet future energy demand and reach net zero between 2030 and 2050. Consultation on the draft SSEP is expected to take place in early 2027, with publication of the final SSEP in autumn 2027, subject to government approval. The SSEP will then be updated every three years.
The delivery of the SSEP will be supported by siting and investment levers. The Delivery Plan includes a live consultation on these levers, running until 2 June 2026, signalling that detailed design is still open to input from industry. The levers under consideration are:
- Network build: Alignment of network buildout with the SSEP with the view to avoiding network delays for SSEP-aligned projects;
- Seabed leasing: Alignment of future seabed leasing with the SSEP zones and capacities, as well as with other levers, such as the connections regime and CfD allocation rounds;
- Planning reform: Formalising the status of the SSEP within the national and local planning regimes;
- Connections regime: Alignment of the connection process with the SSEP to reduce delays and ensure timely delivery of strategic projects;
- Locational charges: Reform of locational transmission charges to align with the SSEP; and
- Generation and storage investment support schemes mechanisms: Use of investment support schemes to enable delivery of technologies in volumes and locations aligned with the SSEP, including the integration of additional locational elements within those schemes to influence siting decisions.
As part of the connections regime lever, the government is considering introducing ‘Connection Capacity Thresholds’, which would set limits on the maximum volume of capacity agreements that could be allocated per technology and SSEP zone. In this context, two important decisions would need to be made: first, where to set the Connection Capacity Thresholds for each SSEP technology and zone relative to the SSEP pathway; and second, which generation projects should be given a connection agreement within the threshold. One option under consideration is to set the Connection Capacity Thresholds to align with the CSNP planning line within the SSPE pathway (referred to as ‘Option 2a’) and the other – to set the Connection Capacity Thresholds higher above the CSNP planning line for each technology and zone (referred to as ‘Option 2b’). Each option has its advantages and disadvantages. Option 2a will likely improve system efficiency and reduce additional network construction as both generation and network buildout will follow the SSEP, but on the downside could result in lower liquidity and competition for investment support as fewer projects would be able to secure a connection agreement. On the other hand, Option 2b would likely increase liquidity and competition for investment support, but it comes with the risk of actual generation buildout significantly diverging from the SSEP pathway, which is something that the government would like to avoid.
In relation to the locational charging lever, Ofgem published a Call for Input in March 2026, which explores potential options for reforming locational charging, as well as possible arrangements for legacy and transitional projects. The options are broad, ranging from targeted, incremental changes to existing network charges – such as capturing marginal network costs – to more fundamental changes to the charging methodology designed to capture wider system impacts, including metric-based charges reflecting SSEP alignment or constraint impact, or SSEP-based auction charges. For legacy and transitional projects, Ofgem is considering three options: maintaining the existing charging methodology with annual updates; phased transitioning to the new charging methodology over a defined period; or introducing a fixed regime based on the existing charging methodology with no recalculation of charges once set. The deadline for responding to the Call for Input is 26 May 2026, with the summary of responses to be published by late 2026. However, as part of RNP, the government is taking a more holistic view of the role of locational charges and their relative importance in driving siting outcomes compared to other levers. Overall, the government’s emerging preference is to retain a role for locational charges alongside the connections regime, while seeking to ensure that they reflect marginal network costs and benefits in a robust and comprehensive manner, take account of geographical and temporal variations, and continue to support stable and reliable revenues for Transmission Owners (TOs).
The role that existing investment support schemes can play in delivering the SSEP and meeting wider strategic system objectives remains under consideration. Potential options include introducing locational maxima or minima, applying measures within individual auctions or allocations to address locational inframarginal rents (that is, the difference between auction clearing price and bid price), or moving towards location-specific auctions covering individual SSEP zones or groups of zones. If required, changes to scheme design may be introduced and any necessary additional legislative changes made.
The government recognises that each siting and investment lever cannot be viewed in isolation and that there are important interactions between them, particularly between investment support schemes and the wider siting and investment levers. With that in mind, the government is working towards striking the right balance to ensure healthy auction liquidity is maintained, encourage project development in locations that minimise whole-system costs, reduce excess inframarginal rents, and ensure that locational charging arrangements are sufficiently predictable and stable. At the same time, the government wants to ensure that the siting and investment levers can be adjusted over time to take account of changing circumstances, while maintaining investor certainty.
For legacy and transitional projects, the government has committed to developing fair and transparent arrangements that maintain investor confidence, support continued investment, and ensure that existing investments are not exposed to significant windfall gains or losses if major siting and investment reforms are implemented.
The government is expected to respond to the consultation feedback and announce its decision on the preferred mix of siting and investment levers later in 2026. It will then confirm the specific reforms proposed for each policy lever and the approach to their implementation.
While the siting and investment levels are focused on transmission connections (including distribution connections that impact the transmission network), considering the growing demand for distribution connections, changes at distribution level are also in sight. The Regional Energy Strategic Plans (RESPs) are intended to encourage strategic DNO investment in network capacity upgrades and new connections and the government will also in due course consider locational charges for distribution connections.
Network constraint management
Constraint costs have increased sharply in recent years, driven by the pace of network investment failing to keep up with rapid growth of generation and new generation often being located far from centres of demand, and – absent mitigating action – are expected to continue rising. RNP envisages a Constraints Management Action Plan, comprising a range of short-, medium- and long-term measures designed to reduce and more effectively manage network constraint costs. Some of these measures are already being implemented, while others are subject to, or will be developed through, further consultation.
Key themes include:
- Acceleration of network build, including through reforming the connections queue, planning and land access processes, supporting supply chain and skills availability, and incentivising TOs to avoid delays in delivering necessary transmission infrastructure;
- Technical interventions to achieve better use of the existing network;
- Reforming system access and the process by which outages are planned, coordinated and managed;
- Considering new or better use of existing tools for NESO to take action ahead of gate closure;
- More efficient use of energy storage, flexible demand, and interconnectors;
- Removal of final consumption levies (FCLs) from demand turn up, subject to parliamentary approval;
- Targeted electricity price discounts for AI Growth Zones in Scotland, Cumbria and the North East, under which data centres located in those zones may benefit from reduced electricity costs reflecting the system benefits they deliver, including through reductions in grid constraint costs. Subject to legislative approval, data centres located in AI Growth Zones are expected from April 2027 to receive electricity cost reductions of up to £24/MWh in Scotland, £16/MWh in Cumbria and £14/MWh in the North East, with the arrangements to be reviewed in 2030.
Each measure is expected to progress to a separate timeline, with further industry engagement to take place on specific measures during the course of 2026.
Balancing, settlement and dispatch
RNP also confirms government’s intention to reform the balancing and settlement arrangements, focusing on the five areas of reform identified by NESO and outlined in its Call for Input, which closed on 14 April 2026. These comprise:
- Lowering the threshold for mandatory participation in the Balancing Mechanism;
- Aligning the market trading deadline with gate closure;
- Requiring Final Physical Notifications (FPNs) to match traded positions;
- Mandating unit-level bidding into the Balancing Mechanism that would require trading at BM Unit (rather than portfolio) level; and
- Shortening the settlement period to either 15 or 5 minutes.
Given that these reforms are at different levels of development and complexity, the government is considering approaching them in two phases. The first phase would comprise the first three measures listed above, with a final policy decision expected in the second half of 2026. The second phase would cover the remaining two measures, with an initial decision expected in the second half of 2026, followed by further consultation before a final decision is made.
The government is also considering reforming the current dispatch arrangements without moving to central dispatch. NESO’s abovementioned Call for Input sets a clear case for tighter alignment between the market position and system needs, better visibility and access to balancing resources and reduced reliance on redispatch, while retaining national pricing and market based dispatch principles. Any reform to dispatch arrangements will need to satisfy several key requirements, including delivering benefits for consumers, ensuring future system operability, maintaining investor confidence, and aligning with government’s legal obligations and international agreements. Further work on dispatch reform is expected to be undertaken in 2026, based on industry feedback to the Call for Input.
Contracts for Difference (CfD)
As part of its work on RNP, the government has provided an update on potential adaptations to the CfD scheme, building on options considered under REMA. It has concluded that the deemed CfD model where payments are based on theoretical (rather than actual) output will not be taken forward due to its significant drawbacks and that the existing output based CfD model remains a robust model for providing renewable investment support. However, recognising market distortions caused by the current CfD model, further consideration is being given to a capacity based CfD model where payments would be based on installed capacity rather than actual output. The government is also considering the role of CfDs in supporting capacity deployment in a manner aligned with the SSEP and their interaction with other siting and investment levers.
Delivery timetable
Policy development and consultation are expected to continue throughout 2026-2027, with code and licensing changes to complete during 2028 and full implementation by the end of 2029.