Overview

While technological advancement has brought many benefits to the global economy – driving greater efficiency, productivity, new markets for businesses and cross-border investment and trade – it has also led to greater sophistication in organised crime, particularly the illicit activity of crypto criminal networks.

Cryptocurrency – which continues to gain acceptance worldwide as a valid form of legal tender having all the hallmarks of property – has become an attractive means for hackers and fraudsters to carry out their activities. The opportunity has certainly been ripe for the taking, with crypto becoming a routine part of financial life for everyday investors, businesses, regulators and governments. It is easy to use, relatively seamless and can easily be woven into both legitimate – and illegitimate – financial transactions.

Crypto fraud is typically conducted in one of two ways – when fraudsters:

  • establish fake crypto investment platforms and pose as legitimate organisations to manipulate victims into transferring funds; or
  • hack legitimate crypto exchanges – gaining access to investors’ crypto wallets and stealing their bitcoin and other digital currency, before realising the assets and laundering the proceeds.

Increasingly, crypto fraud is arising in an insolvency scenario – in circumstances where the perpetrator leaves behind empty shells of interposed entities through which misappropriated funds have been laundered, or where a crypto exchange, having been cleared of its assets, is compelled to enter an insolvency process.

Given the borderless nature of cryptocurrency and its appeal to investors located all over the world, crypto fraud insolvency matters will inevitably be conducted on a cross-border basis. The task for an insolvency practitioner (IP) seeking to trace and recover misappropriated crypto assets or their proceeds is much more difficult than in the case of traditional currency utilising established banking systems.

Yet a combination of technology and specialist expertise means that cryptocurrency has ceased to be a black hole for investigations and recovery prospects, with IPs now gaining the edge in asset tracing and recovery (ATR) measures, in a constant game of “cat and mouse”.

At the same time, no matter how effective ATR technology becomes in an AI-empowered digital age, recovery prospects ultimately depend on a consistent cross-border normative framework – in relation to the adoption of substantive ATR tools such as freezing and constructive trust orders, as well as insolvency regulations relating to recognition and cooperation under the United Nations Commission on International Trade and Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (MLCBI), applicable law on substantive insolvency principles and the recognition of judgments.

The nature of fraudulent crypto schemes

It is estimated that US $17 billion was stolen in crypto scams and fraud in 2025, with AI-enabled scams around 4.5 times more profitable than traditional scams.1 These scams have continued to increase in sophistication as the fraud ecosystem becomes more professionalised.

High-yield investment scams (HYIS) and pig butchering scams have, for some time, made up the highest volume of crypto fraud sub-classes.

In a HYIS, a bogus initial coin offering or other investment “opportunity” is promoted to prospective well-off investors, encouraging them to invest in crypto and promising outsized returns via an online trading platform that does not actually exist. A particularly successful example of this has been Smart Business Corp, a Ponzi scheme targeting Spanish-speaking countries, which added bitcoin to its fake investment portfolio in 2022 and has since received over US $1.5 billion on-chain in transfers from unsuspecting victims.2

Pig butchering scams (also known as investment or romance scams) target and build relationships with individuals, convincing them to invest in fraudulent opportunities. To date, they have primarily originated via large scam compounds in Southeast Asia.3 The International Justice Mission has observed increasing human trafficking tied to these scams, with vulnerable individuals forced to work in scam operations.4

Crypto hacking is also lucrative. In this scenario, fraudsters steal the bitcoin or other cryptocurrency owned by clients of crypto services providers (generally a crypto exchange or custodian), before liquidating the assets for cash and using various interposed entities and transfers to “clean” and launder the proceeds.

It is estimated that, in 2025, illicit actors stole US $2.87 billion across 150 distinct hacks and exploits.5 In February 2025, North Korean hackers executed what so far remains the largest cryptocurrency heist in history, stealing approximately US $1.5 billion worth of digital assets (in the form of digital Ethereum coins) from Dubai-based crypto platform ByBit. The hackers exploited a free storage software product that ByBit used to move Ethereum to another location, coupled with phishing attacks to access control and download malware. It is estimated that at least US $160 million of the funds stolen from ByBit were laundered within the first 48 hours of the attack.6

So where does insolvency come into the picture in crypto fraud cases? Where the fraud consists of crypto exchange hacking, the crypto exchange may itself become insolvent after the fraud has taken place. Otherwise, the entities engaging in the illicit activity may become insolvent, as one or more interposed entities used to perpetrate the crypto fraud and launder the illicit proceeds are left as empty shells, seemingly without any trace of funds to meet investors’ claims.

Challenges for IPs

IPs seeking to investigate and trace the movement of crypto assets and their proceeds to recover funds for the benefit of defrauded investors are confronted with a difficult task. Unlike traditional financial systems and assets, the decentralised and pseudonymous nature of cryptocurrency and other digital assets can make unravelling a fraudulent scheme seem like a distant prospect.

Further, the borderless footprint of cryptocurrency makes ATR inherently a complex cross-border task. Practitioners are required to navigate a raft of differing legal frameworks for facilitating investigations, the recovery of assets and the enforcement of judgments. There is a need to consider not only local insolvency laws, but also various international treaties and protocols, with the added complication of privacy laws and restrictions on the use of personal data. There is also the potential for more than one insolvency proceeding to be opened against a debtor in different jurisdictions simultaneously. Indeed, many jurisdictions, such as Singapore, the United States, the United Kingdom and various offshore regions now adopt flexible “connecting factor” jurisdiction tests, meaning that several courts may claim jurisdiction over a particular ATR action at once, and some may assert exclusive or extraterritorial jurisdiction.7

Differences in domestic insolvency, civil procedure laws and property laws, along with relevant evidentiary requirements and standards of proof, can also complicate ATR efforts. This includes the basic threshold issue of whether cryptocurrency – and other digital assets – are even “property” and therefore capable of forming part of the insolvency estate available for recovery and distribution to stakeholders.

There are also differences as to the availability and familiarity with various ATR tools and remedies across jurisdictions, for example discovery orders, injunctive relief and constructive trust remedies. As UNCITRAL has identified:

ATR measures known and widely used in some [member] States may be unknown, or their use could create tension with public policies, in other [member] States. As a result, some ATR measures might be effective in the domestic context or across only some [member] States and less effective in other settings.8

Enhancing ATR prospects

That said, the tracing and recovery of crypto assets by IPs appointed to an insolvent entity involved in a fraudulent scheme (as perpetrator or victim) is by no means hopeless.

Emerging technologies, such as AI-driven data tracing, forensic analytics and blockchain forensics, have provided new breakthroughs in recent times that are now reshaping investigations. IPs are now becoming adept at drawing on a range of expertise – assembling specialist investigation teams comprised of forensic accountants, blockchain tracers, and IT and cyber experts – in seeking to unravel fraudulent schemes.

While, as noted, cryptocurrency offers a greater level of obfuscation potential to perpetrate fraudulent schemes than traditional currency and banking systems, it is not completely anonymous and untraceable. Most blockchains still leave a public record of the wallets involved and the transaction amounts. The core challenge is linking these transactions to real-world entities that can be targeted for the recovery of misappropriated assets.

The technology currently being deployed in ATR efforts in crypto fraud investigations includes:

  1. Machine learning and data analytics – AI-powered platforms can analyse substantial volumes of datasets to detect irregular transfers across multiple accounts and unravel hidden assets and relationships between interposed entities.
  2. Natural language processing – AI-driven tools, such as SymphonyAI’s Financial Crime Prevention Solutions, extract key insights from unstructured data sources to identify asset concealment and fraudulent activities.
  3. Blockchain forensics and analysis – again, AI-powered tools allow investigators to identify digital wallets linked to fraudulent crypto activities and then track the flow of funds on a public blockchain ledger as it moves across various wallets and decentralised finance platforms.

Investigators are assisted in this task by cluster analysis, a specialist blockchain forensics tool that groups together wallet addresses likely to belong to the same user and can enable investigators to obtain the user’s identity. Transaction graph analysis also assists in mapping out the flow of funds between wallets and identifying patterns of illicit activity replicated across the blockchain.

While fraudsters can obscure the origin and destination of transactions through the use of mixing software such as Wasabi, which jumbles up blockchain data from multiple users, forensic tools can still use the “before and after” to piece together patterns in transaction size, timing and destination, and draw on multi-chain analytics capability to track funds across various blockchains. 9

However, jurisdictional enforcement challenges remain no matter how sophisticated tracing efforts become.

Apart from efforts to harmonise domestic substantive laws providing for a broad range of ATR tools, the procedural recognition framework under the provisions of the MLCBI can also be of significant assistance. Of particular note, the recognising court in a cross-border insolvency matter can order a broad range of discretionary relief if it recognises a foreign proceeding and is satisfied that the interests of creditors and other interested persons, including the debtor, are adequately protected.10 Discretionary relief could be tailored to support ATR measures, particularly where the local jurisdiction itself provides for ATR tools available to litigants in substantive laws. In that regard, article 23(1) of the MLCBI states that the court can grant any additional relief that may be available to a representative under the law governing the recognising court.

Further, when applying for recognition of a foreign insolvency process as a foreign main proceeding or a foreign non-main proceeding, the foreign representative may seek relief of a provisional nature if it is “urgently needed to protect the assets of the debtor or the interests of the creditors.”11 This has the potential to extend to provisional ATR measures such as the freezing of assets and the compulsory production of information concerning the debtor's assets and affairs.

As part of the effort to enhance the use of the MLCBI framework in an ATR context, and to also drive greater adoption of substantive recovery tools by legislators, UNCITRAL adopted both a toolkit (ATR Toolkit) and background explanatory notes (ATR Notes) on Asset Tracing and Recovery in Insolvency Proceedings at its 58th Session in Vienna in July 2025.

The adoption of the ATR Toolkit and the ATR Notes came after a 4-year deliberation process led by UNCITRAL’s Working Group V (Insolvency Law) in which it became evident that adequate ATR tools might not be available in all member States, while access to existing tools, in particular by foreigners, might not be effective and efficient especially given the complexities and difficulties involved in unwinding hidden crypto assets.

The final text of the ATR Toolkit sets out tools and steps that could expedite ATR both domestically and across borders in both physical and digital environments. The ATR Toolkit and the accompanying ATR Notes are non-prescriptive. They are designed to provide a source of information about measures used across jurisdictions to “enable, facilitate and expedite” ATR and to identify common features across States.12 Some of the ATR tools profiled include provisional measures – such as attachment or garnishment orders, sequestration, embargoes, freezing orders, judicially ordered security interests or liens and seizures – and substantive relief such as actio pauliana or constructive trust orders.

The intention of the ATR Toolkit is to influence legislators to adopt these ATR tools in cases where they are lacking in a particular jurisdiction.13 The text is also designed to enhance court-to-court communication and cooperation and expedite ATR across borders under the existing MLCBI framework. This may lead to both the greater availability of ATR measures across jurisdictions, and costs savings due to a reduction in duplicative hearings on ATR measures in jurisdictions through which assets have been transferred.14

A key priority going forward should be to encourage greater willingness among recognising courts to enable foreign representatives to use local ATR tools to pursue misappropriated digital assets. While the ATR Toolkit and the ATR Notes will assist, there is also an opportunity to enhance judicial diplomacy efforts – informal networking, training and education from judges in advanced legal systems with a range of ATR tools (such as the United Kingdom, Singapore, the United States and Australia), and the use of forums such as the Judicial Insolvency Network.

However, the effectiveness and efficiency of ATR could be enhanced even further by the adoption of additional international frameworks beyond the MLCBI. Especially significant is the UNCITRAL Model Law on the Recognition and Enforcement of Insolvency-Related Judgments (MLIRJ). In that regard, while the MLCBI provides a framework for the recognition of, and cooperation regarding, restructuring and insolvency procedures, it does not of itself automatically facilitate the recognition of foreign judgments arising out of those procedures.

Conflicting positions have been taken by courts in different jurisdictions. For example, the United Kingdom position is that the MLCBI is limited to the procedural aspects of cross-border insolvency and does not govern choice of law rules to enable the enforcement of insolvency-related judgments. This leaves in place default ordinary private international law rules preventing the enforcement of in personam judgments against defendants not present in the foreign country where the judgment is entered and who do not submit to the jurisdiction of the court entering the judgment.15 In contrast, United States courts have taken the position that the MLCBI does provide a basis for the recognition and enforcement of insolvency-related judgments under the discretionary relief provisions in article 21 of the MLCBI.16

The MLIRJ is intended to overcome the uncertainty regarding the interpretation of article 21 of the MLCBI as a means of supporting the recognition and enforcement of insolvency-related judgments and limiting potential challenges to the validity of court orders that may protract and complicate cross-border insolvency recoveries.

While the MLIRJ has not yet been adopted by any nation, its implementation is under active consideration in Singapore. The United Kingdom also still intends to adopt the MLIRJ, although the adoption process appears to have stalled for the time being.

Convergence in substantive insolvency laws is also desirable. Working Group V considered a standalone draft Model Law on Applicable Law in Insolvency Proceedings (Draft Applicable Law) at its 67th Session in Vienna in December 2025, after a consultation process extending more than 4 years. The Draft Applicable Law text reinforces the application of the lex fori concursus – the law of the state where the insolvency proceedings are opened – to all aspects of insolvency proceedings, subject only to limited and clearly defined exceptions.17 Notably, there is one such exception in the case of avoidance proceedings (which will, necessarily, be required in ATR efforts relating to a fraudulent crypto scheme). Article 6 of the Draft Applicable Law provides that, instead of the lex fori concursus, a court may apply the insolvency law of the State where the debtor had its centre of main interests at the time of the conclusion of the transaction giving rise to the relevant act of avoidance. This is on the condition that deference to that law is necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the parties to the transaction.

Also relevant is the work of the United Nations Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) to facilitate the harmonised legal treatment of digital assets, including cryptocurrency. After an extensive consultation process, the UNIDROIT Principles on Digital Assets and Private Law (UNIDROIT Principles) were adopted by the UNIDROIT Governing Council at its 102nd session in May 2023.

The UNIDROIT Principles comprise legislative guidance and best practices in relation to transactions involving digital assets. They are designed to serve a twofold purpose: to provide clear rules relating to digital transactions, and to encourage States to adopt legislation consistent with the UNIDROIT Principles. The overall objective is to increase predictability in transactions relating to digital assets, which UNIDROIT hopes will lead to reduced costs and increased efficiency.

While the UNIDROIT Principles have a broad scope, including as to the nature and enforceability of security interests over digital assets and general legal issues pertaining to the holding and transfer of digital assets across a variety of commercial use cases, they have a distinct level of importance in an ATR context. Notably, principle 3(1) expressly states that digital assets can be the subject of proprietary rights. This may mean that, in certain jurisdictions, digital assets could be classified as “property” (or the law reformed to include a new class of property which can accommodate digital assets).

This is significant – insofar as, if implemented by a particular jurisdiction, cryptocurrency would be considered property (or its functional equivalent), such that it could form part of the insolvency estate subject to the control of an IP and recovery for the benefit of investors. This would considerably enhance certainty and efficiency in ATR efforts. As noted above, current debate over the proprietary nature of digital assets can impede and even prevent ATR.

Conclusion

Crypto crime is costing investors tens of billions of dollars every year. It is also becoming a fast-growing area in the cross-border insolvency landscape, as investors scramble to locate their funds within a web of interposed entities used to perpetrate a fraudulent scheme.

Enhanced investigative methodologies and AI-powered forensic tools are increasing the ability for IPs – supported by expert forensics teams – to trace and recover crypto and other digital assets in this scenario. Yet the cat and mouse game can ultimately only be won against crypto criminals through greater regulatory convergence and alignment – both in the adoption of substantive ATR tools in domestic legislation, and in the consistent adoption and implementation of cross-border insolvency norms relating to the recognition of foreign insolvency processes and judgments, mutual assistance and cooperation and substantive insolvency law.

With the level of attention being given to combating cyber crime and digital fraud by global regulators and legislators, and the proactive attitude of courts in supporting cross-border investigations to unwind fraudulent schemes, it is hoped that we will see further advances in ATR processes – and greater prospect of investors receiving some of their funds retuned in an insolvency matter – in the near future.

Footnotes

  1. 1

    Chainalysis, “Record $17 Billion Estimated Stolen in Crypto Scams and Fraud in 2025 as Impersonation Tactics and AI Enablement Surge”, January 13, 2026, available at: https://www.chainalysis.com/blog/crypto-scams-2026/.

  2. 2

    Chainalysis, “Crypto Scan Revenue in 2024: Pig Butchering Grows Nearly 40% Year on Year as Fraud Industry Leverages AI and Increases in Sophistication”, February 13, 2025, available at: https://www.chainalysis.com/blog/2024-pig-butchering-scam-revenue-grows-yoy/. \

  3. 3

    Ibid.

  4. 4

    International Justice Mission, “IJM Uncovers Links Between Child Sextortion and Southeast Asia’s Scam Compounds”, August 19, 2025, available at: https://www.ijm.org/news/ijm-uncovers-links-between-child-sextortion-and-southeast-asias-scam-compounds. \

  5. 5

    TRM Labs, 2026 Crypto Crime Report, January 28, 2026, available at: https://www.trmlabs.com/reports-and-whitepapers/2026-crypto-crime-report.

  6. 6

    Centre for Strategic and International Studies, “The ByBit Heist and the Future of US Crypto Regulation”, March 18, 2025, available at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/bybit-heist-and-future-us-crypto-regulation.

  7. 7

    UNCITRAL, Asset Tracing and Recovery in Insolvency Proceedings, Background Notes (ATR Notes), 2025, [15]. \

  8. 8

    Idem, [20].

  9. 9

    Quantuma Advisory, “Tracing and Recovering Misappropriated Digital Assets”, December 17, 2024, available at: https://www.quantuma.com/insights/tracing-and-recovering-misappropriated-digital-assets. \

  10. 10

    MLCBI, article 22(1).

  11. 11

    Idem, article 19.

  12. 12

    ATR Notes, [1].

  13. 13

    Idem, [1].\

  14. 14

    ATR Toolkit, 12-14.

  15. 15

    Rubin v Eurofinance [2013] 1 AC 236.\

  16. 16

    In Re Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments, 421 BR 685 (Bankr SDNY 2010).

  17. 17

    Article 5.\

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