Introduction
Queensland’s introduction of a statutory community benefit framework into the Planning Act 2016 (Qld) (Planning Act) represents a significant shift in how renewable energy projects are planned, assessed, approved and delivered. For projects captured by the framework, social impact assessments (SIAs) and community benefit agreements (CBAs) are no longer peripheral stakeholder engagement tools. They are now threshold requirements that must be resolved before a development application can even be accepted for assessment.
In December 2025, we wrote about some of the key practical issues we were seeing at the time. In this article, we discuss some further risk areas we now see developing under the framework in Queensland. We also discuss practical approaches proponents can take to manage these risks, drawing on our observations from current projects and discussions with key government and industry stakeholders.
Quick recap on the community benefit framework
The community benefit framework applies to the following types of development:
- A material change of use of premises for a solar farm that has a maximum instantaneous electricity output of 1MW or more.
- A material change of use of premises for a wind farm.
- A material change of use of premises for a battery storage facility that has a maximum instantaneous electricity output of 50MW or more.
The stated goal of these reforms was to ensure renewable projects do not just deliver clean energy but leave lasting, positive impacts on local communities. The reforms are intended to embed social and community considerations directly into planning and assessment processes.
Developers for projects captured by the community benefit framework are now required to carry out a SIA and enter into a CBA with the local government before lodging a development application with the assessment manager (the State Assessment and Referral Agency or SARA). Without it, the development application will not be properly made under the Planning Act and cannot be accepted by SARA unless the chief executive administering the Planning Act (Chief Executive) grants an exemption or waiver (discussed further below).
SIAs assess how a project affects local wellbeing, values, access to services, and livelihoods. They must identify positive, negative, direct, indirect and cumulative impacts as against a baseline of existing social conditions and trends in the project area. The SIA must also include clear, realistic, and measurable actions to reduce adverse impacts and strengthen community benefits to ensure accountability and transparency throughout the project’s lifecycle.
CBAs must be negotiated with the relevant local government (and potentially neighbouring councils). These agreements are intended to ensure clear, accountable delivery of tangible community benefits – ideally, as linked to the social impacts identified in the SIA.
The legislation also establishes a formal mediation process to support SIA and CBA negotiations where agreement cannot be reached. Mediation is intended to facilitate resolution between proponents and local governments during the CBA negotiation phase. Local governments are expressly permitted to recover the costs associated with the mediation (in addition to the costs they may incur related to the SIA preparation and CBA negotiation). More on the limitations of the mediation process below.
As foreshadowed above, the Chief Executive has a discretionary power to issue a notice that a CBA and/or SIA is not required for a particular development application. This power is intended to deal with limited or exceptional circumstances, for example, where impacts are minimal or adequately addressed through other mechanisms, or where the local government has failed to engage in the SIA/CBA process.
Developing risk areas
In the following sections of this article we discuss our views on emerging areas of risk with the CBA framework, and ways these risks may be approached:
- Potential inconsistency of approach between local governments
- Relationship between CBAs and agreements with Traditional Owners
- SIA drift
- Scope creep: infrastructure and development assessment overlap
- Battery energy storage systems (BESS) and ancillary use issues
- No meaningful deadlock mechanism or State oversight
Potential inconsistency between local governments
The potential for inconsistency between local government approaches has already given rise to practical difficulties in CBA negotiation.
While the Planning Act and supporting guidelines establish the framework, they leave substantial discretion to councils as to policy design, contribution methodology, governance of funds and the scope of matters addressed through CBAs. Some councils have adopted detailed CBA policies with clear contribution formulas, governance arrangements and links to identified social impacts. Others have limited or no formal policy, relying instead on ad hoc negotiation. The lack of a CBA template has meant that proponents and councils are adopting varying approaches to agreement drafting.
In practice, councils adopt approaches that reflect local priorities, capacity constraints or risk appetite, rather than a consistent interpretation of social impact mitigation across the state. While this is arguably what was intended by the reforms, it is resulting in divergent views on issues such as MW based contributions, treatment of hybrid generation and storage projects, the inclusion of infrastructure or technical obligations in CBAs, and whether benefits should be paid directly to council or allocated to community led initiatives.
This variability is creating real uncertainty for proponents, particularly those developing multiple projects in different local government areas, as substantively similar renewable projects may attract materially different community benefit expectations depending solely on location rather than their impact profile. Some projects cross local government boundaries which can cause inconsistency within the same project if the local governments are not aligned on approach.
The risk is compounded by the absence of a State level calibration or oversight.
Because this inconsistency is not something proponents can meaningfully control, mitigation strategies must be framed around containing commercial exposure rather than achieving uniform outcomes. Proponents should undertake early comparative analysis to understand how a council’s position sits relative to peer councils, not with an expectation of harmonisation, but to inform internal risk assessment and escalation decisions.
Negotiations should be anchored, as far as possible, to the statutory purpose of CBAs as impact based (rather than revenue raising) instruments Negotiations should be supported by examples of proportionate outcomes adopted elsewhere in Queensland where those examples assist in demonstrating reasonableness.
For larger developers, there is strategic value in developing an internal, repeatable “baseline” CBA position that defines acceptable scope, contribution principles and red lines. While this approach does not prevent local variation, it materially reduces the risk that council specific discretion translates into uncontrolled or precedent setting commercial outcomes across a project portfolio.
Relationship between CBAs and agreements with Traditional owners
An increasingly important issue for renewable energy proponents is the intersection between CBAs and agreements entered into with Traditional Owners under native title or cultural heritage legislation, or those entered into on a voluntary basis – often called relationship or shared benefit agreements (SBAs).
While agreements with Traditional Owners are often negotiated in parallel and may sit alongside one another in a project’s broader stakeholder engagement framework, they are legally and conceptually distinct instruments that serve different purposes.
SBAs are typically grounded in recognition of Traditional Owners’ rights and interests in land, culture and heritage, and are directed to sharing the economic and social benefits of a project with Traditional Owner groups. CBAs, by contrast, are intended to address and offset the broader social impacts of a development and provide lasting benefits to the broader local community (including First Nations peoples).
Consistent with this distinction, some local governments have made it expressly clear in their CBA policies that community benefits must be additional to, and not a substitute for, obligations committed to under agreements with Traditional Owners. This requires that there is to be no double counting of benefits, and no dilution of community benefit outcomes by reference to commitments made to Traditional Owners. From a proponent’s perspective, this creates a real risk of cumulative obligation if the boundaries between the two types of agreements are not carefully managed.
To manage risks effectively, it is essential to clearly define and retain the separate objectives of each agreement in negotiations and documentation. Care must be taken to avoid drafting in CBAs that attempts to “offset” or “credit” commitments under Traditional Owner agreements against broader community benefit obligations. Instead, governance arrangements, funding sources, and reporting requirements should be kept entirely distinct for each agreement.
Additionally, agreements with Traditional Owners are generally confidential and often contain culturally sensitive information relating to those Traditional Owners. While it may sometimes be appropriate to acknowledge the existence of a Traditional Owner agreement within a CBA, it is critical not to disclose confidential or sensitive details from that agreement in the CBA or any related documents or negotiations. Maintaining this separation not only demonstrates respect and good faith engagement with Traditional Owners but can also reassure local government that CBAs are delivering additional benefits to the broader community.
SIA drift
A recurring practical risk is the potential disconnect between SIAs and CBA outcomes. The framework does not require every social impact identified in an SIA to be addressed through a CBA, nor does it mandate that CBAs mirror SIA prioritisation. Although this flexibility is deliberate, it can lead to CBAs becoming broad funding tools that may not be focused on addressing project-specific impacts.
From a proponent perspective, this creates two risks. First, contribution demands can escalate beyond what is reasonably connected to the project’s impacts. Secondly, CBAs that lack a clear impact rationale may be harder to defend to boards, financiers and, in some cases, communities themselves.
One way to address this is to make sure the agreement clearly identifies which social impacts from the SIA are being dealt with, and which are not. This does not mean the CBA needs to be overly technical, just that it should openly state how identified social impacts are managed.
In practice, this can be difficult as local governments have considerable flexibility as to what goes into the CBA. As discussed above, this flexibility means that the content and scope of CBAs can vary significantly from one council to another, and even between projects within the same jurisdiction. Local governments may seek to include a range of initiatives, from funding for community facilities and social programs to commitments regarding infrastructure or environmental management. While this allows CBAs to be tailored to local needs, it can also create uncertainty for proponents, who may face shifting expectations or be required to negotiate on matters that extend beyond the traditional scope of community benefits.
As a result, it is important for proponents to engage early and openly with councils to clarify priorities and ensure the CBA remains focused on delivering genuine, impact-linked benefits rather than becoming an overly broad or duplicative instrument.
Scope creep: Infrastructure and development assessment overlap
Another significant risk arises where CBAs begin to overlap with, or duplicate, development approval (DA) obligations, including infrastructure charges and conditions. The framework allows for CBAs and DA processes to address the same infrastructure, but for different purposes: CBAs are about benefit contributions, while DA conditions and infrastructure charges respond to network and other impacts caused by the development.
In practice, the line between those regimes may blur. Councils may seek commitments in CBAs relating to roads, utilities, environmental management or other technical matters at a point in time when proponents lack final design certainty. This exposes proponents to duplication, premature commitments and, in some cases, inconsistent obligations.
Ideally, there should be a clear contractual separation between mitigation of project impacts and community benefits, where CBAs explicitly acknowledge that infrastructure charges and DA conditions are separate statutory regimes, and include “no double recovery” language.
We also recommend that CBAs avoid dealing with matters that are more properly addressed through DA conditions, such as obligations relating to traffic impact assessment and management, construction environmental management plans or noise impact management. These matters sit squarely within the statutory development assessment framework, where they are assessed against established assessment benchmarks and attract appeal rights. Attempting to resolve them through a CBA may risk blurring the distinction between strict impact mitigation (which is the role of DA conditions) and community benefit outcomes (which are intended to address social impacts and deliver positive legacy outcomes).
Including technical and operational matters in a CBA can materially increase project risk. As noted above, at the time CBAs are typically negotiated, proponents often do not have the level of technical detail required to make informed, enforceable commitments on issues such as traffic management, construction methodologies or noise controls. Locking in obligations prematurely can lead to inconsistency with later DA conditions, duplication of requirements, or the need to renegotiate agreements once approvals are granted.
From a bankability and project delivery perspective, it is generally preferable for CBAs to focus on clearly defined, impact linked community benefits, while leaving technical mitigation measures to be imposed, refined and enforced through the DA process, where they can evolve in response to detailed design and regulatory assessment.
Local governments are likely to resist the proposition that technical and operational matters should be quarantined to the development assessment process, particularly where they are not the assessment manager for the development application. From a council perspective, this can create a perceived loss of control over impacts that will be felt most acutely at the local level, such as construction traffic, noise, road safety and amenity impacts. As assessment responsibility sits with SARA, councils may seek to use the CBA process as an alternative mechanism to secure comfort that these impacts will be managed, or at least acknowledged, notwithstanding that they fall outside the intended scope of community benefit outcomes. This dynamic increases the risk that CBAs become a proxy impact mitigation instrument, rather than an agreement focused on addressing residual social impacts and delivering positive community legacy.
The most effective mitigation is early, structured engagement supported by credible technical evidence. Commencing preparation of key technical supporting reports, such as traffic impact assessments, noise modelling and construction methodology assumptions, at an earlier stage can materially assist CBA negotiations, even if those reports are preliminary or high level. Early development of technical material allows proponents to demonstrate that impacts are being actively identified and managed through the statutory approval pathway, reducing the perceived need for councils to secure parallel protections through a CBA. Importantly, this does not require final or even application ready documents. It does require sufficient analysis to explain likely impacts, mitigation principles and the regulatory mechanisms through which they will ultimately be controlled.
Other approaches include:
- Clearly articulating, in the CBA itself, the respective roles of the DA and the CBA, including express acknowledgements that technical mitigation measures will be addressed through DA conditions imposed by the relevant assessment manager.
- Providing for information sharing or consultation commitments, rather than substantive technical obligations, for example commitments to brief council on key findings of traffic or noise studies as they are finalised, without hard wiring outcomes or thresholds into the CBA.
- Deferred mechanisms, whereby certain community benefit initiatives are informed by DA outcomes but not triggered until approval conditions are known, avoiding premature or inconsistent commitments.
BESS and ancillary use issues
BESS can, in appropriate circumstances, be treated as related and ancillary to the generation component of a renewable energy development, particularly where the battery is co located with wind or solar generation and is functionally integrated with that facility. Whether a BESS is ancillary is ultimately determined on a case by case basis, having regard to facts and circumstances such as functional relationship, proportionality and whether the storage is subordinate to the primary use. Where a BESS is genuinely ancillary and is storing energy generated by the same project, a key policy and practical question arises: should proponents be required to effectively duplicate community benefit payments for the same underlying activity?
From a framework perspective, the answer does not turn on the energy itself, but on the social impacts associated with the use. The community benefit regime is designed to address and offset social impacts arising from development uses, not to levy contributions by reference to electrons generated and then stored. Where an ancillary BESS does not materially change the project’s impact profile (such as workforce, traffic, amenity, or demand on local services) there is a strong argument that requiring a separate or additional contribution risks double counting and departs from the impact based intent of the scheme. The focus, in principle, is on whether the addition of storage introduces new or incremental impacts that warrant further community benefit contributions, rather than assuming that storage automatically justifies a second payment.
In practice, however, some local governments are requiring contributions to community benefit funds on a MW or MWh basis for both generation and BESS, even where the BESS is ancillary and integrated with the generation facility. This approach reflects a tendency to apply contribution formulas mechanically, rather than through an impact based lens, and it creates a real risk of cumulative and disproportionate obligations for hybrid projects. Proponents cannot assume that ancillary classification alone will prevent duplication.
Mitigation of this risk lies in taking an evidence based approach to negotiations. We recommend that proponents clearly articulate the ancillary nature of the BESS, demonstrating, through early technical and social impact material, whether and how the battery alters (or does not alter) the project’s impact profile. While this strategy will not eliminate local variation, it will improve a proponent’s ability to contain contribution creep.
No meaningful deadlock mechanism or State oversight
A structural weakness in the framework is the absence of a reliable deadlock breaking mechanism. If a proponent and a local government cannot reach agreement on a CBA, there is no independent forum empowered to determine fair or reasonable terms. While mediation is available, it is a voluntary process and non determinative. The Department of State Development, Infrastructure and Planning manages the mediation process, including by receiving requests for mediation, appointing the mediator and issuing a mediation certificate at the conclusion of the process.
If mediation fails, the process simply returns the parties to negotiation, with the potential for positions to become further entrenched. Critically, there is no judicial or other review pathway that can impose an outcome and allow a project to progress.
The Chief Executive has discretion to waive the requirement for a CBA and/or SIA for a particular development application. Although the Chief Executive waiver mechanism is sometimes characterised as a “backstop”, it cannot be relied upon to resolve genuine impasses.
The Chief Executive’s decision is discretionary, binary, and non appealable. The power is intended to deal with limited or exceptional circumstances, for example, where impacts are minimal or adequately addressed through other mechanisms, or where the local government has failed to engage in the SIA/CBA process. There is no guarantee that a waiver will be granted, particularly where a council has been negotiating and engaging in a meaningful way, even if agreement ultimately proves impossible. In those circumstances, the existence of negotiations may itself weigh against the grant of a waiver, leaving proponents exposed to prolonged stalemate despite good faith efforts and substantive engagement.
This stands in sharp contrast to compensation and land access regimes under Queensland’s resource legislation, where failure to reach agreement does not equate to project failure. In that context, compensation disputes can be referred to the Land Court for determination, providing both parties with a clear incentive to negotiate reasonably and the certainty that, if negotiations fail, an independent body will impose terms. The availability of a determinative forum fundamentally alters the risk profile: it prevents hold out behaviour and ensures that projects are not stranded simply because commercial agreement proves elusive despite all best efforts.
Under the community benefit regime, however, renewable energy developers face a materially different risk analysis. Faced with looming final investment decision timelines, capacity investment scheme considerations, and grid and offtake milestones, proponents may find themselves with only two practical choices: accept onerous or disproportionate community benefit obligations or abandon or defer otherwise viable projects. This risk is most acute for capital intensive or finely balanced projects, where uncertainty about CBA outcomes and costings can undermine bankability or delay investment approvals. Proponents with multiple projects facing similar challenges are also exposed.
The absence of a true deadlock resolution mechanism therefore has consequences well beyond individual negotiations. It shifts leverage decisively toward councils and introduces a level of timing and execution risk that is difficult to price or manage.
Until the framework evolves to include a credible, independent determination pathway, proponents must treat CBA negotiations not as a procedural step, but as a critical project risk capable of determining whether a renewable energy project proceeds at all.
Conclusion
Queensland’s community benefit framework is reshaping the risk profile of renewable energy development in ways that extend well beyond traditional planning compliance. The combination of localised discretion, inconsistent policy approaches, expanding CBA scope and the absence of any determinative deadlock resolution mechanism means that CBA negotiations can now operate as a gating issue for project progression.
In this environment, proponents cannot afford to treat CBAs as a procedural step to be resolved late in the development process. Instead, CBA risk must be identified, assessed and actively managed as a core project risk, alongside grid connection, offtake, financing and construction considerations. Failure to do so can result in cost escalation, loss of leverage, compromised bankability or prolonged project delay.
In the absence of a determinative pathway for resolving disputes, proponents must approach CBA negotiations with a clear negotiation strategy and robust evidence to protect project viability. Approached in this way, CBAs can still serve their intended purpose of delivering meaningful, impact linked benefits to host communities.