I. Introduction

  1. In a rare appellate decision (CNL Logistic Solutions Pte Ltd and another v Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore [2025] SGCAB 1), the Competition Appeal Board (the “Board”) sets out what constitutes price fixing and information-sharing conduct prohibited under section 34 of the Competition Act 2004. This case note summarises the Board’s decision and highlights key takeaways for commercial parties to note.

II. Decision

  1. A finding of infringement under section 34 consists of two key elements:

    1. there is an “agreement” or “concerted practice” between undertakings; and
    2. that agreement or concerted practice has the “object” or “effect” of preventing, restricting or distorting competition within Singapore.
  2. In this case, the largest warehouse operator in Keppel Distripark had in June 2017 announced a decision to introduce a "Free Trade Zone Surcharge" (the “FTZ Surcharge”) on import cargo stored within the free trade zone at Keppel Distripark. Many of the other operators quickly followed suit. The Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore (“CCS”) found that four of these operators had, in doing so, infringed section 34 by engaging in an agreement and/or concerted practice to fix the price of warehousing services by coordinating the imposition of the “FTZ Surcharge” on their respective warehousing services.

  3. Two of these operators (the Appellants) appealed on both liability and quantum. They argued that: (a) they only communicated their independent decisions to follow the decision of market leaders in Keppel Distripark to introduce the FTZ Surcharge, and this did not amount to infringing conduct under section 34; and (b) there was no causal connection established between the communication of information by the Appellants to Penanshin (another operator), and the subsequent market conduct of the Undertakings; instead, the market conduct of the Undertakings was the natural and rational response to market movements initiated by the market leaders.

  4. The Board allowed the appeal on liability and set aside the infringement decision against the Appellants. The Board found as follows:

    1. On the first element of an “agreement” or “concerted “practice – The CCS had not proven on a balance of probabilities that there was an agreement involving the Appellants and Penanshin (one of their competitors) to coordinate the imposition of the FTZ Surcharge. However, the CCS did sufficiently establish the Appellants’ involvement in a concerted practice in exchanging their pricing intentions with Penanshin and using that information to convince their customers to agree to the implementation of the FTZ Surcharge.
    2. On the second element of an agreement or concerted practice with the “object” or “effect” of restricting competition in Singapore – The CCS had not proven on a balance of probabilities that the concerted practice (viz. the Appellants’ exchange of pricing information) had the “object” of restricting competition in Singapore. The CCS did not advance an alternative case of a concerted practice with the “effect” of restricting competition in Singapore.
  5. In its decision, the Board distilled the following legal principles, which are worth noting.

    1. "Agreements" and "concerted practices" are distinct concepts. How an infringement is characterised is crucial for a clear assessment of whether each element of the infringement has been established.

      • An agreement may be formed when parties arrive at a voluntary consensus with each other about how they will act or not act, regardless of how it is arrived at and whether it is legally enforceable.
      • In contrast, a “concerted practice” concerns situations where the parties have not reached any apparent agreement but have knowingly substituted the risks of competition with some form of practical cooperation between them. This entails: (a) direct or indirect contact between undertakings which reduces or removes uncertainty as to future market conduct; (b) subsequent market conduct from which concertation may be inferred; and (c) a causal relationship between the parties’ contact and their subsequent conduct. A mere act of communication between horizontal competitors does not immediately constitute a “concerted practice”. A “concerted practice” also requires their communications to result in subsequent market conduct that can be regarded as a form of “practical cooperation” despite the absence of an agreement between them.
    2. A cautious approach should be taken not to expand the scope of the “object” limb of section 34.

      • Only the most well-established, egregious and obviously harmful forms of anti-competitive conduct fall within the “by object” limb of the prohibition under section 34. Other forms of conduct may infringe section 34 if they are shown to be restrictive of competition “by effect”.
      • The legal test to determine if conduct should be prohibited under the “object” limb is whether such conduct is “regarded, by their very nature, as being harmful to the proper functioning of normal competition” or whether “such coordination reveals in itself a sufficient degree of harm to competition”. Once it is shown that the anti-competitive conduct falls under the “object” limb, there is no need to examine its actual or likely effects on competition in the market, nor to prove that the parties have the subjective intention of restricting competition.
    3. Price-fixing is to be distinguished from information-sharing conduct. Price fixing is a well-established category of conduct under the “object” limb. Whereas information sharing will only infringe section 34 where it is shown to have an appreciable adverse effect on competition – this depends on the market characteristics, the type of information and the way in which it is exchanged.

III. Key takeaways

  1. The Board’s decision provides useful and practical guidance on the applicability of cartel prohibitions to price-fixing and information-sharing conduct.
  2. To start with, price-fixing and information-sharing must be viewed as distinct categories of conduct. While price-fixing would involve an exchange of pricing information to some degree, not every sharing or exchange of price-related information between competitors constitutes “price-fixing”.
  3. Businesses should nevertheless be aware of the competition law risks of engaging in private disclosures or exchanges of pricing information. Depending on the nature of pricing information exchanged and the specific economic context of the relevant market, such communications may still infringe the section 34 prohibition whether under the “object” limb (where the conduct is clearly injurious to competition) or the “effect” limb (where the conduct can be shown to have an appreciable adverse effect on competition).
  4. Information-sharing cases – where an overt price-fixing agreement cannot be proven – are likely to be particularly nuanced. The Board recognised that parallel pricing behaviour or independent price-following conduct in a highly concentrated oligopolistic market could be regarded as “normal” market behaviour from which an inference of concertation should not always be drawn. However, an inference of concertation may be appropriately drawn where market players behave in similar ways after one undertaking has made significant private disclosure of its pricing plans to another to signal the former’s pricing intentions in advance, in order to influence the latter’s future pricing conduct or persuade the latter to adopt similar pricing strategies.

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