Overview

On February 17, 2026, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC or Commission) filed an amicus curiae brief (the Amicus Brief) in the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit case North American Derivatives Exchange, Inc. v. State of Nevada, marking the agency’s first formal judicial intervention in the rapidly expanding litigation over the legal status of event contracts and prediction markets.1 The filing followed a Wall Street Journal op-ed by CFTC Chairman Michael S. Selig, who characterized state enforcement actions against prediction market operators as a “power grab” that “ignores the law and decades of precedent.”2

The CFTC’s intervention represents a decisive policy shift. Under the previous presidential administration, the Commission sought to broadly restrict political and sports-related event contracts.3 Indeed, the current Commission has withdrawn that proposal,4 and now affirmatively advocates that event contracts traded on CFTC-designated contract markets (DCMs) are “swaps” within the CFTC’s exclusive jurisdiction under the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) that preempt state gambling laws.5

The central dispute

The Amicus Brief addresses a jurisdictional question of first impression at the federal circuit court level: whether event contracts—financial instruments whose payoffs depend on the occurrence or non-occurrence of a specified future event—fall within the CFTC’s exclusive federal jurisdiction when traded on a registered DCM, or whether they may be regulated or prohibited by state gaming and gambling laws.

The CFTC’s coordinated intervention

The amicus filing was coordinated with CFTC Chairman Selig’s February 16 Wall Street Journal op-ed, in which he publicly announced the filing and articulated the Commission’s policy rationale. Chairman Selig wrote that prediction markets are “derivative instruments that allow two parties to speculate on future market conditions without owning the underlying asset,” that they “serve legitimate economic functions” and that “event-contracts markets are subject to rules and regulations that ensure fair outcomes for market participants” and are “examined and supervised by experienced CFTC staff.”6

Scale and commercial stakes

The commercial stakes are significant. Super Bowl LX generated over US$1 billion in notional trading volume on regulated prediction market platforms.7 Kalshi has reported annualized trading volume exceeding US$100 billion, with approximately 90 percent tied to sports-related contracts.8 Beyond prediction markets, the Amicus Brief warns that more than 3,000 self-certified event-based contracts—encompassing cryptocurrency price levels, GDP releases, interest rate decisions, election outcomes, temperature forecasts, electricity usage and price movements of precious metals—could be exposed to state prohibition if the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirms the October 2025 ruling of the US District Court for the District of Nevada.9

Background

The CFTC’s exclusive jurisdiction: Legislative history

The CFTC’s claim to exclusive federal jurisdiction over event contracts rests on a half-century legislative edifice designed to displace state regulatory authority over commodity derivatives markets. Congress created the CFTC in 1974 and vested it with “exclusive jurisdiction” over US commodity futures and options markets to eliminate a fragmented state regulatory regime.10 That preemptive framework was reinforced through successive amendments—including in 1982, 1992 and 2000—and culminated in the Dodd‑Frank Act of 2010, which expressly extended the CFTC’s exclusive jurisdiction to “transactions involving swaps” and adopted a deliberately broad statutory definition of that term.11

The emergence of commercial event contract markets

The CFTC has engaged with event contracts for decades, beginning in 1992 with a no-action letter for the Iowa Electronic Markets12 and later recognizing in a 2008 Concept Release that event contracts may be based on “varied” eventualities, including “the results of political elections, or the outcome of particular entertainment events” and could be structured as “futures” or “options.”13

In 2020, KalshiEX LLC became a CFTC‑registered DCM, and, in 2023, it sought to list election‑based event contracts.14 The Commission blocked the request under the CEA’s “Special Rule” as involving “gaming” and therefore contrary to public interest.15 However, in September 2024, the US District Court for the District of Columbia held that election contracts did not constitute gaming under the CEA.16 In May 2025, the CFTC dismissed its appeal—clearing the way for Kalshi’s expansion into sports‑related contracts and prompting subsequent state enforcement actions.17

The CFTC’s 2024 proposed rulemaking and its withdrawal

In June 2024, the prior CFTC administration published a proposed rulemaking that would have broadly identified political and sports‑related event contracts as “contrary to the public interest,” effectively barring them from CFTC‑regulated exchanges. However, as noted above, the proposal was never finalized.18 In February 2026, the CFTC formally withdrew the proposed rulemaking, citing “various forms of state regulatory actions and litigation concerning the Commission’s exclusive jurisdiction over event contract derivatives listed on designated contract markets.”19 The Commission simultaneously withdrew CFTC Staff Advisory Letter No. 25-36, which cautioned market participants that state enforcement actions “should be accounted for with appropriate contingency planning” and had noted that the CFTC had not “taken any official action” approving the listing for trading of sports-related event contracts on a DCM.20

Key highlights of the Amicus Brief

The Amicus Brief is organized around three interlocking legal arguments: (1) event contracts are “swaps” under CEA Section 1a(47); (2) the CEA field-preempts state gambling laws as applied to DCM-listed event contracts and (3) state gambling laws are independently preempted under conflict preemption doctrine.

Event contracts are “swaps” under CEA Section 1a(47)

The CFTC argues in the Amicus Brief that the distinction between an “event” and an “outcome” has no textual basis in the CEA, and that event contracts satisfy multiple, independently sufficient, sub-clauses of the “swap” definition in CEA Section 1a(47)(A)—including as options,21event‑contingent transactions with potential economic consequences22 and as instruments commonly known to the trade as swaps.23 The brief highlights, among other things, the absence of any exclusion for event contracts from the swap definition under the CEA, as well as the CFTC's longstanding treatment of event contracts as binary options within its existing regulatory framework.24

Field preemption under CEA Section 2(a)(1)(A)

The CFTC argues that CEA Section 2(a)(1)(A) vests the Commission with “exclusive jurisdiction” over swaps and futures traded on contract markets, leaving no room for state gambling law to apply to DCM-listed event contracts.25 According to the Commission, the CEA’s “savings clause” in CEA Section 2(a)(1)(A) preserves statutory authority only outside this exclusive field—such as antifraud enforcement or purely intrastate activity—and does not permit states to ban federally regulated instruments.26

Conflict preemption

Independent of field preemption, the CFTC argues both variants of conflict preemption. First, the Amicus Brief asserts an impossibility conflict— that is, DCMs are required by federal regulation to provide “impartial access” to all eligible participants nationwide, and simultaneous compliance with a state ban and the federal impartial access requirement in CFTC Rule 38.151(b) is irreconcilable.27 Second, the Amicus Brief argues obstacle preemption—that is, applying state-by-state gambling licensing, fees and infrastructure requirements to national commodity exchanges would recreate the regulatory patchwork that Congress sought to eliminate.28

Multi-jurisdictional litigation landscape

The prediction markets litigation landscape involves more than 30 active cases, spanning federal preemption battles, state enforcement actions, tribal gaming challenges, consumer class actions and related proceedings.29 The central question in every case appears to be whether prediction markets are federally regulated financial instruments subject to the CFTC’s exclusive jurisdiction or unlicensed gambling subject to state police powers. Courts have reached conflicting conclusions, generating an emerging circuit split.

Implications for market participants

DCMs and CFTC-registered exchanges

The Amicus Brief provides significant support for DCMs but should not be treated as a safe harbor. DCMs should maintain contingency plans for adverse federal circuit court rulings, uphold self-certification rigor under the DCM Core Principles, consider how to address any geofencing measures necessitated by state court orders (which may conflict with the federal impartial access mandate under CFTC Rule 38.151(b)) and prepare to engage actively in the pending CFTC rulemaking on event contracts.

FCMs and introducing brokers

Intermediaries face derivative compliance risk if state courts enjoin DCMs from offering event contracts in particular jurisdictions. FCMs and introducing brokers should review customer agreements for geographic restriction provisions, confirm technical capacity for rapid implementation of state-specific access controls and update disclosures to communicate the legal uncertainty associated with event contract positions.

Swap dealers

The CFTC’s position that event contracts are swaps triggers Title VII swap regulatory requirements, including trade reporting, clearing, margin and business conduct standards. Swap dealers should review product classification frameworks to confirm  event contracts are properly captured. Swap dealers should also monitor the pending joint SEC-CFTC interpretation of Title VII definitions for any modifications to the definition of “swap” under the CEA and the impact any such modifications may have on whether certain event contracts are scoped in or out of the “swap” definition.30

Institutional investors and portfolio managers

Institutional investors should inventory event contract positions and assess the risks arising from the regulatory uncertainty as to the status of event contracts and the financial resilience of DCMs to sustained multi-state litigation. Fund documents and investor disclosures should adequately address the regulatory uncertainty and the risk of forced unwinding of positions in response to state enforcement actions.

New market entrants

Although the CFTC’s supportive posture regarding event contracts creates a market entry window, new entrants should consider risks arising from state litigation, potential shifts in the regulatory framework with future presidential administrations and the possibility of Supreme Court review within the next few years. New entrants should evaluate whether to adopt a conservative posture (assuming state laws apply and limiting geographic exposure) or an aggressive posture (relying on CFTC preemption and accepting litigation risk).

Gaming industry participants

Licensed sportsbooks, casinos and tribal operators face competitive displacement risk by prediction markets. Gaming industry participants should consider engaging with state gaming regulators to assess whether entering CFTC-regulated prediction markets could jeopardize existing state gaming licenses.

Systemic implications beyond prediction markets

The CFTC’s preemption theory has implications beyond prediction markets. The CFTC argues in the Amicus Brief that “[e]xcluding event contracts from the definition of swap would leave no principled boundary preventing any other event-based derivatives . . . from falling outside the CEA.” Accordingly, such an adverse ruling would potentially enable states to recharacterize weather derivatives, energy derivatives and agricultural derivatives as prohibited gambling. Market participants across the full spectrum of commodity derivatives—not merely prediction market operators—have a stake in the outcome of North American Derivatives Exchange v. State of Nevada and should consider whether to participate in appellate proceedings through amicus briefs or other advocacy.

Conclusion

The Amicus Brief in North American Derivatives Exchange v. State of Nevada represents the CFTC’s first formal judicial intervention in defense of federal exclusive jurisdiction over DCM-listed event contracts. The brief's core arguments—that event contracts are swaps under CEA Section 1a(47) and that the CEA preempts state gambling laws under both field and conflict preemption theories—are grounded in substantial statutory authority, but remain untested at the federal circuit level, with district courts reaching materially conflicting conclusions across the Third, Fourth and Ninth Circuits.

Market participants should note that: (i) the CFTC’s intervention, while significant, is neither dispositive, nor formal regulatory guidance, and thus should not be treated as a legal safe harbor; (ii) conflicting district court rulings arguably make Supreme Court review likely within the next few years; (iii) state enforcement risk remains substantial and immediate; (iv) the regulatory framework regarding event contracts is administration-dependent and may shift under future leadership and (v) the preemption question implicates the broader commodity derivatives market, as an adverse ruling could enable states to regulate any event-based derivative as gambling. Participants operating in event contract markets should maintain robust contingency planning, engage in pending rulemaking proceedings and monitor the Third, Fourth and Ninth Circuit appeals—particularly the consolidated Ninth Circuit oral argument scheduled for April 2026.

Special thanks to senior counsel Stephan Ariyan for assisting in the preparation of this article.

Footnotes

  1. 1

    See Brief for Amicus Curiae Commodity Futures Trading Commission in Support of Appellant and in Support of Reversal, N. Am. Derivatives Exch., Inc. d/b/a Crypto.com Derivatives N. Am. v. State of Nevada, No. 25‑7187 (9th Cir. filed Feb. 17, 2026); see also Press Release, CFTC, CFTC Reaffirms Exclusive Jurisdiction over Prediction Markets in U.S. Circuit Court Filing (Feb. 17, 2026). The brief was filed in support of Appellant North American Derivatives Exchange, Inc., a CFTC-designated contract market operating under the Crypto.com Derivatives North America brand, which is appealing the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada’s October 2025 denial of a preliminary injunction against Nevada state enforcement. The federal district court held that sports event contracts are not “swaps” under the Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”) and that self-certification to the CFTC does not insulate a DCM from state oversight.

  2. 2

    See Public Statement, CFTC Chairman Michael S. Selig, States Encroach on Prediction Markets (Feb. 17, 2026).

  3. 3

    See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, CFTC, Event Contracts, 89 Fed. Reg. 48968 (June 10, 2024).

  4. 4

    See Notice of Withdrawal of Proposed Rules, CFTC, Event Contracts; Withdrawal of Proposed Regulatory Action, 91 Fed. Reg. 5386 (Feb. 6, 2026). In withdrawing the CFTC’s 2024 event contracts proposal, CFTC Chairman Selig stated that: “The 2024 event contracts proposal reflected the prior administration’s frolic into merit regulation with an outright prohibition on political contracts ahead of the 2024 presidential election. The Commission is withdrawing that proposal and will advance a new rulemaking grounded in a rational and coherent interpretation of the Commodity Exchange Act that promotes responsible innovation in our derivatives markets in line with Congressional intent.” See Press Release, CFTC, CFTC Withdraws Event Contracts Rule Proposal and Staff Sports Event Contracts Advisory (Feb. 4, 2026).

  5. 5

    See Amicus Brief at pp. 14-19.

  6. 6

    See supra note 2.

  7. 7

    See D. Tsekova and P. Forte, Super Bowl Gives Prediction Bets Record $1.2 Billion Trading Day, Bloomberg (Feb. 10, 2026).

  8. 8

    See Kalshi Claims Annualized Trading Volume of $100B, Critics Doubt That, SCCG Management (Jan. 8, 2026); L. Akabas, Kalshi’s Volume Has Been 90% Sports During Football Season, Sportico (Oct. 3, 2025).

  9. 9

    See Amicus Brief at p. 28; CFTC Designated Contract Market Products.

  10. 10

    See Amicus Brief at p. 1. The Amicus Brief emphasizes that Congress’s rationale was explicitly preemptive—the existing patchwork of state regulation had “critically impaired the development and functioning of national commodities markets.” See Amicus Brief at p. 1 referencing H.R. Rep. No. 93-975 at p. 51 (1974); S. Rep. No. 93-1131 at p. 36 (1974). The tension between state gambling laws and federal derivatives regulation predates the CFTC by a century. By the mid-nineteenth century, many states prohibited futures trading as a form of wagering. See, e.g., Irwin v. Williar, 110 U.S. 499, 508–09 (1884); Cothran v. Ellis, 16 N.E. 646, 647 (Ill. 1888). The United States Supreme Court recognized the legitimate economic function of futures markets in Board of Trade of Chicago v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., observing that speculation’s “value is well known as a means of avoiding or mitigating catastrophes, equalizing prices and providing for periods of want.” See Amicus Brief at p. 2 (quoting Board of Trade of Chicago v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236, 247–48 (1905)).

  11. 11

    See CEA Section 2(a)(1)(A).

  12. 12

    SeeLetter of Andrea M. Corcoran, Director, CFTC Division of Trading and Markets, to George R. Neumann, Professor of Economics, The University of Iowa, Regarding Iowa Presidential Stock Market (Feb. 5, 1992) (reviewing a university-operated futures market for presidential election and corporate earnings contracts).

  13. 13

    See Request for Public Comment, CFTC, Concept Release on the Appropriate Regulatory Treatment of Event Contracts, 73 Fed. Reg. 25669 (May 7, 2008).

  14. 14

    See Press Release, CFTC, CFTC Disapproves KalshiEX LLC’s Congressional Control Contracts (Sept. 22, 2023).

  15. 15

    Id.

  16. 16

    See KalshiEX LLC v. CFTC , No. 23-cv-3257, 2024 WL 4164694 at *13 (D.D.C. Sept. 12, 2024).

  17. 17

    See D. Mangan, U.S. Commodities Regulator Seeks to Drop Appeal of Kalshi Election Bets Offers, CNBC: Politics (May 5, 2025).

  18. 18

    See supra note 3.

  19. 19

    See supra note 4 at 5387.

  20. 20

    See CFTC Letter No. 25-36, p. 2 and n.4 (Sept. 30, 2025).

  21. 21

    See Amicus Brief at p. 15.

  22. 22

    See Amicus Brief at pp. 14-15, 19.

  23. 23

    See Amicus Brief at p. 14, n.7.

  24. 24

    See Amicus Brief, p. 16. On the “financial, economic, or commercial consequence” requirement within the CEA’s definition of “swap” under CEA Section 1a(47), the CFTC adopts a broad interpretation, marshaling economic evidence that sporting events generate billions of dollars in commercial activity and citing evidence that sportsbooks use DCM-listed event contracts for hedging purposes. See Amicus Brief at p. 19.

  25. 25

    See Amicus Brief at p. 21.

  26. 26

    See Amicus Brief at pp. 24-25. Specifically, the “savings clause” in CEA Section 2(a)(1)(A) provides, “[e]xcept as hereinabove provided, nothing contained in this section shall (I) supersede or limit the jurisdiction at any time conferred . . . on . . . other regulatory authorities under the laws of the United States or of any State,” or “(II) restrict . . . such other authorities from carrying out their duties and responsibilities in accordance with such laws,” or “supersede or limit the jurisdiction conferred on courts of the United States or any State.” See CEA Section 2(a)(1)(A).

  27. 27

    See Amicus Brief at p. 26

  28. 28

    Id. at p. 26

  29. 29

    See S. Petrella, Tracking Every Prediction Market Lawsuit Involving Kalshi, Polymarket & Other Operators, last updated February 19, 2026.

  30. 30

    In a January 2026 speech, CFTC Chairman Selig directed CFTC staff to work with SEC staff to develop a joint interpretation of the Title VII definitions. See Speech of CFTC Chairman Michael S. Selig, The Next Phase of Project Crypto: Unleashing Innovation for the New Frontier of Finance (Jan. 29, 2026).

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