2025 saw a number of major developments affecting litigation funding in England & Wales. Many of those developments took place in the competition litigation arena as the post-PACCAR fallout1 continued to filter through collective actions in the Competition Appeal Tribunal (the CAT), with the settlements in Merricks2 and Rail Fares3 grabbing the legal headlines.
More widely, the Civil Justice Committee (CJC)’s final report on litigation funding last summer provided several recommendations for the industry, some of which are likely to be implemented in legislation this year. This was followed by the Department for Business and Trade (DBT)’s call for evidence on the competition opt-out collective actions regime and a consultation on proposals for change will follow in the next few months.
This article focuses on these key developments, including the vexed issue of funder-returns, and considers their effect upon those seeking to pursue and defend competition litigation proceedings in the CAT. We also look ahead to what is on the horizon in 2026.
The immediate post-PACCAR fallout
As readers will know from our earlier articles here and here, the Supreme Court’s majority judgment in PACCAR effectively ruled that litigation funding agreements (LFAs) which remunerate the litigation funder based on a proportion or percentage of the damages recovered constitute damages-based agreements (DBAs). As such, those LFAs are unenforceable in opt-out collective proceedings and in funded litigation more broadly, unless they satisfy certain stringent conditions in subsidiary legislation.
The immediate reaction to the PACCAR judgment was seen in collective actions in the CAT where, amongst other things, funders and class representatives amended the terms of LFAs to provide for returns to funders based on multiples of funds invested (or funds committed), rather than a percentage of the damages recovered. As a number of commentators observed, those multiples generally increased (from those pre-PACCAR), in an attempt by funders to preserve the ‘windfall’ upside that they would have received from a return based on a percentage of damages recovered (see Rachael Mulheron KC’s ‘A review of litigation funding in England and Wales - a legal literature and empirical study’ report to the Legal Services Board, page 111 onwards).
2025 also saw class representatives (and their funders) and defendants pursuing various arguments to try and improve their position post-PACCAR:
- On the claimant side, class representatives and funders proposed amendments to LFAs which sought to ‘future-proof’ the funding agreement if PACCAR was reversed by legislation. In other words, LFAs were amended to include a clause which provided that the funder’s recovery could be based on a percentage of damages (i.e. the pre-PACCAR basis) where enforceable to the extent permitted by law (i.e. if there was a change in the law to overturn PACCAR).4
- On the defence side, defendants challenged the enforceability of funding agreements which provided that the amount of the funder’s recovery would be capped at the level of the proceeds recovered. They argued that the cap made the LFA a DBA, which was unenforceable in opt-out collective proceedings post-PACCAR.
The Court of Appeal considered the above points in four rolled-up appeals in summer 2025 (Sony v Neill CA), and in what might be seen to be a claimant/funder-friendly decision, held that:
- ‘Future-proofing’ language did not render the LFAs in question unenforceable and so funders could effectively ‘preserve’ their position pending a change in the law to reverse PACCAR (until then, the percentage provision would have no contractual effect).
- The ‘cap’ provisions did not render the revised LFAs unenforceable – if they did it would be difficult for any LFA to avoid being a DBA which would render funding in the CAT practically impossible.5
Two of the defendants (Visa and Apple) sought permission to appeal the Court of Appeal’s judgment, however the Supreme Court refused to give permission on the basis that the grounds of appeal did not raise an arguable point of law (permission to appeal was refused on 6 November 2025). The Court of Appeal’s decision therefore stands.
Funder returns: When and what funders should be paid
The questions of when and what funders should be paid generated significant headlines in 2025, with the issue being considered in the Court of Appeal, and in subsequent cases in the CAT.
When should funders be paid?
On the issue of when funders should be paid (i.e. where in the order of priority of distributions the funder can receive their return) the Court of Appeal confirmed in Justin Gutmann v Apple Inc & Others[2025] EWCA Civ 459 (Gutmann v Apple) that the CAT can order that funders and lawyers are paid from any damages prior to payment to the class, and there is nothing wrong with a class representative agreeing to an LFA in these terms.
In Professor Barry Rodger v Alphabet Inc and Others [2025] CAT 45 (Rodger v Google) the CAT went one step further and said that in certain circumstances it might be in the best interests of the class to agree to at least some payment to the funder first, in order to secure the funder’s agreement to a particular settlement or distribution method. This might be appropriate where there is a possibility of a high level of distribution to the class members (e.g. because of the small number of class members and large alleged claim value per member), meaning there could be little left over for the funder after distribution, thereby diminishing any incentive for the funder (or other funders) to fund collective proceedings.
While the CAT’s comments in Rodger v Google appear positive for funders, the Court of Appeal made clear in Gutmann v Apple that any proposed distribution of damages is always subject to the wide supervisory jurisdiction of the CAT. The CAT also noted in Rodger v Google that the lawfulness of any such payment to funders will need to be considered at the relevant time and not at the outset (upon certification) “where the circumstances […] are not known” (Rodger v Google, §42).
What should funders be paid?
The level of the return to funders was the subject of the more headline-grabbing case law last year. In general terms, there are three main stages where a funder’s return will be scrutinised by the CAT: (i) upon certification, (ii) when considering a settlement and/or (iii) following success at trial. There is yet to be a situation where the CAT has scrutinised a funder’s return following success at trial, but this may now arise, following the successful judgment in Dr Rachael Kent v Apple Inc and Others [2025] CAT 67 (Kent v Apple). However, the former two scenarios have been considered in some detail.
Upon certification, the CAT has essentially adopted a ‘gatekeeping’ approach. It has made clear that certification does not mean that it is approving or endorsing the funding arrangements. Rather, the level of a funder’s return is a matter for the conclusion of proceedings and is subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the CAT, unless, at certification, there are provisions that are “sufficiently extreme to warrant calling out or in extremis a blanket refusal to certify” (Dr Liza Lovdahl Gormsen v Meta Platforms, Inc. and Others [2024] CAT 11 §36 (Gormsen v Meta)). This position was confirmed by the Court of Appeal.6
Reflecting those comments, the CAT now appears to be taking a less interventionist approach to funder returns upon certification. Back in 2024, in the Gormsen v Meta certification decision, the CAT considered whether the funder “was taking more from the class than they properly should” by virtue of a provision in the LFA whereby the funder’s return effectively increased from a 3.9 x multiple to a 8.3 x multiple, over a period of less than two years, and the LFA in question was subsequently re-structured to address those concerns. However, in certification decisions in 2025, the CAT has appeared less willing to intervene despite identifying provisions providing for similarly high levels of funder returns as in Gormsen v Meta. In the recent Hammond/Stephan v Amazon certification decision, despite reiterating that the funder’s level of return (which for the Stephan proceedings constituted an 8 x multiple) seemed “remarkably” or “exceptionally high”, the CAT did not consider this to be an obstacle to certification on the basis that the terms of the funding would be “subject to subsequent review by the Tribunal at the conclusion of the case” and/or were a matter “for more detailed consideration at another time” (Robert Hammond v Amazon.com, Inc and Others; Professor Andreas Stephan v Amazon.com, Inc and Others [2025] CAT 42, §43, §67).
Significantly, the CAT has stated that “funding arrangements set parameters, not outcomes” (Justin Gutmann v First MTR South Western Trains Limited, London & South Eastern Railway Limited, Govia Thameslink Railway Limited & Others[2025] CAT 72 (Stakeholder Entitlement), §86) (Gutmann v First MTR (Stakeholder Entitlement)) and that the CAT has a “supervisory role” which means that it can “at the end of proceedings, revisit whether it is prepared to endorse the payment of the agreed sums to the Funder” (Justin Gutmann v Apple Inc and others [2024] CAT 18, §12). This supervisory role and the deferral of consideration of the funder’s return until the conclusion of proceedings creates an element of uncertainty which has not been universally welcomed – and we return to this below.
As to what happens to the funder’s return at the conclusion of proceedings, two cases grappled with the issue last year and hit the headlines for different reasons. Those cases involved settlement, and featured disagreements about the level of the funder’s return in that scenario.
Merricks
In Merricks, the parties notionally settled what was originally a £14 billion claim for £200 million in December 2024. At the hearing of the collective settlement, the CAT was required to determine whether the terms of that settlement were “just and reasonable”. Those terms provided a return to the funder of £68 million, representing repayment of the funder’s outlay of around £45 million and a profit return to the funder of £23 million (i.e. 0.5 x of its original outlay).7 This was considerably less than the profit return provided for under the LFA which was, at the date of settlement, to be calculated as a multiple of 8 x the total commitment amount of £60.1 million. Although it was recognised that a return at this level would be impossible given the settlement sum was only £200 million, the funder, who made submissions at the settlement hearing, argued that the LFA provided for an agreed minimum return of £179 million.
As the CAT could not assess the funder’s return by way of a percentage of the damages (post-PACCAR) it therefore considered return on investment (ROI) to be a relevant metric for this purpose.8 Having done so, the CAT found a multiple of 1.5 x was appropriate in this case, recognising that there was significant risk for the funder but also a poor outcome for the class (NB: the CAT included the return of the original outlay in this multiple). As a cross-check, the CAT noted that a payment of £68 million constituted 34% of the £200 million settlement figure.
The funder has filed an application in the Administrative Court seeking judicial review of the CAT’s judgment on distribution of the settlement sum, on the grounds the CAT made a series of errors in its settlement judgment, including the incorrect application of the ROI multiple. The application has not yet been determined.
Rail Fares
In October 2025, the CAT dismissed collective proceedings brought by Justin Gutmann against several London train operators, which (in essence) alleged that passengers with a travelcard had been over-charged on certain routes. Prior to the trial (and judgment), the class representative settled with one of the defendants, Stagecoach. As part of that settlement, Stagecoach made up to £25 million available to class members who submitted a valid claim. However, only a very low number of valid claims were submitted by the class (with a total claim value of £216,485). The CAT was subsequently called upon to determine the distribution of a proportion of the remaining settlement funds as between stakeholders, including how much the funder should receive.
The CAT considered it reasonable in this case to use Multiple on Invested Capital (MOIC) as a practicable measure of the overall returns earned by the financial stakeholders. The CAT awarded the funder a further £1.29 million, raising the funder’s MOIC from 1.87 (based on previous distributions to the funder) to 2.34. This was still somewhat less than the MOIC sought by the funder (which amounted to approximately 4.73). The CAT stressed that any higher return would be disproportionate given the “very poor take-up by class members” (Gutmann v First MTR (Stakeholder Entitlement), §69).
Consideration of payments to funders
As noted above, in exercising its supervisory jurisdiction over the funders’ returns in Merricks and Rail Fares, the CAT awarded much lower payments to funders than anticipated in their respective LFAs. The use of the CAT’s supervisory jurisdiction in this way has resulted in significant uncertainty for funders, claimants and defendants alike. For funders, the uncertainty around the level of their return makes it challenging to reach informed cost-benefit decisions on their investment in cases. If the range or level of returns cannot be predicted with some degree of certainty, this may well deter investment in future collective proceedings, and it is perhaps no coincidence that 2025 saw a significant slowdown in new collective actions being issued in the CAT. Uncertainty also arises for defendants who might wish to settle a collective action, but who have very few data points to assess what level of funder return is likely to be acceptable to the CAT. This then makes it challenging to calibrate the parameters of any settlement offer and to reach a commercial decision.
As to the way in which the CAT will use its supervisory jurisdiction, the CAT has been clear in previous cases that the ‘success’ of the collective proceedings will be an important factor in determining the sums to be repaid to stakeholders following the conclusion of proceedings. It has said that ‘success’ includes factors such as the amount of damages available for class members and the likely and actual take up by class members.9 The low returns to funders in Merricks and Rail Fares reflect this approach: in Merricks, the CAT stated that the low quantum settlement was “very far from a success for a class of some 44 million claimants” (Merricks, §182), whereas in Rail Fares, the CAT stated that the very poor level of uptake by class members and the high level of costs in relation to the take up was “not a success” (Gutmann v First MTR (Stakeholder Entitlement), §69).
It will be critical to see what approach the CAT takes in cases which have resulted in ‘success’. 2026 may yield some answers in that regard, given the success for the class representative at trial in the Kent v Apple proceedings, and the recent, relatively larger, settlement in the remaining McLaren v MOL proceedings. Previous comments by the CAT in other cases may well point to higher returns for funders in those cases. In particular, the CAT has been clear that it understands the importance of litigation funding to collective proceedings, that class representatives cannot bring these proceedings without funding and that funders are “integral to the viability” of these claims (Gutmann v First MTR South Western Trains Limited and Another[2024] CAT 32, §47) (Gutmann v First MTR). The CAT also recognises that funders generally operate on a portfolio basis and “the fact that they may want a higher return than would seem justified on an individual case is to be explained by the fact they have a book of claims, of which some will bear fruit and others will not bear fruit. The ones that do not bear fruit will make a loss and funders need to be able to make up for that loss in other cases that are successful” (Gutmann v First MTR, §46). Those comments may well point to higher returns for funders in more ‘successful’ cases, but it remains to be seen whether those returns are at the level contemplated in their respective LFAs.
Further regime change?
In terms of the wider legislative and political landscape, 2025 saw two further developments: the CJC’s publication in June 2025 of its final report on litigation funding in England and Wales; and the announcement by the government of a review of the opt-out collective regime.
The CJC report recommended the introduction of legislation to reverse the effect of the Supreme Court’s decision in PACCAR, and on 17 December 2025, the UK government confirmed its plans to do so by clarifying that LFAs are not DBAs (Statement on Third-Party Litigation Funding, 17 December 2025). This is likely to be viewed as a funder-friendly development, owing to the possibility of larger ‘windfall’ returns based on a percentage of damages. Although the CJC also recommended that this reversal should be implemented as soon as possible (and should apply both retrospectively and prospectively) the Ministry of Justice indicated that the legislation would be introduced “with prospective effect” and “when parliamentary time allows.”
In better news for defendants, the CJC final report also recommended:
- Standardised LFA terms to be introduced by regulation: this could limit the degree of flexibility available to litigation funders and class representatives in practice. It remains unclear how the government will respond to this proposal – the announcement on 17 December 2025 indicated that it will “introduce proportionate regulation of LFAs” to improve transparency and fairness for claimants without further detail on the proposed scope of those regulations.
- A baseline set of regulatory requirements including: codification of the requirement that litigation funders should not control funded litigation; conflict of interest provisions; the application of anti-money laundering requirements; and disclosure at the earliest opportunity of the existence of funding, the name of the funder, and the ultimate source of the funding. This contrasts with the position to date where the litigation funding market has so far been self-regulated by a voluntary association of funders.
- Mandatory costs budgeting and costs management for all funded collective proceedings, representative actions and group actions. This contrasts with the present position where a proposed class representative is required to provide information on funding arrangements as a condition of certification, but there is currently no ongoing budget management. The recommendation is aligned with the CAT’s recent indication in the Merricks settlement judgment regarding the importance of the CAT exercising “close control over costs in collective proceedings” (Merricks, §149).
The Ministry of Justice’s announcement also noted that the government will consider the CJC’s wider litigation funding recommendations in detail and announce further changes in due course.
Separately (but relatedly), in August 2025, the government announced a review of the competition opt-out collective actions regime. A focus for the review is litigation funding, including questions around whether funders’ share of settlement sums or damages is fair and proportionate, the degree of influence funders have over the resolution of a case, and how to manage potential conflicts of interest. Responses to a ‘call for evidence’ were provided by a number of market participants in October 2025. As might be expected, respondents on the defendant side urged the introduction of a merits threshold and stricter certification to prevent unmeritorious claims, whereas respondents on the claimant side (who rely on litigation funders to fund their clients’ claims) warned that restricting access to opt-out collective redress would undermine access to justice and protect companies that breach competition law. The next stage will be proposals for change to the opt-out collective actions regime, which will themselves be subject to further consultation. It is anticipated that those proposals will be announced early this year.
We anticipate that 2026 will be full of further developments to litigation funding and await those developments with interest.
The authors wish to thank Lucy Reynolds, Trainee Solicitor, Norton Rose Fulbright LLP for her contribution.
Footnotes
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Walter Hugh Merricks CBE v Mastercard Incorporated and Others [2025] CAT 28
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Justin Gutmann v First MTR South Western Trains Limited, London & South Eastern Railway Limited, Govia Thameslink Railway Limited & Others [2025] CAT 64
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This issue arose in relation to the LFAs in Sony Interactive Entertainment Europe Limited & Anor v Alex Neill Class Representative Limited (Sony v Neill proceedings) and in the opt-in CICC proceedings Visa Inc. and ors v Commercial and Interregional Card Claims I Limited and another (CICC proceedings). In the CICC proceedings, the opt-in LFA provided in clauses 2.1.3 and 2.1.4 that “subject to [these clauses] being enforceable and/or permitted by applicable law” the funder’s return would be calculated as a percentage of the proceeds but if those clauses were “unenforceable and/or not permitted by applicable law” then clauses 2.1.5 and 2.1.6 would apply under which the funder’s return would be calculated by reference to its outlay. In the Sony v Neill proceedings, clause 11 of the LFA provided similarly. We refer to the Court of Appeal judgment as Sony v Neill CA.
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In addition to the Sony v Neill proceedings and the CICC proceedings, the CA judgment considered appeals brought by Mastercard against the funding arrangements of CICC I and CICC II, and by Apple Inc against collective proceedings brought by Dr Rachael Kent and Mr Justin Gutmann.
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Gutmann v Apple, §99. The Court of Appeal stated that “the arrangement made in the LFA was importantly always subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the CAT to determine what is the appropriate order to make [and] any issue as to the reasonableness of the funder’s return is to be addressed at the time of distribution”.
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The CAT approved a settlement giving the funder its estimated costs of £45.6 million plus £22.8 million, which it described as a 1.5 x return. The funder disputed this, arguing that the £22.8 million was only a 0.5 x uplift on its costs and was inadequate given the scale, duration, and risk of funding the £14 billion claim.
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In Merricks, at §185, the CAT notes that the funder could have provided evidence on the range of, or average, rates of ROI it achieves but had chosen not to.
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Mark McLaren Class Representative Limited v MOL (Europe Africa) Ltd and Others [2025] CAT 4, §21 (McLaren v MOL) where the CAT said that “success” was “a highly important factor” […] in assessing whether the terms of a proposed settlement are reasonable and ultimately what sums would be paid to stakeholders out of a settlement” and that “success” includes factors such as “the amount of damages available for class members and the likely and actual take up by class members.”