Executive summary
On August 18, 2026, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Commission or SEC) issued a release proposing Regulation Crypto Assets (Reg CA), a sweeping rule package intended to give issuers of certain crypto-asset “investment contracts” a tailored path to raise capital without full Securities Act registration. The proposal would create two new registration exemptions—a startup exemption permitting up to US$5 million in sales during a single four-year window, and a fundraising exemption modeled on Regulation A, structured in two tiers permitting up to US$20 million or US$75 million in sales in any 12-month period depending on tier, together with a new, non-exclusive investment contract safe harbor under which an issuer may formally notify the Commission that its covered investment contract has ceased to exist.1
For clients that originate, distribute or advise on crypto-asset offerings, the headline is capital-formation relief. For clients that must manage litigation and enforcement exposure, the more important story is what the proposal does not do: it explicitly leaves the antifraud and antimanipulation provisions of the federal securities laws fully intact, preserves and in places sharpens the Commission’s enforcement toolkit (including a codified basis for Section 20 actions for exemption noncompliance), leaves Howey characterization disputes very much alive outside the narrow safe harbor, preserves state antifraud jurisdiction notwithstanding registration preemption and does nothing to limit the Department of Justice’s independent authority to pursue criminal charges—including for securities fraud, mail fraud and wire fraud—arising from the same underlying conduct.
Background: Howey, the 2026 interpretation and the case for bespoke rules
The Commission’s starting premise is that a crypto asset2 itself is typically not a security, but that crypto assets are frequently offered and sold subject to an investment contract—for example, paired with issuer representations or promises to undertake “essential managerial efforts” from which purchasers reasonably expect profit, satisfying the Howey test. Building on its 2026 interpretive release addressing when a crypto asset becomes, and later ceases to be, subject to such an investment contract,3 the Commission concluded that its existing exemptions (Regulation A, Regulation D, Regulation Crowdfunding) and disclosure forms were built for conventional equity and debt offerings and did not elicit the information that is actually material to investors in “covered investment contract” offerings—for example, information about the issuer’s progress toward the managerial efforts it has promised, rather than conventional financial statement disclosure alone.4
Reg CA is the Commission’s attempt to close that gap through five operative components, each of which carries distinct enforcement implications discussed below:
- general provisions and definitions applicable across the regulation, including a bad-actor disqualification rule;
- the startup exemption;
- the fundraising exemption;
- the investment contract safe harbor; and
- the rule’s state securities law preemption framework.
Overview of the proposed framework
General provisions and bad-actor disqualification (subpart A)
Proposed Rule 100 defines the regulation’s key scoping terms, including “covered investment contract,” “covered transaction” and “subject crypto asset.”5 The term “covered investment contract” did not appear in the Commission’s 2026 Token Taxonomy6 and so represents a new clarification as to the application of securities laws to crypto assets. The Commission explained that “covered investment contract” means “a contract, transaction, or scheme that constitutes an investment contract; provided that the investment contract must meet the following requirements:
- a crypto asset is subject to the investment contract;
- such crypto asset is not a security; and
- no asset other than such crypto asset (including any security or non-security asset) is subject to the investment contract.”7
Proposed Rule 104 conditions availability of both exemptions on the issuer and related persons—directors, executive officers, 20 percent-or-greater beneficial owners, promoters and paid solicitors—not being subject to a “bad actor” disqualifying event, by cross-reference to the existing Regulation A disqualification standard in Rule 262.8 Proposed Rule 101(d) provides a limited cure for insignificant deviations from an exemption’s terms, but—critically for enforcement purposes—the proposal simultaneously states that noncompliance with an exemption’s terms is independently actionable by the Commission under Section 20 of the Securities Act.9
Startup exemption: Up to US$5 million / four years (subpart B)
Designed for early-stage projects, the startup exemption would permit an issuer to raise up to US$5 million in covered investment contracts over a single four-year window while it works toward the managerial efforts it has promised investors, and the exemption may be used only once for a given crypto asset.10 Notably, the scope of “covered transaction” under the startup exemption reaches not only capital-raising sales but also distributions made in exchange for, in recognition of or as an incentive for past or future use of the network or application, and rewards for operating, governing or securing it—meaning that airdrops, staking rewards and governance incentives all fall within the exemption’s ambit.11 The issuer “may be an entity, an individual, or a group of individuals or entities,” with each member of a group signing, certifying and satisfying every condition; neither the issuer nor its affiliates may have previously used the exemption for the same or a substantially similar crypto asset.12
Before selling, the issuer files a short Form NOR notice of reliance with the SEC, but the substantive Rule 103 principles-based disclosure itself is not filed on EDGAR—it must instead be posted, free of charge, on a website the issuer specifies in its Form NOR, must stay available for the exemption period and must be amended within 30 calendar days after each calendar year end if material changes have occurred.13 While website-hosted disclosure may be harder for Commission staff to monitor systematically than an EDGAR filing, inaccurate or stale postings will still be subject to potential antifraud liability. The issuer must separately amend Form NOR itself, as soon as practicable, to correct a material mistake or reflect a material change; letting an inaccurate Form NOR sit uncorrected is a distinct compliance failure that can independently jeopardize the exemption.14 A transition report on Form TR is due no later than four years after the notice, and its filing ends both the exemption and the update obligation.15 Issuers relying on the exemption would not be subject to ongoing periodic reporting or a Commission qualification review before selling, but would remain subject to the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.16
Fundraising exemption: Two tiers, up to US$20 million or US$75 million / 12 months (subpart C)
Modeled in part on Regulation A, the fundraising exemption is structured as two tiers with distinct assurance requirements: Tier 1 permits offerings of up to US$20 million in a 12-month period, including no more than US$6 million from affiliated selling securityholders, and issuers must still include financial statements in the offering circular, but they need not be audited; Tier 2 permits offerings of up to US$75 million, including no more than US$22.5 million from affiliated selling securityholders, and requires audited financial statements.17 Selling securityholder participation is separately capped at 30 percent of the aggregate offering price in an issuer’s first offering and in any offering qualified within a year of it.18 Eligibility is intentionally narrower than that of the startup exemption: the issuer must be organized under United States law, with a majority of officers or directors who are US citizens or residents, more than 50 percent of its assets in the US and its business administered principally here.19 Blank check-style development-stage companies, investment companies, business development companies and issuers subject to a Section 12(j) order within five years are excluded, and the issuer must be current on prior reports.20 Because Regulation A’s own exemptive authority under Securities Act Section 3(b) is limited to enumerated “eligible securities” that do not include covered investment contracts, the Commission instead proposes the fundraising exemption under its broader, discretionary exemptive authority in Securities Act Section 28—a standard turning on whether an exemption is “necessary or appropriate in the public interest” and “consistent with the protection of investors,” rather than the categorical eligibility test under Section 3(b).21 That gives the Commission correspondingly greater latitude both to grant and, later, to narrow who qualifies.
Issuers using either tier must file a publicly available offering statement on new Form 1-CRYPTO and may not commence sales until it is qualified. An issuer may first submit a draft statement to SEC staff for non-public review, but that track is only a pre-filing accommodation—the statement itself must ultimately be filed publicly before qualification and sales can occur.22 Non-reporting issuers must also deliver a preliminary offering circular at least 48 hours before sale to anyone who indicated interest. Non-accredited purchasers are subject to investment limits, capped at 10 percent of the greater of their annual income or net worth (or, for entities, revenue or net assets).23 Ongoing reporting follows on Forms 1-KC (annual), 1-SC (semiannual) and 1-UC (current).24 Separately, proposed Rule 306 would let the Commission suspend an issuer’s ability to rely on the exemption altogether, including on reason-to-believe grounds that the offering violates Section 17 of the Securities Act or Reg CA’s own terms.25 As with the startup exemption, antifraud and antimanipulation liability is unaffected by reliance on either tier.26
Investment contract safe harbor (subpart D)
Proposed Rule 400 is a non-exclusive safe harbor from the definition of “investment contract” in Securities Act Section 2(a)(1) and Exchange Act Section 3(a)(10). In recognition of the fact that the Howey test (used to determine whether a given asset falls under the definition of an “investment contract”)27 can be difficult to apply to crypto assets, the safe harbor provides additional clarity on when a covered investment contract is deemed to have ceased to exist. If an issuer:
- has completed or permanently ceased all essential managerial efforts it promised and is not making new such promises, and
- files a transition report on new Form TR certifying and analytically supporting that conclusion, the Commission will treat the covered investment contract as having ceased to exist—meaning the underlying crypto asset is no longer treated as a security going forward.28
Form TR will require the issuer to provide basic background and organizational information, a description of the covered investment contract and crypto asset sufficient for investor identification, a certification that the issuer has ceased managerial efforts in compliance with proposed Rule 400(a) and an analysis supporting that certification. The safe harbor is available whether or not the issuer used either registration exemption, and is intended to codify the separation concept from the Commission’s March 2026 Token Taxonomy interpretive release.29
While the Commission may decide to treat a covered investment contract as having ceased to exist, the DOJ and private party litigants may not be constrained by such determination when pursuing securities fraud claims, and the Commission’s decision may be afforded little to no deference by the courts following the Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright to overrule Chevron deference.30
State law preemption, with a carve-out (subpart E)
The proposal would define the term “qualified purchaser” as used in Section 18 of the Securities Act—which preempts states from requiring registration or qualification of covered securities offered or sold to qualified purchasers—to include all persons purchasing covered investment contract offerings under both the fundraising exemption and the startup exemption, as well as specified secondary market transactions, thereby extending preemption to both initial sales and resales. Unlike Regulation A, which limits preemption to Tier 2 offerings, the proposed preemption applies to both Tier 1 and Tier 2 fundraising offerings. Secondary market transactions of a covered investment contract are covered by the preemption rule even if the investment contract was not initially issued under one of the Reg CA exemptions, provided the issuer satisfies one such exemption and remains current with its disclosure, filing and reporting obligations; if an issuer falls out of compliance, preemption would not apply until the issuer cures the defect. The Release is explicit, however, that states retain jurisdiction to bring antifraud enforcement actions—preemption runs only to registration and qualification, not to fraud.31
Securities enforcement issues, concerns and risks
Registration relief is not fraud relief
The Release states, in nearly identical language for both exemptions, that issuers “remain subject to the antifraud and antimanipulation provisions of the Federal securities laws.”32 Practically, this means the entire body of SEC enforcement doctrine developed in crypto-asset and other fraud-related cases to date continues to apply in full force to issuers that otherwise comply with the new exemptions. As such, clients should not treat qualification for the startup or fundraising exemption as materially reducing fraud-based enforcement risk. If anything, the new principles-based disclosure obligations (focusing on progress on managerial efforts, use of proceeds, etc.) create fresh categories of statements that can support a misrepresentation or omission theory.
Exemption noncompliance is itself an enforcement trigger
Proposed Rule 101(d) offers a narrow cure for insignificant, good-faith deviations from an exemption’s conditions, but the Release pairs that cure with an explicit statement that failure to comply with an exemption’s terms is independently actionable by the Commission under Securities Act Section 20.33 Issuers should not read the insignificant deviation cushion as a general grace period: it applies only where:
- the lapsed condition was not one designed to protect the specific investor at issue,
- the deviation was insignificant to the offering as a whole and
- the issuer made a good-faith effort to comply.
Any deviation outside those narrow bounds—for example, exceeding the dollar caps, offering or selling while the issuer or a covered person is subject to a Rule 262(a) disqualifying event34 or a defective Form TR certification—exposes the issuer to a registration violation enforcement theory in addition to any fraud theory, and potentially to Section 12(a)(1) rescission exposure from investors if the exemption is unavailable. For issuers relying on the fundraising exemption, this exposure is not limited to after-the-fact liability: proposed Rule 306 would let the Commission suspend the exemption prospectively, mid-offering, on reason-to-believe grounds that include a suspected Section 17 violation35—a faster and more disruptive tool than a subsequent enforcement action, since it can cut off an active raise before it closes.
Issuers that use the fundraising exemption take on periodic and current reporting obligations (Forms 1-KC, 1-SC and 1-UC) that persist well beyond the offering itself.36 Each periodic filing is a fresh opportunity for a material misstatement or omission claim, and—particularly for projects whose crypto-economics, tokenomics or managerial roadmap evolve quickly—issuers should build controls now for keeping these disclosures current, rather than treating the initial Form 1-CRYPTO offering statement as the end of the compliance obligation.
The Rule 400 safe harbor is not self-executing and invites its own enforcement risk
The Release is unusually candid that Rule 400 relief depends on the accuracy of the issuer’s own certification and supporting analysis on Form TR, and that the Commission is not precluded from later challenging whether the conditions were, in fact, satisfied. The Release specifically flags that a Form TR that misrepresents—“either intentionally or otherwise”—satisfaction of the cessation condition can leave the covered investment contract intact for enforcement purposes notwithstanding the filing.37 That phrase is worth unpacking: it means the Commission need not prove scienter to disregard an inaccurate safe harbor certification, so a good-faith mistake in the Form TR analysis is enough to unwind the safe harbor’s benefit. A separate antifraud claim would still require its own scienter showing, but issuers should not assume the absence of scienter protects the safe harbor determination itself, and liability for violations of Section 17(a)(2) and (3) of the Securities Act only requires a showing of negligence. This creates a distinct enforcement exposure: an inaccurate or premature Form TR filing is both:
- a potential misrepresentation to the market (since the filing is meant to be relied upon by investors and counterparties) and
- an independent, no-fault basis for the Commission to disregard the safe harbor and pursue the issuer for unregistered transactions occurring after the purported cessation date. Clients considering a Form TR filing should treat the underlying “essential managerial efforts” cessation analysis with the same rigor as an opinion of counsel, given that the Commission has reserved the right to revisit it on a strict, no-fault basis.
Howey characterization risk persists outside the safe harbor’s narrow scope
Rule 400 addresses only one moment in the lifecycle of a covered investment contract—when the promised managerial efforts have been completed or abandoned. It does not provide affirmative, ex ante certainty that a given token sale is, or is not, an investment contract in the first instance; that threshold characterization continues to rest on the multifactor Howey analysis and the Commission’s 2026 interpretive guidance regarding how a non-security crypto asset becomes subject to an investment contract through marketing and promotional conduct. Issuers, secondary trading platforms and market makers should expect continued case-by-case Commission enforcement scrutiny of go-to-market messaging, promotional statements about profit potential and post-sale conduct that could be read as an implied promise of continuing managerial effort—all independent of whether the issuer ultimately relies on Reg CA for the primary sale.
Multi-forum exposure survives despite state preemption
While state registration and qualification preemption reduces blue sky law compliance burdens, the Release’s express acknowledgment of continuing state antifraud jurisdiction38 means issuers should expect potential state actions—whether that be state securities fraud, common law or statutory fraud or state unfair and deceptive acts and practices or consumer-protection claims—even where the SEC does not act, or in addition to SEC enforcement. Coordination of a unified factual and disclosure record across a potential multi-regulator posture—SEC, state securities regulators and civil plaintiffs—becomes more, not less, important under a disclosure-lightened federal regime, precisely because federal merit review of the offering itself is reduced.
The regime is silent on intermediaries, which pushes unregistered-activity risk downstream
Reg CA is an issuer-side rulemaking; it says essentially nothing about the entities that will actually move these instruments once sold—trading venues, market makers, custodians and other platforms that facilitate transactions in a subject crypto asset. The Release itself concedes the point directly: in a footnote acknowledging that commenters (citing Commissioner Peirce’s Running on Empty statement) had urged the Commission to carve exchange, broker and dealer registration definitions back from covered investment contract activity, the Release states plainly that “this proposal does not address those recommendations” and that the Commission “will continue to consider whether further action with respect to covered investment contracts beyond the proposed rules in this Release is warranted.”39 Until that further action materializes, a platform that facilitates trading before an issuer’s managerial efforts have concluded is transacting in an instrument the Commission still treats as a security, without any bespoke accommodation. As such, an issuer’s compliance with Reg CA does nothing to resolve an intermediary’s own registration exposure.
Federal criminal exposure runs independently of—and is untouched by—this civil framework
Every enforcement mechanism discussed in this alert is civil or administrative: SEC injunctive and monetary relief, Section 20 actions, Rule 306 suspension and state civil antifraud claims. None of it touches, expands or narrows the government’s separate authority to bring federal criminal charges, and nothing in Reg CA purports to do so. The US Department of Justice and US Attorneys’ Offices have brought, and will continue to bring, criminal cases arising from crypto-asset offerings under statutes that operate independently of Reg CA’s registration exemptions, disclosure requirements and safe harbor—in important respects, criminal actions can be brought independently of the Howey and security-status analysis that otherwise pervades this alert.
Most significantly, mail and wire fraud require the government to prove only a scheme to defraud carried out through the mails or interstate wires—not that the crypto asset sold was ever a security or part of an investment contract.40 These statutes have been DOJ’s principal charging tools in prior crypto-offering prosecutions precisely because they sidestep the Howey analysis that dominates the SEC’s civil framework. An issuer that satisfies every condition of the startup exemption, the fundraising exemption or the investment contract safe harbor gains no protection from a wire fraud indictment premised on the same underlying misrepresentations—Reg CA compliance is simply irrelevant to that charge.
Separately, willful violations of the Securities Act’s and Exchange Act’s own antifraud and registration provisions carry criminal penalties under Securities Act Section 24 and Exchange Act Section 32,41 and 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (securities fraud) reaches schemes to defraud “in connection with” a security42—a category that, prior to any investment contract safe harbor cessation, squarely includes a covered investment contract. Because these provisions require proof of willfulness or intent, they sit closer to the SEC’s own scienter-based antifraud claims than to the no-fault safe-harbor standard discussed in Section C above, but a higher burden of proof at trial is not a defense available at the exemption-design stage: the same facts that would satisfy a civil fraud claim frequently support a parallel criminal charge.
Reg CA’s own certification requirements create a further, narrower exposure. Form NOR and Form TR are federal filings signed under certification; a knowing false statement in either could implicate 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (false statements to a federal agency)43 independent of any securities-law consequence. Unlike the Commission’s civil safe-harbor standard, which can be disregarded for a certification that is inaccurate “either intentionally or otherwise,” a Section 1001 charge requires the government to prove the statement was knowingly false—a distinction that favors the issuer on the criminal side specifically, but does not diminish the civil consequence discussed in Section C, and the same underlying investigative record frequently supports both theories.
Individual officers, directors and signatories face this exposure personally and separately from the issuer entity. Because Form NOR and Form TR require individual certification, and because DOJ’s charging practice in recent years has emphasized individual accountability in corporate and crypto-asset cases alike, the natural persons who sign these filings should not assume that an entity-level civil resolution with the SEC forecloses personal criminal exposure. SEC and DOJ investigations of crypto offerings frequently proceed in parallel, with the SEC’s civil investigation—including the very disclosures and certifications Reg CA would require—generating much of the factual record a criminal referral would rely on.
Practical considerations for risk mitigation
- Map any contemplated or existing token offering against the startup/fundraising exemption eligibility criteria and the Rule 262 disqualification standard, including diligence on affiliated development-team members and 20 percent+ holders.
- Treat narrative disclosure regarding “essential managerial efforts” and use of proceeds with the same care given to a registration statement, since these principles-based statements are natural targets for Section 17(a) and Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 theories.
- Build a documented, defensible record before any Form TR filing under the investment contract safe harbor, anticipating that the Commission may later test the certification.
- Maintain go-to-market and secondary-market messaging discipline, since promotional statements remain central to the threshold Howey/investment contract analysis regardless of exemption reliance.
- Treat certifications on Form NOR and Form TR with the same rigor as a filing made under penalty of perjury, given potential individual exposure under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 in addition to civil securities-law consequences.
Conclusion
Reg CA represents the most significant proposed expansion of tailored capital-formation relief for crypto asset issuers to date, and issuers, platforms and investors have real reason to welcome it. But the proposal is deliberately structured to preserve—and in places to reinforce—the Commission’s enforcement authority: antifraud liability is unaffected, exemption noncompliance is an independent enforcement trigger, the safe harbor’s finality is expressly conditional, state antifraud jurisdiction remains untouched and federal criminal exposure under general fraud statutes runs entirely independently of it. Clients evaluating whether and how to use the new framework should treat it as a compliance and disclosure discipline exercise, not merely a capital-raising shortcut, and should factor enforcement risk—civil, administrative and criminal—into deal structuring and diligence from the outset.
We are closely tracking this rulemaking, including through the 60-day public comment period (with a deadline for submission of October 20, 2026), and are available to discuss how it may affect specific transactions, platforms or enforcement matters.
Footnotes
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Regulation Crypto Assets, Securities Act Release No. 33-11434; Exchange Act Release No. 34-106150; File No. S7-2026-27 (Aug. 18, 2026) (the “Release”), at 1–2 (Summary); see also id. at 71–72 (startup exemption), 97, 107–08 (fundraising exemption), 163–67 (investment contract safe harbor), 169–79 (state preemption).
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“Under the proposed rules, the term ‘crypto asset’ would be defined to mean any digital representation of value that is recorded on a cryptographically-secured distributed ledger.” Release at 7 n.3 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 228.100 (proposed)).
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Release at 18–20 (discussing the Commission’s March 2026 interpretive release and the circumstances under which a non-security crypto asset becomes, and later ceases to be, subject to an investment contract, including how an issuer’s marketing and promotion of a crypto asset bear on the Howey analysis).
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Release at 8–9, 25–26 (describing the view, shared by commenters and the Commission, that the existing exempt offering and disclosure framework was designed for conventional securities offerings and does not elicit information material to investors in covered investment contract offerings).
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Release at 33–38 (proposed Rule 100).
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Application of the Federal Securities Laws to Certain Types of Crypto Assets and Certain Transactions Involving Crypto Assets, 91 Fed. Reg. 13714, 13715 (Mar. 23, 2026) (the “2026 Token Taxonomy”).
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Release at 7 n.4.
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Release at 67–69 (proposed Rule 104, cross-referencing the disqualification standard in 17 C.F.R. § 230.262(a)).
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Release at 220–21 (explaining that proposed Rules 101(d)(2) and 101(d)(3) would make noncompliance with an exemption’s terms actionable by the Commission under Securities Act Section 20); see also 17 C.F.R. § 228.101(d) (proposed).
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Release at 71–72 (proposed Rule 200).
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Release at 74–77. See also 17 C.F.R. § 228.100 (proposed).
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See 17 C.F.R. §§ 228.200(b)(2)–(3) (proposed).
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Release at 75–76 and n.198, 84–86.
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Release at 86 (describing the circumstances requiring an issuer to amend a previously filed Form NOR, including to correct a material mistake of fact or error).
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See 17 C.F.R. § 228.200(e) (proposed).
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Release at 71–72, 96 (“Issuers that rely on the exemption would remain subject to the antifraud and antimanipulation provisions of the Federal securities laws, including, but not limited to, section 17 of the Securities Act and section 10 of the Exchange Act.”).
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Release at 106–108 (proposed Rule 300(a)).
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See 17 C.F.R. § 228.300(a)(3) (proposed).
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See 17 C.F.R. § 228.300(b)(1) (proposed).
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See 17 C.F.R. § 228.300(b)(2)–(5) (proposed).
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Release at 96 n.222 (explaining that the fundraising exemption is proposed pursuant to the Commission’s exemptive authority under Securities Act Section 28, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-3, rather than Section 3(b)).
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Release at 145 (detailing proposed Rule 301(d), permitting non-public submission of a draft offering statement to Commission staff for review prior to public filing).
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See 17 C.F.R. § 228.300(c)(2)(i) (proposed).
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Release at 151–156 (detailing proposed Rule 305, periodic and current reporting requirements, including Form 1-KC, Form 1-SC, and Form 1-UC).
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Release at 147 (detailing proposed Rule 306, suspension of the fundraising exemption).
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Release at 96.
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Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298–99 (1946) (“an investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act means a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party[.]”).
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Release at 163–67 (proposed Rule 400).
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2026 Token Taxonomy at 13721; Release at 35 n.117 (“The term “investment contract” is not defined in Rule 100. Issuers and other market participants should refer to the 2026 Interpretation for guidance as to whether an investment contract exists with respect to a crypto asset.”).
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See generally Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024).
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Release at 258–59 (“States will, however, retain jurisdiction to bring antifraud enforcement actions.”).
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Release at 70–71, 96.
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Release at 44–45 and n.137, 220–21, 324.
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Release at 43–44, 221–23, 324.
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Release at 351–52.
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Release at 104, 106–08, 151–61, 272–74.
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Release at 166 (“[I]f an issuer files a Form TR and misrepresents, either intentionally or otherwise, that it has satisfied the conditions in Rule 400(a), the Commission may take the position that, notwithstanding the issuer’s attempted reliance on the investment contract safe harbor, the issuer’s covered investment contract has not ceased to exist and the reporting, registration, and other requirements of the Federal securities laws continue to apply.”).
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Release at 258–59.
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Release at 73 n.192 (“This proposal does not address those recommendations. We will continue to consider whether further action with respect to covered investment contracts beyond the proposed rules in this release is warranted.” (referencing Commissioner Hester M. Peirce’s Running on Empty and commenters’ recommendation that the Commission exempt transactions in covered investment contracts from the Exchange Act definitions of “exchange,” “broker,” and “dealer”)).
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18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (mail and wire fraud). Unlike Securities Act Section 17(a) or Exchange Act Section 10(b), neither mail fraud nor wire fraud requires the government to prove that the property or interest obtained through the scheme was a security or investment contract.
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15 U.S.C. § 77x (Securities Act Section 24, criminal penalties for willful violations of the Securities Act or rules thereunder); 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (Exchange Act Section 32, criminal penalties for willful violations of the Exchange Act or rules thereunder).
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18 U.S.C. § 1348 (securities fraud).
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18 U.S.C. § 1001 (false statements to a federal agency).