The big picture
On April 10, 2026, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) proposed (the Proposal) what it characterizes as a "fundamental" reform of anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) program requirements1 under the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA). The Proposal goes well beyond a cosmetic update. It would implement aspects of the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020 (AML Act) and revisions to other long-standing aspects of regulations promulgated under the BSA. FinCEN’s intent is to modernize the AML/CFT compliance regime to move from a check-list, formulaic model to a risk-focused, outcome-oriented framework. Note that the Proposal supersedes and withdraws FinCEN’s prior AML/CFT program modernization proposal, which was published on July 3, 2024. If finalized this time around, the operational consequences for CCOs could be significant.
Comments on the Proposal must be received by June 9, 2026.2
Who is covered
The Proposal covers the following financial institutions:
- Banks
- Casinos and card clubs (casinos)
- Money services businesses (MSBs)
- Brokers or dealers in securities (broker-dealers)
- Mutual funds
- Insurance companies
- Futures commission merchants (FCMs) and introducing brokers in commodities (IBCs)
- Dealers in precious metals, precious stones or jewels (DPMSJs)
- Operators of credit card systems
- Loan or finance companies engaged in residential mortgage lending
- Housing government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs).3
The structural shift: From the traditional “four pillars” to an effectiveness framework
What changed and why it matters
The existing regulatory framework organizes AML compliance around four (later five) program "pillars."4 The Proposal seeks to replace that architecture with a single overarching standard: an effective AML/CFT5 program.
First, FinCEN proposes inserting "CFT" throughout the AML program rules. FinCEN states this is not intended to create new obligations because institutions already must account for terrorist financing risks under the USA PATRIOT Act, so the change is expected to be technical and not anticipated to substantively impact BSA compliance obligations.6
Second, and more substantively, FinCEN proposes that an AML/CFT program will be considered "effective" if it is established and maintained in accordance with the final rule. FinCEN also emphasizes that an effective program is not expected to detect and report all illicit transactions or prevent every minor instance of misuse.7 FinCEN explains that while it has in prior rulemakings referenced the concept of effectiveness, with respect to what constituted a reasonably designed program and its specific requirements, the AML Act instructs FinCEN to focus on achieving effective outcomes rather than dictating the processes used to reach those outcomes. Under the Proposal, in order for its AML/CFT program to be considered effective, the financial institution will be required to:
- Establish a program that is calibrated to address its highest areas of ML/TF risk, in accordance with the Proposal’s establishment requirements, including, but not limited to, utilizing the appropriate risk assessment processes to establish a reasonably designed set of risk-based internal policies, procedures and controls
- Maintain the properly established program by implementing it “in all material respects”.8
The two-prong framework: "Establish" vs. "maintain"
While FinCEN acknowledges that the requirement of financial institutions to establish and maintain an AML/CFT program is not new, and over time various formulations of the requirement have developed in statutes and regulations, the Proposal attempts to standardize terms across FinCEN’s regulations for all BSA-regulated financial institutions and delineate the requirements that must be met for financial institutions to have what FinCEN characterizes as an effective AML/CFT program. The Proposal creates a two-prong framework for an effective program: a financial institution must:
- "Establish" an AML/CFT program—that is, design a program that is consistent with the institution’s money laundering/ terrorism financing (ML/TF) risk
- "Maintain" it by implementing it "in all material respects," with the focus of supervisory attention on design failures that could result in systemic failures, as opposed to day-to-day execution issues.9 This distinction puts added emphasis on the importance of the risk assessment process.
Understanding the “establish” prong: What the Proposed Rule requires
FinCEN stresses that programs must stay current as risk profiles change—under the Proposal a financial institution could be treated as failing to "establish" an effective AML/CFT program, if it failed to appropriately update its program to account for significant risk-profile changes.10 FinCEN intends for financial institutions to continuously update their AML/CFT programs to reflect material changes in their risk profile—or risk non-compliance. The Proposal explains that triggering events that could represent material changes in a covered institution’s risk profile would include, but are not limited to:
- Introducing a new product or service
- Modifying how an existing product is delivered or service is performed
- Expanding operations into a new geographic location
Specific obligations
When any such material change occurs, the Proposal would require the relevant financial institution to:
- Conduct a new risk assessment to evaluate the risks associated with the change and make a determination.
- Redesign its internal policies, procedures and controls to address the risks that are not fully covered by its existing procedures.
Action items for covered financial institutions:
- Implement internal processes to identify and flag material changes in products, services or operational geography.
- Establish a protocol for conducting timely risk assessments upon any such change.
- Establish a protocol for timing (the “when”) and appropriate review (the “what”) of the redesign of internal policies, procedures and controls, when material changes have occurred.
- Ensure AML/CFT program updates are documented and implemented before or promptly upon any new activity commencing.
Compliance consideration: A financial institution that fails to reasonably address warnings that its program is not being properly implemented risks significant AML/CFT supervisory action, enforcement action or both.
Action item for covered financial institutions: While the Proposal is intended to clarify and reinforce a supervisory and enforcement focus on addressing significant or systemic failures to implement an effective AML/CFT program, rather than on isolated, technical or immaterial implementation issues, financial institutions should treat internal “red flags” and regulator feedback as a “call to action”, that is, mandatory triggers for remediation not merely advisory notices.
Understanding the “implementation” prong
The Proposal explains that implementation “in all material respects,” is not achieved with respect to specific types of AML/CFT program failures. Commonly observed examples of implementation failures include the following.
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Inconsistent execution: Internal policies, procedures and controls are not being carried out on a consistent, regular or timely basis, often due to inadequate resources.
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Risk assessment gaps: The program fails to identify or adequately cover higher ML/TF risks, such as transaction monitoring systems that fail to identify:
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- Material volumes of transactions
- Types of transactions
- Common actors involved in high-risk transactions Systemic weaknesses: Deficiencies in risk assessment processes, including data-related issues that materially undermine the institution's ability to mitigate ML/TF risks through its controls.
FinCEN also provides ways in which institutions can identify implementation-related concerns, including, but not limited to:
- Independent testing of the AML/CFT program
- Examiner observations or informal comments from FinCEN or a federal functional regulator
- Management information systems and related reports or other outputs (key performance indicators or key risk indicators, such as monitoring for potentially material backlogs in relevant AML/CFT processes)
- Issues flagged by personnel involved in operating the AML/CFT program11
Compliance considerations: The "establish vs. maintain" distinction is the new standard to be reflected in examinations. A stale program—that is, one not updated after a material change to the institution's risk profile—will be regarded as a failure to establish, which can in turn result in significant supervisory actions.
What the proposal requires of each type of institution
All covered institutions: Risk-based internal controls with embedded risk assessment processes
FinCEN is proposing to standardize program rules across institution types, such that all BSA regulated institutions will be required to implement "risk-based sets of internal policies, procedures and controls" that are "reasonably designed" to:
- Identify, assess and document ML/TF risks through regularly-updated risk assessment processes
- Implement controls that mitigate ML/TF risks consistent with identified risks, including through risk-based allocation of resources that will be targeted to control the highest risk products, geographies or customer types
- For certain institution types—such as banks, broker-dealers, mutual funds, FCMs/IBCs and credit card operators—to facilitate conducting ongoing customer due diligence (CDD), as is required under existing regulations.12 The level of sophistication of the internal policies, procedures and controls should be commensurate with the size, structure, risk profile and complexity of the financial institution.13
More robust and frequent risk assessment processes
For many institutions, it is common practice to maintain a periodic risk assessment process. However, a risk assessment requirement is not stated in a uniform manner for all financial institutions under current AML regulations.14 While previously implicitly required, the explicit risk assessment processes requirement will be new for casinos, MSBs, certain broker-dealers, mutual funds and FCMs/IBCs.15
As proposed, risk assessment processes must:
- Evaluate ML/TF risks of business activities—products, services, distribution channels (including remote and non-face-to-face customer onboarding), customers and geographies.
- Review and, as appropriate, incorporate the AML/CFT National Priorities (the National Priorities)16, under the AML Act.17
- Be updated "promptly" after changes the institution knows or has reason to know significantly changes its ML/TF risk profile—including new products or services, new customer types, new geographic distribution or footprint, new mitigation technology and mergers, acquisitions or divestitures.18
FinCEN also emphasizes the importance of incorporating the National Priorities into both the risk assessment methodology and the resulting procedural controls.19 Additionally, the use of the term "risk assessment processes" is intended to reflect that a financial institution may implement multiple processes, as appropriate for different business operations. Institutions will be examined based on the totality of these processes rather than the sufficiency of a single, standalone risk assessment process.20
While the Proposal is designed to reduce complexity and formulaic “check-the-box” examinations in an effort to bring a “big picture” approach to both constructing and evaluating an effective AML program, the Proposal may not simplify an institution’s compliance challenge. It will be important for financial institutions to regularly evaluate the scope and parameters of their risk assessment processes, in light of their specific products and services, and to regularly evaluate whether the timeframe for updating risk assessments and then implementing responsive policies, procedures, controls and trainings is appropriate. This will particularly be the case in larger enterprises that have more complex business models and distribution channels—a not uncommon example would be an enterprise that has an insurance company, a broker-dealer and an investment adviser. The ambiguity in the language of the Proposal coupled with FinCEN’s expectation that programs stay current as risk profiles change, arguably raises the stakes with respect to ongoing review, improvement and resource allocation in terms of the risk assessment process.
Apart from the overall thematic focus on compliance practices that identify and target areas of highest AML risk, the majority of the Proposal's AML/CFT program components remain essentially unchanged. Still, in the Proposal, FinCEN provides additional guidance on fulfilling the other AML/CFT program requirements as follows:
AML/CFT Officer must be US-based
From the inception of AML/CFT program requirements, the Chief Compliance Officer has been responsible for establishing and implementing the AML/CFT program, overseeing training and coordinating and monitoring day-to-day compliance. In the Proposal, FinCEN stresses that the Chief AML Officer should be qualified, and not overburdened with other responsibilities. Importantly, the Proposal underscores that the Chief AML Officer must have authority, independence and decision-making capability, as well as adequate resources to implement a sufficient AML/CFT compliance program. Appropriate resources include access to sufficient staffing, funding and technology, commensurate with the institution's risk profile.21
The Proposal also provides that the AML/CFT Compliance Officer must be located in the United States and accessible to—and subject to oversight by—FinCEN and its designees. This may require certain internal reorganizations of compliance reporting functions, particularly for the US operations of non-US-based banks. The requirement that the AML/CFT Compliance Officer reside in the US does not prohibit institutions from relying on non-US resources to support the overall compliance function.22
Governance approval and availability of written program to FinCEN
The Proposal generally standardizes the requirements for financial institutions to make their written AML/CFT programs and policies available to FinCEN or its designees upon request, and have the board, equivalent governing body or appropriate senior management approve the AML/CFT program—with flexibility as to what counts as "equivalent governing body" and who in senior management may approve.23
Independent testing: Now explicitly outcome-focused
Additionally, the Proposal attempts to standardize language regarding independent testing across institution types and emphasizes that testing should assess effectiveness relative to the institution's risk profile, using objective criteria to evaluate whether the program is reasonably designed and resources are allocated consistent with risk assessment processes, along with areas for remediation identified accordingly.24
Testing must be independent of the compliance function. Institutions without an internal audit function may use internal staff not involved in the function being tested. Additionally, financial institutions with less complex operations and lower risk profiles, may consider utilizing a shared resource as part of a collaborative arrangement to conduct testing as long as the testing is independent.25
Training: Clarifying, not substantive
The Proposal also seeks to harmonize language regarding training objectives across institution types. Training content and frequency should be consistent with the risk-profile, be role-dependent and can cover employees and non-employees as identified through a risk-based approach.26 As is already the case, FinCEN would generally expect training to cover the financial institution's internal policies, procedures, and controls, which should in turn reflect the results of the risk assessment processes, the latest AML/CFT regulatory developments and other relevant information.27
All covered institutions: Codified risk-based resource allocation
The Proposal states that institutions should direct more attention and resources to higher-risk customers and activities—consistent with the institution's risk profile—than to lower-risk customers and activities, and frames this as a meaningful departure from the status quo that will free institutions to de-prioritize low-risk areas.28 Fundamental to this approach is that the institution is directing appropriate human and technological resources to its AML/CFT program generally.
Examiners are not supposed to "second-guess" reasonable risk and resource determinations, but are to assess whether resource allocation is informed by a set of reasonably designed risk assessment processes and whether the institution knew or should have known of resource-related issues that resulted in a material failure to implement effective AML controls.29
This is arguably the most operationally consequential provision. FinCEN is proposing to give institutions latitude to allocate fewer compliance resources to low-risk areas—but only if the decision to do so is supported by traceable and documented risk considerations.30
Banks
Under the Proposal, banks face the most sweeping structural changes, including a new supervision and enforcement framework unique to them (see Section III below).
FinCEN would combine the two existing bank program rules—for banks with and without a federal functional regulator—into a single set of rules, largely because the proposal standardizes written-program availability and approval requirements across all banks.31 FinCEN also proposes removing from its bank program rule the provision requiring banks to comply with parallel federal regulator program rules, stating those rules are consistent and banks are expected to adhere to FinCEN's rule as BSA administrator.32
The Proposal will permit federally regulated banks to have their programs approved by a governing body within the bank, other than their board of directors.33 For complex US banking organizations, this may provide flexibility to have AML Program elements reviewed by a group of senior executives that may report to the board, rather than require a board vote. For the US branch of a foreign bank, the equivalent governing body may be the foreign banking organization's Executive Board, rather than the Bank’s Supervisory Board34.35
Casinos, card clubs and money services businesses (MSBs)
Casinos, card clubs and MSBs are currently not required to have AML programs approved by their board or senior management. The Proposal would move these entities closer to the standards that apply to banks and broker-dealers—requiring approval by a board, equivalent governing body or appropriate senior management.36
FinCEN would also remove existing language in the casino and MSB regulations that reference integrating compliance procedures with automated data processing systems. FinCEN explains that the removal is not intended to eliminate substantive obligations but to align with a risk-based, technology-neutral approach, which allows but does not mandate the use of automated data processing systems.37
Note that existing MSB-specific customer identification provisions and the agent-responsibility provisions, would not be amended by the Proposal.38
Broker-dealers and mutual funds, FCMs, IBCs, insurance companies, DPMSJs, credit card operators, loan/finance companies and housing GSEs
With the objective of standardized requirements across financial institutions, the Proposal, once finalized, will change the provisions governing all of these institutions, introducing the (new) requirements of:
- Conducting formal risk assessments
- Making written AML/CFT programs available to FinCEN, or its designee, upon request. For broker-dealers that are not subsidiaries of bank holding companies and mutual funds, both requirements will be new, though previously implied.39 For FCMs and IBCs, the risk assessment process being codified will be new. For all the covered financial institutions, the governance approval mechanics will be standardized. Compliance Officers at these institutions should review their current program rules against the proposed uniform framework to identify potential gaps.40
The bank-specific supervision and enforcement framework: A material change
The following provision is the one most likely to reshape how banks engage with their federal supervisory agencies when facing enforcement actions arising from alleged AML compliance shortcomings.
The "significant or systemic" standard for implementation deficiencies
Under the Proposal, once a bank establishes an AML/CFT program, regulators must demonstrate that any implementation deficiency is "significant or systemic" in order to be the basis for a significant AML/CFT supervisory or enforcement action. The Proposal clarifies that this will not restrict actions for failures to establish an effective program nor factors FinCEN applies in the disposition of a violation41, and does not affect criminal liability.42
This would be a meaningful amendment to what has been the traditional approach to bringing AML enforcement actions, but it would not be an absolute shield. Failure to establish—including by not updating the program when the bank’s risk profile materially shifts—would remain fully actionable. The incentive structure is clear: invest in program design and risk assessment governance, and isolated operational misses would likely carry lower enforcement risk.
The consultation "gate" that must be cleared before significant supervisory actions are brought
Before a prudential regulatory agency could initiate a "significant AML/CFT supervisory action," it would need to provide the FinCEN Director an opportunity to review the action and consider FinCEN's input—generally by providing written notice at least 30 days in advance (unless a shorter period were determined necessary in the agency's sole discretion for safety and soundness reasons)–including relevant underlying AML/CFT information and responding to FinCEN requests for additional information to the extent reasonably practicable.43
This 30-day pre-enforcement consultation gate is new and significant. It inserts FinCEN as a check on delegated agency action—theoretically promoting national consistency, but clearly obligating the prudential regulators to justify their case to FinCEN before pursuing an enforcement action. For banks, this also means more supervisory actors will be involved in the supervisory process, and there may be opportunities (and risks) with respect to information flows between FinCEN and the primary federal regulator.
The "effectiveness credit" factors: Outcomes and innovation count
In deciding whether to take—or when reviewing—a proposed enforcement or significant supervisory action, FinCEN would consider the extent to which the bank—where appropriate in light of its size, complexity and risk profile—had advanced AML/CFT priorities by engaging in highly useful information sharing and/or proactive analytics and other innovative activities producing demonstrable outputs, including through effective use of AI, federated learning and advanced monitoring tools.44
Notably, FinCEN acknowledges that it will factor in the bank’s size, complexity, risk profile and, as relevant, circumstances in which the bank’s low-risk customers or limited business activities naturally limit the extent to which the bank can meaningfully contribute to AML/CFT priorities. It also acknowledges that adopting new technologies for BSA compliance may not be suitable for every financial institution, particularly smaller ones and it is therefore not currently requiring the use of any particular technology, though it is certainly simultaneously encouraging the use of innovative technologies45 and signaling it as a factor that could impact enforcement risk.
In an additional nod to advanced technologies and AI, FinCEN explicitly states that responsible experimentation with innovative technologies will not, by itself, increase the risk of a significant supervisory or enforcement action.46 In fact, FinCEN further states that the requirement that a financial institution's risk-based set of internal policies, procedures and controls be "reasonably designed" would give financial institutions flexibility in how they achieved compliance with the BSA and the Proposal's other requirements. As part of having a risk-based set of internal policies, procedures and controls that was reasonably designed, financial institutions may choose to responsibly adopt new technologies or innovative approaches to comply with BSA requirements. Consistent with this approach, FinCEN encourages financial institutions to evaluate whether new technology or innovative approaches in the use of other resources might help to more effectively combat financial crime. Innovative approaches could involve machine learning, GenAI, digital identity, blockchain monitoring and analytics or APls. These technologies may be especially useful in countering illicit finance activity involving digital assets, an effort for which FinCEN supports the responsible use of novel models, techniques or strategies.47
Compliance considerations: This is a quiet but important incentive shift. The quality and usefulness of SARs, participation in 314(a) and 314(b) information-sharing programs and demonstrable outputs from analytics and artificial intelligence (AI) tools could affirmatively weigh in the institution's favor in an enforcement calculus. Chief Compliance Officers would be given a green light to build an "effectiveness narrative" that goes beyond traditional processes for documenting customer wealth and payment activities.
The bottom line: Key issues and what's genuinely new or at stake
The shift from process to outcomes is real—and likely to change the examination dynamic
The Proposal is an attempt to codify an approach that members of Congress and certain regulators have been articulating for years but have not succeeded in formally embedding in the rules. The evolving philosophy is that an AML/CFT program is to be judged by what it produces, not just whether it checks boxes. FinCEN's economic analysis expects the primary aggregate effects to be "reallocative"48—not necessarily reducing total AML/CFT spend, but changing what resources are spent on and by whom, with no expected aggregate cost increase and potential for more effective outcomes at similar expenditure levels.49 However, financial institutions should be wary of such projections as an increased emphasis on timely updated risk assessments, combined with an enforcement mechanism that relies on establishing and maintaining the linkage between the risk assessment and the AML/CFT program may in practice require an increase in spending due to the need to conduct major risk assessments more frequently.
Risk assessment documentation is now the central compliance artifact
Every major element of this rule—resource allocation, program design, update timing, independent testing and examination defense—flows through the quality and documentation of the institution's risk assessment processes. FinCEN uses the term "processes" intentionally to encourage or accommodate multiple processes, and states it is not prescribing specific methodologies or updating timeframes beyond the critical elements.50 That flexibility is real—but so would the expectation be that processes were sound, well-documented and driving defensible decisions.
The establishment vs. maintenance distinction creates a new risk taxonomy for compliance officers
The rule creates a structurally important distinction with potential enforcement consequences. Failures to establish a compliant program—potentially involving stale risk assessments—will be treated more harshly than isolated implementation failures. Bank Compliance Officers in particular should map their internal governance processes to ensure the "establish" prong is met continuously, not just at program inception.
For banks specifically: Arbitrary enforcement standards in the context of AML/CFT compliance should become a thing of the past
The 30-day FinCEN consultation requirement before significant supervisory actions should add a buffer that protects institutions, particularly those that may be subject to more than one federal regulator, from arbitrary standards. Over time, if it produces greater cross-agency consistency, it will be a benefit for institutions—but it is too early to tell how enforcement actions will be impacted in either case.
The innovation incentive is worth taking seriously
FinCEN highlights low-tech information sharing—through 314(a), 314(b) and FinCEN Exchange—as an important element of effectiveness.51 One of the most notable changes that may be a result of the Proposal is FinCEN and the prudential regulatory agencies embracing the use of evolving technologies as major components of AML/CFT programs. Combined with the express consideration of AI and advanced analytics outputs in the enforcement calculus, this Proposal is the clearest regulatory signal to date that investment in technology and information sharing is not just a best practice—it is a potential defense.
Final observations
However, again it is worth noting that the expectation will be that resources be devoted appropriately to higher-risk areas, and inherently that each AML/CFT program will have adequate human and technological resources commensurate with the institution’s ML/TF risks.
These reforms are part of a broader regulatory trend toward reducing AML compliance burdens, consistent with FinCEN's recent FAQs on SAR filing requirements and its February 2026 order granting relief from repeat beneficial ownership verification requirements.
While the Proposal could ease some compliance burdens, financial institutions should nonetheless remain attentive to a critical tension: even as regulators emphasize flexibility and reduced burden, there is heightened US Department of Justice (DOJ) and Treasury focus on fraud—particularly fraud involving federal programs and benefits—this suggests that supervisory attention on institutions’ ability to identify high-impact illicit activity may increase in practice.
Ultimately, the practical impact of the Proposal will depend heavily on whether examination and enforcement practices evolve in parallel with the stated policy shift. Institutions that continue to be evaluated primarily on “check-the-box” implementation may find the shift in paradigm more limited than the Proposal suggests. Accordingly, financial institutions should consider conducting gap assessments of their existing risk assessment processes and evaluating whether their current programs would satisfy the Proposal's "establishment" requirements before any final rule takes effect.
If you need assistance assessing the impact of the Proposal on your institution, please reach out to one of the authors listed below.
**
Footnotes
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91 Fed. Reg. 18704 (April 10, 2026).
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91 Fed. Reg. 18704, 18724 (April 10, 2026).
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91 Fed. Reg. 18704 (April 10, 2026).
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The 4 pillars are:
- risk-based internal policies, procedures and controls;
- an independent audit function to test programs;
- a designated AML Compliance Officer and
- an ongoing employee training program.
The implementation of the Customer Due Diligence Rule is often referred to as the fifth AML pillar.
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The AML Act refers to “countering the financing of terrorism” in addition to “anti-money laundering” when describing the requirement to establish an AML/CFT program. Section 6101(b) expands the BSA's program rule requirement to formally include an express reference to CFT in addition to AML. Therefore, the Proposal adds a definition of “AML/CFT program” to the regulations to replace existing references to “anti-money laundering program” and “compliance program.” FinCEN does not anticipate that this change would create new compliance obligations.
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91 Fed. Reg. 18704, 18711 (April 10, 2026).
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91 Fed. Reg. 18704, 18712 (April 10, 2026).
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Id.
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91 Fed. Reg. 18704, 18713 (April 10, 2026).
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91 Fed. Reg. 18704, 18710 (April 10, 2026)
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91 Fed. Reg. 18704, 18714 (April 10, 2026),
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91 Fed. Reg. 18704, 18714, 17-18 (April 10, 2026).
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Id.
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91 Fed. Reg. 18704, 18715 (April 10, 2026).
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The National Priorities refers to the most recent statement of Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism National Priorities issued by FinCEN. FinCEN is required to update the National Priorities not less than every four years, though they have not yet been updated the most recent statement, which was released on June 30, 2021. The eight priorities from that release were:
- corruption;
- cybercrime;
- domestic and international terrorist financing;
- fraud;
- transnational criminal organization activity;
- drug trafficking organization activity;
- human trafficking and human smuggling and
- proliferation financing.
Given that FinCEN is overdue for a formal update of the Priorities, financial institutions should treat guidance from FinCEN that has since been issued as reflective of the agency’s current priorities. This is particularly noteworthy in the current context of heightened DOJ and Treasury focus on fraud—particularly fraud involving federal programs and benefits. Recent initiatives—including the creation of a DOJ national fraud enforcement function and FinCEN advisories targeting benefits-related fraud—underscore that even as regulators emphasize flexibility and reduced burden, expectations around identifying high-impact illicit activity may increase in practice. See US Dep’t of Just ., Acting Attorney General Todd Blanche Issues Memorandum on the Creation of the National Fraud Enforcement Division (Apr. 7, 2026); See also Fin. Crimes Enf’t Network , FinCEN Issues Advisory on Health Care Fraud Schemes Targeting Medicare, Medicaid, and Other Federal and State Health Care Benefits Programs (Mar. 30, 2026).
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FinCEN, “Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism National Priorities”, (June 30, 2021).
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Id.
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91 Fed. Reg. 18704, 18716 (April 10, 2026).
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Id.
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91 Fed. Reg. 18704, 18719 (April 10, 2026).
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91 Fed. Reg. 18704, 18720 (April 10, 2026).
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Id. at 18720-21.
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91 Fed. Reg. 18704, 18718 (April 10, 2026).
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Id. at 18718-19.
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91 Fed. Reg. 18704, 18720 (April 10, 2026)
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Id. \
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91 Fed. Reg. 18704, 18717 (April 10, 2026).\
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Id. \
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Id. \
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91 Fed. Reg. 18704, 18723 (April 10, 2026) citing FinCEN, Customer Identification Programs, Anti-Money Laundering Programs, and Beneficial Ownership Requirements for Banks Lacking a Federal Functional Regulator, 85 FR 57129 (/citation/85-FR-57129) (Sept. 15, 2020).\
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Id.\
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91 Fed. Reg. 18704, 18721 (April 10, 2026).\
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The FRB, FDIC, and OCC already each require the US branches, agencies, and representative offices of the foreign banks they supervise operating in the United States to develop written BSA compliance programs that are approved by their respective bank's board and noted in the minutes, or that are approved by delegates acting under the express authority of their respective bank's board to approve the BSA compliance programs. See 12 CFR 208. 63(b)(1), 21.21 (c)(1), 326.8(b)(1), and 748.2(b)(1). "Express authority" means the head office must be aware of its U.S. AML program requirements and there must be some indication of purposeful delegation See 91 Fed. Reg. 18704, 18721 (April 10, 2026) at FN 90.\
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Id.\
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Id. **citing applicable AML program rules located at 31 CFR 1021.210. \
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91 Fed. Reg. 18704, 18723 (April 10, 2026).\
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Id. \
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91 Fed. Reg. 18704, 18715 (April 10, 2026).\
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Id.\
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Factors that FinCEN and the prudential regulatory agencies consider in evaluating an appropriate disposition of a violation include, but are not limited to: prior history of misconduct, nature and seriousness of violation, presence or absence of prompt remedial measures, and timely and voluntary disclosure. See e.g. FinCEN, FinCEN Statement on Enforcement of the Bank Secrecy Act (Aug. 18, 2020).
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91 Fed. Reg. 18704, 18722 (April 10, 2026).\
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Id.\
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Id.\
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91 Fed. Reg. 18704, 18712 (April 10, 2026).\
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Id.
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91 Fed. Reg. 18704, 18714 (April 10, 2026).\
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91 Fed. Reg. 18704, 18726 (April 10, 2026).
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91 Fed. Reg. 18704, 18726-27 (April 10, 2026).
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91 Fed. Reg. 18704, 18715 (April 10, 2026).
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91 Fed. Reg. 18704, 18722 (April 10, 2026).