Since the outbreak of hostilities in Iran and the surrounding region on February 28, 2026, the conflict has introduced notable volatility into global energy markets. Crude oil and refined product prices have experienced sharp dislocations, natural gas benchmarks have come under pressure and physical supply chains across the region and beyond have faced material disruption. For energy trading firms and their compliance teams, these conditions demand attention not only with respect to commercial risk, but also regulatory risk. Since the Energy Policy Act of 20051, energy companies trading crude oil, natural gas and petrochemical products have faced overlapping anti-manipulation enforcement authority from three key federal agencies, each operating under distinct but structurally similar statutory mandates:

  • The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) enforces anti-manipulation rules under Section 222 of the Federal Power Act (FPA), and Section 4A of the Natural Gas Act (NGA). Penalties for relevant violations can reach approximately US$1.3 million per violation per day (adjusted for inflation), in addition to disgorgement of unjust profits and injunctive or compliance remedies.2
  • The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) enforces the Prohibition of Energy Market Manipulation Rule, promulgated under Section 811 of the Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA), covering wholesale crude oil, gasoline and petroleum distillates. Penalties for relevant violations reach US$1 million per violation per day.3
  • The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) enforces anti-manipulation provisions under the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA). Traditional manipulation claims under CEA § 9(a)(2), require proof that the defendant caused an artificial price. Following the Dodd-Frank Act, the CFTC may also pursue fraud-based manipulation claims under CEA § 6(c)(1) and CFTC Rule 180.1, which do not require proof of an artificial price. Under Rule 180.1, a manipulative scheme coupled with intent or recklessness is sufficient to establish liability. Penalties can reach the greater of US$1 million per violation or triple the monetary gain.4

Implications for market participants during the current conflict

The current conflict carries the following implications for energy and commodity market participants:

Geopolitical volatility increases rather than excuses enforcement risk

The current conflict with Iran has produced precisely the type of market conditions that regulators have historically treated as warranting heightened scrutiny. Wars, hurricanes, sanctions and infrastructure failures are not periods of regulatory forbearance; they are periods in which regulators expect market participants to exercise greater discipline and in which deviations from normal trading behavior will attract immediate attention.

Proof of an artificial price is not required in many cases

Under both FERC’s anti-manipulation rules and CFTC Rule 180.1, a manipulative scheme coupled with intent or recklessness is sufficient to establish liability. Market participants cannot assume that the absence of a demonstrable price impact will insulate them from enforcement.

Historical trading patterns are the enforcement baseline

Regulators routinely compare a firm’s conduct during periods of stress against its own prior trading behavior. Deviations from established patterns, particularly during benchmark-setting windows such as bid-week or Platts Market-on-Close assessments, are treated as powerful circumstantial evidence of manipulative intent.

Physical-financial overlap remains the core risk area

The dominant enforcement paradigm targets firms that hold derivatives settled to a benchmark while simultaneously trading physical volumes that influence that benchmark. Any firm with this profile common among integrated energy companies, trading houses and financial institutions active in energy markets should treat the current conflict as a period requiring enhanced internal controls.

Individual liability is real and expanding

As the cases discussed below demonstrate, traders can face personal civil penalties, trading bans and criminal referral. Compliance programs must ensure that individual traders understand that personal liability attaches to manipulative conduct regardless of whether the firm itself is also held accountable.

Compliance programs materially affect penalty outcomes

For example, under FERC’s Penalty Guidelines, an effective and genuinely enforced compliance program can reduce penalties by up to 95 percent.5 Conversely, the absence of such a program or a program that exists on paper but is not enforced in practice is treated as an aggravating factor, particularly where the firm has been the subject of prior regulatory inquiries. The current conflict presents an opportunity for firms to demonstrate the effectiveness of their compliance infrastructure, or a risk that its deficiencies will be exposed.

In light of the foregoing implications and the enforcement precedents surveyed above, energy and commodity trading firms should review and, where necessary, strengthen their compliance frameworks. At a minimum, firms should consider implementing the following measures:

Contemporaneous documentation

Require traders to document, in real time, the commercial rationale for trades executed during periods of heightened volatility (including armed conflict, sanctions developments, infrastructure outages or extreme weather). Documentation should (i) identify the business purpose (such as, supply coverage, customer obligation, inventory management or risk reduction), (ii) explain pricing and venue choices, (iii) note any benchmark exposure implicated and (iv) be retained in a searchable format for later review.

Benchmark setting surveillance

Calibrate surveillance and supervisory controls to benchmark-setting periods (such as, bidweek/month-end index formation, daily index windows and Platts Market-on-Close assessments). Firms should (i) implement pre-trade review for strategies reasonably likely to influence a benchmark, (ii) apply heightened alerts for last-minute order bursts, cancellations or “marking the close” patterns and (iii) require supervisory sign-off for unusual benchmark-sensitive physical activity when the desk holds material derivatives exposure settled to the same benchmark.

Concentration and uneconomic trading monitoring

Monitor for market concentration, dominant-share trading or sudden surges in fixed-price volume at a hub/assessment location, particularly where reported trades feed published indices. In parallel, flag transactions that appear uneconomic when viewed in isolation (including consistent losses in physical trades that correlate with gains in related derivatives). Escalation triggers should be documented, time-bound and routed to independent compliance/surveillance personnel with authority to pause activity pending review.

Event-driven controls (conflict, sanctions, natural disasters)

Establish (or activate) a documented “event protocol” that triggers enhanced controls during extreme volatility, including (i) increased surveillance frequency, (ii) pre-trade approvals for benchmark-sensitive strategies, (iii) tightened position/credit limits and stress testing and (iv) escalations to a cross-functional committee (Trading/Risk/Compliance/Legal/Operations). Protocols should also address sanctions screening, supply-chain disruptions and operational constraints that can create inadvertent benchmark.

Position and exposure governance

Maintain clear governance over benchmark-linked exposure across physical and derivatives books (including aggregation across affiliates where relevant). Best practices include (i) independent daily reporting of benchmark-linked net exposures, (ii) limits tailored to benchmark sensitivity and liquidity and (iii) documented approvals for strategies that intentionally increase exposure into benchmark windows.

Index reporting and price-assessment controls

If the firm reports trades to price-reporting agencies or provides data used in indices, implement written controls around what can be reported, by whom and based on what records. Controls should include (i) segregation between traders and index reporters where feasible, (ii) validation against deal tickets/confirmations, (iii) prohibition on reporting non-bona fide trades and (iv) periodic sampling/audit of submissions.

Communications, chat and recordkeeping controls

Reinforce that communications are discoverable and often central evidence in manipulation cases. Firms should (i) prohibit off-channel communications for trading activity, (ii) train traders to avoid benchmark intent language (and to escalate if counterparties suggest it) and (iii) ensure retention of chats, calls and trade notes consistent with applicable regulatory requirements.

Escalation and self-reporting readiness

Define clear escalation paths for suspected benchmark sensitive misconduct (such as, Trading → Compliance → Legal), including time-bound triage and preservation steps. Firms should also maintain a playbook for responding to regulator inquiries and evaluating voluntary self-reporting, including criteria for when to engage counsel, scope an internal review and implement remediation.

Post-event lookback reviews

After a major dislocation (such as, a significant escalation in conflict, new sanctions package or severe weather event), conduct a documented lookback focused on benchmark windows, position changes, outlier pricing and any deviations from historical trading patterns. Findings should be reported to senior compliance/risk leadership and used to tune alerts, limits and training.

Firms should treat the current conflict and related market volatility as a catalyst to test whether their controls work in practice: whether benchmark-sensitive trades are supervised, whether rationales are documented, whether surveillance escalates issues quickly and whether compliance can evidence an effective program if regulators later inquire.

Regulatory authority

FERC compliance

FERC’s anti-manipulation authority derives from two parallel statutory provisions:

  • FPA § 222 makes it unlawful for any entity to use or employ any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in connection with the purchase or sale of electric energy or transmission services subject to FERC jurisdiction in contravention of FERC rules prescribed as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of electric ratepayers.6
  • NGA § 4A makes it unlawful to use any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in connection with FERC-jurisdictional purchases, sales or transportation services for natural gas, and it likewise expressly provides that it creates no private right of action.7

Together, FPA § 222 and NGA § 4A give FERC broad authority to pursue manipulation across the electricity and natural gas markets it regulates. Penalties are assessed under FERC's Penalty Guidelines,8 which afford significant weight to the existence or absence of effective compliance programs.

Relevant FERC compliance obligations:

  • Do not use any manipulative or deceptive device in connection with the purchase or sale of electric energy, natural gas or related transmission or transportation services.
  • Maintain and genuinely enforce an effective compliance program.

FTC compliance

The FTC enforces the Prohibition of Energy Market Manipulation Rule, promulgated under Section 811 of EISA.9 The rule provides that it is unlawful, in connection with the purchase or sale at wholesale of crude oil, gasoline or petroleum distillates, to: (a) knowingly engage in any fraudulent or deceptive act or practice, including making any untrue statement of a material fact; or (b) intentionally omit a material fact where the omission renders a statement misleading and where the omission distorts, or is likely to distort, market conditions for the covered product.10 The rule defines “knowingly” to mean the person knew, or must have known, that the conduct was fraudulent or deceptive.11 The FTC's anti-manipulation standard closely mirrors the SEC's anti-fraud Rule 10b-5.12

Relevant FTC compliance obligations:

  • Do not knowingly engage in any fraudulent or deceptive act or practice, including making any untrue statement of a material fact, in connection with wholesale purchases and sales of crude oil, gasoline or petroleum distillates.
  • Do not intentionally omit a material fact where the omission renders a statement misleading and where the omission distorts, or is likely to distort, market conditions for the covered product.
  • Ensure that trading activity and communications do not involve manipulative or deceptive conduct.

CFTC compliance

The CFTC is the primary federal regulator of US derivatives markets and enforces anti-manipulation provisions of the CEA, including traditional manipulation claims and fraud-based manipulation claims, the latter of which apply to manipulation in connection with commodity futures, swaps and related spot transactions subject to CFTC jurisdiction and do not require proof of an artificial price; a manipulative scheme coupled with scienter (intent or recklessness) is sufficient.13 The CEA contains express provisions preserving FERC’s and state regulatory authorities’ statutory authority with respect to certain tariff-based transactions, while separately maintaining CFTC authority in specified circumstances.14 The CFTC has exemptive authority for agreements, contracts and transactions entered into pursuant to FERC-approved or state/municipal electric tariffs, but any such exemption does not limit the CFTC’s authority to investigate compliance with exemption conditions or take enforcement action for violations thereof.15

A critical jurisdictional boundary governs FERC/CFTC regulatory oversight. In Hunter v. FERC, the DC Circuit held that the CFTC has exclusive jurisdiction over futures market manipulation, while FERC’s authority is limited to manipulation in connection with FERC-jurisdictional physical-market transactions.16 This distinction is critical in cross-market “tool-and-target” cases, where physical trades are used to influence financially settled positions. Notwithstanding this boundary, the two agencies routinely coordinate under interagency memoranda of understanding, and a single set of trading activity can give rise to parallel investigations by both agencies.

Relevant CFTC compliance obligations:

  • Do not engage in manipulation or attempted manipulation of commodity prices, and do not employ any manipulative or deceptive scheme in connection with commodity futures, swaps, or related transactions. Note that reckless conduct is sufficient for liability and proof of an artificial price is not required.

Prior enforcement cases

Enforcement agencies have repeatedly pursued manipulation cases under a “tool-and-target” theory: physical trading activity in a spot or forward market serves as the tool used to move a benchmark price that is the target since the trader holds derivatives positions referencing that benchmark, or because the physical trading itself is uneconomic absent the financial gain derived from the benchmark move. Historical enforcement actions illustrate the breadth of this theory across markets and instruments.

Hurricane Rita

In 2007, the CFTC and FERC pursued parallel proceedings against a Texas-based energy company, alleging attempted manipulation of Houston Ship Channel natural gas prices in the aftermath of Hurricane Rita. Hurricane Rita made landfall in September 2005 and was alleged to have reduced Houston-area gas demand as residents fled. The agencies alleged a scheme in which the company sold massive quantities of physical gas at the Houston Ship Channel (HSC) on ICE Futures-US during September and November 2005 and reported those transactions to Platts’ Inside FERC Gas Market Report in an effort to depress the October 2005 and December 2005 monthly index prices and thereby benefit related financial basis-swap positions. The company ultimately settled the CFTC action for a US$10 million civil penalty and permanent injunction, while FERC’s July 2007 Order to Show Cause under NGA § 4A later resolved through a US$30 million settlement that included disgorgement and additional compliance-related program modifications.

2000s energy crisis

In July 2008, the CFTC brought a civil enforcement action against a Dutch-based company and three senior traders alleging manipulation and attempted manipulation of NYMEX Light Sweet Crude Oil, New York Harbor Heating Oil and New York Harbor Gasoline futures during the 2007-2008 period of record oil prices. The complaint alleged the defendants used a “banging/marking the close” strategy, that is, building sizeable positions (including trade-at-settlement positions) and then executing heavy, directionally aggressive trading immediately before and during the closing period to influence the settlement price (a VWAP-based benchmark) and profit on their related exposure. The CFTC alleged they were successful in causing artificial prices (both up and down) and profited about US$1 million. The CFTC also alleged the company and the traders concealed the scheme and made false statements to NYMEX during an exchange inquiry. The company was ultimately fined US$13 million including $1 million in disgorged profits, as well as significant trading bans for its three traders.

Hurricane Ike

In the wake of Hurricane Ike (September 2008), FERC scrutinized a UK-based energy company trading at the Houston Ship Channel amid severe market dislocations. FERC’s Office of Enforcement alleged that, from mid‑September through November 2008, the company’s traders executed uneconomic next‑day, fixed‑price physical natural gas sales at HSC and used transportation and market concentration tactics to suppress the Platts Gas Daily HSC index, while holding financial HSC-Henry Hub spread positions that benefited from a depressed HSC index. FERC issued an Order to Show Cause alleging violations of NGA § 4A and 18 C.F.R. § 1c.1. Years of litigation followed and the matter ultimately resolved with a civil‑penalty settlement (US$10.75 million) along with disgorgement of unjust profits.

Volatility amplifies this risk. When geopolitical events cause price dislocations, traders may have larger than usual derivatives exposures and stronger than usual incentives to influence physical benchmarks. Regulators are aware of this dynamic and will scrutinize trading patterns during periods of market stress with particular care. Market volatility is, in regulators’ experience, both a condition that increases manipulation risk and a condition that has historically preceded significant enforcement activity.

Firms with questions about their specific exposure or compliance obligations should consult experienced energy regulatory counsel. This client alert is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.

Footnotes

  1. 1

    Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109‑58, 119 Stat. 594 (Aug. 8, 2005).

  2. 2

    16 C.F.R. Part 317; 42 U.S.C. §§ 17301–17305.

  3. 3

    16 C.F.R. § 317.2.

  4. 4

    7 C.F.R. § 240.10b‑5 (promulgated under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)).

  5. 5

    17 C.F.R. § 180.1.

  6. 6

    7 U.S.C. § 2(e).

  7. 7

    7 U.S.C. § 6(c).

  8. 8

    Hunter v. FERC, 711 F.3d 155 (D.C. Cir. 2013).

  9. 9

    16 U.S.C. § 824v and 15 U.S.C. § 717c-1, implemented through 18 C.F.R. §§ 1c.1 and 1c.2.

  10. 10

    16 C.F.R. Part 317; 42 U.S.C. § 17301.

  11. 11

    7 U.S.C. §§ 9, 13, implemented through 17 C.F.R. §§ 180.1 and 180.2.

  12. 12

    Revised Policy Statement on Enforcement, 132 FERC ¶ 61,216 (2010).

  13. 13

    16 U.S.C. § 824v(a),

  14. 14

    15 U.S.C. § 717c-1,

  15. 15

    132 FERC ¶ 61,216 (2010).

  16. 16

    42 U.S.C. § 17301, and codified at 16 C.F.R. Part 317.

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Impacts of evolving trade regulations and compliance risks
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