On February 24, 2026, the US Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York (SDNY) announced a new Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self Disclosure Program for Financial Crimes (the Program) that offers eligible companies a clear, two step path to a declination for fraud or financial misconduct affecting market integrity. If all conditions are met, the Program contemplates no criminal fine, forfeiture, or monitorship. SDNY also released a model conditional declination letter detailing its expectations, breach consequences, successor in interest provisions, and other key terms. This update is the latest in a series of government enforcement policy shifts aimed at reshaping the calculus around corporate and individual cooperation in civil and criminal matters.
This district‑specific policy builds on the US Department of Justice’s (DOJ) own corporate enforcement program updates discussed in our May 2025 legal update and previewed by SDNY at a conference earlier this month. The Program sets out eligibility criteria, timing, district-specific deviations from DOJ’s enforcement framework and potential benefits for self‑disclosures involving fraud and other market‑integrity offenses, with SDNY stating that it expects to issue conditional declinations within two to three weeks of a qualifying self‑report.
Background
SDNY’s Program updates build on DOJ’s Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self‑Disclosure (CEP) framework, which shifted from a “presumption of declination” to a “will receive a declination” standard for qualifying disclosures, introduced a “near‑miss” presumption of a non-prosecution agreement and signaled a narrower, more tailored approach to monitorships. The Program contemplates early conditional declinations and a restitution‑only resolution for eligible companies.
Key policy updates and clarifications
Office-specific disclosure
SDNY requires companies to self-disclose directly to SDNY, independent from reporting under DOJ’s CEP or any other agency’s self-reporting program. This is SDNY’s latest move in seeking to incentivize incoming tips—in 2024, SDNY launched its whistleblower pilot program geared towards voluntary self-disclosures of criminal conduct by individuals for certain non-violent offenses.
Scope of eligible misconduct
SDNY's Program covers self-reported conduct involving market-integrity offenses such as company or agent‑level fraud; fraud in connection with securities, commodities or digital assets; false statements or fraud upon auditors or market regulators and other willful violations of core federal securities and commodities statutes that undermine market integrity or harm customers, competitors or market participants. “Fraud” is defined expansively for these purposes and includes false statements, forgery, embezzlement, misappropriation, insider trading, spoofing and market manipulation. The model conditional declination letter confirms that eligibility hinges on these same categories of misconduct.
Timeliness and voluntariness
Under the Program, a disclosure must be made promptly upon discovery, before the company learns of a government investigation or receives a subpoena or document request from DOJ, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) or a state AG. Knowledge of a whistleblower submission, press reporting (absent public reporting of a government investigation) or a prior self‑report to another agency does not disqualify eligibility, though strategic delay may disqualify a company. The disclosure also “must be substantive and specific, including all known facts about the nature of the misconduct, the individuals involved and any affected parties,” and “must be updated promptly as new information becomes available.” SDNY indicates that qualifying companies can expect a conditional declination within two to three weeks of making a self-report, though the reliability of this timeline remains to be demonstrated. Companies should note that the disclosure requirements are extensive and, once initiated, create ongoing obligations that may limit future strategic flexibility.
Cooperation expectations
Required cooperation includes timely disclosure of all non‑privileged facts; identification of individuals and key witnesses; sharing non‑privileged internal‑investigation results with attribution where feasible; prompt global production with efforts to overcome foreign‑law barriers; specific identification of materials probative of individual culpability; facilitation of interviews and sworn testimony; preservation of data across all platforms, including ephemeral messaging; non‑interference with SDNY’s investigation and a three‑year commitment to report credible evidence or allegations of company criminal conduct relating to law. These cooperation obligations are substantial and, in practice, may require significant resource commitments and could affect the company’s position in related regulatory or civil proceedings.
Remediation and restitution
Companies must commit to remediation before a conditional declination and must reasonably remediate—including through compliance‑program enhancements and appropriate discipline—and make full restitution to injured parties before a final declination; restitution to wrongdoers is not required. The Program introduces a restitution‑only outcome (no fines or forfeiture), though the scope of restitution obligations could be significant depending on the nature and extent of the underlying misconduct, and related SEC/CFTC resolutions may be credited against restitution obligations.
Aggravating circumstances
A nexus to terrorism, sanctions evasion, foreign corruption, sex trafficking, human trafficking and smuggling, international drug cartels, slavery or forced labor or physical violence—including knowing or reckless financing or laundering in support—disqualifies eligibility. By contrast, seriousness or pervasiveness of misconduct, severity of harm, past criminal adjudications or involvement of senior leaders are not disqualifying or aggravating factors under SDNY’s Program. This deviates from the CEP, which instructs DOJ lawyers to consider, among other things, the severity of the misconduct, demonstrable loss and involvement of senior-level personnel.
Benefits and timing
Eligible companies are expected to receive a declination covering the company and its affiliates for acts in furtherance of the illegal activity, with no criminal fines or forfeiture (subject to restitution) and no monitorship. SDNY will ordinarily issue a conditional declination within two to three weeks and a final declination after cooperation, remediation and restitution are complete. The model letter details these benefits and boundaries, and companies considering self-disclosure will need to carefully weigh these conditions and ongoing obligations, including the risk of breach and its consequences, against the stated benefits.
Consequences for non‑self‑reporting
Where a company does not self‑report or otherwise fails to qualify, SDNY states there is a presumption in favor of a guilty plea, deferred prosecution agreement or non-prosecution agreement with monetary penalties, and a strong presumption against a declination.
Practical takeaways for companies
Eight months after the national DOJ policy framework was released, the same core themes continue to shape federal corporate criminal enforcement policy: voluntary disclosure, cooperation focused on individual accountability, concrete remediation, limited use of monitors and stated transparency and outcome certainty. The Program is the latest in US enforcement bodies’ efforts to operate at the forefront of local-level incorporation of national framework initiatives, and was released the same day that the SEC announced that it updated the SEC Enforcement Manual for the first time in almost a decade.
SDNY’s Program adds district‑specific refinements for market-integrity offenses: a restitution‑only financial consequence, conditional declinations in approximately two to three weeks of a qualifying self-report and a narrow set of disqualifying aggravating circumstances that notably excludes senior‑management involvement. These deviations from DOJ’s CEP provide additional considerations for companies assessing the options of whether to self-disclose through SDNY, DOJ’s CEP program, or not at all. Whether and how these stated benefits materialize in practice—and whether the associated obligations and risks justify self-reporting in a given case—remains to be seen. Nonetheless, companies will need to review their disciplinary policies and compliance programs. Strong compliance efforts and meaningful responses to misconduct will continue to be important factors that SDNY and other government agencies consider when deciding how to resolve matters, including whether to offer cooperation credit or a declination.
SDNY’s announcement reflects a continuing pattern of high-level policy updates that carry significant implications for corporate enforcement strategy. While the Program offers additional clarity on certain aspects of the self-disclosure framework for market-integrity offenses, companies and counsel should carefully evaluate the costs, benefits and uncertainties of self-reporting on a case-by-case basis as the Program is implemented and any further guidance is released.