In Spurgeon & Ors v Capita PLC [2026] EWHC 241 (KB), the High Court rejected a strike-out application brought by Capita against nearly 4,000 claimants who were alleging non‑material damage following a cyber‑attack. Capita argued that the claimants’ solicitors had drafted standardised Particulars of Claim which exaggerated the alleged distress and did not reflect their clients’ actual instructions, thereby “tainting” evidence by putting words into the claimants’ mouths and rendering the entire action an abuse of process.

In rejecting the application, the Court supported a measured approach to the limits of permissible drafting and reaffirmed the high threshold for striking-out claims for abuse of process, even in light of imperfect or standardised pleadings in mass claims.

Background

In March 2023, Capita plc (Capita) suffered a cyber incident which resulted in unauthorised access to the personal data of employees and pension scheme members. Following notification, nearly 4,000 individuals instructed solicitors under a group retainer to bring claims under the UK GDPR and the Data Protection Act 2018, alleging non-material damage (distress and anxiety).

The Particulars of Claim included schedules describing the distress suffered using standardised wording prepared by solicitors and counsel, and approved by each claimant. Expressions such as “tormented by the knowledge” and “violation of security” were used.

Capita challenged the formulation process of the pleadings and pursued a strike out application for abuse of process (under CPR 3.4(2)(b)), on the basis that:

  1. language used in the Particulars of Claim did not reflect the claimants’ actual experiences or instructions;
  2. distress had been exaggerated or ‘invented’ by the claimants’ solicitors; and
  3. by approving those pleadings, the claimants’ recollections of distress had been ‘irrevocably tainted’, making a fair trial impossible.

Decision

The Court refused the strike-out application. The Court emphasised that strike-out of a claim for abuse of process is a severe remedy, reserved for cases involving serious misuse of the courts’ procedures or demonstrable unfairness. In its rejection, the Court emphasised four key points:

1. Pleadings are a lawyer’s work product

The Court rejected Capita’s argument that individual claimants were participants in the alleged abuse through approval of Particulars of Claim said to overstate their distress, emphasising that pleadings are lawyers’ work, not clients’. Counsel therefore enjoyed a “wide latitude” when formulating instructions into pleadings, and are not required to mirror clients’ language, provided that the claimant understands and assents to the substance of what is pleaded.

Critically, the Court maintained the distinction between a lawyer’s drafting and a client’s conduct. It would be disproportionate and unjust to deprive claimants of their causes of action because of alleged defects in how their advisers formulated the case.

2. Standardisation in mass claims is not inherently abusive

The Court recognised that in large, multi-claimant actions, pleadings will often adopt standardised language, which is not a failing. A pleading is not a witness statement, and lawyers are entitled to exercise judgment in summarising common case features, particularly where the alleged harm is similar.

What matters is the claimant’s understanding and assent to what is pleaded. The Court referred to professional obligations governing statements of truth, and the principle that assent by the lay client is the essential safeguard. In this case, each claimant had approved the Particulars of Claim and accompanying schedules, so standardised language alone was insufficient to support an allegation of abuse of process.

3. No evidence of incurable prejudice

As standardised pleadings are not abusive (alone), Capita was required to demonstrate that the drafting process had caused incurable prejudice, such that a fair trial was no longer possible. The Court noted Capita had failed to do so and rejected the suggestions that claimants’ assent had been improperly obtained through the use of leading statements, or that emotive terminology had distorted their recollections.

The Court accepted that lawyers may need to probe their clients’ experiences when taking instructions, and this falls within the wide latitude of professional judgment. Accordingly, it was speculative to allege ‘psychological taint’ by the use of words such as ‘tormented’, without expert evidence capable of supporting such a theory of confirmation bias. In any event, an issue of reliability is ordinarily a matter for trial, not for strike-out.

4. Alternatives to further clarity were available

Finally, a last-resort option like strike-out should not be sought where there are appropriate alternatives. If Capita wanted more clarity, it could rely on proportionate case-management tools (e.g. Part 18 requests, early witness statements etc.), which were alternatives that undermined any rationale for strike-out.

The Court rejected the suggestion that every claimant be required to produce witness evidence at this stage as, given the number of claimants, this would not only be burdensome and impractical but potentially oppressive. The Court commented that better alternatives were available at this early stage, and the typical procedures of litigation (i.e. eventual witness statements and cross-examinations), provided adequate protection against unreliability. The Court concluded that nothing had undermined the integrity of the litigation process so as to justify the ‘draconian’ step of strike-out.

While refusing the strike-out application, the Court accepted that certain language used to describe the claimants’ distress lacked precision and could create evidential or case management difficulties later in the proceedings, due to potential for subjectivity. However, the appropriate response was not to strike out thousands of claims, but for the claimants to clarify and amend their pleadings to adopt clearer and more neutral formulations of loss.

Key takeaways

The decision is a reminder that strike-out for abuse of process is rare, and the courts will usually deal with problems in mass data breach pleadings through case management and targeted amendment, not by shutting claims down. The decision reinforces that:

  • Strike‑out for abuse of process remains exceptional: arguments regarding how distress is pleaded will not justify strike‑out without clear evidence of dishonesty or irreparable unfairness.
  • Standardised pleading in mass claims is not inherently improper: lawyers are entitled to frame claimants’ experiences using common language, provided claimants understand and agree to it.
  • The appropriate remedy is amendment: where wording risks evidential or case‑management difficulty, courts will favour clarification and amendments over striking-out claims at an early stage.

With thanks to Violet Rab for her assistance in preparing this post.

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