On 25 August 2026, the Draft Anti-Cross-Border Corruption Law of the People’s Republic of China (the Draft) was submitted by the National Supervisory Commission (NSC) to the Standing Committee of the 14th National People’s Congress for its first reading.1 Public consultation began on 28 August 2026. As China’s first dedicated draft law targeting corruption with cross-border elements, the Draft sets out a comprehensive framework with a broad extraterritorial reach. The Draft proposes mandatory anti-corruption compliance programmes, direct penalties for compliance failures, and restrictions against certain forms of evidence sharing and foreign enforcement-related investigative activities in China.
The Draft remains subject to public consultation and may be revised before final enactment. The general expectation is that the final version may be approved before the end of 2026 or in the first half of 2027, and there would be a transition period between promulgation and entry into force. Nevertheless, as a key bill in China’s 2026 legislative plan that is driven by the NSC, the Draft provides a strong indication of China’s future regulatory priorities and enforcement trends, which would significantly reshape the compliance and investigations landscape for multinational companies with a China nexus.
Significantly, the Draft introduces a new corporate integrity and compliance obligation which requires all cross-border businesses (i.e., Chinese entities with overseas investment, or foreign entities with branches and subsidiaries in China) to implement a holistic compliance framework addressing corruption risk assessments, controls, whistleblowing, books and records keeping, and third-party due diligence (among other things). Such requirements – which previously only existed as non-binding best practices – would bring China closer to the statutory requirements and regulatory expectations in other major jurisdictions, including compliance programmes designed to prevent breach of the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and adequate procedures designed to prevent bribery under the UK Bribery Act and the Australian Criminal Code.
In addition to the mandatory anti-corruption compliance programmes, the Draft also (a) requires all cross-border businesses to report suspected cross-border corruption to the relevant Chinese authorities in accordance with PRC law, and (b) establishes a mechanism restricting overseas anti-corruption investigations and enforcement activities within China.
In anticipation of the upcoming law, businesses should monitor the Draft’s legislative progress and be prepared to conduct, promptly following enactment, a gap analysis and review of their existing compliance framework, third-party risk management policies, and cross-border investigation protocols specifically for application in China.
We discuss below several key aspects of the Draft that all cross-border businesses should note.
I. What Constitutes “Cross-Border Corruption” under the Draft?
Article 3 of the Draft defines “cross-border corruption” through five categories of conduct:
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Bribery of foreign public officials of another country:
- By Chinese citizens or entities: bribery committed within or outside China by Chinese citizens, domestic entities and other organisations in China, and their branches and subsidiaries, towards foreign public officials of another country or officials of public international organisations; or
- By foreign individuals or entities within China: bribery committed within China by foreign individuals, foreign entities, and other organisations outside of China and their branches, towards foreign public officials of another country or officials of public international organisations.
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Bribery of Chinese public officials and state-owned entities by foreign individuals or entities, and corresponding acceptance of bribes: Bribery committed by foreign individuals, foreign entities, and other organisations outside of China and their branches, towards Chinese public officials and their closely connected persons, or towards state organs, state-owned entities, public institutions, or people’s organisations, as well as the corresponding acceptance of bribes by such Chinese public officials, their closely connected persons, state organs, state-owned entities, public institutions, and people’s organisations.
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Other public duty-related misconduct and criminal offences committed abroad by Chinese individuals and entities: This category includes other public duty-related misconduct and offences, including bribery and corruption, abuse of power, dereliction of duty, rent-seeking, improper transfer of benefits, favouritism and fraud for personal gain, embezzlement, or misappropriation of state assets. Notably, the categories of conduct listed under this provision closely track those falling within the jurisdiction of the NSC under China’s Supervision Law, which regulates the conduct of Chinese civil servants.
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Other corrupt conduct of a similar nature as the three categories above, where all or part of the conduct occurs outside China and all or part of the effects materialise within China: This catch-all provision adopts a broader and more flexible jurisdictional nexus compared with the preceding three categories. Circumstances that may constitute “all or part of the effects materialising within China” could include: the realisation within China of benefits derived from the corrupt conduct; harm to the commercial interests of Chinese individuals or entities; or the flow of corruption-related proceeds through financial institutions in China. For example, if a foreign entity bribes a foreign public official outside China to enable its China subsidiary to secure a project invested by that foreign government in China, the conduct will not fall within the first two categories of Article 3 but could nevertheless be captured by this provision.
However, the Draft does not define what constitutes “all or part of the effects materialising within China” or conduct “of a similar nature”. Accordingly, the precise scope of these concepts will likely be clarified through implementing regulations and enforcement practice.
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The act of persons suspected of corruption absconding to jurisdictions outside China or transferring assets derived from corruption across borders: This category targets the cross-border movement of persons and assets following corrupt conduct. It aligns with mechanisms for fugitive repatriation, asset recovery, confiscation of illicit proceeds, and international mutual legal assistance.
While the first category of “cross-border corruption” focusing on bribery of foreign officials resembles the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions (which are broadly aimed at prohibiting certain entities and individuals from bribing non-US government officials), the Draft’s extraterritorial scope is, in several ways, broader than the extraterritorial scope of the FCPA. In particular:
- the Draft covers a wider range of misconduct than the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions, including not only public bribery but also fraud, embezzlement, abuse of power, and related public duty misconduct in cross-border transactions;
- the Draft targets corrupt conduct that is either “outbound” (i.e., improper benefits flowing out of China) or “inbound” (i.e., improper benefits flowing into China), whereas the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions primarily target outbound bribery of foreign officials;
- the Draft includes a broad “catch-all” provision covering overseas corrupt conduct “similar in nature” to other enumerated categories where all or part of the effects materialise within China, potentially capturing unspecified misconduct that causes harm in China.
II. What Key Developments and Changes Should Cross-Border Businesses Note?
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Legal penalties for cross-border corruption are now more clearly defined
Under the Draft, “cross-border corruption” constitutes a criminal offence for which the entity, directly responsible employees, and management may be held liable. The Draft does not create new standalone offences; rather, it establishes a unified definition of “cross-border corruption” that builds upon China’s existing anti-corruption framework, with enforcement coordinated through the Criminal Law, the Anti-Unfair Competition Law, and the Supervision Law.
The Draft also specifies aggravating and mitigating factors (such as repeat offences or cooperation with authorities) and clarifies liability for failure to cooperate with investigations.
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Cross-border entities will be legally required to implement a compliance framework and self-report any suspected cross-border corruption
Significantly, while previously only existing in the form of “best practices”, Chapter 4 of the Draft proposes a mandatory requirement for cross-border entities (regardless of size) to implement a compliance framework to uphold corporate integrity and compliance.
The cross-border entities (i.e., “entities engaged in cross-border business”) defined under the Draft fall into two categories: (1) domestic entities that establish overseas branches, subsidiaries, or engage in investment activities abroad; and (2) branches and subsidiaries established by foreign entities within China.
Among other things, the corporate integrity and compliance obligations proposed under the Draft include requirements to:
- Develop corporate integrity and compliance management systems and enhance operation of the entity's corporate integrity and compliance management framework, based on the entity’s scale, business scope, revenue etc.;
- Conduct corporate integrity risk identification and assessment for cross-border operations, enhance internal reporting and whistleblowing mechanisms, provide timely early warnings and appropriate remediation for identified corporate integrity risks;
- Report suspected cross-border corruption to the relevant authorities in accordance with law (although it remains unclear what penalties may be imposed for a failure to report) – this contrasts with the FCPA, which does not mandate any self-reporting;
- Establish robust financial and accounting systems and controls, ensure the accuracy and completeness of relevant accounting records, and not use financial or accounting methods to facilitate, disguise, or conceal cross-border corrupt conduct – this partially aligns with the FCPA, which also contains accounting provisions, but the Draft applies to a broader range of entities and does not use listed status as a threshold;
- Conduct due diligence on third parties, exercise supervision and management, and require them to strictly comply with the entity’s corporate integrity and compliance code of conduct; and
- Provide training to cross-border business departments and employees of overseas branches and subsidiaries, ensuring they understand and adhere to the entity’s corporate integrity and compliance management systems and risk control requirements.
These proposed compliance obligations on cross-border entities are accompanied by direct administrative penalties. Article 45 of the Draft provides that entities engaged in cross-border business that fail to fulfil these obligations may be ordered to rectify the lapses within a specified period. Those that refuse to rectify may be ordered to suspend business operations, cease operations for rectification, or have their relevant business licences revoked.
Consequently, cross-border entities in China may be held accountable for both corrupt conduct (after the fact), and the lack of a properly functioning compliance programme (before the fact). Under the Draft, the Chinese authorities are empowered to take a more direct approach to enforcement, unlike the more reactive position under the FCPA (where effective compliance programmes serve to act as a mitigating factor) or the UK Bribery Act and Australian Criminal Code (where adequate procedures to prevent bribery serve only as a defence if the company is charged for bribery).
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Cross-border internal investigations and evidence sharing should be conducted in view of the Article 26 prohibition against the conduct of cross-border law enforcement activities
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Draft explicitly provides:
“Without the consent of the competent authorities of the People's Republic of China, overseas institutions, organisations, and individuals shall not conduct anti-cross-border corruption investigations or other law enforcement activities within the territory of China, whether directly or through intermediaries. Institutions, organisations, and individuals within the territory / jurisdiction of China shall not provide evidence, evidentiary materials, or any other form of related assistance to overseas institutions, organisations, or individuals.
Where any person or entity violates the laws and regulations of China, the relevant state authorities may, in accordance with relevant national provisions, adopt corresponding countermeasures, including blocking measures, and pursue legal liability in accordance with the law.”
This establishes a dual restriction mechanism: on one hand, restricting foreign parties from conducting anti-corruption investigations or other enforcement activities within China; on the other hand, restricting domestic parties (including China-based subsidiaries of foreign entities and Chinese nationals working overseas) from providing evidentiary materials and investigative assistance to foreign parties (including transferring data located in China overseas, or conducting interviews or other investigative activities in China, in response to foreign governmental enforcement action or instructions).
Based on the text of Article 26 and its placement within the “Case Handling and International Cooperation” section of the Draft, Article 26 appears to be aimed at restricting investigations into cross-border corruption (as defined under Article 3) from acquiring the character of “law enforcement activities” – that is, formal investigations initiated by official law enforcement authorities.
Of note is that the definition of cross-border corruption in Article 3 of the Draft does not expressly include purely private-sector bribery that does not involve public officials. The Draft’s final scope will, of course, remain subject to confirmation in the enacted text or through subsequent enforcement or judicial interpretations. Accordingly, viewed in the context and structure of the Draft, an internal investigation into purely private / commercial bribery, conducted entirely by the entity itself and primarily driven by internal compliance or management needs, may not be deemed to constitute “law enforcement activities” relating to “cross - border corruption” that would be caught under Article 26.
A practical challenge is the potential overlap between internal investigations and foreign enforcement activities with respect to public bribery. For example, tension may arise for multinational companies that receive document requests, subpoenas, or other investigative demands from the US Department of Justice (DOJ) or the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Where a company is required to produce documents located in China, or to facilitate interviews of China-based personnel in response to such demands, compliance with those demands may risk falling within the scope of Article 26’s prohibition. (See Key Takeaway and Recommendations in Part III below for a preliminary discussion of practical considerations for managing such tension.)
Article 26 also empowers the Chinese government to issue blocking orders and impose sanctions pursuant to China’s existing Anti-Foreign-Sanctions legislation such as the Rules on Blocking Unjustified Extraterritorial Application of Foreign Laws and Measures and the Regulations on Countering the Inappropriate Extraterritorial Application of Foreign Countries.
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China may issue blocking measures and countermeasures against foreign enforcement activities
Article 6 of the Draft provides a link to China’s existing anti-foreign-sanctions framework. It provides that where a foreign country or state (i.e., outside of mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan) violates international law and the basic norms of international relations by using anti-corruption as a pretext or improperly applies its domestic laws extraterritorially, and adopts measures of containment, suppression, or discriminatory restrictions against China that endanger China’s sovereignty, security, or development interests, China may adopt countermeasures, blocking measures, and other corresponding measures in accordance with the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law and related provisions. Unlike Article 26 (see above), Article 6 primarily targets specific improper measures adopted by foreign states, focusing on whether such measures involve improper extraterritorial application or discriminatory restrictions, and whether they endanger China’s interests.
III. Key Takeaways and Recommendations
Although the Draft is subject to public consultation and its final text may still be revised, the regulatory direction of travel is clear. Entities engaged in cross-border business with a China nexus should monitor the Draft’s legislative progress and proactively consider the following preparatory measures, so that they can make timely adjustments during the transition period following enactment:
- Assess existing compliance systems against the Draft’s requirements Given that the Draft elevates corporate integrity and compliance obligations to mandatory requirements with express regulatory consequences, cross-border entities with operations in China are advised to conduct an item-by-item gap analysis of their existing compliance framework for China against the requirements of Articles 29 through 34 of the Draft, focusing on: risk assessment processes, whistleblowing and reporting mechanisms, financial and accounting controls, third-party management, and employee training. Based on this gap analysis, entities should develop a targeted enhancement plan tailored to their scale, business scope, and operational needs. While there are similarities between the Draft’s requirements and those in other jurisdictions (e.g., under the US FCPA, UK Bribery Act, and Australian Criminal Code), the requirements are not identical. Entities should conduct a China-specific review to localise any existing policies and procedures for China to satisfy the upcoming requirements under the Draft. For companies that are also subject to US jurisdiction, the DOJ’s Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs (ECCP) provides a useful benchmark. The ECCP sets out the factors US prosecutors consider when evaluating the adequacy of a company’s compliance programme, including the programme’s design, whether it is implemented in good faith, and whether it works in practice. Entities should consider cross-referencing their China-specific review with the ECCP framework to identify whether enhancements to their compliance programme satisfy both the Draft’s requirements and US expectations.
- Move from one-off due diligence to ongoing third-party management Article 33 of the Draft specifically requires entities to carry out due diligence on third parties and to supervise them on an ongoing basis. This means entities should shift from screening third parties only at the onboarding stage to managing corruption risks throughout the relationship. It is also important to ensure that proper records are kept demonstrating that third-party management policies have been actually followed.
- Build in PRC law review checkpoints for cross-border investigations Multinational companies operating in China should consider creating a China-specific supplement to their global internal investigation protocols. This should set out investigation requirements, allocate responsibilities, and define escalation pathways for situations involving PRC entities, personnel, or evidentiary materials. Matters such as information access for overseas personnel, employee interviews, voluntary disclosures, and evidence submissions to foreign authorities should all be subject to PRC law review and any potentially applicable Chinese governmental approval procedures (such as approval requirements administered by the PRC Ministry of Justice). Even before an internal investigation escalates to a government inquiry or formal proceedings, entities should review their evidence collection methods and data handling requirements at the outset – this helps ensure that investigation findings can be used lawfully later on. Entities may also want to keep investigation activities in China operationally separate from those conducted overseas, based on where materials are located, where they come from, and how they will be used. In practice, this could mean maintaining separate investigation databases, access permissions, investigation teams, and channels for external submission to authorities. When materials need to be shared across borders, appropriate legal review should be carried out based on the specific intended use. Please feel free to reach out to us if you require any advice or assistance in relation to investigations or regulatory compliance in the light of these significant changes.
Footnotes
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For the avoidance of doubt, references to “China” and the laws of “PRC” in this article are to mainland China only and do not include the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (Hong Kong), the Macau Special Administrative Region (Macau) and Taiwan. Unless otherwise specified, references to “foreign” in this article generally means countries and jurisdictions outside of mainland China(i.e., “境外”). Where the Draft instead refers to countries and states outside of mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan (i.e., “外国“), we have used the terms “of another country” or “foreign country / state”.