Key development

On September 10, 2026, China’s Ministry of Commerce reportedly sought information from several French companies operating in China regarding subsidies received from the EU and its member states. While the identities of the companies and the scope of the enquiry remain unknown at the time of publication, this development represents a notable new chapter in the evolving EU-China dialogue on foreign subsidies. It may also signal the emergence of the only foreign subsidies review regime outside the EU, potentially reshaping the regulatory landscape for subsidy oversight.

Background: the EU Foreign Subsidies Regulation

The Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR) empowers the European Commission (EC) to assess whether public support from non-EU governments to companies active in the EU distorts competition in the internal market. It requires companies involved in certain M&A transactions and large public procurement procedures in the EU to report public support and financial interactions with non-EU governments, and gives the EC broad investigatory powers, including the ability to initiate investigations on its own initiative (ex officio). The disclosure net is broad: relevant financial contributions include loans, grants, tax incentives and contracts with non-EU governments or related entities.

China’s evolving response to the EU FSR

China’s response to the EU FSR has developed in two distinct phases.

Phase one: counter-extraterritoriality measures

China’s initial response to EU FSR proceedings involving Chinese entities was case-specific and focused on restraining the EC’s investigatory powers towards Chinese undertakings.

I. The Nuctech case – EC’s request for data located outside of the EU

In April 2024, the EC conducted dawn raids at Nuctech’s premises in the Netherlands and Poland as part of an ex officio FSR investigation, based on preliminary concerns that Nuctech may have benefited from foreign subsidies distorting competition in the EU. During the inspection, Nuctech informed EC officials that certain employee mailboxes were stored on servers in Beijing. The EC responded by imposing a legal hold and issuing a formal request requiring Nuctech to make the data available. Nuctech’s subsequent challenge before the EU courts seeking interim relief was unsuccessful, with the ruling endorsing a broad view of the EC’s investigatory powers, including in respect of data located outside the EU, absent compelling evidence of a genuine and unavoidable conflict of laws.

Against this background, in April 2026, China’s Ministry of Justice invoked Order No. 835 which has empowered the Ministry to designate specific foreign measures as constituting “inappropriate extraterritorial jurisdiction” and which, once an identification announcement is issued, prohibits the implementation of, or assistance with, the designated measures. On May 15, 2026, the Ministry issued Announcement No. 5 – a formal Prohibition Order characterising the EC’s Nuctech investigation as an unlawful exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction and barring Chinese entities from cooperating with the investigation. This was the first enforcement action under Order No. 835 linked to the FSR.

II. The JD.com/Ceconomy case

On August 19, 2026, the Ministry of Justice issued Announcement No. 8 – a second prohibition order under Order No. 835, this time targeting the EC’s FSR investigation of JD.com’s proposed $2.5 billion acquisition of Ceconomy, a German consumer electronics retail group. The EC had opened an in-depth investigation on May 28, 2026, with preliminary concerns that JD.com may have benefited from preferential financing, tax incentives and grants attributable to China.

The Chinese prohibition order does not directly prevent the transaction from proceeding but restricts cooperation with the EC’s investigation which can impede both the ability of the parties to address the EC’s concerns, as well the EC’s ability to gather all the facts relevant for the assessment. In the second half of August, JD.com reportedly offered remedies to address the EC’s concerns – this timing may indicate an effort to reduce the need for extensive information-gathering and mitigate the risks associated with limitations on information access.

III. Conflict of laws in practice

The issuance of Announcement No. 8 less than three months after Announcement No. 5 appears to signal China’s intention to deploy its counter-extraterritoriality framework as a counterweight to the FSR’s investigatory powers. The Nuctech order concerned an ex officio investigation into a security equipment manufacturer; the JD.com order targets a transaction-specific FSR investigation in the context of a high-profile cross-border acquisition. The speed and breadth of China’s response suggest that further prohibition orders may follow as additional FSR investigations are opened.

This conflict-of-laws dynamic adds a significant layer of complexity to cross-border compliance for Chinese companies and their counterparties. Entities subject to both regimes face an inescapable dilemma as complying with EC investigation requests may breach Chinese law, while refusing to cooperate may expose them to EU enforcement action or derail their business pursuits.

Phase two: towards a Chinese foreign subsidies review regime?

The Chinese Ministry of Commerce’s recent information requests to French companies may signal an evolution in the Chinese response to the EU’s FSR investigatory powers and a shift towards a more reciprocal approach – specifically, a review of foreign subsidies granted by non-Chinese governments, including the EU and its member states, to companies with operations in China. Should this practice develop on a systematic basis, it could come to resemble, in certain respects, the regulatory logic underpinning the EU FSR itself.

If such a regime were to materialise, it would represent a notable development – not only in the bilateral EU-China context, but as a matter of international regulatory practice. The EU FSR has, to date, been a unique instrument globally. It is worth noting, however, that interest in foreign subsidies scrutiny has not been confined to Europe and China. In the United States, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) adopted a rule in 2024 – mandated by the Merger Filing Fee Modernization Act of 2022 – requiring parties to premerger notification filings under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act to disclose subsidies received from designated "foreign entities or governments of concern." That rule was vacated by a federal court in February 2026 and is not currently in force, though the FTC and the Department of Justice have signaled their intention to pursue revised filing requirements.

It will be interesting to see whether a Chinese foreign subsidies review regime will prompt a broader international interest in cross-border scrutiny of public support.

I. Compliance burden and regulatory asymmetry

The adoption of Order No. 835 means that the provision of information on Chinese subsidies to the EC raises not only practical challenges, but also complex regulatory considerations.

On the other hand, from a compliance standpoint, the burden on companies – primarily those incorporated in the EU, though not exclusively – of identifying and reporting subsidies received from the EU Member States to the Chinese authorities is likely to be more limited. Under the EU State aid framework, subsidies are strictly controlled and subject to transparency obligations and the State Aid Transparency Public Search tool maintained by the EC provides public access to information about individual State aid awards above certain thresholds. Finally, companies generally maintain records of the grants, guarantees, and other forms of support they have received.

That said, the ultimate difficulty in collecting required information will depend on how China defines “subsidy” in any formal regime it may develop. If the definition is broad, encompassing, for example, general regulatory advantages, infrastructure access, or indirect benefits, the compliance burden could become considerably more demanding.

II. Remaining uncertainties

Many details of China’s approach to review of foreign subsidies remain unclear. The Ministry of Commerce’s information requests do not in themselves establish a formal review regime. Key questions include: the legal basis and institutional framework for any future regime; the definition of “subsidy” and which forms of public support would be captured; the scope of application (whether limited to certain sectors, transaction types, or company sizes); procedural requirements, including notification thresholds and timelines; the substantive test to be applied (distortion of competition, injury to Chinese industry, or another standard); available remedies and enforcement mechanisms; and the interaction with China’s existing trade policy instruments.

Until these questions are addressed, the significance of this development and its implications for businesses operating in or with China – will necessarily remain provisional.

Considerations for businesses

While many uncertainties remain, companies with global operations, and in particular those with a presence in China and the EU, should already prepare for a possibility of cross-border review of subsidies in both jurisdictions.

In relation to EU subsidy screening, which already is in place:

  • Companies with Chinese state-related financial links (including loans, grants, tax benefits, or contracts) that participate in EU M&A or public procurement should assess potential FSR notification requirements and proactively consider their disclosure position at an early stage.
  • The EC’s investigatory reach extends to data held outside the EU. Businesses should accordingly review data storage arrangements and assess whether cross-border data retrieval may be necessary in the context of an FSR investigation.
  • Businesses with operations or data in China should map the regulatory tension in advance and develop internal protocols for situations in which compliance with one set of requirements may create friction with the other. Responding to EC requests may raise concerns under Chinese law, while declining to cooperate may have consequences under EU enforcement action or disrupt their commercial plans. The emergence of a Chinese review regime could introduce additional complexity to the existing EU-China regulatory divergence, potentially creating scenarios in which compliance obligations are not aligned.
  • Companies in this position may benefit from engaging legal advisers with experience in both EU competition and State aid law and Chinese regulatory frameworks. The intersection of these regimes gives rise to compliance challenges that are best addressed through coordinated advice across jurisdictions.

In relation to potential screening in China:

  • Companies with operations in China may wish to conduct an internal audit of EU and member state subsidies, grants, tax incentives, and other forms of government support they have received. This is particularly important where the beneficiary entity has subsidiaries, affiliates, or significant operations in China.
  • In anticipation of potential information requests, companies should ensure they maintain internal documentation capable of demonstrating the nature, purpose, and value of any subsidies received.
  • The parameters of any formal Chinese foreign subsidies review regime remain to be clarified. Companies should monitor Chinese regulatory developments for any legislative or regulatory frameworks that may follow.

Outlook

The Ministry of Commerce's information requests represent a notable development in the evolving EU– China dialogue on foreign subsidies. China's approach may in time develop into an affirmative review regime for foreign subsidies, which could carry implications well beyond the bilateral relationship with the EU.

Much remains uncertain, and the details of any future regime are yet to be defined. It is nonetheless a development that warrants close attention. Companies with operations in both the EU and China may wish to consider the possibility that foreign subsidies scrutiny could increasingly operate in both directions.

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