In a significant decision for any party seeking to rely on an arbitration agreement, the English High Court has confirmed that a binding one-way promise to arbitrate (sometimes known as a unilateral or asymmetric clause) is a valid arbitration agreement under English law, among other points of interest for parties and practitioners.

In A and Ors v E, the Court dismissed several challenges to an LCIA award brought under s.67 of the Arbitration Act 1996 (AA96), under which a party may challenge a tribunal's jurisdiction, and s.68, under which a party may challenge an award on the basis of a "serious irregularity" causing “substantial injustice”. Our key takeaways are set out below but, in short, this judgment highlights the importance of clearly worded arbitration agreements, the English courts' pro-arbitration stance and the very high bar that losing parties face when seeking to challenge and overturn arbitral awards in England.

Background

The defendant, E, is the parent company of a substantial private group with varied interests in shipping, travel, energy, real estate and oil and gas. For decades, Claimants A-D, members of the founding family (“Family F”), most of whom are resident in "Country G", held shares in the group's local subsidiaries on trust for E as nominees. This arrangement was recorded in documents dating back to 1983 and reconfirmed by the claimants after the death of M (father of three of the claimants and husband of the fourth) in 1994.

In 2018, due diligence revealed that the first claimant, A, had been withdrawing large sums from the local businesses for personal use. E calculated that, as at 31 May 2021, over USD66 million had been withdrawn. From July 2022, the claimants also had business expense accounts with, and were paid salaries through, the local entities which the tribunal later found to be unauthorised.

As part of a 2021 group restructuring, each claimant signed a deed confirming the nominee arrangement. Clause 4 gave E a one-way right to refer disputes "arising in relation to" the deed to LCIA arbitration in London. When the claimants later asserted that they were the true beneficial owners, rather than nominees, E commenced an arbitration. The tribunal ultimately found for E on all issues and granted wide-ranging relief, including declarations, injunctions and orders for accounts, after which the claimants challenged the award.

The Challenges

The claimants challenged the tribunal’s jurisdiction under s.67 on four distinct grounds, arguing that:

  1. a one-sided promise is not an "arbitration agreement";
  2. the deed was subject to conditions precedent which had not been satisfied, with the result that the arbitration agreement had not come into force;
  3. the tribunal could not decide matters pre-dating the deed;
  4. the tribunal did not have the power to decide the dispute over certain withdrawals and salary payments.

The claimants also alleged a serious irregularity under s.68 on the basis that the award's definition of the local Country G entities was overly broad and could capture businesses falling outside those owned by E.

The Decision

Section 67

Every ground ultimately failed. On the first ground, the claimants contended that, because the arbitration clause conferred the right to arbitrate on E only and therefore lacked mutuality, it was not a true arbitration agreement under ss. 5 and 6(1) of the AA96. The Court disagreed. Following Court of Appeal and Privy Council authority that bilateral rights of reference are no longer an essential ingredient of an arbitration clause, the Court held that an agreement to arbitrate can be unilateral. The Act refers only to an "agreement", not a contract or bilateral contract, which is a broader concept connoting an expression of consent to be bound, and the only formal requirement is that it is in writing. A binding obligation, recorded in writing, to refer a dispute to arbitration is an arbitration agreement.

The second ground fared no better. The Court found that the deed was in fact unconditional on its face, and contemporaneous records showed that A had agreed to sign it "no ifs and buts". Informal assurances from senior executives as to the point at which the deed would be effective and the purpose for which it would be used were not clear and unequivocal promises not to enforce it and could not be read into the terms of the otherwise unconditional deed or give rise to an estoppel. The claimants’ case also turned on A’s testimony which an experienced tribunal had found not to be credible and which was not available because he was not called to give evidence. The Court observed that, while s.67 requires a fresh de novo assessment of the facts relevant to substantive jurisdiction, it is inevitably a “collapsed process” rather than a re-run of the hearing. In any event, the Court found that, even if conditions in the terms proposed had applied, the arbitration clause was a separate agreement under s.7 of the Act and would survive and indeed govern any dispute as to the existence and effect of alleged conditions precedent.

The Court also rejected the third ground on the basis that the tribunal had not in fact determined any matter pre-dating entry into the deed. Instead, the tribunal had recognised that its jurisdiction derived from, and was limited by, the arbitration agreement, and, while it could look at pre-deed material and determine its evidentiary weight in the context of claims advanced by reference to the deed, it would “pause” before deciding any claim based on that material. The tribunal then considered pre-deed material in order to verify the deed's statement at Clause 1(a) that the claimants held, and had "always" held, their shares as nominees, concluding that material demonstrated it was true and the claimants were therefore estopped from denying it. The tribunal’s central declaration – that the deed was valid and set out the parties’ rights on the subject matter to which it relates – was within its jurisdiction.

On the fourth ground relating to the claim concerning the claimants’ alleged withdrawals, the Court applied the Fiona Trust presumption that rational businesspeople intend all disputes arising from their relationship to be decided by the same tribunal. The Court found that the language of the arbitration clause, “any dispute or claim arising in relation to this Deed”, was very broad, and far wider than the “arising under” wording considered in Fiona Trust. It also sat alongside a governing law provision covering all disputes “in connection with [the deed] or its subject matter”, which encompassed the parties’ past and present relationship, and the claimants’ pledge to repay outstanding debts which they signed at the same time as the deed. The dispute therefore fell within the tribunal’s jurisdiction.

Section 68

The section 68 challenge was dealt with shortly. Reiterating that s.68 is a “longstop only available in extreme cases”, the Court held that the award's definition was not ambiguous when read against E's request for arbitration, statement of claim and the agreed list of issues. In any event, any residual doubt could be cured by clarification under s.57, and E had also offered an undertaking to enforce the award only applying the narrower meaning expressed in its request so there was no substantial injustice. There was also no evidence that any ambiguity would lead a Country G court to enforce the award incorrectly.

Key takeaways

  1. A unilateral arbitration clause can be a valid arbitration agreement. A clause that gives only one party the right to refer disputes to arbitration is in principle a valid arbitration agreement. The Act’s concept of an “agreement” extends to all written binding obligations to refer a dispute to arbitration, including those made by deed.
  2. Failure to satisfy conditions precedent is unlikely to make the arbitration clause unenforceable. The Court held that, even if such conditions were to have applied, the arbitration clause would survive under s.7 of the Act, absent exceptional circumstances affecting the clause itself. Challenges to the validity of a wider transaction document will not ordinarily undermine its arbitration agreement unless the wording of the condition or the arbitration clause itself clearly expresses that intention.
  3. The scope of the arbitration clause is important. A tribunal’s power derives from, but can be limited by, the scope of the arbitration clause. Here, discrete claims independent of the deed based on pre-deed material were not within the scope of the clause but the clause gave it jurisdiction to determine all disputes arising in relation to the deed or its subject matter, which encompassed issues arising out of the underlying relationship. Parties need to be very careful when drafting arbitration agreements if they do not wish to submit all disputes that could arise to arbitration.

The authors would like to acknowledge the valuable assistance of Owen Greaves, Trainee Solicitor, in the preparation of this article.

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