Background

On October 30, 2026, Norton Rose Fulbright’s Global Head of Restructuring, Scott Atkins, participated in a Panel Discussion on “Singapore’s Latest Insolvency Reforms” in Singapore.

The event was organised by INSOL International’s Asia Hub, in partnership with the Centre for Asian Legal Studies (Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore) and Allen & Gledhill. Other panellists were Jo Tay (Partner at Allen & Gledhill), Matt Becker (Deloitte) and Stuti Jain (Deutsche Bank AG).

The session provided important insights into the practical implications of Singapore’s new reforms, and their context and relevance to the broader Asian region and global economy.

In this post, we recap some key themes and highlights.

Key takeaway

On May 14, 2026, Singapore’s Ministry of Law (MinLaw) announced that it had broadly accepted the recommendations of the Committee to Enhance Singapore’s Corporate Restructuring and Insolvency Regime (Review Committee) and would implement those recommendations by developing draft legislation for public consultation, while making “suitable refinements and adjustments that take into account the feedback from the consultation.”1

Considered together, the key reform areas mark the most significant realignment of Singapore's restructuring toolkit since its landmark 2017 reforms which drew heavily on the US Chapter 11 process.

The reforms reflect an even greater focus on preserving value and maximising restructuring outcomes, particularly in removing creditor and shareholder roadblocks. At the same time, the reforms achieve a balanced approach in also improving creditor oversight and participation in a restructuring.

The reforms also continue Singapore’s strong leadership in the development of cross-border restructuring and insolvency laws aligned with the UNCITRAL Model Law framework, particularly in the Asian region.

Genesis of the reforms

The Review Committee was convened by MinLaw to provide recommendations to further enhance Singapore’s corporate debt restructuring and insolvency framework.

The Review Committee released its Final Report on March 11, 2025, with a number of core recommendations, including:

  • recalibrating and reconceptualising the judicial management process, as one focused primarily on achieving a successful turnaround and restructuring;
  • lowering the approval threshold for a cross-class cram down in a scheme of arrangement and expanding the scope of the cram down to include shareholders;
  • providing the court with the discretion to assess and appoint a neutral third-party individual as a “restructuring officer” to assist with a restructuring under a scheme of arrangement; and
  • deepening Singapore's cross-border insolvency cooperation architecture, by formally adopting the UNCITRAL Model Law on the Recognition and Enforcement of Insolvency-Related Judgments and the UNCITRAL Model Law on Enterprise Group Insolvency.

What will the reforms achieve?

Overview

While MinLaw is yet to publish the draft legislation implementing the Review Committee’s recommendations, it is anticipated that the legislation will be broadly consistent with its recommendations.

Because Singapore’s judicial management process currently serves three statutory purposes at once under section 89 of the Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act 2018 (IRDA) – keeping the company alive as a going concern (turnaround), delivering a scheme of arrangement (restructuring), or simply achieving a better asset realisation than a straight winding up (recovery) – the practical result is a blurring of the lines among debtors and creditors. The process has come to be seen as a measure of last resort rather than a genuine, early-stage restructuring vehicle.

Focussing judicial management appointments within a turnaround or restructuring context, with both debtors and creditors entitled to appoint a judicial manager, aims to enhance its potential to facilitate effective restructuring outcomes in Singapore outside of a scheme-led restructuring.

In relation to the change to the cross-class cram down threshold, the Review Committee noted that a frequently cited issue in Singapore has been the problem of holdout creditors who “may hold the entire scheme ransom to the prejudice of the vast majority of creditors who support the scheme” not through questions of substantive fairness but simply to secure a better personal deal.2

Singapore has had a cross-class cram down power for schemes of arrangement since its 2017 reforms (now consolidated in section 70 of the IRDA). The first actual use of that power was in the unreported decision in Re GP Global APAC Pte Ltd in April 2025 – a sign the cram down has been under-utilised and, in practice, too difficult to satisfy for debtors.

The Review Committee recommended streamlining the current dual requirements to impose a cram down under the IRDA – being an overall numerosity requirement (a majority in number of voting creditors across all classes) and a value requirement (at least 75 percent in value of voting creditors across all classes) – noting that “Singapore’s conditions for invoking the use of the cross-class cramdown provisions [are] more restrictive, compared to other leading restructuring jurisdictions.”3

It is anticipated the legislation will remove the overall numerosity requirement. This would mean that a creditor's voting influence would depend on their economic stake (i.e. the value of their claims). This is a more commercially pragmatic outcome and prevents small-value claims – extensive in number but with little economic significance – from controlling the vote in a restructuring attempt.

Combined with the Review Committee’s recommendation to expand the cross-class cram down to include out-of-the-money shareholders – and, in connection with a scheme or judicial management, removing shareholders’ right of veto under the Companies Act 1967 as to the issue of new shares or the disposal of a company’s undertaking or property – these reforms would offer a more flexible pathway to effect a scheme-led restructuring in Singapore. This, in turn, has the potential to significantly enhance the appeal of Singapore as an optimal restructuring forum in the minds of debtors and creditors.

Further, the ability to appoint a third-party restructuring officer under the reforms – broadly correlating to a monitor in the United Kingdom or Canada – may also bring greater cooperation and cohesion among disparate creditors in securing support for a scheme-led restructuring. Indeed, there may be greater confidence and “buy in” from creditors knowing they have the benefit of independent oversight and expert advice that could both guide and hold to account the debtor’s existing management.

Balancing debtor flexibility and creditor protections

Collectively, the reforms can be seen as reflecting a careful balance between debtor flexibility on the one hand, and creditor oversight and protections on the other hand.

The intended change to the cross-class cram down threshold enhances flexibility for the debtor and takes power away from hold-out creditors. On the other hand, creditors’ rights are improved by the clearer pathway to a rescue or turnaround solution under judicial management or a scheme-led process – including, in the latter case, via the ability to appoint a restructuring officer to provide additional oversight – and by the modification of shareholders’ rights under a cross-class cram down and the approval of new share issues and major asset disposals.

The Review Committee’s proposal to broaden clawback powers for a judicial manager is particularly notable. Such a power is generally not available in rescue procedures in comparative jurisdictions (e.g. administration in Australia and Brazil, and most schemes of arrangement globally). This aspect of the reforms places Singapore (along with the US under Chapter 11) among the few jurisdictions to protect unsecured creditors’ rights in this manner as a counterbalance to debtor flexibility in a rescue process.

The protection of creditors’ rights – so that debtor flexibility is balanced by accountability and oversight in a restructuring process – is a fundamental aspect of a best-practice insolvency system. It is recommended in both the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law and in the World Bank’s Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes.

The balance of these two outcomes is also reflective of modern practice. In that regard, over the last six years, Professor Aurelio Gurrea-Martinez has led research to develop a Global Insolvency Index measuring the attractiveness of reorganisation procedures from the perspectives of debtors, secured creditors and general unsecured creditors across 133 reorganisation procedures in 55 jurisdictions. In that research, Professor Gurrea-Martinez notes the idea that insolvency systems are either pro-debtor or pro-creditor (i.e. one or the other) is a myth. In practice, global restructuring systems in different jurisdictions are typically somewhere between being strictly pro-debtor or pro-creditor.4

Singapore’s latest reforms continue the considered, carefully calibrated reform approach it has taken to its restructuring and insolvency laws over the last decade.

The Model Law and cross-border aspects

Adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Enterprise Group Insolvency (MLEGI) and the UNCITRAL Model Law on the Recognition and Enforcement of Insolvency-Related Judgments (MLIRJ), with Singapore the very first nation to do so, would further enhance Singapore’s appeal and status as an optimal global restructuring hub.

In that regard, the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (MLCBI) only facilitates procedural recognition and cooperation. It does not, on its face, enable courts to recognise court judgments issued in connection with a foreign restructuring. The MLCBI also does not facilitate the coordination and consolidation of group restructuring matters.

Adoption of the MLIRJ would therefore address the practical gap between a restructuring outcome and its cross-border effect.

On the other hand, the MLEGI would facilitate the coordination of restructurings at a group level, rather than leaving open the prospect of fragmented parallel proceedings for individual group entities in multiple jurisdictions. Significantly, the Review Committee recommended Singapore adopt the MLEGI in its entirety, including the supplemental provisions that would allow Singapore to support “synthetic proceedings” – i.e. resolving foreign creditor claims in a manner similar to the foreign insolvency proceeding, in lieu of actually commencing the foreign insolvency proceeding.5

The breadth of this implementation would enhance coordination and efficiency in cross-border restructuring matters, and minimise the potential for inconsistent judgments and competing creditor enforcement processes that can destroy enterprise value and compromise the efficacy of a restructuring attempt.

The Singapore judiciary has adopted a progressive interpretation of the MLCBI which technically obviates the need for Singapore to adopt the MLIRJ. Notably, in Re PT Garuda Indonesia (Persero) Tbk,6 the Singapore International Commercial Court (SICC) confirmed that foreign insolvency orders and judgments can be recognised and enforced under the MLCBI as applied in Singapore. The SICC favoured the similarly broad approach taken by the US Bankruptcy Court, while disagreeing with the more limited approach taken in the United Kingdom in Rubin v Eurofinance SA (Rubin).7 The SICC held that the recognition and enforcement of foreign insolvency orders and judgments falls within the broad discretionary remit of the court to grant “any appropriate relief” under article 21(1) of the MLCBI.

Nevertheless, Singapore’s adoption of the MLIRJ would reflect its consistent leadership over the last decade, to build a uniform and effective cross-border restructuring and insolvency normative framework both regionally and globally. The same would apply in relation to the MLEGI, even though the efficacy of a group enterprise framework would depend on consistent and widespread adoption by other nations.

As the Review Committee noted, enacting the MLIRJ and the MLEGI would signal the importance of the entire Model Law framework as a whole, “serving as a nudge and inducing participation by other countries to adopt that framework, which would promote uniformity and consistency.”8

Comparative context

Singapore’s reforms are part of an unprecedented wave of restructuring and insolvency law reform in the Asian region at present. For example:

  • Vietnam’s Law on Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy came into effect on March 1, 2026 and introduces Vietnam's first standalone rehabilitation procedure;
  • Thailand's House of Representatives approved amendments to the Bankruptcy Act in March 2026. These amendments are pending Senate review and, if implemented, will introduce pre-packaged rehabilitation proceedings (drawing on US Chapter 11);
  • India’s Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act 2026 came into effect in April 2026. It extensively reforms India's corporate insolvency regime, with the key change being the introduction of the Creditor-Initiated Insolvency Resolution Process (CIIRP) as a new hybrid, out-of-court restructuring mechanism featuring a debtor-in-possession (DIP) model;
  • in addition to adopting the MLCBI with effect from August 28, 2026, Malaysia’s Companies (Amendment) Act 2024 came into force on 1 April 2024. It introduces measures such as pre-packaged schemes, automatic moratoria, super-priority financing and a cross-class cram down; and
  • in June 2025, Japan’s Early Business Recovery Act was enacted (due to enter into force in December 2026), introducing a new hybrid out-of-court restructuring framework designed for debt adjustments with financial institutions and other creditors.

The reforms in Singapore, and the broader Asian region, can be seen as a concerted effort by those jurisdictions to keep pace with a global trend towards more flexible restructuring laws designed to attract large-scale, high-value restructurings.

Final observations

Singapore’s impending new wave of restructuring reforms will enhance its appeal as a progressive and flexible, yet balanced and carefully calibrated, restructuring forum for both debtor groups and creditors. The reforms reflect a deep and considered approach to policy and law reform, continuing the reputation Singapore has cultivated over the last decade.

These new reforms come at a critical time, with an ever-growing number of jurisdictions having introduced more flexible restructuring systems – from the United Kingdom restructuring plan, the Netherlands WHOA, the German StaRUG and the Italian concordato preventivo, to more recent restructuring reforms in Asia. These reforms are being driven by a need to modernise legal infrastructure, protect enterprise value and remain competitive in attracting global capital amidst significant economic and geopolitical uncertainty.

Along with the development of an advanced restructuring and insolvency ecosystem – including the expanded restructuring and insolvency jurisdiction of the SICC and a thriving network of practitioners, policy makers and academics – Singapore’s new reforms will enable it to consolidate and enhance its reputation as a significant cross-border restructuring hub. This is appealing to both multinational debtor groups and creditors seeking to invest with confidence and security in an economy in a state of rapid change and fluctuation.

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