Long awaited, heavily debated and fresh off the press! Today, the European Commission (EC) published for public consultation its draft guidelines on the assessment of mergers under the EU Merger Regulation (2026 Draft Guidelines or Draft). The Draft consolidates, in a single document, the EC’s analytical framework for assessing both horizontal and non-horizontal mergers, replacing the 2004 Horizontal and 2008 Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines.

The Draft does not reinvent the fundamentals of EU merger control. The main objective “to preserve a vibrant and competitive internal market, with dynamic competition” remains unchanged. What has evolved is the application of that framework, reflecting changes in the economic and competitive landscape over the past two decades, including increasingly innovation-driven markets, the growing role of ecosystems, greater global scale and consolidation, and increased emphasis on non-price parameters of competition. Against this background, the Draft carries important practical implications for merger planning and deal execution in the EU.

Key takeaways for business

  • The legal test is unchanged, but the assessment is broader. The EC continues to focus on whether a transaction harms effective competition, but places greater weight on how companies compete, including through innovation, quality, sustainability, resilience and security of supply.
  • Innovation and future growth attract closer scrutiny. Transactions involving R&D, pipeline products or emerging markets will be examined more closely, while deals that credibly strengthen innovation through complementary assets or capabilities can be viewed positively.
  • Scale can support clearance where competition is preserved. The Draft more explicitly recognises that transactions enabling firms to achieve scale and invest may support clearance where this allows companies to compete more effectively across European markets and internationally, particularly where deals combine complementary activities rather than remove close competitors.
  • Ecosystem effects are a clear area of enforcement focus. Businesses operating across related products, services or data-rich environments should expect scrutiny where a merger could reinforce structural advantages and make markets less competitive over time.
  • Efficiency arguments must be concrete and commercially grounded. Parties are expected to present a clear and evidence-based explanation of how merger-specific efficiencies arise and how they translate into customer benefits, including beyond price effects.
  • Early alignment of deal rationale and competition strategy is increasingly important. Successful transactions will require a coherent narrative, supported by internal evidence, explaining how the deal strengthens competitive outcomes from the outset.

Competition, scale and competitiveness in a broader policy context

Maintaining effective competition remains the cornerstone of EU merger control. At the same time, the 2026 Draft Guidelines situate merger assessment within a broader economic context shaped by intensified global competition and ongoing debates in Europe around the ability of European undertakings to scale up, sustain investment and innovation, and compete effectively at global level.

Against that background, the Draft recognises that mergers may be pro-competitive where they enable firms to grow within the internal market or enable expansion to countries outside the EU, in particular where transactions combine complementary activities across Member States without giving rise to significant competitive overlaps. Such transactions are viewed positively, where they enhance European competitiveness and deliver consumer benefits without undermining effective competition.

The Draft also places greater emphasis on non-price parameters of competition, including innovation, sustainability, resilience, and security of supply, amongst others. In that context, the Draft recognises that certain scale-enhancing transactions may generate pro-competitive effects and contribute to European competitiveness, in particular where they combine complementary capabilities, including in areas such as defence-related projects or critical infrastructure. Technological progress likewise plays a more prominent role in the EC’s assessment, with transactions that combine complementary innovation capabilities, generate R&D synergies or enable large-scale projects to be recognised as potentially pro-competitive. The same applies to transactions that facilitate access to scarce talent or other critical resources.

A more structured approach to innovation-related theories of harm

The Draft confirms the central role of innovation in the EC’s merger assessment. Building on decisional practice and the enhanced focus on pipeline products and R&D activities already reflected in the revised Form CO, the Draft articulates three closely related theories of harm that are particularly relevant in dynamic and innovation-driven markets.

First, the theory of loss of potential competition continues to apply to transactions involving firms that already constrain, or are likely in the foreseeable future to constrain, the competitive behaviour of incumbents. Second, the Draft further develops the theory of loss of investment and expansion competition, addressing scenarios where a merger may adversely affect competition through discontinuation, downsizing, delay or redirection of investment projects. Third, the Draft articulates a distinct theory of loss of innovation competition, focused on whether a transaction may significantly impede the innovation process itself by weakening incentives to innovate.

Notably, the 2026 Draft Guidelines also introduce an “innovation shield” for acquisitions of start-ups and small innovative players. Subject to clearly defined structural conditions, such as limited overlaps, modest combined market shares, or the presence of a sufficient number of alternative innovators with comparable competitive potential, such transactions are considered unlikely to give rise to a significant impediment to effective competition. This reflects a more structured articulation of circumstances in which such acquisitions are unlikely to harm dynamic competition, while maintaining a case-by-case, effects-based assessment and a focus on preserving competitive constraints where they are genuinely at risk.

Dominance, ecosystems and entrenchment

Reflecting recent enforcement practice, and building on the analytical framework set out in the EC’s Policy Brief No. 02/2022 on Merger Enforcement in Digital and Tech Markets, the 2026 Draft Guidelines articulate a theory of harm focused on the entrenchment of a dominant position, particularly where firms operate ecosystems of products or services. A merger may raise concerns where it leads to the structural creation or reinforcement of barriers to entry or expansion, thereby reducing market contestability over time.

In this regard, the Draft identifies a number of cumulative elements relevant to the assessment, including (i) the existence of dominance in a core market or group of closely related markets, (ii) a connection between the acquired assets and those core activities, and (iii) the importance of those assets for rivals’ ability and incentives to compete, enter or expand. Particular attention is paid to assets such as data, intellectual property, infrastructure or key access and acquisition channels, where their control may reinforce ecosystem-based advantages and weaken competitive constraints.

Efficiencies and the “theory of benefit”

The 2026 Draft Guidelines reshape how the EC takes efficiencies into account in the merger control process. Where parties rely on efficiencies, they are expected to articulate a coherent “theory of benefit”, setting out how specific merger-related synergies arise and how they enhance or preserve effective competition. In this respect, the Draft aligns the presentation of efficiencies more closely with the EC’s effects-based assessment and the structure of the theory of harm.

The Draft distinguishes between direct efficiencies, which arise directly from the integration or combination of the merging firms’ activities, and dynamic efficiencies, which confer the ability or strengthen the incentives to invest or innovate. Examples include the combination of scarce complementary assets or capabilities, economies of scale, scope or density, and cost- or performance-related efficiencies that improve firms’ competitive performance.

For efficiencies to be taken into account, the Draft reiterates that they must satisfy three cumulative conditions. First, efficiencies must be verifiable, meaning they are substantiated, likely to materialise, timely and sufficiently substantial. Second, they must be merger-specific, in that they cannot be achieved to a similar extent through less anticompetitive alternatives. Third, efficiencies must benefit consumers, in particular by being sufficient to offset any competitive harm arising from the merger. In this regard, the Draft clarifies that consumer benefits may extend beyond price effects and may include benefits relating to non-price parameters of competition such as innovation, sustainability or resilience, where relevant.

The EC retains discretion in weighing demonstrated efficiencies against potential harm to competition. The Draft explains that this balancing exercise may involve symmetric balancing, where harm and benefit relate to the same competitive parameter, as well as asymmetric balancing, where they concern different parameters, provided that the overall competitive assessment supports a finding of compatibility.

The protection of Member States’ legitimate interests

An entirely new Part III of the 2026 Draft Guidelines provides detailed guidance on the exercise of Member States’ prerogatives under Article 21(4) EUMR to adopt measures protecting legitimate interests other than competition, such as public security, media plurality or prudential rules. The Draft emphasises that such measures must be interpreted strictly and may not be used to pursue purely economic objectives. Member States bear the burden of demonstrating that any measures adopted comply with the general principles of EU law, including proportionality and non-discrimination.

On the procedural side, the Draft clarifies the notification and standstill obligations applicable to Member States, the types of decisions the EC may adopt in this context, and the interaction between Article 21(4) EUMR procedures and other EU legal frameworks. This section brings together, for the first time in a single instrument, the EC’s approach to both the substantive limits and procedural safeguards governing Member State interventions in EU-dimension mergers.

Final thoughts

The 2026 Draft Guidelines update and consolidate the EC’s merger control framework to reflect today’s economic and competitive landscape. While maintaining effective competition remains the decisive benchmark, the Draft places greater emphasis on dynamic competition and a wider set of price and non-price parameters, including innovation, investment, sustainability and resilience, alongside scale considerations. At the same time, the practical application of these broader parameters, the balancing of harm and efficiencies, and the extent to which the framework will improve legal certainty for scale- and innovation-driven deals remain to be seen. The Draft is now open for public consultation until 26 June 2026 and an interactive stakeholder workshop will be held on 10 June. The EC aims to finalise the revisions in Q4 2026.

The authors wish to thank Zeynep Tavsanli, Trainee Solicitor, Norton Rose Fulbright LLP for her contribution.

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