In Beneathco DMCC v R.J. O’Brien Ltd [2025] EWHC 3079 (Comm), the High Court held that a broker was not obliged to return a sum held in its client account to a UAE-based client which was subject to US Iran-related sanctions. While the Court ultimately determined the case on the construction of the contract, finding there was no obligation to comply with the client’s instructions for the return of the money, the judgment is of interest for the obiter dicta discussion of the rule in Ralli Bros and its interplay with the UK Blocking Regulation.
In particular, the Court held that the Ralli Bros rule, that performance of a contract is excused where it would be unlawful in the jurisdiction where it has to be performed, extends to actions carried out by a third party as a necessary part of the performance of the contract.Previously it had been unclear whether third party unlawfulness was sufficient to engage the Ralli Bros rule.
Background
The claimant, Beneathco, a company primarily trading petroleum products and incorporated in the UAE, entered into a derivatives trading arrangement in 2019 with the defendant, RJ O’Brien Limited, a UK-incorporated and FCA-regulated brokerage firm, which is part of a larger group with a parent company registered in the US. As a result of the trading activities, funds worth several million US dollars were accumulated and were held by the defendant in a client account maintained in England. In early 2020, the claimant was designated by the United States Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) as a Specially Designated National (SDN) under Executive Order 13846, an Iran‑related sanctions regime.
Following this designation, the claimant requested its most substantial open trading position be liquidated, and the defendant obliged, resulting in a positive cash balance of US16.5 million in the claimant’s client account. The claimant then requested that the funds be converted into AUD and transferred, first to the claimant and subsequently to a third party in the UAE. The defendant refused on the basis that as part of a US-owned group, it was under an obligation to comply with the US sanctions. The claimant alleged that the defendant’s refusal had breached the contract.
Decision
The Court decided the claim on the basis that the defendant was not contractually obliged to comply with the payment instructions. The Court found the defendant held the US$16.5 million on trust for the claimant and there was no claim in debt; this meant that the defendant’s obligation was to pay the specific sum in the claimant’s client account rather than an equivalent amount held elsewhere. The terms of the agreement were narrowly defined: the defendant was only obliged to pay the claimant itself and in the currency of the client account. Accordingly, instructions to transfer the funds in currency other than US dollars or to a third party had no contractual effect.
Ralli Bros rule
Having ruled on the construction of the contract, the Court went on to consider on an obiter basis the defendant’s alternative argument: if there had been an obligation to comply with the payment instruction, the payment obligation would have been suspended under the rule in Ralli Bros. The Ralli Bros principle provides that English courts will not enforce a contractual obligation if performance would necessarily require an act to be done in a place where it would be illegal to carry it out. The critical issue was whether performance of the payment obligation had to take place in the US. The Court emphasised that “performance” is a narrow concept, referring only to what the contract itself requires, rather than factual or incidental acts that may be necessary to give effect to performance.
The Court held that the Ralli Bros principle extended to actions carried out by a third party where those actions formed a necessary part of contractual performance rather than a mere preparatory step. In this case, the payment of the specific sum held in the claimant’s client account, requiring the transfer and exchange of US dollars, would necessarily have involved the performance of a US correspondent bank in the United States. It was that correspondent bank, rather than the claimant itself, which would have been in breach of US sanctions had the transfer been effected. Accordingly, the Ralli Bros principle was engaged.
OFAC licence
The Court also considered whether the defendant could or should have obtained a licence from OFAC; the Ralli Bros principle will not apply if a licence is available that would make performance lawful. It was held that the defendant would most likely have been unable to obtain such a licence in time to comply with the instruction, and therefore the defendant’s reliance on the Ralli Bros principle was not defeated due to a failure to do so.
The Blocking Regulation
The Court also considered the claimant’s argument that the UK Blocking Regulation prevented the defendant’s reliance on the Ralli Bros principle. The Blocking Regulation is designed to counteract the extra-territorial application of certain foreign sanctions regimes by prohibiting UK persons from complying with those regimes. The claimant argued that its US designation was made under one of the laws proscribed by the Blocking Regulation, therefore it would be an offence for the defendant to comply with the designation by not making payment to the claimant. The Court, while noting the absence of any relevant authorities regarding the application and interpretation of the Blocking Regulation, held that the Blocking Regulation would only apply in this case if the foreign sanctions regime made an act illegal outside of the US. Since the Ralli Bros principle was engaged on the basis that the transfer of funds would require an illegal act to be taken inside the US, the Blocking Regulation was irrelevant.
Key takeaways
Although the points relating to the Ralli Bros rule were obiter and therefore not binding on another court, the judgment nevertheless provides valuable insight into the scope of the Ralli Bros rule in the context of sanctions‑related disputes. It reaffirms that the principle is engaged only where contractual performance requires an act to be carried out that would be illegal in its place of performance, but confirms that the principle extends to acts carried out by a third party as a necessary part of the performance of the contract. The Court’s conclusion that third‑party unlawfulness is sufficient to engage the Ralli Bros principle was grounded in the rule’s underlying rationale of comity between courts in different jurisdictions.
The decision is also the first case to comment on the interplay between the Ralli Bros principle and the UK Blocking Regulation which is a largely novel question of law, with no relevant authorities to guide the approach. However, the judgment provides a strong indication that the UK Blocking Regulation prohibits compliance only with extra-territorial legislation. There is no conflict with the Ralli Bros rule which applies where performance of an obligation would necessitate an act within a foreign jurisdiction which would be illegal under the sanctions regime of that jurisdiction.
With thanks to Zeynep Tavsanli for her assistance in preparing this post.