Labour market conduct is moving rapidly up the antitrust enforcement agenda in the EU. In the first months of 2026 alone, several national competition authorities have imposed fines or opened investigations into alleged no-poach conduct across sectors ranging from IT services and technology consulting to automotive and industrial engineering and machinery manufacturing. Enforcement action has also extended well beyond technical industries, reaching areas such as sport, including exclusivity arrangements in ski instruction and no-poach commitments between professional football clubs. These developments confirm that labour market collusion, regardless of the sector in which it arises or the form it takes, now sits firmly on the front line of antitrust enforcement.

Key takeaways for businesses

Against this backdrop, businesses should be alert to the growing risk that labour market restrictions may attract the same level of scrutiny, and potential sanctions, as more traditional cartel conduct. The key messages emerging from recent developments are clear:

  • Every industry is potentially exposed. Any arrangement between competing employers that restricts hiring, caps wages, or limits worker mobility may attract antitrust scrutiny, irrespective of sector.
  • Labour market restrictions can take many different forms, from traditional no-poach and wage-fixing agreements to less conventional arrangements, such as informal understandings and restrictions embedded in industry codes or association rules.
  • Such restrictions may give rise to penalties comparable to those imposed for traditional cartel infringements, and the financial stakes are significant.
  • The regulatory landscape is evolving rapidly. Businesses should actively monitor developments in the EU and globally to identify potential exposure early.

Setting the stage: The European Commission's policy framework

The European Commission (EC) laid the groundwork for its increased focus on labour market conduct in July 2023, with the entry into force of the revised Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines. The Guidelines clarify that coordination between competing employers in labour markets, notably wage fixing and hiring allocation agreements, is comparable to a buyer cartel and will normally qualify as a restriction of competition by object, meaning that an infringement of Article 101 TFEU can be established without demonstrating actual anti-competitive effects.

This position was reinforced in May 2024, when the EC confirmed in its dedicated policy brief that wage fixing and no-poach agreements are, in most cases, likely to amount to restrictions by object. The brief also highlights the wide ranging harm such conduct may generate, including the entrenchment of employer market power, downward pressure on wages, reduced worker mobility, and, ultimately, weakened competition in downstream product and service markets. These concerns are amplified by evidence that labour markets in a number of EU Member States exhibit significant levels of concentration, creating conditions in which collusive behaviour between employers can further distort an already uneven playing field for workers.

Importantly, the EC has also made clear that the scope for justifying such arrangements is narrow. No-poach provisions are often defended on the basis that they serve legitimate objectives, such as protecting investments in employee training or safeguarding non patent IP rights, including trade secrets. While the EC acknowledges that no-poach agreements may, in principle, have pro competitive effects, it considers any net efficiencies to be uncertain and, in any event, typically achievable through less restrictive means (e.g., non-disclosure or other confidentiality agreements, possible obligations on the employees to reimburse proportionate training costs, national labour-law-compliant non-compete clauses, etc). The EC further takes the view that no-poach agreements are unlikely, in most cases, to satisfy the cumulative conditions of the ancillary restraints doctrine and are equally unlikely to meet the criteria for exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU. For wage fixing arrangements, the EC goes further still, signalling that circumstances in which such agreements could plausibly give rise to pro competitive effects are highly unlikely to arise in practice.

From policy to penalties: Enforcement gathers pace

A significant turning point in EU labour market enforcement came with the EC’s landmark decision in Delivery Hero/Glovo in June 2025, marking the first time the EC sanctioned a no-poach agreement. The case concerned conduct by two of Europe’s largest food delivery platforms over a four-year period, from July 2018 to July 2022, during which Delivery Hero progressively acquired a minority stake in Glovo before ultimately taking sole control.

The EC confirmed a strict approach to the anti-competitive nature of no-poach agreements and imposed €329 million in fines for a labour‑market cartel involving, among other conduct, reciprocal no‑poach commitments not to hire or actively solicit each other’s employees (for further detail, see our previous article ‘Key takeaways’: The EC’s online food delivery cartel decision).

At Member State level, enforcement has since gathered pace, with national competition authorities across Europe opening investigations and imposing significant penalties for labour market collusion across a broad range of industries. Recent cases from 2026 alone illustrate the breadth and speed of this trend:

  • The tech sector has been a particular hotspot for enforcement activity. In February 2026, the Dutch Competition Authority opened an investigation into an IT services provider suspected of agreeing with competitors not to poach each other’s employees. The following month, a Portuguese court upheld a €3.09 million fine imposed by the Portuguese Competition Authority (AdC) on three companies within a multinational technology consulting group for bilateral no-poach agreements, while three additional companies operating in the same market had previously been fined a total of approximately €4 million for similar conduct after cooperating with the AdC.
  • Automotive and industrial manufacturing have also come under scrutiny. In January 2026, the Romanian Competition Council imposed fines of €32.15 million on eight companies in the automotive and industrial engineering services sector, targeting agreements not to recruit or approach one another’s specialised workforce. Around the same time, the Italian Competition Authority opened an investigation into suspected no-poach arrangements among manufacturers of automated machinery and packaging equipment.
  • Enforcement has also extended beyond technical sectors to industry associations. In March 2026, the AdC fined APESPE, the national association of temporary employment agencies, €4.5 million for a no-poach clause embedded in its Code of Ethics since 1987, a striking example of how long-standing industry norms may infringe competition law where they restrict hiring between competing employers.

The increasing focus on labour markets is not limited to classic no-poach or wage-fixing arrangements but also captures other forms of restrictions. For example, in March 2026, the French Competition Authority imposed a €3.4 million fine on the leading French ski instructors’ union for long standing exclusivity rules embedded in the École du Ski Français (ESF) standard instructor agreement, which prevented self employed instructors from offering their services outside ESF schools. The Authority found that the exclusivity obligation, by its very object, restricted instructors’ freedom to exercise their profession and limited competing schools’ ability to recruit instructors, thereby contributing to the lock in of the market structure in a sector where the ESF network brings together around 80% of ski instructors in France (for further detail, see our previous article French Competition Authority reminds that sports activities are subject to antitrust scrutiny).

A note of nuance: The Tondela judgment

In its preliminary ruling of 30 April 2026 in the Tondela case (see our article here), the ECJ adds a carefully delimited note of nuance to the analysis of labour market restrictions.

The case concerned a no-poach agreement between Portuguese professional football clubs, under which clubs undertook not to recruit players who had unilaterally terminated their contracts during the Covid 19 pandemic due to payment delays.

The Court confirmed that no-poach agreements between competing employers are, in principle, capable of restricting competition by object, as they involve coordination on a key parameter of competition on the labour market, namely the ability of clubs to recruit players. At the same time, the Court emphasised that classification as a restriction by object is not automatic and requires an assessment of the agreement’s content, objectives, and the specific economic and legal context in which it operates. In exceptional circumstances, such as the systemic disruption affecting professional football during the pandemic, those contextual elements may justify examining whether specific, objectively verifiable considerations rebut the presumption of sufficient harm to competition.

The bottom line

Taken together, these developments leave little room for doubt: labour market conduct has become a core enforcement priority across the EU. In this environment, businesses should assess whether any of their existing or contemplated arrangements could restrict competition for talent – and act before enforcers do.

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