Can legal advice privilege protect internal communications within a corporate client, even where no lawyer is a party to the exchange? In Aabar Holdings SARL v Glencore plc [2026] EWHC 877 (Comm), the High Court has answered that question in the affirmative, holding that privilege attaches to "intra-client" documents created for the dominant purpose of seeking legal advice – i.e. to documents sent between members of the ‘client group’ at the client or created by members of that group. The ‘client group’ here means the small group of individuals at the client authorised to provide instructions to and receive advice from the lawyer, as set out in the leading case of Three Rivers (No. 5) [2003] QB 1556.
This decision represents a significant development for corporate clients, marking a departure from the widely held view that legal advice privilege is confined to communications passing between lawyer and client and documents that disclose the substance of such communications.
Background
The underlying dispute arises out of Financial Services and Markets Act claims brought by various groups of shareholders against Glencore plc and two of its former directors. This judgment addressed a second privilege-related issue that had arisen in the proceedings – in an earlier ruling, the same judge held that the shareholder privilege rule was not part of English law (see our previous article here).
During disclosure, Glencore had initially withheld documents on the basis that the Court of Appeal's decision in Three Rivers (No 5) was wrongly decided, maintaining that legal advice privilege applied to all communications made for the dominant purpose of seeking or receiving legal advice. Glencore subsequently withdrew that broader position and produced 885 previously withheld documents, but continued to assert privilege over communications between members of the "client group" that did not involve lawyers.
The claimants argued that Glencore should be ordered to produce all documents withheld on the basis of legal advice privilege that constituted communications between members of the client group, rather than between the client group and lawyers, unless the documents evidenced the substance of privileged communications or were "inchoate communications" intended to be sent to a lawyer but not in fact communicated. The claimants relied on what they described as a "basic tenet" of legal advice privilege: that it attaches only to communications between lawyer and client.
Decision
Picken J declined to make the order sought by the claimants. He held that legal advice privilege applies to any intra-client document sent between or created by members of the client group for the dominant purpose of seeking legal advice. Rejecting the claimants’ more restrictive formulation, he concluded that legal advice privilege is not confined to intra-client documents that disclose the substance of a communication between the client group and a lawyer, nor to documents intended to be communicated to a lawyer but not in fact sent.
Central to the judgment was a careful analysis of Three Rivers (No 5). In that case, the Court of Appeal held that only a committee of three officials within the Bank of England, known as the "BIU", constituted the client for privilege purposes. The consequence was that documents prepared by employees outside the BIU did not attract privilege, regardless of whether they had been prepared with the aim of obtaining legal advice. Picken J agreed with Glencore that the ratio of Three Rivers (No 5) was confined to the treatment of documents originating from outside the client group and did not extend to the distinct question of whether privilege covers communications exchanged internally within the client group itself. He acknowledged that the disclosure order ultimately made in Three Rivers may incidentally have swept up some documents internal to the BIU, but observed that neither party had directed argument at that category, and neither the first instance judge nor the Court of Appeal had addressed the point.
Having concluded that he was unfettered by binding authority, Picken J turned to principle. He reasoned that it would make no sense for legal advice privilege not to apply to intra-client documents whose dominant purpose is to identify an issue on which the client proposes to seek advice from a lawyer. He held that there can be no principled distinction between an engagement or instruction letter that identifies the issue on which legal advice will be sought and any other document or communication created by the client which identifies that same issue. By way of illustration, he gave the example of a client writing a memorandum the day before meeting their lawyer for the first time, or one member of the client group emailing another with information in preparation for such a meeting. In each scenario, the document ought to attract privilege irrespective of whether it was ever actually transmitted to the lawyer. He further reasoned that there can be no distinction between an intra-client document which is itself intended to be communicated to a lawyer and one which contains information intended to be communicated to a lawyer but is not itself intended to be sent.
Picken J also drew support from the Court of Appeal's decision in Jet2.com Ltd v CAA [2020] QB 1027. In that case, Hickinbottom LJ confirmed that for legal advice privilege to attach to a particular communication or document, the proponent of the privilege must demonstrate that the dominant purpose of that communication or document was to obtain or give legal advice. Critically, he acknowledged that privilege could extend to “documents or other materials between an employee … and a co-employee” within the client group, where the employee was “tasked with seeking and receiving such advice on behalf of the company.” Picken J agreed with Glencore that these references were to intra-client documents and that Hickinbottom LJ was acknowledging that legal advice privilege can arise in relation to such documents provided the dominant purpose test is met. He rejected the claimants' argument that these observations were obiter, noting that Jet2.com itself concerned drafts of letters prepared by members of the client group rather than lawyers, as well as multi-addressee emails involving both lawyers and non-lawyer members of the client group.
It is worth noting, however, that the judgment leaves untouched the separate and controversial question of who qualifies as part of the "client group" in the first place — the narrow approach laid down in Three Rivers (No 5) and endorsed by the Court of Appeal in SFO v ENRC [2019] 1 WLR 791 remains binding. That narrower issue can only be resolved by the Supreme Court. The judgment also underscores the importance of the dominant purpose test in the context of multi-addressee emails: where a single email is sent simultaneously to various individuals including a lawyer, the purpose of the communication to each addressee must be assessed separately. If the dominant purpose is to obtain the commercial views of non-lawyer addressees, the email will not be privileged even if a subsidiary purpose is simultaneously to obtain legal advice.
Key takeaways
What does this mean in practice? For corporate clients and their advisers, the decision is welcome news. It confirms that the internal preparatory work within the client group which inevitably takes place before a lawyer is consulted — emails between colleagues identifying a problem, notes pulling together the relevant facts, memoranda scoping out the issues on which advice is needed — can attract legal advice privilege, provided the dominant purpose is to seek that advice.
That is a welcome development. Large organisations rarely seek legal advice in a single step. The process typically involves several individuals within the client group gathering information, discussing the issues, and settling instructions before a lawyer is ever contacted. Picken J's reasoning — which treats a client's working papers as the mirror image of a lawyer's working papers, themselves undeniably privileged — is difficult to fault as a matter of logic.
Three points of caution, however. First, the decision does not alter the narrow definition of who falls within the "client group", which remains governed by Three Rivers (No 5). Second, the dominant purpose test continues to apply rigorously, and documents created for mixed purposes may not qualify. Third, as a first instance decision, it will not be binding on other courts and it remains to be seen whether the claimants will seek to challenge this ruling and how a higher court will approach the issue. The case is listed for trial in October 2026.
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