This quarter has seen significant activity across multiple fronts. The UK’s Failure to Prevent Fraud offence marks its first anniversary, with companies at varying stages of compliance maturity. New corporate criminal liability provisions under the Crime and Policing Act 2026 have broadened the basis for prosecuting companies for the acts of their senior managers; and the UK Serious Fraud Office (SFO) continues to signal continuity in its enforcement priorities, with an emphasis on international co-operation, technology-assisted review and a growing pipeline of corporate enforcement cases.
The UK Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) has intensified its focus on financial crime, with over 75% of its enforcement work now directed at financial crime and a notable increase in enforcement operations in 2025/26. The FCA’s joint enforcement head has publicly called for Big Tech companies to be brought into the ‘anti-fraud fight’, reflecting a broader push for a system-wide response to online financial crime.
The UK Government has published its Anti-Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Strategy 2026–2029, backed by at least £550 million in funding, which sets out an ambitious programme of supervisory consolidation, intelligence reform and enhanced asset recovery.
In the AI space, novel questions continue to arise around legal professional privilege and the use of AI in investigations, while ESG enforcement is advancing through proposed amendments to the Modern Slavery Act. Sanctions enforcement has also been active, with record penalties imposed for breaches of the Russia sanctions regime.
Failure to Prevent Fraud: One year on
FCA enforcement and financial crime developments
UK Government Anti-Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Strategy 2026–2029
Failure to Prevent Fraud: One year on
On 1 September 2025, the UK's new Failure to Prevent Fraud (FTPF) offence came into force, reshaping the fraud landscape for organisations operating in or connected to the UK. The offence is part of a broader move towards making it easier to prosecute companies (see Section 3 below) and is modelled on the UK Bribery Act's failure to prevent offence. It makes it significantly easier to bring fraud prosecutions against companies where employees, subsidiaries, or third parties commit fraud for the company's benefit (or that of its clients) because it does not have to be shown that senior management were involved or aware of the fraud. It has significantly increased expectations in relation to fraud compliance programmes (many of which previously focused on fraud where the company was the victim). See our overview of the offence here.
A year on, different companies are at different stages: many clients are reviewing the effectiveness of procedures they put in place ahead of September 2025, whereas others are just getting started.
We've set out below some of the common questions we've had from clients and what we see on the horizon. Please get in touch if you would like to discuss how to put in place (or review) effective anti-fraud procedures.
Does the offence apply to non-UK companies?
The offence applies to organisations wherever they are located. Jurisdiction may be triggered where, for example, part of the fraud took place in the UK or the intended gain or loss occurred there. In practice, applicability depends on where employees or third parties operate, where relevant meetings take place, and where counterparties or investors are located. Many multinationals with a UK connection are therefore adopting a global approach to compliance procedures, while focusing more intensive procedures on entities with the strongest UK nexus.
What are companies expected to do?
The only defence to the new offence is having "reasonable procedures" to prevent fraud. Companies are expected to conduct a detailed risk assessment, demonstrate "tone from the top", maintain effective policies and training, conduct due diligence on third parties, and monitor programme effectiveness.
Conducting and documenting a risk assessment is the first step in order to identify where the company’s greatest fraud risks lie. The UK government estimates a risk assessment alone will take 100–120 hours, and its guidance states that procedures are unlikely to be deemed reasonable if a risk assessment is not conducted. We have found the most efficient approach is structured workshops with key functions and stakeholders, which can also serve as training. A gap analysis should follow to identify where existing controls need enhancement.
Even companies with sophisticated financial crime programmes typically identify multiple fraud risks not effectively covered by existing controls. This is unsurprising, given it was previously near impossible to prosecute companies for fraud; most pre-existing fraud programmes focused on "inward fraud" (the company as victim) rather than "outward fraud" (fraud for the company's benefit).
There are quick wins that can be put in place while medium and longer term actions are ongoing, for example senior management communications, updated fraud policy, and updated codes of conduct and contractual clauses. Longer-term enhancements typically cover third-party due diligence, training, sales and bid processes, whistleblowing procedures, and monitoring.
Where are companies now, and what's next?
Companies are at varying stages; some have completed detailed risk assessments and enhancement programmes, while others are just beginning. Crucially, there is no grace period: the SFO has made clear it is keen to prosecute the new offence and stated that it will have no sympathy for companies who have not put in place procedures.
In the coming months, we expect to see: (i) companies continuing to develop their fraud compliance programmes (particularly as they come to review the effectiveness of the programmes developed in response to the new offence); (ii) a UK FTPF case announced; and (iii) increased board and auditor focus on fraud risk management, particularly in light of Provision 29 of the UK Corporate Governance Code, applicable from 1 January 2026, requiring boards to declare on the effectiveness of material internal controls.
Corporate criminal liability
The Crime and Policing Act 2026 (CPA 2026) has recently significantly broadened the scope of corporate criminal liability. From 29 June 2026, where a “senior manager” of an organisation commits any offence, the organisation also commits an offence. This amends the previous position (itself only in force from 26 December 2023) that provided that only where a “senior manager” of an organisation commits a specific economic offence, would the organisation also commit an offence.
Under the CPA 2026, a “senior manager” is someone who plays a significant role in making decisions about how all, or a substantial part, of an organisation is managed or organised, or who actually manages or organises those activities in practice. The test focuses on what the individual does, rather than their job title. Heads of department, regional managing directors and senior operational leaders could therefore fall within the definition (which the SFO expects to be litigated).
The organisation does not need to have authorised, approved or known about the senior manager’s criminal conduct. The key question is whether the senior manager was acting within the actual or apparent scope of their authority when the offence was committed.
Organisations now face risk of prosecution for a wider range of offences committed by their “senior managers”, including: workplace offences; modern slavery and human trafficking offences; and data privacy offences. Furthermore, this expansion means that representations in contracts, financing documents, and M&A disclosures about 'compliance with laws' now carry significantly more risk if they prove inaccurate.
The practical effect of these changes is that it provides an easier path for prosecuting companies for these offences. Importantly, companies should bear in mind that unlike the UK failure to prevent offences (failure to prevent fraud, bribery and facilitation of tax evasion) there is no statutory defence of having reasonable or adequate procedures in place: where there is offending by a senior manager, a compliance programme will not shield a company from liability.
What should companies do?
Companies should take proactive steps now to understand and manage their exposure under the expanded corporate criminal liability regime. In particular:
- Map broader risk: review of all areas of risk which may arise from corporate activities e.g. cybersecurity, data protection and modern slavery.
- Review senior manager roles: identify individuals below Board level who may fall within the statutory definition, including those with significant operational or regional authority, and document relevant reporting lines, delegations, and escalation routes and review their roles and reporting lines.
- Stress-test risk and response: assess and test protocols for responding to senior management misconduct.
- Review compliance programmes: check that policies, procedures, and controls are up to date, properly understood and working well in practice, particularly in higher-risk areas where senior managers have decision-making or operational responsibility.
- Refresh training, supervision, and insurance: deliver targeted training, maintain appropriate oversight, and review relevant directors’ and officers’ and liability cover.
- Consider brand and reputational risks: assess whether increased scrutiny of senior manager behaviour is needed and if this may impact the corporate brand and reputation and also consider increased stakeholder engagement.
See our article here for more details on practical next steps.
SFO enforcement trends
Leadership, continuity, business plan 2026–27
There has been significant speculation about the future and leadership of the SFO this year, although we have seen it continue to open cases and cooperate with overseas authorities.
Following the departure of Nick Ephgrave in March 2026, the SFO has been led on an interim basis by Graham McNulty, formerly the SFO’s Chief Operating Officer, who has signalled continuity with the SFO's 2024–29 strategy. On 22 September 2026, a member of the House of Lords confirmed that the job would be officially advertised at the end of September, and that the Attorney General expects to appoint a permanent director “by the end of this year, to take up the post in 2027”.
The SFO’s 2026–27 Business Plan, published on 16 April 2026 states that its core priorities include:
- proactive intelligence gathering; the deployment of modern investigative tools; and improved disclosure practices:
- AI and technology-assisted review are being prioritised to seek to accelerate the SFO's ability to process large volumes of documents and communications, compress investigation timescales and increase the likelihood that material inconsistencies are identified early.
Crypto asset capabilities and enhanced digital forensics signal that the SFO is building the tools to trace, analyse and restrain digital assets. In July 2025, the SFO obtained its first Crypto Wallet Freezing Order to freeze Bitcoin and USDC belonging to Arena Television's CEO. Further, in November 2025, the SFO launched its first major cryptocurrency investigation into the US$28 million Basis Markets scheme. Director Ephgrave stated that the SFO was determined to pursue those who "seek to use cryptocurrency to defraud investors" with its "expanding cryptocurrency capability and growing expertise."
A new Disclosure Improvement Plan and the SFO's first case management system are intended to streamline case preparation, potentially accelerating the path from investigation to charge.
It remains to be seen how the above will impact on the SFO's ability to progress cases (and make decisions) faster. While the SFO has received £8.3 million in additional funding following last year’s government spending review, it is uncertain whether this relatively small addition to the SFO’s budget is sufficient to effect necessary changes.
International co-operation
Perhaps mindful of suggestions in recent years that the SFO was focusing on domestic investigations, the SFO continues to seek to develop and expand international enforcement cooperation. In March 2025 it co-founded the International Anti-Corruption Prosecutorial Taskforce with France's Parquet National Financier and the Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland and in May 2026 the Taskforce convened over 100 investigators and prosecutors in London. The SFO also joined the NCA-hosted International Anti-Corruption Coordination Centre in June 2025, and in June 2026 it announced parallel investigations with the New York District Attorney's Office into Internet Mobile Communications Limited.
The practical effects are intended to be (a) greater cross-border evidence sharing; (b) coordinated enforcement action across jurisdictions; and (c) a reduced ability for companies to compartmentalise exposure by geography. Businesses operating across multiple jurisdictions should treat any SFO inquiry as carrying a meaningful risk of parallel investigation elsewhere and be mindful of the SFO’s policy in its 2025 Co-operation Guidance that it will view a company’s “seeking to exploit differences between international law enforcement agencies or legal systems” as uncooperative conduct.
Case activity, outcomes and enforcement priorities
The SFO's 2025–26 Annual Report records five new investigations, seven search operations across 24 premises, fourteen arrests and ten suspects charged across four cases, from approximately 1,500 referrals. The SFO’s recent activity suggests a greater willingness to take substantial early action; in January 2026 the SFO searched seven sites and arrested six individuals in its Home REIT fraud and bribery investigation. Other 2026 matters concern companies involved in Energy Company Obligation 4 contracts and suspected fraud and money laundering at Internet Mobile Communications Limited.
The SFO continues to pursue individuals. In September 2026, following guilty pleas to offences of fraudulent trading, three directors of Ethical Forestry Limited were sentenced to imprisonment averaging 5 years each.
Corporate enforcement has also returned to prominence. In May 2026, Ultra Electronics Holdings Limited entered into a DPA for failure to prevent bribery, agreeing to a £10 million penalty and £4.8 million in investigation costs. The SFO's 2025 Co-operation Guidance confirms that a company which promptly self-reports and fully co-operates can ordinarily expect an invitation to negotiate a DPA, absent exceptional circumstances – the guidance (which includes an expanded list of what the SFO’s views as cooperative and uncooperative conduct) provides a framework that companies should factor into any decision on voluntary disclosure.
FCA enforcement and financial crime developments
The FCA has signalled an increasingly assertive position on financial crime. In the financial year ending 31 March 2026, the FCA opened 33 new enforcement operations (up from 23), with over 75% focused on financial crime and at least half involving potential criminal offences. The FCA secured 17 criminal convictions in 2025/26, more than three times the five recorded the previous year. Alongside formal enforcement, the FCA opened 265 intervention cases, using voluntary requirement agreements, skilled person reviews and own-initiative powers to address compliance failings at an earlier stage.
Key developments
In August 2026, the FCA published findings from a review of financial crime controls in the asset management sector, identifying weaknesses in business-wide risk assessments (over a fifth of firms had not completed one), customer due diligence for complex offshore structures, outsourcing oversight (only 36% had full oversight of third-party AML processes) and transaction monitoring (more than a quarter had no formal process). The FCA has indicated it will maintain supervisory scrutiny in these areas.
On 27 August 2026, the FCA’s joint head of enforcement publicly called for Big Tech companies to be ‘brought further into the tent’ to fight financial crime. This builds on:
- FCA Chief Executive Nikhil Rathi’s May 2026 keynote, in which he framed financial crime as a matter of “economic and national security”, called for a “radically different operating model” built on greater openness and information sharing, embracing technology and deeper joint working across the system and which sent a “clear message to big tech: you cannot sit on the sidelines as online investment fraud continues to rise.”; and
- The recent Independent Review on Fraud in the Digital Age (the Independent Review) which calls for a new criminal offence targeting technology platforms that fail to prevent fraud on their services, marking a significant potential expansion of the UK’s corporate criminal liability framework. The Independent Review proposes that the new offence would “closely mirror” the FTPF offence (as described above). While acknowledging inherent concerns with extending the failure-to-prevent fraud regime to online platforms, including technical feasibility, proportionality and jurisdictional enforcement, the Independent Review notes that these concerns are “not insurmountable” given the offence would only require reasonable, risk-proportionate measures. See our article here for more details.
Practical implications
For technology companies, this signals increasing regulatory pressure to implement more robust measures for detecting and removing fraudulent financial content (this includes conducting risk assessments and putting in place reasonable procedures to prevent fraud for their organisation’s benefit, to manage the risk of criminal liability under ECCTA). For regulated firms, it underscores the FCA’s expectations in terms of financial crime prevention measures and firms should ensure their compliance programmes reflect the FCA’s emphasis on systemwide information sharing.
Non-financial misconduct
Non-financial misconduct (NFM) – which includes behaviour that is not of a clearly financial nature such as bullying, harassment and violence - is now a key area of regulatory focus, with recent FCA rule and guidance changes and high-profile enforcement. In the FCA’s view, one of the clearest warning signs of a failing culture is NFM and it is important that firms are across developments in this area so that they can appropriately deal with instances of NFM when they arise.
Regulatory changes
On 1 September 2026, a new FCA rule for non-banks and new FCA guidance for all regulated firms came into effect in this area:
- New Code of Conduct (COCON) rule: A new rule, COCON 1.1.7FR, extends the scope of the conduct rules in non-banking firms in respect of bullying, harassment or violence against colleagues, bringing the position more in line with the position for banks (unless the conduct only relates to a part of the firm’s business that does not carry on regulated activities). This new rule is treated as guidance for banks.
- New Handbook guidance: Alongside the new rule, the FCA has introduced new Handbook guidance on NFM to help firms apply COCON and the Fit and Proper test, which is relevant for both banks and non-banks and covers: the boundary between work and private life; how NFM can breach the conduct rules; reasonable steps for managers; and fitness and propriety assessments, including private life, social media and unproven allegations.
Enforcement
Recent enforcement demonstrates that the FCA is prepared to tackle NFM which it considers demonstrates a lack of integrity and to impose serious sanctions on those that break the rules and ignore good governance. Earlier this month, the Upper Tribunal upheld Crispin Odey’s proposed prohibition and decided to fine him £1.53 million for being in breach of Individual Conduct Rule 1, the requirement to act with integrity. Mr Odey had faced an internal disciplinary process for breaching a final written warning relating to inappropriate behaviour towards female employees at the firm he founded. In response to this, Mr Odey had twice dismissed the firm’s executive committee due to hear the allegations against him. The Tribunal found that Mr Odey was motivated by his own self-preservation so as to avoid accountability and that he risked entrenching an existing culture within the firm where inappropriate behaviour by him towards female employees had been normalised.
Next steps for firms
Firms should ensure that they understand the recent regulatory changes and, to the extent they have not done so already, consider whether they need to update their approach to: staff policies such as speak up procedures, grievance and disciplinary policies, and their investigation protocol; conduct breach reporting; fit and proper assessments; and regulatory references.
Internal training on the changes is also important. The FCA has emphasised that staff and managers should know how the changes apply to them, including expectations around preventing and handling NFM and conducting internal investigations.
More broadly, firms should monitor enforcement activity in this area and identify where regulatory decisions contain practical learnings in relation to NFM applicable to their business. For further resources in this area, please see our dedicated non-financial misconduct hub.
UK Government Anti-Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Strategy 2026–2029
In September 2026, the UK government published its Anti-Money Laundering and Asset Recovery (AMLAR) Strategy 2026–2029. Backed by at least £550 million of investment and more than 500 new officers, the Strategy sets three core objectives: making the UK’s defences more effective while simplifying the operating environment for legitimate businesses; disrupting high-harm criminal networks; and recovering more criminal assets.
Key reforms
The Strategy’s most significant initiatives include: (a) AML/CTF supervisory consolidation from 25 supervisors to 3 (the FCA, HMRC and the Gambling Commission), with the FCA assuming supervision of legal, accountancy and trust and company services providers; (b) £30 million of funding over three years to intensify action against high street money laundering, supported by a new cross-government High Street Organised Crime Unit; (c) creation of a National Financial Intelligence Service (NFIS) within the NCA; (d) new UK Financial Intelligence Unit legislative powers to compel information and suspend transactions; (e) SAR reform, including raising the POCA threshold from £1,000 to £3,000 and exploring a ‘reasonable grounds to suspect’ standard; (f) consultation on Money Laundering Regulations reforms to reduce low-value compliance activity (estimated to save the regulated sector £178 million per annum); and (g) strengthened regulation of stablecoins and a policy roadmap for privacy-enhancing technologies in the crypto asset space.
The UK will use its Financial Action Task Force (FATF) presidency (2026–28) and G20 presidency (2027) to pursue reforms to international AML standards aimed at reducing low-value compliance burdens.
Practical implications
For financial institutions and other regulated firms, the Strategy signals a material shift in supervisory expectations. The key implications are: (a) a sharper focus from supervisors on genuine risk rather than compliance process, with low-value ‘box-ticking’ activity actively deprioritised; (b) expanded supervisory enforcement powers, including unannounced visits and strengthened director accountability for MLR breaches; (c) increased expectations around information sharing and adoption of AI and other technologies for AML/CTF compliance; (d) firms in the legal, accountancy and TCSP sectors should begin preparing for the transition to FCA supervision; and (e) greater emphasis on asset recovery, with enhanced powers to trace and seize assets including crypto assets held on overseas exchanges.
The Strategy’s emphasis on intelligence-led enforcement, enhanced cross-border cooperation and the growing prosecution pipeline suggests that the volume and sophistication of AML-related investigations is likely to increase.
AI developments
The rapid adoption of artificial intelligence across business and legal functions is raising novel questions for investigations, particularly around legal professional privilege, the conduct of AI-assisted investigations, and the emerging expectations of enforcement agencies.
Privilege and AI-generated outputs
We have seen increasing questions raised as to whether AI-generated outputs are covered by legal professional privilege. It is important to note that an AI-generated answer is not privileged merely because it resembles legal advice. Where, however, an AI tool is used by legal counsel, or under legal counsel's direction, as part of advising a client or preparing for litigation, the prompts and outputs may attract privilege depending on who used the tool, what was inputted, and whether confidentiality was preserved. It is arguable that the tool is analogous to any other research aid, and privilege attaches because a qualified lawyer adopted the output as part of their advice. The position internationally remains unsettled, with US federal courts reaching directly contradictory conclusions in early 2026 on whether AI interactions attract privilege or work-product protection. See our article here for more details.
Waiver risk: Feeding privileged material into AI tools
A key tenet of legal advice privilege is that the communication must remain confidential. Uploading legal advice or investigation materials into public AI tools whose terms permit data retention, model training, or third-party access may amount to voluntary disclosure, thus waiving privilege. In November 2025, the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) held that uploading confidential material to an open-source AI tool such as ChatGPT breaches confidentiality and waives legal professional privilege, while distinguishing this from closed-source tools where confidentiality is not breached. The message is clear: do not put privileged material into a public or open tool, and verify the confidentiality, retention, training and access terms of any enterprise product before use. Our more detailed briefing is available here.
However, although using closed-source / enterprise platforms can mitigate waiver risk through no-training commitments, confidentiality obligations, data segregation and audit controls, lawyers should still document the basis for using the tool and keep privileged material within a supervised workflow.
The use of AI in conducting investigations
In large-scale fraud, sanctions or regulatory matters, AI can assist with document review, issue coding, chronology building, privilege triage, pattern identification, and comparing witness accounts. However, it should not be the final decision-maker on legal conclusions, witness credibility, privilege calls or regulatory submissions. Those judgements require human oversight.
Enforcement agencies are themselves integrating AI into their investigative processes, driving more data-led investigations. Disclosure requests are increasingly calling for AI prompts and outputs, and regulators may use statutory powers to direct that AI settings be varied to preserve prompts and outputs. Compliance functions should actively assess and monitor the risks AI introduces, including the prospect that regulators will request disclosure of AI prompts, outputs and configuration settings.
ESG enforcement
On 30 June 2026, the UK government introduced proposed amendments to section 54 of the UK Modern Slavery Act (MSA), included in the Immigration and Asylum Bill (the Bill), currently before the House of Commons. If enacted, these provisions would implement significant changes to the UK’s modern slavery reporting regime, including:
- Making the content of slavery and human trafficking statements more prescriptive, requiring disclosures on risk assessment, policies, due diligence processes, training and effectiveness;
- Extending the application of the obligations to public authorities, including persons “with functions of a public nature”; and
- Introducing new financial penalties for non-compliance, including up to 1% of the organisation’s total turnover or total budget (dependent upon whether the organisation is private or public sector), or £1 million (whichever is the greater).
As the reforms are contained in a government Bill, they should be treated as a serious legislative proposal, signalling that modern slavery reporting is moving towards a more prescriptive and enforceable compliance regime. Our more detailed briefing on the Bill is available here.
While the government Bill does not go as far as introducing mandatory human rights due diligence legislation as called for by the UK Joint Committee on Human Rights (see our article here) and as implemented in the EU (see our article on the EU Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CS3D) here), it would strengthen the UK’s existing regime and should be viewed alongside wider pressure for more substantive due diligence obligations.
This is particularly in light of recent comments from members of the UK government. On 30 June 2026, then UK Minister for Trade Policy, Chris Bryant MP expressed his support for mandatory due diligence legislation. Significantly, the Minister expected the government to introduce such legislation “by the end of this parliament” (i.e. by 2029). In addition, he separately advocated for forced labour import bans akin to the EU Forced Labour Regulation, which is due to enter into force in December 2027.
Since then, newly appointed UK Minister for Business, Innovation, Science and Trade, Lord Sarwar confirmed on 4 September that the government is considering the findings of the Responsible Business Conduct Review, which amongst other things addressed the potential introduction of mandatory human rights due diligence and forced labour import bans. During a debate in the House of Lords, he remarked: “I am an impatient Minister. I want us to get things done and to get them done quickly”.
Sanctions
Introduction of new sanctions targeting Iran
On 8 September 2026, the UK government announced that it was introducing legislation that would target Iranian nuclear activity and “other hostile Iranian activity”.
In a return to some of the types of sanctions previously imposed in relation to Iran, the Iran (Sanctions) (Amendments) Regulations 2026 (the Iran Regulations) introduce financial, trade and transport restrictions, which will be effective from 29 September 2026.
The new trade prohibitions target energy-related goods and technology, maritime goods and technology, natural gas, oil and petroleum products, petrochemicals, sectoral software and technology, and gold, precious metals and diamonds. These prohibitions not only target exports, but also third country trade, indirect trading activity and various ancillary services, amongst other restrictions. The Iran Regulations also introduce new financial restrictions concerning various activity relating to loans, credit, investment, insurance, banking relationships and market access and dealings in Iranian sovereign bonds. Transport restrictions include broadened powers to specify ships and restrict their operation. Finally, nuclear related restrictions have been updated to expand their scope (including by updating the definitions of nuclear-list goods and technology).
Sanctions on settlement activity in the West Bank
On the same day as announcing the sanctions targeting Iran, the UK government announced that it would be taking steps to address settlement expansion in the West Bank.
These sanctions include designating five individuals under the global human rights sanctions regime and announcing plans to create powers to allow the government to designate individuals and companies that “support, facilitate or profit from illegal settlement activity”.
The proposed sanctions also include a ban on the import of goods from illegal settlements, a ban on promoting or advertising land and property in illegal settlements, and a plan to strengthen the existing global human rights sanctions regime to target those who commit serious violations of international humanitarian law.
Recent Russia-related designations
The UK government continues to sanction individuals and entities under its sanctions targeting Russia. On 16 June 2026, it sanctioned 70 individuals, ships and entities covering Russia’s shadow fleet, military procurement supply chains, and financial networks on the basis that they are used to circumvent UK sanctions. On 6 August 2026, a further 19 targets were sanctioned, including six Russian banks and six shadow fleet tankers.
National Security (State Threats) Act 2026
On 8 July 2026, the National Security (State Threats) Act 2026 (the NSSTA) received Royal Assent. Building on the National Security Act 2023 (the NSA), the NSSTA provides the Secretary of State with the power to designate bodies that are engaged in “foreign power threat activity”, which is defined in the NSA to include various activities done with the intention to benefit a foreign power including espionage and sabotage, and other offences (see Home Office Guidance here).
The NSSTA also introduces new offences including prohibitions on supporting or assisting a designated body and obtaining material benefits from a designated body. Depending on the breach, penalties can result in 10-14 years in prison and/or a fine.
Key enforcement actions
UK authorities have been active in enforcing both financial and trade sanctions breaches, including:
- On 8 September 2026, HMRC announced a record £7.4 million compound settlement had been paid by Illumina Cambridge Limited for breaches of the UK’s sanctions regime targeting Russia. The offences related to the indirect supply of sanctioned goods to Russia following the supply of goods between overseas companies in their corporate group (see government summary);
- On 2 September 2026, OFSI announced that it had imposed a £4.7 million penalty on CBNA London, the UK branch of Citibank (see notice). In total, CBNA processed 970 payments with a value in excess of £19.72 million which OFSI considered to have breached financial sanctions. The breaches mostly occurred in the immediate aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, between February and November 2022, and concerned breaches relating to commercial bank accounts that were majority owned by designated persons, internal charges made to the accounts of (or accounts of entities owned or controlled by) designated persons, Russia-related correspondent banking, amongst other breaches. In addition to Russia-related breaches, the notice refers to payments processed between January and July 2025 in breach of the Global Anti-Corruption sanctions regime. The penalty notice went into some detail as regards both aggravating and mitigating factors, noting that one aggravating factor was the extent of the bank’s London-operations specific stress testing of CBNA’s systems in advance of the imposition of sanctions. In light of the voluntary disclosures made, the degree of cooperation with OFSI, and the proximity of the breaches to the imposition of designations in a large number of instances (amongst other mitigating factors), OFSI determined that CBNA London was entitled to a 20% voluntary disclosure and co-operation discount;
- On 30 July 2026, HMRC announced a £6.4 million compound settlement had been reached with an entity operating in the aviation sector in connection with breaches of export controls. A month earlier, it announced it had agreed a £569,157 compound settlement with Petrofac Facilities Management Limited for breaches of UK sanctions against Russia (see government summary of both penalties here); and
- In June 2026, OFSI announced that a technology company operating in the travel sector was fined just over £1 million for making funds available for the benefit of a designated person, making an economic resource available to a designated person, and breaching certain prohibitions on circumvention of UK sanctions (see notice). In May 2026, a major bank was fined £165,000 for making funds available to a designated person without a licence (see notice).
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