Key takeaway

In a decision of the Hong Kong Court of First Instance in Re China SCE Group Holdings Ltd [2026] HKCFI 4824 (SCE Group), the Honourable Justice Jonathan Harris sanctioned on 16 June 2026 a Hong Kong scheme restructuring US $2.27 billion of offshore debt owed by China SCE Group Holdings Limited (Company), a Mainland property developer.

The decision provides further guidance on the principles applied by the Hong Kong Court in relation to the appropriate composition of creditor voting classes for a scheme. Moreover, the decision reflects the willingness of the Hong Kong Court to sanction a scheme containing non-consensual third-party releases, provided they are necessary to implement the scheme and are subject to appropriate carve-outs for fraud, gross negligence and wilful default.

The Hong Kong Court’s approach to non-consensual third-party releases is similar to that applied in the United Kingdom, and stands in contrast to the strict approach in the United States, according to which non-consensual third-party releases are invalid under Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code following the decision in Harrington v Purdue Pharma LP1 (Purdue Pharma).

Background

The Company is incorporated in the Cayman Islands and has been listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange since 2010. Its liquidity problems began in mid-2021 with the downturn in the Mainland property market. A default on its 2021 syndicated loan triggered cross-defaults. Since late 2023, the Company took steps to actively formulate and implement a debt restructuring proposal. This was driven primarily by the work of an ad hoc group (AHG) composed of certain institutional holders of the Company’s offshore debts. This work led to the launch of a Restructuring Support Agreement on 26 June 2025, later amended on 20 November 2025 (Amended RSA)

The Amended RSA had secured accessions from around 78% of scheme creditors by March 2026. At the scheme meeting on 18 May 2026, 381 of 385 creditors voted in favour of the scheme, representing 99% in number and 88.1% in value.

Scheme terms

The scheme debt of US $2.27 billion represented 87.16% of the Company’s outstanding liabilities as at 31 December 2025. The remaining 12.84% of liabilities were excluded from the scheme on the basis that enforcement of these liabilities would not undermine the restructuring and that creditors of the excluded liabilities had expressed willingness to cooperate with the Company. In any event, the exclusion of these liabilities was not objected to by scheme creditors.

Under the scheme, creditors could select from three restructuring options with different combinations of cash, new notes, mandatory convertible bonds and shares.

The scheme provided for various fees to be paid to nominated persons – including a Consent Fee payable to scheme creditors who acceded to the Amended RSA before a nominated deadline, a Work Fee payable to the AHG and Advisor Fees payable to the advisors of the AHG and other major bank lenders involved in negotiating the scheme.

Importantly, the scheme contained releases from:

  • claims against the subsidiary guarantors and security providers of the Company’s debt; and
  • claims against the corporate group, the AHG, other major bank lenders, their advisors and agents, and other service providers in relation to the “preparation, negotiation, sanction or implementation” of the scheme or the related restructuring documents.

In each case, the releases were subject to carve-outs, so that they did not extend to liability for fraud, gross negligence or wilful default, or the liability of advisors arising under their duty of care to their client. There was also no general release for any breach of directors’ duties.

The decision

Scheme classes

Harris J held that it was appropriate for the scheme creditors to have been placed in, and voted as, a single class. In doing so, His Honour applied the test from Re CIFI Holdings (Group) Co Ltd [2025] HKCFI 3250 – “whether the new rights granted by the scheme in place of the existing rights are so different that the scheme must be treated as a compromise with more than one class”.

Harris J held that:

  • the fact that the relevant noteholders and lenders had different instruments, interest rates, maturities and default interest entitlements did not fracture the single class because, applying the correct scheme comparator (as the relevant alternative if the scheme was not approved) – i.e. an insolvent liquidation – all claims would rank pari passu;
  • all creditors benefited from the same package of guarantees and charges granted by the Company and third parties;
  • all creditors had the right to choose from the same three options as the scheme consideration;
  • the exclusion of default interest from the calculation of scheme creditors’ entitlements impacted only one group of creditors and would increase recovery by only around 0.1% to 0.5% in any event;
  • the use of the interest cut-off date of 31 December 2024 (and not a more recent date) to calculate scheme creditors’ entitlements under the scheme was immaterial. The commercial terms were negotiated on that basis, applied to all creditors equally, and were fully disclosed in the scheme explanatory statement. Further, including interest accrued up to a later date of 31 December 2025 would only have reduced recovery by around 0.1% to 0.2%; and
  • the fees payable did not fracture the single class. The Consent Fee was open to all creditors if they acceded to the Amended RSA and its quantum was minimal compared to estimated scheme recoveries. The Work Fee and Advisor Fees were appropriate to reflect the time and effort expended by the relevant creditors and advisors over 2 years in formulating the scheme, and their assumption of risks in negotiating the scheme, and both amounts (US $8.71 million for the Work Fee and US $6.2 million for the Advisor Fees) were also minimal compared to estimated scheme recoveries.

The decision demonstrates the flexibility applied by the Hong Kong Court in assessing whether creditors have a sufficient community of interest, such that they can vote as a single class. Differences in loan and payment terms under the contractual terms governing creditors’ claims are not fatal, nor are differential fees and payments under the scheme itself provided they are minimal in comparison to total scheme recoveries and are fairly disclosed.2

Releases

Harris J held that the releases were “consistent with contemporary scheme practice”.

The release of claims against the subsidiary guarantors and security providers were necessary “to prevent any potential ricochet claims from arising post restructuring that could otherwise undermine the scheme”, and Harris J noted a similar release had been included in a scheme sanctioned in Re Sunac China Holdings Limited [2026] HKCFI 68 (Re Sunac).

The release of claims against entities involved in the negotiation and implementation of the scheme was also consistent with Re Sunac, where it was held that releases of that kind are “essential to securing the cooperation of such parties in executing the documentation required for the implementation of the scheme and the restructuring”.

However, Harris J indicated the carve-outs to both releases were a significant factor in the Court not objecting to the releases, preserving creditors’ rights in relation to matters unconnected with the scheme.

Other matters

His Honour held that the creditors’ meeting was properly convened to vote on the scheme and there was appropriate disclosure to creditors of the key terms of the scheme. Further, average estimated returns under the scheme (14.6% to 28.1% of the compromised debt) significantly exceeded liquidation returns (2.3% to 5.0%) and this meant the Court was satisfied that an intelligent and honest creditor could reasonably approve the scheme.

Finally, while it was an offshore company, the Company had a sufficient jurisdictional connection with Hong Kong – it was listed in Hong Kong, with some of its creditors in Hong Kong and with some of the debts to be compromised under the scheme governed by Hong Kong law.

A closer look at the releases

The sanction of the scheme notwithstanding the non-consensual third-party releases is consistent with previous decisions of the Hong Kong Court. Releases have been allowed where they are necessary to prevent contribution or indemnity claims against the scheme company by the released parties (which would undermine the restructuring and possibly result in liquidation), or where they are otherwise reasonably necessary for the successful operation of the scheme – subject to carve-outs for breaches of duty, malfeasance and claims unrelated to the scheme or restructuring.3

Courts in the UK have taken a similar approach, finding that a non-consensual third-party release can be included in a scheme or a restructuring plan if it relates to guarantee claims (and therefore minimises the risk of ricochet claims against the company)4 or the release of directors, advisors or plan participants in connection with the negotiation, preparation and implementation of the scheme or plan (subject to appropriate carve-outs).5

Both types of release were approved in the sanction of a restructuring plan in Re NFE Global Holdings,6 with Cawson J noting that such releases are “fairly customary”.

However, the Court of Appeal cautioned against broader releases against directors and advisors in Thames Water,7 finding that non-consensual third-party releases (which bind dissenting creditors) in a restructuring plan must be "necessary in order to give effect to the arrangement proposed for the disposition of the debts and liabilities of the company to its own creditors".

In the context of a UK restructuring plan containing non-consensual third party releases, a debtor must also be mindful of the section 901G "no worse off" comparison when a dissenting class is crammed down and the court’s general fairness discretion – particularly following the Court of Appeal’s decisions in Thames Water, Adler8 and Petrofac.9 In the relevant alternative, which is usually a liquidation, any value lost through a release would need to be offset by what the plan provides.

The ability for non-consensual third-party releases to be included in a restructuring scheme or plan in Hong Kong and the UK – subject to meeting the minimum conditions noted above – stands in contrast to the strict approach taken in the US.

In Purdue Pharma, the US Supreme Court held on 27 June 2024 that such releases are invalid under Chapter 11. However, that outcome was in the context of the specific statutory scheme comprising Chapter 11. A key aspect of the reasoning of the Supreme Court majority was the construction of section 1123(b) of the US Bankruptcy Code. The majority noted that subsections (1) to (5) of section 1123(b) allow a plan to “address claims and property belonging to a debtor or its estate”, or “modify the rights of creditors who hold claims against the debtor or its estate.” The catch-all provision contained in section 1123(b)(6) – that a Chapter 11 plan may “include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title” – was read down so that it must relate to “debts of, or claims against, the debtor". A non-consensual third-party release of debts not part of or against the debtor or its estate therefore cannot be released using the catch-all provision.

However, outside the specific statutory context of Chapter 11, non-consensual third-party releases have been allowed in recognition applications under Chapter 15 of the US Bankruptcy Code, on the basis that Chapter 15 is a different statutory scheme and such releases are not automatically to be regarded as being contrary to US public policy.10

Concluding thoughts

While SCE Group provides useful guidance on the appropriate composition of creditor classes in a Hong Kong restructuring scheme, the decision is particularly notable in confirming that non-consensual third-party releases can, within limits, be included in a scheme in Hong Kong.

However, if such releases are not necessary to effectuate a scheme – for example, if they do not control the risk of ricochet claims against the debtor company and do not protect parties helping to negotiate and implement the scheme – they are unlikely to survive scrutiny in either Hong Kong or the UK.

This would include releases of claims regarding a breach of directors’ duties or mass tort or other liability claims against third parties unconnected with the scheme (or a restructuring plan in the UK) – even if the released party is contributing value.

Likewise, the absence of carve-outs for fraud, gross negligence and wilful default may risk a scheme or plan not being sanctioned.

With debtor groups on the look-out for jurisdictions providing maximum flexibility to restructure complex multinational debt arrangements, with a view to then securing recognition of a scheme or plan abroad, this remains an important space to watch. We can expect that non-consensual third-party releases will be one of the most litigated issues in global restructuring matters well into 2027.

Read the judgment

You can access the full judgment (as at the time of publication of this post) here.

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