On 22 June 2026, the FCA published Consultation Paper ‘CP26/20: Adapting our rules for a changing market: self-invested personal pensions’ in which they propose to produce a set of Handbook rules and guidance that address proportionate and risk-based due diligence and monitoring requirements. This article explores the recent history of the self-invested personal pension (SIPP) industry to understand why the FCA are now taking this step to formalise a due diligence framework for SIPP operators.
SIPPs continue to be a core part of the retail investment market. In 2024 total assets under SIPP administration were £567bn for approximately 5.3m UK consumers. SIPPs can allow for greater flexibility and control in retirement planning. However, as the FCA note, the average SIPP pot is often higher than in other personal pension schemes, which raises the possibility of harm to the consumer, were something to go wrong.
In recent years SIPP operators1 have faced an increasing number of court decisions that prioritise protecting the interests of SIPP investors. In the FCA’s November 2024 SIPP portfolio letter, the FCA noted that there were 800 open SIPP-related complaints with the Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS), down from around 3,500 in 2019/20.
Some of these complaints involve SIPP operators acting on an execution-only basis2, such as the February 2025 decision against Options UK Personal Pensions LLP - Decision Reference DRN-5314391.
The FCA remarks that some firms may have historically failed, and may still continue to fail, to conduct the expected level of due diligence on SIPP investments. This article will explore recent important cases and how they have influenced the development of SIPP operator due diligence obligations.
A brief history of the regulatory focus on the SIPP industry and due diligence
Regulatory focus on SIPPs and SIPP investments is not new. Firms engaging in regulated business involving SIPPs are well-advised to remember some of the earlier concerns from the FCA and FSA as they navigate current (and future) expectations. These include:
- In October 2012, the Financial Services Authority’s (FSA) thematic review on SIPP operators3 found “inadequate controls over the investments” in some SIPPs, as well as “[an] increase in the number of non-standard investments held by some SIPP operators…” and “A lack of evidence of adequate due diligence being undertaken for introducers and investments.” All of this meant that SIPPs posed “the potential to cause significant consumer detriment.”
- In 2013, an FSA alert4 stated that the provision of advice regarding the suitability of a SIPP “cannot be reasonably done” without having “consider[ed] both the customer’s existing pensions arrangement and the underlying investments intended to be held within the SIPP”.
- In October 2013, the FSA published Finalised guidance FG13/085. In relation to SIPP operators and due diligence, it stated:
Principle 2 of the FCA’s Principles for Businesses requires all firms to conduct their business with due skill, care and diligence. All firms should ensure that they conduct and retain appropriate and sufficient due diligence (for example, checking and monitoring introducers as well as assessing that investments are appropriate for personal pension schemes) to help them justify their business decisions. - In a 2014 further alert6, the FCA provided a warning against activities that echoed closely the fact pattern of some of the recent court cases in relation to SIPP operators and investments. In the alert, though primarily targeted at regulated pension advisors, the FCA warns against firms advising pension investors transferring their monies out of “more traditional pension schemes” and into “unregulated assets via SIPPs” leading to them “taking on very high and often entirely unsuitable level of risk”.
- In a 21 July 2014 Dear CEO letter to SIPP operators7, the FCA stated that they had identified “continue[d] and widespread” failures in which SIPP operators “demonstrate[d] a lack of engagement with some areas of their regulatory obligations”. The annex to this letter set out steps that SIPP operators should have taken, including to review firms’ own operating procedures to ensure that they had “adequate procedures in place” to assess non-standard investment business including high-risk and speculative investments.
Berkeley Burke SIPP Administration v FOS [2018] – going beyond ‘SIPPable’
R (Berkeley Burke SIPP Administration Ltd) v Financial Ombudsman Service Ltd [2018] EWHC 2878
Berkeley Burke SIPP Administration Limited (Berkeley Burke), a SIPP operator and administrator, appealed a final decision made by the FOS9. The complaint involved Mr Charlton, who was introduced to Berkeley Burke by an unregulated third-party in 2011. Mr Charlton transferred his pension investments into a SIPP administered by Berkeley Burke and invested £24,000 in a green oil scheme in Cambodia run by Sustainable AgroEnergy plc (SA). This was part of a total £12.25m invested by 616 investors through Berkeley Burke SIPPs.
Mr Charlton received written warnings about the risks and proceeded with the investment on an execution-only basis. He signed documents acknowledging that: (i) Berkeley Burke was acting “on an Execution Only basis”, (ii) Berkeley Burke had not provided him with investment advice, (iii) he had been advised to seek independent advice but chose not to, (iv) Berkeley Burke could not be held responsible for any losses, and (v) that the assessment of the suitability of the investment rested with Mr Charlton and his advisers10. As per their warning, Berkeley Burke conducted “little or no investigation11” into the suitability of the SA investment, only assessing whether it was ‘SIPPable’, i.e., whether the investment was eligible for tax relief if placed within a SIPP but not the suitability of the underlying investment.
By early 2012, it was revealed that the green oil scheme was fraudulent as SA did not own the land in Cambodia. SA went into receivership after the Serious Fraud Office intervened, causing Mr Charlton to suffer financial loss. He brought a claim to the FOS seeking to recover his funds from Berkeley Burke.
The FOS, taking into account the abovementioned FSA and FCA reports and guidance as well as application regulations and principles, ruled that Berkeley Burke had not acted “fairly and reasonably in its dealings” with Mr Charlton, as they had failed to “act in accordance with its responsibilities…set out in the [FCA’s] Principles for Business” as detailed in FCA Handbook rule PRIN 2.1.1R, and that it had not carried out “sufficient due diligence on the SA investment”. In particular, the FOS highlighted FCA Principle 2 and 6, which requires firms to conduct business with due skill, care and diligence and treat customers fairly. The FOS found that Berkeley Burke did not undertake sufficient due diligence on the SA investment and that they should have (i) identified that the investment was high risk, non-standard and speculative, (ii) ensured that the investment was not fraudulent by verifying that the assets were real, and (iii) ensured that the investment could be independently valued.
The FOS emphasised that Berkeley Burke’s due diligence should have gone beyond checking if the investment was ‘SIPPable’ and should have “looked carefully at the investment” that Mr Charlton was investing in. In failing to look beyond SIPP-ability, and failing to conduct sufficient diligence to reveal that the investment was not secure or may be fraudulent, it was not fair and reasonable to say that Berkeley acted with due skill, care and diligence and it was not fair to ask Mr Charlton to absolve it of responsibility for any consequences arising from the investment. The FOS decision then went on to describe what it considered would have been sufficient due diligence in this case. This included:
- Identifying SA as a “high-risk, speculative and non-standard investment”.
- Considering whether SA was appropriate for a pension scheme.
- Ensuring that the investment was genuine and not a scam (including verifying the assets were real and secure and that these could be independently valued).
- “Ensur[ing] Mr C[harlton’s] SIPP wouldn’t become a vehicle for a high-risk and speculative investment that wasn’t a secure asset, and could be a scam.”
Ultimately, the FOS found that while Berkeley Burke did not need to assess “the suitability” of the SA investment, it should have concluded that it “wasn’t acceptable” for Mr Charlton’s pension and thus had failed to act with due skill, care and diligence when accepting the investment.
As a result of the FOS determination, Berkeley Burke appealed two main grounds (i) the FOS had improperly used the FCA Principles in order to create “new unexpected duties” and it claimed that the duty of due diligence arising from the FOS decision conflicted with the duty under FCA Handbook Rule COBS 11.2.19R which required Berkeley Burke to execute a client’s order in accordance with their specific instruction at the relevant time and (ii) the FOS had failed to follow three previous decisions of the Pensions Ombudsman Service (POS) or to give cogent reasons for declining to do so, which it claimed contravened public law, and that a consequence of this would effectively be forum-shopping by complainants12.
The High Court upheld the FOS decision and rejected Berkeley Burke’s appeal for judicial review. The court agreed that the FOS had correctly applied FCA Handbook Principles 2 and 6, which required firms to conduct business with due skill, care and diligence, and to treat customers fairly. The court clarified that COBS 11.2.19R, which deals with the execution of orders, does not conflict with the need to conduct adequate due diligence on the investment before executing the order as it “has nothing to do with the question of whether or not the order should be accepted in the first place.”
Lessons to be learnt
Following the judgment in Berkley Burke, the FCA issued a Dear CEO letter to SIPP operators outlining their due diligence requirements, which had been set out in the 2013 guidance13. The Berkeley Burke case highlights the need for SIPP operators to conduct thorough due diligence that extends beyond the ‘SIPPable’. It is not enough that SIPP operators conduct due diligence on whether the asset is suitable to be placed into the SIPP. Rather, SIPP operators must conduct due diligence on the actual underlying investment, rejecting those investments which are not suitable for the relevant SIPP. This applies even on an execution-only basis14.
The case means that individuals who suffer losses from scam investments through a SIPP can bring complaints against SIPP operators, even if the SIPP operators were acting on an execution-only basis.
Due to liabilities arising from SIPP-related claims, Berkeley Burke entered into administration15.
Adams v Options – the saga unwinds
Adams v Options SIPP [2020] EWHC 122916
Mr Adams, a retail investor, had a personal pension plan with Friends Life worth approximately £52,000. Around February 2012, Mr Adams saw an advertisement on the internet which led him to the website of an unregulated and unauthorised introducer, CL&P, based in Malaga, Spain. Mr Adams claimed that CL&P told him that he “could unlock some pension money” by transferring his money to “invest in better investments.” After making contact with CL&P, Mr Adams was introduced to Carey Pensions (later known as Options UK Personal Pensions LLP, referred to in this article as Options). Mr Adams transferred his existing Friends Life pension fund to invest, via a SIPP arrangement with Options, in a company which sold long leases to storage pods to provide rental income and potential capital growth. Options acted on an execution-only basis and Mr Adams signed documents stating that Options was not providing advice and was not responsible for the suitability or appropriateness of the decision to establish a SIPP. Mr Adams had complained to Options on 5 October 2012 but only to complain about the length of time the process of the purchase of the underlying investment had taken; this was dealt with via Options’ Internal Complaints Procedure. Over time the investments lost value and became worth less than the initial investment, causing Mr Adams to suffer financial loss.
Mr Adams subsequently brought a claim on three grounds: (i) Options had failed to act honestly, fairly and professionally in accordance with the requirements set out in COBS 2.1.1R and had failed to implement relevant FCA guidance; (ii) Options was, by virtue of its relationship with the unregulated introducer, CL&P, in a joint venture with it and / or should be held as a joint tortfeasor and (iii) a claim under Section 27 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA).17
Mr Adams’ Section 27 claim argued that his contract with Options was unenforceable because the agreement had been made in consequence of CL&P as introducer carrying out regulated activities (namely, “arranging” on investments pursuant to Article 25 of the Regulated Activities Order (RAO) and “advising” pursuant to Article 53 RAO) when not properly authorised to do so and therefore in contravention of the general prohibition in Section 19 FSMA18. Mr Adams sought to in effect have the transaction reversed and recover his original investment in the SIPP and receive damages.
The High Court dismissed all three claims. Mr Adams was subsequently granted permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal (CoA) on the COBS and section 27 FSMA grounds.
Adams v Options UK Personal Pensions LLP [2021] EWCA Civ 47419
The Court dismissed the COBS claim on procedural grounds20 but found that CL&P had carried out regulated activities in contravention of the general prohibition despite the fact that the underlying investment (the storage pods) were not in and of themselves a regulated investment. In relation to Article 25 RAO, the CoA followed Lord Sumption’s comments in Financial Conduct Authority v Asset LI Inc [2016] UKSC 17, finding that ‘arrangements’ “was a broad and untechnical word”. The CoA found that CL&P did not satisfy the exception to Article 25 RAO21 found in Article 26 RAO as they had undertaken steps that had brought about the transaction. This included, for example, the completion of an application form and contacting the storage pod company to identify which store pods should be sold as part of the investment. As such, CL&P’s actions were “significantly instrumental” in bringing about the transfer of Mr Adam’s pension fund, satisfying the test in Article 25(1) (and in contravention of the general prohibition).
In relation to Article 53 RAO, the CoA found that while the storage pods were not a regulated investment, CL&P was “encouraging Mr Adams to achieve that end [i.e., invest in the storage pods] by transferring out of the Friends Life policy and buying a [Options] SIPP, both of which were regulated.” CLP’s recommendation to transfer his money out of the Friends Life policy and into the Options SIPP, CL&P:
proposed that Mr Adams undertake those transactions too and, in so doing, gave "advice on the merits" of selling a "particular investment which is a security" (viz. the Friends Life policy) and buying another "particular investment which is a security" (viz. a [Options] SIPP).
Thereby giving Mr Adams “advice within the scope of article 53” in contravention of the general prohibition.
As a result, the agreement between Mr Adams and Options arose from the actions of the unregulated entity carrying out authorised activities in contravention of Section 27 FSMA. Thus, the contract between Mr Adams and Options was unenforceable and consequently Mr Adams was entitled to have the money he invested in the SIPP returned. The CoA declined to use their powers under Section 28 FSMA to enforce the agreement, finding that to do so would be contrary to the spirit of FSMA’s consumer protection principles.
Lessons to be learnt
The implications arising from this series of judgments are clear: SIPP operators, especially those acting on an execution-only basis, must be very cautious and maintain robust processes to vet and conduct appropriate due diligence on the transactions, introducers and other parties that they transact with. This is especially true when it involves a large number of customers (580 investors in Options and 616 in Berkeley Burke), as the consequences of getting it wrong could be severe, both financially and reputationally.
It seems clear that the courts are willing to protect consumers, even where they willingly choose to make higher risk or more speculative investments and enforce the recovery of money from SIPP operators who are not aware that the third party they dealt with (the introducer) was conducting a regulated activity while being unregulated. If SIPP operators fail to conduct business with intermediaries that are appropriately regulated to conduct investment activities, they remain at risk of the courts utilising Section 27 FSMA to unwind the transaction and have the funds returned.
New rules for the SIPP market – CP26/20
In the background to CP26/20, the FCA acknowledge the “number of cases in the Courts involving the nature and extent of an operator’s responsibilities for due diligence of investments accepted into a SIPP”. In summary, the FCA proposes in the CP to produce a set of Handbook rules and guidance that address proportionate and risk-based due diligence and monitoring requirements for SIPP operators. These rules would apply to personal pension schemes that offer consumers flexibility (i.e., it would not apply to schemes that offer limited, pre-selected investments or risk-rated model portfolios).
Broadly, the rules would take a tiered approach to due diligence requirements, focusing on asset classes with fewer existing protections, arrangements involving unvetted third parties (e.g. unauthorised introductions or overseas third parties), or areas with a higher risk of fraud. SIPP operators would need to carry out initial and ongoing due diligence on introducers, advisers, and discretionary investment managers in order to satisfy themselves that these third parties have the required regulatory permissions and do not pose risk to consumers. Moreover, all assets proposed for inclusion in a SIPP would be subject to core due diligence requirements to reduce the risk of accepted assets being fraudulent, with additional due diligence required for higher-risk investments.
The FCA proposes a 12-month implementation period for firms to make the necessary changes to their due diligence processes and procedures.
Please see our companion articles on due diligence requirements here and the PSM&A regime here for further insight into CP26/20 and what it means for SIPPs and SIPP operators.
Conclusion – what does this mean for SIPP operators?
Overall, case law shows that a SIPP operator must ensure that the investment(s) it is suggesting for its SIPP investors are genuine, even if they are acting on an execution-only basis. A SIPP operator must have proper and appropriate due diligence processes in place to achieve this. If it fails to do this, it is not only exposed to the risk of regulatory sanction for non-compliance with regulatory rules and guidance, but also to customer complaints and claims, potentially leading to significant financial and reputational risks. SIPP operators must also ensure that, unless they work only with authorised introducers, they have fully assessed the risk that such firms may be acting in breach of the general prohibition, exposing the operator to claims under Section 27 FSMA.
Notwithstanding this, CP26/20 represents a watershed moment for SIPP regulation and reflects the FCA’s conclusion that existing arrangements are not sufficient to protect consumers in this growing market. The move from principles-based expectations and non-binding guidance to explicit Handbook rules is a qualitative change in the regulatory relationship between the FCA and SIPP operators. SIPP operators should take stock of this CP and start preparing now to implement changes, where required.
Our Financial Services and Pensions regulatory team is well placed to support you and would be pleased to discuss ways in which we can assist you in understanding the organisational and governance implications of these proposals, as well as the practical steps you can take now and in the future.
The authors would like to thank Matthew Greenhill for his assistance in preparing this article.
Footnotes
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SIPP operators may occasionally be referred to as “SIPP providers”. This article will use the term “SIPP operator”, reflecting FCA terminology and the regulated activity of establishing, operating or winding up a personal pension scheme set out in Article 52 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001.
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A transaction executed (i.e., carried out) by a firm on the instruction of a client where the firm does not give the client advice on the investments involved in the transaction (execution-only transaction - FCA Handbook).
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A guide for Self-Invested Personal Pensions (SIPP) operators
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Action required: review of Self Invested Personal Pension (SIPP) operators
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R (Berkeley Burke SIPP Administration Ltd) v Financial Ombudsman Service Ltd - ICLR
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Paragraphs 17-20, Berkeley Burke judgment.
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Paragraph 23, Berkeley Burke judgment.
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The court noted that the FOS did not seek to distinguish the POS cases on the basis of dissimilarity on the facts. The FOS considered that he needed to make up his own mind on the basis of the facts of the case that were before him, and the statutory framework in which he was operating. The court held that approach was correct and did not involve any error of law.
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Dear CEO letter: Due diligence requirements for Self-Invested Pension Plan (SIPP) investments
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This is in addition to any claim that such individuals may have for compensation from the Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS), which was established under Part 15 FSMA to provide compensation to clients of authorised financial services firms who are unable, or are likely to be unable, to meet the claims against them themselves.
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Where section 27 FSMA applies, the consumer may also be able to bring a claim against the authorised SIPP Operator firm they have entered into an agreement with to (i) recover any money paid or transferred by them under the agreement; and ii) seek compensation for losses they have suffered. This is referred to as a “Section 27 Claim”. In an update published on 13 December 2023, the FSCS said that it was continuing to assess SIPP operator claims that are eligible for compensation as a result of the CoA decision in Adams v Options. It said that the law in relation to when SIPP Operators may be liable to their clients is still developing and that determining whether a Section 27 Claim can be established is a complex exercise and depends on the particular facts of each case. In an update published April 2026, the FSCS noted they had issued 4,114 decisions and paid over £18.3m in compensation and were in the process of allocating the remaining claims. However, they noted that from April 2026 they were transitioning away from a proactive to reactive approach.
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(1) No person may carry on a regulated activity in the United Kingdom, or purport to do so, unless he is – (a) an authorised person; or (b) an exempt person.
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The CoA found that Mr Adams’ COBS arguments brought in his appeal differed from the arguments originally put forward in his particulars of claim at the original trial.
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Arrangements made under Article 25 are excluded if they are arrangements which do not or would not bring about the transaction to which the arrangements relate.