The UK’s subsidy control framework under the Subsidy Control Act 2022 (SCA22) has been in force since January 2023. Over three years on, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has published its first report on the operation of the regime (the Report). The Report, and the government’s response (the Response), describe a regime which is (essentially) working effectively.

Looking in the round, we consider there is also other important evidence of the regime not working as effectively as might be hoped for. Overly generous or poorly designed subsidies are a matter of genuine concern. If left unchecked, they have the potential to cause lasting damage to competition and waste public money. We examine the issues further below.

The context

Since the SCA22 replaced the EU state aid framework in the UK, public bodies have been able to issue subsidies without prior authorisation, with only a principles-based self-assessment required. As a recent Financial Times article highlighted, this has resulted in a sharp increase in subsidies awarded, the vast majority of which have been directed at energy projects, such as the Sizewell C nuclear power station and offshore wind farms. The article described the CMA’s "hands off" role and the relative lack of clear direction for public bodies providing support. As has been widely commented on, no SCA22 challenge against a public authority has succeeded to date.

The EU has also publicly expressed its concern, stating that "the EU considers that it is vital to enhance the effectiveness of the United Kingdom’s subsidy control system to ensure a level playing field in particular with the EU, given our close and important trading relationship".1 (emphasis added)

The Report and the Response

The Report makes three recommendations to the government: (1) improve and clarify the Statutory Guidance and provide a wider range of practical support tools; (2) introduce additional streamlined routes across a range of sectors and improve the operation of existing streamlined routes; and (3) improve the subsidy database, which is not "as effective as it could be" 2 in providing transparency over subsidies being awarded.

The government accepts all three recommendations in the Response. The Response, however, also notes there are "positive signs in terms of the regime deterring poor subsidy-giving and promoting competition and investment" 3 on the limited evidence available, and praises the regime’s flexibility.

We consider the CMA’s three recommendations in more detail below, and why the Report does not go far enough in highlighting the negative consequences arising from the deficiencies in the regime which it identifies.

Key issues

Regarding recommendations one and two: the effects of unclear statutory guidance and impractical streamlined routes on scheme design and consumer and market interests

The Report recognises the need for clearer statutory guidance and supportive tools for public bodies carrying out subsidy assessments. It notes "[p]ublic authorities were often unclear on expected levels of analysis required or whether external advice was proportionate".4 Even for the largest subsidies (which the CMA reviews because of their financial value) public bodies’ principles assessments frequently contain significant weaknesses. In Appendix E of the Report, the CMA states that:

"Analysis indicates that assessments tended to need most improvement with respect to the market characteristics element of Principle F, which was identified as needing improvement in 83% of SAU reports. This was closely followed by Principle B (proportionality), which was identified as needing improvement in 78% of reports." 5

Principle F concerns investment and competition impacts, making it a particularly important area, yet public bodies fail to meet the CMA’s expectations for the required level of analysis in more than four out of five cases. The CMA’s findings confirm public bodies need to do better. Weak competition analysis is likely to feed through to poor design choices, and poorly designed subsidies are not benign: they waste public money, distort competition and harm markets and consumers.

Alongside this, public bodies also face difficulties in using the streamlined routes available. Streamlined routes are schemes pre-assessed against the principles to ensure compliance for use by all UK public bodies. The CMA acknowledges in the Report that the existing routes are too narrow and prescriptive, which has resulted in a lack of confidence on the part of public bodies seeking to make use of them.

Regarding recommendation three: the consequences of an opaque subsidy database and few pre-action information requests for subsidy scrutiny

The limited number of subsidy challenges may be explained by the inconsistent, and often limited, quality of information on the subsidy database. Identifying when a subsidy decision has been made is not straightforward, as reflected in the CMA’s third recommendation, and this is an issue the government itself appears to recognise on the basis of the Response.

This matters for pre-action information requests (PAIR) under the SCA22. As we noted in Two Years of the Subsidy Control Act, such requests suspend the limitation period until the public authority has responded. They are therefore a valuable mechanism for potential challengers to obtain information and decide whether to bring proceedings.

Despite this, there is little evidence the tool is being widely used. Research we conducted in February 2025 found that the majority of government bodies we approached had received no PAIRs; other than PAIRs that later resulted in appeals to the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT), only two PAIRs were identified (made to the Department for Housing, Communities and Local Government, on the English Freeports Subsidy Scheme, and to Durham County Council).

We updated this research in June 2026. The results indicate a modest increase but limited overall usage: seven of the twenty-one government bodies approached reported receiving PAIRs, four within the previous eighteen months. Most of these related to matters already before the CAT (for example, those involving the Gambling Commission, the Welsh Government, Ofgem and Durham County Council).

Notably, DESNZ reported a request concerning the Contracts for Difference scheme. This is not surprising given energy is a key sector for support; however, no challenge was commenced in this case. This may be a good example of the PAIR operating as intended: the transparency provided enabled the potential applicant to be better informed about the public body’s assessment and satisfied that there was no need to commence a challenge. It is likely, however, the decision not to challenge will have been informed by the third issue we identify below.

The significant practical and legal hurdles for challenges under the regime

Even where a challenger identifies a subsidy and has concerns about its lawfulness, the practical difficulties of bringing a challenge should not be underestimated. The statutory time limit is short, often requiring substantial analysis and work on grounds of challenge before all relevant information is available.

The difficulties do not end once proceedings begin: the CAT’s case law is developing in a way that affords considerable deference to public bodies. These decisions reinforce that subsidy control challenges are judicial review proceedings, not merits appeals.

In Bristol Airport, the CAT observed that challenges "fail simply because they do not in substance illustrate any irrationality but rather illustrate a difference of opinion about the weight to be given to matters which were obviously the subject of consideration by the Respondent".6

In Gambling Commission, the CAT refused permission to rely on expert evidence, holding that the relevant question was what the Commission knew, or ought reasonably to have known, when it made its decision. The CAT’s assessment of the public body’s decision had to be based on the material before the decision-maker at the time.

Unlike in other areas of the CAT’s work, it is important to recall that a public body may not be an expert in economic or competition assessments. In circumstances where the CMA's own reporting indicates that the assessments by public bodies fall short more often than not, including on competition and market impact analysis, should there be more scope for the CAT to utilise its own specialist expertise?

Concluding thoughts

The overall picture is therefore more mixed than the Report and the Response suggest. The CMA continues to identify weaknesses in public authorities' analyses, while transparency gaps and procedural hurdles limit opportunities for scrutiny. The key question is whether the regime’s safeguards provide, in practice, sufficient checks and balances to ensure public money is spent effectively and competition is adequately protected. That question remains open.

Footnotes

  1. 1

    EU Statement at the 1st Trade Policy Review of the United Kingdom, 28 October 2025.

  2. 2

    CMA, 25 June 2026, Report on the effectiveness of the Subsidy Control Act 2022 and its impact on competition and investment in the UK.

  3. 3

    DBIST, 12 August 2026, Response to the CMA review of the effectiveness of the UK Subsidy Control Act and its impact on competition and investment in the UK.

  4. 4

    CMA, 25 June 2026, The effectiveness of the Subsidy Control Act 2022 and its impact on competition and investment in the UK First report under section 65 of the Subsidy Control Act 2022, page 50.

  5. 5

    CMA, 25 June 2026, The effectiveness of the Subsidy Control Act 2022 and its impact on competition and investment in the UK First report under section 65 of the Subsidy Control Act 2022, Appendix E: Analysis of SAU Reports.

  6. 6

    Bristol Airport v Welsh Ministers [2026] CAT 30, Para 198.

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