UPDATE: Both decisions under appeal

The English Commercial Court has decided that an arbitral award made by a tribunal in a case under the ICSID rules cannot be assigned, disagreeing with a decision earlier this year of the Federal Court of Australia, and taking some of the international arbitration community by surprise.

The decision means that (unless reversed on appeal), purportedly assigned ICSID awards cannot be enforced in the English Courts. This is a significant qualification to the package of rights held by an investor who has been granted damages in an ICSID award, some of whom consider selling their award as a quick way to turn it into some cash.

Both the English and Australian decisions are now subject to pending appeals.

Background

The case concerned an award made against Spain, in favour of a solar investor (“Operafund”), under the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). In 2019, the Tribunal decided that Spain should pay damages of € 29.3 million. Operafund applied to the English court, without giving notice to Spain, to register the award. The Commercial Court made the order registering the award in 2021, and Operafund sought to serve it on Spain, which took over a year. On 6 September 2023, Spain applied to set aside that order. On 31 January 2024, Operafund entered into an agreement with a well-known investor in arbitration awards (“Blasket”) to assign the award to Blasket.

Spain’s set-aside application is on hold pending the resolution of the appeal in ISL v Spain [2024] EWCA Civ 1257; in which the Court of Appeal decided that Spain was not immune from the jurisdiction of the English Courts, and which is subject to an appeal to the Supreme Court (judgment is expected in 2026 after the hearing took place in December 2025).

However, before the set-aside application is resolved, it was necessary to regularise the position because Operafund remained the claimant. Operafund therefore applied to substitute Blasket as the claimant, in Operafund’s place. In order to succeed in that application, it had to show that there had been a valid assignment to Blasket.

The issues

Two issues were taken:

  1. Spain argued that an ICSID award could not be assigned.
  2. Blasket argued that in the Australian Federal Court, it had already been decided that Operafund could assign the award, and that decision binds Spain due to an issue estoppel. Norton Rose Fulbright acted for Blasket in the Federal Court proceedings.

The issue estoppel

In the Australian Federal Court case, Stewart J was asked by Spain to find that there is no power under s 35(4) of the Australian International Arbitration Act to make an order that varies the terms, effect or beneficiaries of an ICSID arbitral award.

Stewart J considered the issue from both an Australian law perspective, and from an international law perspective, under the ICSID convention. He concluded that from both perspectives, the assigned award could be enforced and Norton Rose Fulbright’s client’s arguments succeeded.

From the international perspective, Stewart J considered that the rights in an ICSID award arose out of international law. Therefore, the question of whether they could be assigned should also be considered primarily as a question of international law. Under international law, he found no rule against assignment of an arbitral award. He also considered that permitting assignment would be consistent with the purpose of the ICSID convention which was the mitigation of sovereign risk and provision of legal security.

Stewart J held that the ICSID convention distinguished between the parties to the original arbitration and the parties who might bring a claim in a domestic court to enforce the award. The latter might include a party (in the sense of a person) to whom the rights under the arbitral award had been assigned.

Spain’s obligation (to the RREEF parties) under Art 53(1) to abide by and comply with the terms of the award had domestic legal effect. The RREEF parties were entitled to enforce that obligation in Australia under the domestic statutory law. There was no reason, the Australian court found, why such a statutory right could not be assigned.

So what was the effect of that decision on the English court’s approach? As established in the well-known case of Good Challenger1 and confirmed recently in the Yukos case,2 to create an issue estoppel in the English courts, the foreign judgment must be (1) entitled to recognition in accordance with the domestic rules on the recognition of foreign judgments, (2) made in an action with the same parties as those before the court, and (3) a judgment deciding the same issue(s) as in the domestic proceedings.

HHJ Pelling decided that the Australian judgment failed the first limb of the test, because (on the evidence before him) Spain had participated in the Australian proceedings only to contest the jurisdiction of the court, and therefore had not submitted to its jurisdiction. Therefore, the decision of the Australian court did not give rise to an issue estoppel.

The assignability argument

Having decided that he was not constrained by the Australian decision, HHJ Pelling decided that Operafund was not entitled to assign the award to Blasket, or at least Blasket could not enforce in England an award purportedly assigned. He therefore disagreed with the Australian Federal Court.

The ICSID convention does not expressly prohibit assignment of awards made pursuant to its provisions. However, in some parts the ICSID convention refers specifically to a “party to the dispute” and in others it refers simply to a “party”. Operafund argued that where the latter expression was used, this indicated that the parties involved might be broader than the original parties to the ICSID arbitration.

However, the Judge rejected Blasket’s argument and preferred Spain’s contention that “a party” in Article 54 was intended to refer to a party to the arbitration itself. The Judge was persuaded that the use of the expression ‘party’ to refer to the parties to the arbitration itself indicated that the further use of that expression in the context of enforcement should be taken still to refer to the parties to the original arbitration, and not to potential assignees.

The Judge found support for this view in Schreuer’s Commentary On The ICSID Convention, noting that the procedure for enforcement of an ICSID award is administrative and should involve simply examining the award to see whether the applicant is the party entitled to enforce it.

The Judge noted that even if he refused the application to substitute Blasket, Operafund could continue as Claimant and Blasket would be able to influence the litigation and benefit from any funds recovered under the terms of the assignment.

The Judge was not persuaded that there is a widespread, representative and consistent practice in international law confirming that ICSID awards cannot be assigned.3 Equally, court decisions from other jurisdictions indicating that assignment is permissible did not seem to be based upon a sufficiently strong base of authority to give rise to a principle that the Judge felt able to follow.

The Judge also accepted an argument that it is “implausible that the authors of the ICSID Convention could have intended that … whether an award was assignable would depend on which state the award was being enforced”. Therefore, the Judge thought, it was more likely that the ICSID convention was intended to achieve a result for all enforcement countries.

Therefore, “awards made in arbitrations convened in accordance with it are not capable of assignment and that there is no rule of customary international law that provides either that such awards are either assignable or not assignable.”

As a secondary point, the Judge considered whether the assignment could transfer the rights of Operafund as a party to litigation in England, with the benefit of the registration order made without notice. The Judge was not convinced that the registration order created any new substantive rights that could be assigned separately from the rights under the award itself. As he pointed out, the enforcement regime for ICSID awards is to confirm that the award itself has the same force and effect as a judgment of the Court. But it does not create a new right equal to a judgment, representing the rights in the award but separate from them. Registration therefore does not affect the substantive position as to whether the award can be assigned.

Discussion

Many readers of this judgment will be taken by surprise by the suggestion that the benefit of an ICSID award cannot be assigned.

Whilst there may well still be a role for the assignment of the monetary benefit of ICSID awards as part of the landscape of enforcement and monetisation, this decision confirms, for now, that the ICSID convention did not create a right to enforcement of awards which could be freely transferred.

In England, HHJ Pelling gave permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal. In January 2026, Spain also lodged an appeal against the Australian Federal Court decision. The decisions are both therefore subject to appeal and further developments can be expected in the coming months. Keep an eye on Norton Rose Fulbright’s channels and we will keep you informed.

Footnotes

  1. 1

    Good Challenger Navegante SA v Metalexportimport SA [2004] 1 Lloyds Rep 67

  2. 2

    Hulley Enterprises Ltd v Russian Federation [2025] EWCA Civ 108

  3. 3

    General Dynamics United Kingdom Ltd v State of Libya [2021] UKSC 22

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