Executive summary

  • On 29 January 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered a landmark judgment1 concerning disclosure in competition litigation proceedings in EU Member States.
  • Following the judgment, we can expect consumer associations and other potential claimants to seek early disclosure in order to assess the merits of bringing a competition damages claim.
  • However, a pre-existing infringement decision is not, on its own, sufficient to justify a disclosure order. Defendants may also require applicants to substantiate the alleged harm and causation.
  • While the EU Damages Directive establishes a ceiling on how plausible such harm and causation must be, Member States are permitted to impose wider national disclosure rules.
  • Applications “following on” from cartel infringement decisions are likely the most difficult to resist, but all “by object” restrictions will be relevant to the national court’s assessment.

Dispute before the national court

In February 2020, the European Commission (EC) adopted a decision finding that Spanish hotel group Meliá infringed EU antitrust rules by discriminating in the pricing offered to consumers based on their nationality or place of residence (Decision). Meliá cooperated with the investigation and obtained a 30% reduction in its fine.2 As is often the case in cooperation cases, the EC’s infringement decision contains limited detail, reducing the amount of publicly available information for prospective follow-on claimants.

An application for pre-action disclosure was filed by Associação Ius Omnibus, a Portuguese consumer rights organisation seeking access to certain documents in Meliá’s control relating to the infringement. Ius Omnibus argued that disclosure was necessary to determine and prove the scope, effects, and harm allegedly suffered by consumers as a result of Meliá’s anti-competitive conduct as found by the EC.

Ius Omnibus’s application was granted and upheld on appeal. On a final appeal, the Supreme Court of Portugal stayed the proceedings and referred three questions to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling: (i) whether the disclosure rules in the EU Damages Directive apply to pre-action applications for disclosure; (ii) whether the existence of an infringement decision alone constitutes sufficient grounds to grant a disclosure application; and (iii) what standard the national court should apply in deciding the application.

Pre-action disclosure

Article 5(1) of EU Damages Directive requires that national courts in EU Members States must be able to order disclosure of documents in proceedings relating to an action for damages brought by the claimant, or someone acting on the claimant’s behalf, for harm caused by an infringement of competition law.3 In Meliá, the CJEU held that an “action for damages” also encompasses applications made before the damages action is formally brought, provided such pre-action applications are available under national procedural law.

The CJEU concluded that the EU Damages Directive does not exclude pre-action disclosure. It relied in particular on recitals (22) and (27), which refer respectively to “the claimant’s intended action for damages” and the evidence claimants “need in order to prepare their actions for damages”.  The CJEU also reasoned that excluding pre-action disclosure applications would undermine effective private enforcement, including by failing to address the information asymmetry between injured parties and defendants.

Finally, the CJEU clarified that any pre action disclosure application falling within Article 5(1) of the EU Damages Directive is fully subject to the Directive’s general rules on disclosure. These rules, particularly Article 5(2) and (3), require national courts to conduct a strict balancing exercise to safeguard both the effectiveness of the right to damages and the protection against abusive requests. As the CJEU notes, applying these disclosure rules to pre action procedures helps prevent “fishing expeditions”, prohibiting vague or non specific searches for information unlikely to be relevant to the claim.4 These disclosure safeguards require applicants to identify specific documents or narrowly defined categories of documents and to demonstrate that they are relevant and necessary to the issues material to the decision and that, where documents are sought from a competition authority,5 they cannot reasonably be obtained by other means. Proportionality and confidentiality are protected through measures such as redactions, restricted access arrangements, and in camera review.6

Impact of infringement decision

The CJEU began by recalling that the EU Damages Directive requires national courts, when deciding a disclosure application, to assess whether the applicant has put forward a sufficiently substantiated basis for all three elements of  a complete cause of action in competition damages claims: (i) infringement, (ii) harm, and (iii) a direct causal link between that harm, and the infringement. Although Ius Omnibus relied on the Decision for the infringement limb, the Decision alone was not sufficient to satisfy all three parts of this test.

The CJEU explained that, while it is established EU law that national courts are precluded7 from adopting decisions that contradict an EC infringement decision, including as regards the nature of the infringement and its material, personal, temporal, and territorial scope, it nonetheless remains for the national court to determine whether the applicant has adequately justified the alleged harm and the direct causal link between the harm and the infringement for the purposes of the disclosure request.

In respect of cartel decisions, applicants benefit from a rebuttable presumption of harm under the EU Damages Directive. However, the vertical infringements at issue in the Decision fall outside this presumption. Even so, the CJEU held that a finding of a vertical infringement, particularly one constituting an EEA-wide restriction of competition “by object”, is an indication that the infringement was susceptible to have adversely affected consumers.

Standard for deciding disclosure applications

A central issue before the CJEU was the standard that national courts must apply when deciding whether to grant or reject applications for disclosure. This was the most general, and arguably most important, issue before the CJEU, as it affects disclosure applications irrespective of whether the alleged anticompetitive conduct is horizontal or vertical, or whether the restriction is “by object” or “by effect”. The CJEU’s analysis focused on the “plausibility” of the damages claim as required by Article 5(1) of the EU Damages Directive.

Observing that the EU Damages Directive does not define “plausibility”, the CJEU observed that the term does not imply a particularly high degree of probability. The CJEU then considered the function and purpose of the plausibility assessment. It emphasised that this assessment does not concern the merits of the damages claim itself, but rather the prior production of documents necessary to enable such a claim. For that reason, the applicable standard, the CJEU concluded, must be lower in order to ensure the effectiveness of bringing an action. Although not addressed in the CJEU’s judgment itself, this is in line with recent case law in Germany, where the Federal Court of Justice formulated a similar standard for deciding disclosure applications.8 Italian law also mandates reasoned requests showing claim plausibility via reasonably available facts, subject to proportionality and specificity, which must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.9

The CJEU reasoned that, as the EU Damages Directive requires disclosure applications to be substantiated by “reasonably available evidence”10, the standard is not intended to be excessively burdensome. Instead, the applicant can meet it by satisfying the national court that, on the basis of the information reasonably available to him or her, it was “reasonably acceptable” to assume that the three-part test (infringement, harm and causation) is met. This interpretation, the CJEU held, is consistent with the EU Damages Directive’s purpose of ensuring effective private enforcement, including by redressing information asymmetry.11

Analysis

The CJEU’s judgment in Meliá marks an important development in the EU competition litigation regime, driven by the CJEU’s continued pursuit of enhancing the regime’s effectiveness.12 The CJEU reaffirmed that effective private enforcement depends on meaningful disclosure, which serves to redress the information asymmetry between claimants and defendants, including, where national procedural law permits, before a claimant has formally brought an action for damages. At the same time, the CJEU underlined that pre‑action disclosure is subject to strict limits, as national courts must prevent abusive or non‑specific “fishing expeditions” by rigorously applying the Directive’s disclosure safeguards. The CJEU’s clarification of the scope and limits of relying on infringement decisions to support disclosure applications is also welcome.

However, the judgment appears to leave several questions open. One such question is how early a disclosure application may be made, i.e., can a claimant bring a disclosure application before a final decision by the EC finding an infringement? Given that Meliá did not concern such a stand-alone action, the CJEU did not explicitly reaffirm or expand upon its judgment in RegioJet. However, in RegioJet, the CJEU clarified that a national court may grant disclosure applications even where related damage proceedings have been stayed pending an EC investigation by the EC into the same conduct, provided a strict proportionality test is met.13 This is because an order requiring disclosure does not fall within the scope of Article 16(1) of Regulation 1/2003. Instead, it must be assessed in light of the principle of sincere cooperation under Article 4(3) of the Treaty of the European Union and the objective of ensuring effective and uniform application of EU competition law.

A second question concerns the implications of the “reasonable acceptability” standard for plausibility. If a claimant can satisfy this standard by relying on reasonably available evidence, to what extent might claimants seek disclosure on the basis of EC decisions adopted after proceedings were initiated but which close through commitments? Such decisions may only be adopted once the EC has expressed concerns in its preliminary assessment regarding a potential infringement,14 which might invite creative reliance on them by claimants when seeking disclosure. In his Opinion in RegioJet, Szpunar AG considered that the existence of a commitments decision in relation to the same conduct as alleged in an action for damages would not prevent a national court from making an order for disclosure.  That issue was not addressed, however, by the CJEU’s judgment in that case or subsequently in Meliá.

Third, does pre action disclosure carry a heightened risk of “fishing expeditions” when compared with requests made once proceedings are underway? And, if so, does this warrant a stricter interpretation of the “reasonable acceptability” plausibility standard and a more rigorous application of the disclosure safeguards to prevent abusive requests? As the CJEU has previously emphasised, national courts must carry out a rigorous examination of the disclosure applications before them in actions for damages, in connection with the balance of interests established by the EU Damages Directive.

Finally, to what extent does the “reasonable acceptability” plausibility standard apply to other instruments provided under national legal systems for obtaining evidence before proceedings are initiated? In the Italian legal system, for example, a similar plausibility assessment governs applications for preventive technical consultancy (consulenza tecnica preventiva), which allows a party to request a court appointed expert to obtain preliminary technical findings with a view to facilitating the settlement of the dispute.16 The use of preventive technical consultancy in antitrust damages cases has, to date, been highly controversial. Although some courts initially accepted its use in private antitrust litigation, more recent decisions have dismissed such requests on the ground that the procedure is available only where the compensation claim does not require the resolution of complex legal issues or factual assessments falling outside the scope of a technical investigation. According to these courts, such conditions are generally not met in antitrust follow on claims, which typically involve extensive and intricate analysis of liability, causation and the quantification of harm. Against this background, it remains uncertain whether the CJEU’s “reasonable acceptability” plausibility standard for pre action disclosure applications could also be applied to preventive technical consultancy requests. The application of the “reasonable acceptability” plausibility standard can be expected to remain a fertile ground for disputes between parties, given the variety of distinct procedures among the EU’s national legal systems.

The CJEU’s judgment in Meliá forms part of an expanding body of CJEU case law on competition damages actions. Other recent cases have addressed jurisdiction in actions for damages brought against parent companies of infringing subsidiaries (here), as well as limitation periods for actions following decisions of national competition authorities (here). In parallel, national frameworks for litigating competition damages continue to evolve rapidly across EU Member States (here).

The co-authors are grateful to Carlotta Pellizzoni and Ludovica Cesari (associates) and Luca Luci (trainee) for their assistance in preparing this article.

Footnotes

  1. 1

    Judgment delivered on 29 January 2026, Meliá Hotels International, S.A. v Associação Ius Omnibus, Case C-286/24, ECLIC:2026:49 (Meliá) (link here).

  2. 2

    Meliá (Holiday Pricing) (Case COMP/AT.40528), decision of 21 February 2020 (link here and here).

  3. 3

    Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union (OJ L 349, 5.12.2014) (EU Damages Directive) (link here), Article 5(1) and Article 2(4)-(5).

  4. 4

    Meliá, paragraphs 46 and 47.

  5. 5

    EU Damages Directive, recital (29).

  6. 6

    EU Damages Directive, recital (18).

  7. 7

    Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (OJ L-001, 04.01.2003) (Regulation 1/2003) (link here), Article 16(1).

  8. 8

    Federal Court of Justice (Germany), Judgment delivered on 4 April 2023, Vertriebskooperation im SPNV, Case KZR 20/21, ECLIBGH:2023:170723BKZR20.21.0 (link here).

  9. 9

    Articles 3 and 4 of Legislative Decree No. 3/2017, implementing the EU Damages Directive; Article 210 of the Italian Code of Civil Procedure.

  10. 10

    EU Damages Directive, recital (16).

  11. 11

    Meliá, paragraph 83-87, citing recitals (14)-(16).

  12. 12

    Meliá, paragraph 40.

  13. 13

    Judgment delivered on 12 January 2023, RegioJet a.s. v České dráhy a.s.,, Case C-57/21, ECLIC:2023:6 (RegjoJet) (link here).

  14. 14

    Regulation 1/2003, Article 9(1).

  15. 15

    Opinion of Szpunar AG delivered on 5 May 2022, RegioJet a.s. v České dráhy a.s.,, Case C-57/21, ECLIC:2022:363 (link here), point 57.

  16. 16

    Article 696 bis of the Italian Code of Civil Procedure.

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