In Veranova Bidco LP v Johnson Matthey PLC & Ors (Rev2) [2026] EWHC 1021 (Comm), the Commercial Court considered a claim for fraudulent breach of warranty arising from the sale of a pharmaceutical business. While the buyer/claimant established breach of warranty, it did not clear the high bar of proving fraud.
The decision underlines the high threshold required to prove fraudulent breach of warranty. It also illustrates that where it is necessary to attribute the state of mind of executives to a corporate entity, a court will not combine the innocent states of mind of different executives within the company to produce a finding of dishonesty; for example, combining one person's knowledge of the facts with another person's knowledge of the warranty terms. A buyer must establish fraudulent knowledge in at least one specific individual whose state of mind is attributable to the company.
Background
In late 2021, the seller/defendant sold its pharmaceutical manufacturing business to a buyer for around £325 million. The SPA contained standard M&A warranties about the state of the target business. Due to the deal being backed by warranty and indemnity insurance, under the SPA the buyer waived all warranty claims except those arising from fraud or wilful misconduct. Notwithstanding these exclusions, the buyer brought direct breach of warranty claims against the seller, arguing that the breaches were fraudulent. This meant that the question of fraud became, as the judge put it, the "major battleground".
The core issue concerned a key customer contract for the supply of a pharmaceutical ingredient. Around two months before signing, the target business entered into renegotiations with the business's largest customer to meet a price match commitment offer by a competitor, at roughly half the existing price under the customer contract. The existence of the renegotiations was disclosed, but the buyer argued that the competing offer and the impact on the customer contract was not disclosed before the deal closed. The buyer alleged that this amounted to a breach of two warranties: an ordinary course warranty and a key contracts warranty. It alleged that four senior executives at the seller had a fraudulent state of mind, i.e. knew the warranties were untrue.
Decision
The Court first considered whether the warranties relied on by the buyer were breached. The Judge rejected the claim that the ordinary course warranty was breached - price negotiations triggered by an existing contractual mechanism were a normal part of running the business, not a material change. However, the Judge found the key contracts warranty was false, and the information disclosed by the seller did not satisfy the requirement of fair disclosure under the SPA. High level references to "increased competition" and "pricing discussions" in the disclosure letter did not amount to fair disclosure of a specific competing offer at half the prevailing price.
Establishing breach of warranty was not, however, sufficient because the SPA excluded all claims other than fraud.
It was common ground that the states of mind of the four senior executives were attributable to the seller/defendant applying the ordinary principles of corporate attribution. However, the buyer/claimant also tried to argue that the knowledge of each individual executive could be aggregated for this purpose. The Judge noted authorities establishing that, a court cannot add together the innocent states of mind of different people within a company to produce a finding of dishonesty; for example, combining one person's knowledge of the facts with another person's knowledge of the warranty terms. The Judge concluded that the buyer needed to establish fraudulent knowledge in at least one specific individual whose state of mind is attributable to the company.
The Judge held that the threshold to establish fraudulent knowledge required: (1) knowledge of the facts that made the warranty (as qualified by disclosure) false; (2) sufficient knowledge of the terms of the warranty to reasonably appreciate that their knowledge was relevant to that warranty; and (3) knowledge that the warranty was false (or was reckless as to this).
As to recklessness specifically, the Judge considered this is a frequently misunderstood concept and often confused with negligence. Recklessness means simply not caring at all whether something is true or false. As the Judge noted “[t]his is a high hurdle since it is inherently unlikely that the senior executives of a company would be reckless in this sense.”
The Judge examined the knowledge of each of the four executives and found that none of them had fraudulent knowledge. Accordingly, the buyer/claimant’s claim failed. Some executives knew about the competing offer but did not have sufficient knowledge of the specific warranty terms to appreciate its relevance; others knew the warranties existed but were never told about the competing offer.
The Judge also noted that none had any motive to act dishonestly; the fraud alleged would inevitably have come to light as soon as the buyer took over the business. The Judge described the fraud allegations as "implausible, improbable and wholly unsupported by the evidence", agreeing that the claimant had "donned its fraud detection goggles, turned the sensitivity up to High and attributed a dishonest motive to every interesting feature in the landscape."
Other issues of interest
The case also raised some important points about the practice of pursing civil fraud claims.
First, the buyer did not call a key witness who remained in the business post-Completion and was contractually obliged to give evidence if requested. The buyer did not provide an explanation. The Court concluded it was appropriate to draw an adverse inference that the uncalled witness’ evidence would not have supported the buyer’s allegations.
Second, the seller argued that the buyer should not have cross-examined witnesses on unpleaded allegations of dishonesty in relation to the conduct of the transaction. The Court held that, to the extent such cross-examination was intended to form the basis for an inference of dishonesty, it was impermissible and unfair. Allegations of dishonesty must be specifically pleaded, and parties should not use cross-examination to allege unpleaded allegations of dishonesty.
Key takeaways
The threshold for fraudulent breach of warranty is high
Establishing fraudulent breach of warranty is a high threshold. Even where disclosure failures have occurred, this should not be assumed to amount to fraud. As the Judge noted, failure to disclose a matter against the warranties usually amounts to no more than negligence, not fraud or recklessness. To establish fraud, it must be proven that at least one person (whose knowledge falls to be attributed to the seller) knew the facts that made the warranty false, had sufficient awareness of the warranty terms, and consciously knew (or was reckless as to whether) that the warranty was false.
Knowledge cannot simply be stitched together
In large organisations with several layers of management and multiple business units, knowledge is inevitably spread across many people. In the context of attribution of knowledge to a corporate entity in civil fraud claims, English law does not allow a court to combine the innocent states of mind of different employees to aggregate their knowledge. This makes it difficult for a buyer to succeed in a complex fraud claim where no single individual has the full picture (as is common).
How you run a civil fraud claim matters
As set out above, parties pursuing fraud claims should carefully consider how to present their case to avoid the risk of undermining the high degree of certainty and credibility that is required for a court to make findings of fraud.
With thanks to Violet Rab for her assistance in preparing this post.
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