We have collated a brief round-up of important recent cases, procedural developments and hot topics for businesses to help in-house counsel stay up to date, particularly those who are involved in managing disputes. You can access more detailed briefings using the links. Please contact us if you would like further information on a topic.
Part 1 – Contract and tort law
Part 2 – Procedural updates (privilege and disclosure, limitation, AI guidance for experts)
Part 3 – Hot topics for businesses (Generative AI and legal privilege)
1. Contract law
Our pick of the recent cases for commercial lawyers:
Credit Suisse Life (Bermuda) Ltd v Ivanishvili & Ors [2025] UKPC 53
The Privy Council made a significant change to the tort of deceit under English law: it held that in cases of implied representations, claimants do not need to be consciously aware of the implied representation.
The case concerned an investment fund. The claimant’s relationship manager had dishonestly misappropriated the claimant’s funds. The Bermudan Court of Appeal held that the fraudulent misrepresentation claim could not succeed because the claimant had failed to prove that he was consciously aware of implied representations that Credit Suisse was not managing the accounts fraudulently. The Privy Council disagreed and held that conscious awareness of a representation is not necessary to found a claim in deceit under English law. The Board emphasised that reliance by a claimant involves two elements: (i) the representation must cause the claimant to hold a false belief; and (ii) the claimant must act on that belief to their detriment. However, although both elements of reliance require the representation to operate on the mind of the claimant, neither element requires the claimant to be consciously aware of the representation at the time they acted on it. Conduct that induces a false belief can give rise to liability even where the claimant did not explicitly consider the representation.
This decision may lead to an increase in deceit claims brought against banks and financial services providers, where claims stem from advice being provided rather than express statements. There may be a resurgence in the types of claims which have previously been defeated on awareness grounds (e.g. benchmark manipulation claims and mis-selling). Similarly, the decision may strengthen the position of passive investor claimants in securities litigation under s.90A and Schedule 10A FSMA 2000 who have struggled to satisfy the reliance requirement for such claims. More generally, it may open the courts to accept arguments based on an implied representation of honesty in a commercial contract. See further details: Rethinking reliance in deceit claims | Inside Disputes
Afan Valley Ltd & Ors v Lupton Fawcett LLP [2026] EWCA Civ 2
This decision reinforces the principle that a professional is not liable for all the losses which a claimant sustains as a result of acting on their negligent advice, but only for those within the scope of their duty of care. Liability is limited to losses sufficiently connected with the advice provided and does not extend to wider issues such as commercial risks or the viability of a transaction if the professional was not instructed to advise on such matters. The Court of Appeal applied the “sufficient nexus” test set out in Manchester Building Society v Grant Thornton [2021] UKSC 20 through the use of a counterfactual, namely whether the loss would have been suffered if the advice had been correct. On the facts, the Court of Appeal unanimously held that a solicitor’s negligent advice did not cause the claimant’s loss. See further details: Court of Appeal: Professional negligence and the scope of duty test | Inside Disputes
Investec Bank Plc v Protopapa & Anor [2025] EWHC 3202 (Comm)
This decision raised an interesting point relevant to the drafting of jurisdiction clauses in commercial agreements. A facility agreement provided for jurisdiction in favour of the English courts. When a dispute arose, the defendants argued that the English courts were not the most appropriate forum to resolve it. The English courts refused to exercise their discretion to decline jurisdiction. Interestingly, the judge also found that wording in the jurisdiction agreement which stated that the parties agreed that the courts of England were the most appropriate and convenient courts to settle any disputes created a contractual estoppel which prevented the defendants from even arguing that England was not the appropriate forum. Although this is a first-instance decision and will not be binding on other courts, commercial parties should consider including similar wording in their jurisdiction agreements to provide another basis on which they can enforce their choice of court. See further details: Contractual estoppel provides ground to uphold English jurisdiction clause | Inside Disputes
WH Holding Ltd v London Stadium LLP (Formerly E20 Stadium LLP) [2026] EWCA Civ 153
This is an important decision about the approach and limits to challenges to expert determinations. A dispute arose regarding the calculation under an overage provision in a concession agreement. The expert determination clause in the contract provided that a decision by the expert was final and binding “in the absence of manifest error” (which is common wording in expert determination clauses). The High Court held that the expert determination was affected by manifest error and therefore was not valid and binding, but this was overturned on appeal.
The Court of Appeal held that: “absent contractual terms which provide differently when interpreted in context, an error will be manifest if, after investigation limited in time and extent, it is so obvious (and obviously capable of affecting the determination) as to admit of no difference of opinion.” It is not wrong for a judge to consider whether the expert made an error before assessing whether the error was manifest, as the test itself invites a two-stage approach. A “limited investigation” did not mean that the usual process of adversarial argument could not be followed. Further, the misapplication of formulae and contractual mechanics does not change the threshold for manifest error. When reviewing the decision of the expert the Court of Appeal held that the approach the expert had taken was “not so obviously wrong as to admit of no difference of opinion” and therefore the determination which was produced was not manifestly in error. Parties should carefully consider whether a complex provision should be subject to expert determination at all given the more limited opportunity for submissions compared to litigation/arbitration and the high threshold to challenge for manifest error.
2. Procedural updates
Case law – privilege
Aabar Holdings SARL & Ors v Glencore PLC & Ors [2026] EWHC 877 (Comm)
This recent decision of the High Court potentially expands the scope of legal advice privilege. Picken J held that any “intra-client” documents – that is, documents sent between members of the ‘client group’ at the client or created by members of that group – may benefit from legal advice privilege if created for the dominant purpose of seeking legal advice. The ‘client group’ here means the small group of individuals at the client authorised to provide instructions to and receive advice from the lawyer, as set out in the leading case of Three Rivers (No. 5) [2003] QB 1556. Previously, the consensus was that intra-client documents were only privileged if they disclosed the substance of a communication between lawyer and client that was itself privileged. However, Picken J considered that earlier cases, including Three Rivers, which held that legal advice privilege applies only to lawyer/client communications were only concerned with non-client documents and not intra-client documents: they were not an exhaustive statement as to the scope of legal advice privilege. As a first instance decision, it will not be binding on other courts, and the point is yet to be considered by a higher court. Therefore, while it helpfully expands the scope of legal advice privilege, clients should for now still exercise caution when creating intra-client documents, particularly relating to sensitive issues. See further details: Legal advice privilege extends to intra-client communications | Inside Disputes
Case law – disclosure
There have been two recent decisions which illustrate how a party to litigation in the English courts can be required to search for and disclose documents held by a third party if such documents can be shown to be in the litigant’s practical control. The test for control extends beyond documents in a party’s physical possession to documents a party has a right to possess, copy or inspect. The right to possession does not need to be a legal right; these decisions adds to the line of case law which establishes that it is enough to show that there is an existing arrangement or understanding that a third party will comply with the requests of the disclosing party to provide documents, i.e. there is practical control.
In the first decision, Baroness Lawrence of Clarendon OBE & Ors v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2025] EWHC 2930 (KB), the High Court decided that documents held by the claimants’ research team were within the claimants’ practical control for the purposes of disclosure, and this included material created before the research team’s formal engagement by the claimants. See further details: High Court clarifies the scope of "control" for disclosure | Inside Disputes
In the second case, IPJSC United Company Rusal v Whiteleave Holdings Ltd & Ors [2026] EWHC 154 (Comm), the party, a CEO of a group of Russian companies, was ordered to search for relevant documents held by the parent company and 11 subsidiary companies. The decision demonstrates how practical control over documents can extend across corporate structures. Parties to disputes should be mindful of this issue as they start to gather documents from various sources to investigate or defend a claim. They should consider if they are establishing an arrangement that could amount to practical control over documents held by a third party for disclosure purposes, which later could require them to carry out wider searches for relevant documents. See further details: High Court finds practical control over documents held by foreign subsidiary | Inside Disputes
Case law – substitution of defendant after expiry of limitation
Adcamp LLP v Office Properties PL Ltd & Ors [2026] EWCA Civ 50
The Court of Appeal refused to allow the claimants to amend their claims to substitute a defendant after the expiry of the limitation period. The Court held that the correct interpretation of the relevant rule allowing the addition or substitution of parties after the expiry of limitation (in CPR 19.6(3)(b)) means that it only applies where the original claim and the new claim are the same in substance. As the claimants were seeking to change the identity of the person they were claiming against, the new claim was not the same in substance. The effect of this decision is that once a limitation period has expired, it is not possible to substitute a defendant where the wrong defendant was sued by mistake, unless that mistake is only as to their name, rather than their identity. Claimants with claims nearing the end of their limitation period should take particular care to ensure they start proceedings against the correct defendant.
Procedural rules
New guidance for expert witnesses on the use of AI
The Academy of Experts has recently published guidance on the use of AI to assist expert witnesses who have been instructed to provide independent expert evidence in legal proceedings: Guidance for Expert Witnesses on the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) (the Guidance). The Guidance considers how experts may use AI in their work and the risks of using it, and suggests safeguards and practical steps experts should take. In England and Wales and other jurisdictions, experts owe important duties to a court or tribunal to provide opinions that are independent and unbiased and that only relate to matters which lie within their expertise; therefore, the risks associated with the use of AI technology are particularly pertinent. The Guidance will also be of assistance to lawyers and clients who instruct an expert by identifying the issues they should keep in mind and questions they may wish to ask their expert about the expert’s use of AI tools. This adds to other guidance published by the Courts and Tribunals Judiciary and The Law Society. See further details: What should expert witnesses consider when using AI? | Inside Disputes
3. Hot topics for businesses
Generative artificial intelligence (Gen AI) and legal privilege
As businesses continue to introduce Gen AI technology, an important issue that is starting to be considered by the courts is how the use of AI tools can impact on legal privilege over documents. In a recent decision, the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) gave a clear warning regarding the impact of loading confidential and/or legally privileged documents and information to open-source AI tools: UK v Secretary of State for the Home Department (AI hallucinations; supervision; Hamid) [2026] UKUT 00081 (IAC). This is something businesses should be aware of if, for example, employees are tempted to use similar tools to summarise detailed legal advice they have received. The Tribunal stated that putting confidential and legally privileged documents into an open-source AI tool, such as ChatGPT, is to place information on the internet in the public domain and so breaches confidentiality and waives legal privilege. The Tribunal drew a clear distinction with closed source tools such as Microsoft Copilot which do not place information in the public domain and so can be used to summarise information without this risk. See further details: Court guidance that use of open-source AI waives confidentiality and legal professional privilege | Inside Disputes
The decision of the Upper Tribunal does not bind other courts and tribunals, although it is likely to be at least persuasive. How the existing rules on privilege will be applied or adapted to new technology is a developing area and we are likely to see further, more detailed judgments on these points and more nuanced arguments depending on the AI tool and its terms of use. For now, businesses should adopt a cautious approach. Confidential and/or privileged information should not be uploaded to open AI tools. Where AI tools are used for legal tasks, businesses should use enterprise-grade, closed AI systems with appropriate contractual and technical safeguards that prevent disclosure of information or the use of input data for training purposes. Although not discussed by the Tribunal, even when using closed AI tools, businesses should take care with legally privileged materials and be mindful of the existing principles of legal privilege. Legally privileged materials may include prompts and AI output as well as more traditional types of documents, and they should all be stored securely and access restricted to those who need it to ensure they remain confidential and therefore privileged. Businesses should consider their AI usage policies and governance frameworks to ensure the adequacy of staff training on privilege and confidentiality in the context of AI tools. For a more detailed discussion of the risks to legal privilege from the use of AI tools see our earlier article: Legal professional privilege in the generative AI era | Inside Disputes
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