On 27 April 2026, China’s office for foreign investment security review under the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) announced that it had issued a decision prohibiting the acquisition of an autonomous artificial intelligence agent startup (AI Startup) by a foreign investor and required the parties to unwind the transaction (the Prohibition Order). This followed an earlier statement by China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) in January 2026 that it would investigate the AI Startup Acquisition (defined below), including whether there were any violations of PRC laws and regulations in the transaction and the Reorganization (defined below). The Prohibition Order marks the first foreign acquisition in the AI sector to be publicly halted since the implementation of China’s Measures for the Security Review of Foreign Investments (《外商投资安全审查办法》, the Security Review Measures) in January 2021.

The AI Startup was founded by a group of Chinese engineers and unveiled its AI agent product in March 2025. In December 2025, the company was acquired by a prominent US-based technology company (the AI Startup Acquisition). This transaction attracted extensive market discussion regarding how AI companies and hard tech startups in China (particularly those targeting global markets) should structure their shareholding, financing and potential exit arrangements where foreign investors are involved.

This briefing aims to: (i) provide an overview of the AI Startup Acquisition and its key legal implications; (ii) outline the principal regulatory and legal issues affecting foreign investors’ investments in China’s hard tech startups; and (iii) offer a snapshot of recent developments in China’s hard tech sector1 and related equity financing activity.

According to public information:

  1. The AI Startup, with substantial business operations in China, initially established a red-chip structure under which the financing vehicle was incorporated in the Cayman Islands (Cayman Holdco). The China operating subsidiaries were held by the Cayman Holdco through a wholly owned Hong Kong subsidiary.
  2. In June 2025, the AI Startup underwent a strategic reorganisation (Reorganisation). The Cayman Holdco established a wholly owned Singapore-based entity intended to serve as the group’s headquarters and assume its substantive business operations, including holding the group’s technologies, intellectual property and user data.
  3. As part of the Reorganisation, the group’s China-based assets and business (including employees and technologies) were either transferred to the new Singapore entity or terminated, such that its China operations would no longer constitute a core part of the group’s business.
  4. Through the Reorganisation, the AI Startup sought to present itself as a non-China-based company, thereby reducing the risk of regulatory review by US authorities and facilitating investment by US investors.

Before the Prohibition Order was issued, the market had expected the AI Startup Acquisition to set a new precedent enabling foreign (especially US) investors to invest in Chinese-founded AI or hard tech startups without triggering stringent regulatory requirements. However, the Prohibition Order sends a clear message to the market that, in future, the following legal issues must be considered from a PRC law perspective before any similar Chinese-founded AI or hard tech startup receives foreign investment:

  1. National security review for foreign investments: The Prohibition Order was issued on national security grounds. China’s national security review regime for foreign investments forms part of the broader foreign investment framework established under the Foreign Investment Law, which came into effect on 1 January 2020 (see further information below).

Under the Security Review Measures, “foreign investments” include, amongst other things, a foreign investor obtaining equity interests in or assets of a domestic Chinese enterprise through acquisition or other means. In the absence of a clear definition of what constitutes “obtaining” equity interests or assets, the general understanding is that any direct or indirect acquisition may qualify as a “foreign investment”. Accordingly, as long as the AI Startup maintained any operations or assets in China (however minimal), the AI Startup Acquisition could still be subject to national security review (provided the conditions described below were satisfied), even though the US investor was acquiring shares indirectly at the Cayman Holdco level rather than directly through a PRC-incorporated entity.

The Security Review Measures grant Chinese authorities broad power to review foreign investments in companies or assets with a China element where the prescribed conditions are met. If: (i) a contemplated investment would result in the foreign investor acquiring actual control over the target; and (ii) the target is engaged in business considered strategically sensitive to national security (such as information technology and internet products and services, which typically form part of the hard tech sector, particularly where important strategic technologies have been developed originally in China), the transaction parties are advised to assess the necessity of submitting a national security review application as early as possible to avoid delays.

  1. Technology import/export: China applies a general technology import/export control regime under its foreign trade legal framework. Technologies subject to import/export are divided into three categories: (i) Prohibited: technologies that must not be imported or exported; (ii) Restricted: technologies subject to a two-stage licensing process, comprising (a) obtaining a Letter of Intent prior to entering into a definitive contract, and (b) applying for an official import/export licence after contract execution; and (iii) Free: technologies subject only to a post-signing contract registration procedure. In addition to direct transfers of patent or patent application rights, technology import/export also includes technology transfer through licensing, the provision of technology services, and a transfer in any other form. A “deemed transfer”, where a foreign entity can access or control domestic PRC technology (even without physical movement of that technology), may still constitute a technology export (and vice versa) and is therefore subject to this regime. The recently promulgated New ODI Regulations (defined below) also explicitly prohibit indirect leaks of prohibited or restricted technology through overseas staff assignments, technical guidance or training programmes.

Certain AI-related technologies (e.g., information processing technology) fall within the restricted category as “data analysis-based personalised information push service technology”, which includes user personalised preference learning technology based on continuous training and optimisation using large-scale data. It is unclear whether the technology developed by the AI Startup would fall within the restricted category. However, under China’s Export Control Law (a separate regime governing “controlled items” such as dual-use items), if an exporter knows or should know that the technology to be exported could damage China’s national security or interests, it must apply for an export licence from the relevant authority before proceeding.

  1. Cross-border data transmission: Cross-border data transmission encompasses not only the physical transfer of data from mainland China to a foreign jurisdiction, but also scenarios where a foreign person or entity can access data stored on servers within mainland China through remote access or other means. If the data involves personal information or important data, cross-border transmission or access is subject to regulatory requirements, and the transferring and receiving parties must enter into a written contract before the data is transmitted abroad.

Apart from the national security review regulations, it remains unclear whether the AI Startup or its founders violated other applicable regulations (i.e., technology import/export and cross-border data transmission requirements) as the Prohibition Order did not explicitly address those matters. While the three topics above should be the primary concerns for foreign investors considering equity investments in China’s hard tech sector (including AI), the additional issues outlined in the next section should not be overlooked (particularly in respect of China’s new outbound investment regulations). A comprehensive regulatory risk assessment covering all these areas is therefore essential.

In addition to the PRC legal issues identified in the Prohibition Order, foreign investors should also consider the following regulatory matters when investing in China’s hard tech startups:

  1. China’s new outbound investment regulations: On 1 June 2026, China’s State Council released the Regulations on Outbound Investment (国务院关于对外投资的规定, New ODI Regulations), effective 1 July 2026. The New ODI Regulations materially expand China’s existing outbound investment (ODI) regulatory regime. Rather than the previous fragmented framework overseen by various authorities, the New ODI Regulations establish a comprehensive state-level ODI regulatory framework consolidating regimes governing ODI approvals and filings, cross-border technology transfer and licensing, import/export control, cross-border data transfer compliance, a new national security review for ODI, and enhanced penalties for ODI non-compliance. Please refer to our recent publication on the New ODI Regulations for further details (https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en-cn/knowledge/publications/cb8c6a41/chinas-first-state-councillevel-regulation-on-outbound-investment).

    In the context of this briefing, key changes introduced by the New ODI Regulations include:

    1. New definition of ODI investors and ODI: ODI “investors” are now expressly defined to include PRC resident individuals (in addition to PRC domestic enterprises and other organisations). ODI is broadly defined to cover activities by which such “investors” directly or indirectly acquire ownership, control, management rights, or other interests in overseas enterprises or assets, whether through investing assets or equity, providing financing or guarantees, or other means. This new definition explicitly grants Chinese regulators the power to oversee offshore investment and structuring activities by Chinese individual founders (including transactions such as the Reorganisation described above), fundamentally changing the regulatory landscape for PRC entrepreneurs in the hard tech sector. Detailed implementing rules governing PRC individuals’ ODI activities are expected to be released by the authorities.
    2. Disposal of overseas assets and new ODI national security review regime: Article 15 of the New ODI Regulations establishes a new national security review regime for ODIs. As a counterpart to the existing security review regime for inbound foreign investment, this regime applies not only to ODIs but also to the transfer or disposal of overseas assets or interests, to the extent such transactions may affect national security. Implementing rules have not yet been issued, and the details remain to be clarified.
    3. Enhanced administrative penalties for ODI non-compliance: For general non-compliance with ODI requirements, administrative penalties include confiscation of illegal gains, orders to cease investment activities and dispose of shares and assets, and fines of up to 1% of the investment value. Directly responsible personnel (e.g., general managers or directors) may also be subject to fines of up to RMB 100,000. For national security review non-compliance, the same penalties apply and non-compliant investors may additionally be subject to bans on all outbound investment activities for one to three years.
  2. China’s overall foreign investment regime: China adopts a negative list approach for foreign direct investment across different sectors. The current version is the 2024 Negative List, released in September 2024. Although the 2024 Negative List removed all market access restrictions on foreign investment in the manufacturing sector (which covers a significant portion of the hard tech sector), certain information technology and internet service businesses remain subject to foreign investment prohibitions or restrictions. These restrictions remain a key consideration where the target engages in such businesses. For example, foreign shareholding in a company providing value-added telecommunications services generally must not exceed 50%, and foreign investment in certain internet-related businesses (such as online publication services, online audio-visual programme services, and online cultural operations, excluding music) is prohibited.

  3. Merger control filing regime: China has established a comprehensive merger control regime comprising the Anti-Monopoly Law and various implementing rules, measures, and guidelines. The thresholds triggering a mandatory merger control filing in China are relatively low compared with equivalent thresholds in some other jurisdictions. Foreign investors should pay particular attention to these requirements when making investments in China.

  4. VIE/red-chip structure regulatory issues: The variable interest entity (VIE) structure, which enables startups to navigate foreign investment restrictions, continues to play an important role for China’s hard tech startups, particularly those engaged in value-added telecommunications services, when establishing offshore financing structures (so-called “red-chip structures”) to access offshore capital markets. To date, Chinese authorities (including judicial bodies) have neither expressly prohibited nor endorsed the use of the VIE structure through legislation or public announcements. In practice, a number of China-based startups using a VIE structure have successfully completed filings with the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) for offshore listing on Nasdaq and the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (the Offshore Listing Filing).

    However, public information indicates that in March 2026, the CSRC required an applicant with a red-chip structure seeking listing on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange to unwind that structure before filing for an Offshore Listing. It remains unclear whether this was a standalone case or whether the CSRC has adopted the same position in relation to other applicants with VIE or red-chip structures. This development may signal a regulatory shift, with the CSRC adopting a more restrictive approach when reviewing red-chip structures for overseas IPO applicants and paying closer attention to the necessity and justification for maintaining such structures.

  5. Circular 37 registration/foreign exchange regulation: Where a Chinese national or founder intends to use assets or interests held in a domestic PRC enterprise to establish one or more offshore special purpose vehicles (SPVs) for fundraising purposes (with subsequent round-trip investment back into China), the individual must complete a registration with the foreign exchange authority (through a qualified local bank) (SAFE) before wiring capital to the SPV(s) (the Circular 37 Registration). The relevant SAFE regulations require that the establishment of such SPV(s): (i) must not damage China’s national security or public interest; and (ii) must not involve technology or products subject to export prohibitions.

Breach of the Circular 37 Registration requirements may result in administrative penalties for the relevant Chinese national, founder, or company, including orders to rectify, fines of up to the amount of illegal proceeds involved, and potentially criminal liability.

As noted above, the New ODI Regulations now explicitly include PRC individuals within the ODI regulatory framework. The authorities are expected to release detailed implementing rules governing PRC individuals’ ODI activities in due course, which may replace or amend the current Circular 37 Registration regime.

Market snapshot: Foreign investment in China’s hard tech sector

China’s hard tech sector experienced strong growth in 2025 and H1 2026, with several standout companies emerging and attracting significant market attention. Some of these companies have successfully listed on China’s domestic stock exchanges or the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Against this backdrop, equity financing activity in China’s hard tech sector grew steadily compared with 2024. Domestic state-backed capital and private RMB funds (including corporate venture capital funds) were among the most active investors in this sector, supported by incentive policies released by state and local authorities in early 2025.

Driven by international investors’ need for portfolio diversification, more realistic valuations of China-based assets, and the Chinese authorities’ continued efforts to attract foreign investment, foreign investor interest and confidence in China’s primary market rebounded in 2025 and H1 2026. In Q4 2025 in particular, foreign private equity investors renewed their interest by investing as limited partners in offshore USD funds focused on the China market. Some foreign investors, particularly sovereign wealth funds from the Middle East, also increased their exposure to China’s hard tech sector through direct investments. In addition, the strong performance of Hong Kong’s IPO market and the recovery in M&A activity in 2025 and H1 2026 provided more encouraging exit prospects for foreign investors. We expect this momentum to continue across China’s equity investment landscape, especially in the hard tech sector.

These active foreign investors should, however, be fully aware of the regulatory landscape and legislative developments we have highlighted in this briefing to ensure their investments remain compliant.

Footnotes

  1. 1

    The term “hard tech sector” used throughout this article generally refers the industries with advanced / high-end technologies, which mainly include artificial intelligence, semiconductors, information technology, new material, new energy and advanced manufacturing, etc.

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