The Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) recently released for public comment proposed amendments to the regulatory framework governing issuer bids, take-over bids and early warning reporting.
In this legal update, the first in a two-part series, we focus on the proposed amendments to the early warning reporting and take-over bid regimes, providing an overview of the most consequential elements and their practical implications for issuers, investors and other market participants. The proposed reforms to the issuer bid regime, including a new exemption permitting selective repurchases by an issuer of its own securities, will be addressed separately.
Disclosure of plans and future intentions in early warning reports
The CSA has identified a concern with the widespread use of broad, boilerplate language in the “plans and future intentions” section of early warning reports (EWRs), which in its view can undermine the informational value of the disclosure.
The proposed amendments introduce new interpretive guidance clarifying that:
- An acquiror should reassess the accuracy and currency of its stated plans and future intentions each time a subsequent EWR filing obligation is triggered.
- A change in plans or future intentions will, at the latest, generally be deemed to occur upon the execution of a definitive agreement, the commencement of a take-over bid or the public announcement of a proxy solicitation, but the obligation to update this section of an EWR may arise earlier if the acquiror has taken “irrevocable steps” toward a particular course of action.
- A series of “significant steps,” whether viewed individually or in the aggregate, may themselves constitute a change in plans warranting updated disclosure.
Early warning reporting triggers and thresholds
The proposed amendments address several perceived gaps and interpretive uncertainties in the current early warning reporting trigger framework, including those described below:
New reporting issuers
The proposed amendments would incorporate a new deemed acquisition provision requiring the filing of an EWR where a person already holds 10 per cent or more of a class when an issuer first becomes a reporting issuer (for example, upon an initial public offering). Currently, EWRs and associated news releases are typically not filed by such holders, as market participants have generally interpreted the rules as not requiring a filing absent an “acquisition” of securities after the issuer becomes a reporting issuer.
Notably, the proposed amendment would only require the obligation to file an EWR — there would not be the additional obligation to issue and file a news release regarding this deemed acquisition, nor would the moratorium provisions apply, striking the appropriate balance between the intended goal of the early warning system, and the desire not to unnecessarily increase administrative burden.
Joint actor relationships
The proposed amendments would introduce deemed acquisition and disposition provisions triggered by the formation and cessation of joint actor relationships. This addresses a gap identified in a recent British Columbia Securities Commission (Re NorthWest Copper Corp.) (the Commission) decision, where the Commission noted the formation of a joint actor relationship did not constitute a reportable “acquisition” for early warning purposes, even where joint actors collectively held 10 per cent or more of a class.
The CSA considers that the policy purpose underlying the early warning system is equally engaged when two or more security holders acting jointly or in concert collectively hold 10 per cent or more, regardless of whether any one of them individually exceeds the threshold or whether there are any subsequent acquisitions following the formation of joint actor relationships.
Elimination of the 5 per cent market purchase exemption during take-over bids
The proposed amendments would repeal the so-called 5 per cent market purchase exemption, which currently permits a bidder to purchase up to 5 per cent of the outstanding securities of the class subject to a take-over bid through market transactions during the pendency of the bid, without those purchases being subject to the take-over bid requirements.
The CSA notes this exemption was invoked on only one disclosed occasion between 2021 and 2023, suggesting limited practical utility following the 2016 amendments to the take-over bid regime, which introduced the 50 per cent minimum tender condition.
Given securities purchased by the bidder and its joint actors are excluded from the 50% minimum tender condition, market purchases under the exemption do not help the bidder satisfy that condition and would not further the CSA’s initial goals of promoting liquidity and facilitating equal selling opportunities, but could instead be used tactically to limit the securities available to a competing bidder.
Enhanced disclosure of equity equivalent derivatives
The proposed amendments would introduce a new framework for disclosing positions in “equity equivalent derivatives,” a newly defined term intended to capture instruments that effectively replicate the economic attributes of direct share ownership. A derivative would qualify as an “equity equivalent derivative” if it provides a rate of return on the reference security within a range of approximately 90 per cent to 110 per cent.
The disclosure of derivative positions would generally not apply to early warning threshold calculations, but instead would apply in more targeted circumstances: by offerors (and those acting jointly or in concert) in the context of a take-over bid, and by soliciting proxyholders other than management (and those acting jointly or in concert) in the context of a proxy solicitation campaign for which an information circular must be sent.
The CSA’s targeted approach is meant to address derivative-related risks such as “hidden ownership” (accumulating undisclosed economic positions to exert influence), “empty tendering” (counterparties hedging and tendering without economic interest in the outcome), “empty voting” (counterparties hedging and voting without economic interest), and “parking” (counterparties refraining from tendering or voting to benefit a party opposed to the bid), which are most acute where shareholders are being asked to make tendering or voting decisions.
Moreover, insiders already disclose their aggregate economic positions, but bidders and soliciting shareholders who are not insiders do not face an equivalent obligation. The proposed amendments are intended to close that gap.
US Comparison
The CSA’s proposed reforms are inspired by the SEC’s 2023 beneficial ownership amendments, requiring disclosure of significant derivative positions in limited circumstances without mandating full aggregation of physical and synthetic holdings for early warning reporting. Importantly, the CSA does not propose real-time disclosure of derivative stake-building; disclosure would only be required once a formal public bid or control solicitation begins, which it views as a measured approach that balances transparency with the interests of issuers and investors seeking to exert influence or control.
Non-reporting issuer exemption
The take-over bid and issuer bid exemptions for closely held non-reporting issuers would be amended to expand the class of persons that may be excluded when determining whether an issuer has 50 or fewer securityholders. In addition to current and former employees, an issuer would also be able to exclude officers, directors, contractors, consultants and their spouses, aligning the exemption with previously granted exemptive relief.
Additional policy guidance
The proposed amendments include guidance on several additional topics, reflecting CSA inquiries and evolving market developments:
- Bid conditions that may engage the public interest jurisdiction of regulators, including conditions that grant an offeror unqualified judgment or discretion to determine whether conditions have been satisfied (creating a degree of optionality that calls into question the credibility of the bid), or that require the target to take actions for the bidder’s benefit.
- Mini-tender offers (widely disseminated offers for less than 20 per cent of a class) and the circumstances in which securities regulators may intervene, for example, where an offeror varies or extends its offer without adequate notice, or where the offer price is at such a substantial discount to prevailing market price that no reasonable holder would tender except through mistake or inadvertence.
- How the “date of the bid” is determined for the purposes of certain take-over bid and issuer bid exemptions.
- The application of the “acting jointly or in concert” concept to proxy solicitations in support of an alternative slate of directors, even in the absence of a take-over bid or issuer bid.
Comment period and next steps
The proposed amendments are open for comment until August 12, 2026. The CSA has invited stakeholder feedback on 22 questions.
Market participants are encouraged to review the proposed amendments carefully and consider whether submissions to the CSA are warranted. Norton Rose Fulbright’s special situations and M&A teams are available to assist clients in assessing the implications of the proposed reforms, preparing comment letters, and adapting compliance frameworks in anticipation of the amendments taking effect.