In Nielsen Consumer LLC v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, the Federal Court considered whether a trademark owner's inadvertent failure to respond to a section 45 notice (Notice) under the Trademarks Act (the Act) was fatal to its prospects on appeal.

Section 45 proceedings are a summary mechanism by which the Registrar of Trademarks may require a registrant to demonstrate use of its mark, failing which the registration may be expunged. In this case, the appellant's failure to respond was the result of an employee's oversight in processing correspondence relating to the Notice, and the mark was accordingly expunged without opposition.

The Registrar’s decision

The Registrar of Trademarks, on the request of the Toronto-Dominion Bank (the respondent), issued a Notice to Nielsen Consumer LLC (the appellant), requiring the appellant to provide evidence it had used its registered word mark, TDLINX (TMA704839), over the last three years, pursuant to section 45 of the Act.

Once a trademark holder receives a section 45 Notice from the Registrar, it has three months to file a response, failing which the Registrar may expunge the trademark registration. By inadvertence, the appellant did not respond to the Notice, and the TDLINX mark was expunged.

Appeal to the Federal Court

On appeal to the Federal Court of the Registrar’s decision, the appellant sought leave to file new evidence of use. The respondent did not participate in the appeal.

Unlike other statutory appeals with respect to a federal decision-maker, subsection 56(5) of the Act provides the Federal Court the power to exercise any discretion vested in the Registrar,1 which calls for de novo consideration of the issues affected by the new evidence.

Leave to file new evidence under subsection 56(5) of the Act will be granted where it is in the interests of justice, analysed through the lens of the following factors: (a) the relevance, credibility, and admissibility of the evidence; (b) the materiality of the evidence; (c) the circumstances surrounding the delay in filing the evidence; and (d) whether granting leave would cause prejudice to the opposing party.2

The Federal Court clarified that, although subsection 56(5) of the Act was recently amended to introduce the requirement to seek leave to file new evidence, the discretionary powers conferred by that section to the Federal Court were maintained. As a result, if leave is granted, the issues affected by the new evidence are to be considered de novo.3

The Federal Court found that the first two elements were readily met, as the evidence consisted of a proposed affidavit relating to the use of the TDLINX mark, which could have materially affected the decision of the Registrar, who did not have any evidence before it.

The court likewise held that, since the respondent did not take a position on the appeal and considering the absence of opposition to the request to file new evidence, there was no prejudice to the respondent. The fourth factor was therefore also met without difficulty, leaving open only the inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the delay.

Inadvertence of appellant not determinative

The appellant provided an affidavit by an employee to explain the circumstances surrounding its failure to file evidence of use. In the affidavit, the employee states she inadvertently overlooked an email regarding the Notice, did not docket or note the deadline to respond, and did not bring the Notice to anyone’s attention. As a result, the appellant did not file any evidence of use by the deadline.

The Federal Court held that, while the circumstances surrounding the delay in filing evidence is an important factor that may be determinative of the question of leave, this factor could be given less weight in an uncontested appeal where the other elements have been satisfied.4

Accordingly, leave was granted to introduce the appellant’s evidence of use. Upon considering the new affidavit evidence, the court found that the appellant met its burden to demonstrate use of TDLINX in association with the majority of the registered goods and services and reinstated the trademark registration on this basis.

Conclusion

The Federal Court retains broad discretionary powers under subsection 56(5) of the Act, notwithstanding the recent amendments introducing a leave requirement for filing new evidence on appeal. This decision underscores that the four-factor test for leave is to be applied flexibly and in the interests of justice. In particular, the court's willingness to accord less weight to the circumstances of delay where the appeal is uncontested and the remaining factors are satisfied provides a measure of reassurance to trademark owners who have missed a section 45 deadline through inadvertence.

That said, the circumstances of delay remain an important consideration and may, in other cases, prove dispositive on an appeal under the Act. Best practices dictate that robust docketing systems be maintained for the timely processing of Registrar correspondence and to avoid the need to rely on the court’s remedial discretion.

Footnotes

  1. 1

    Clorox Company of Canada, Ltd v Chloretec SEC, 2020 FCA 76 at para 21.

  2. 2

    Products Unlimited Inc v Five Seasons Comfort Limited, 2026 FC 48 at para 30.

  3. 3

    Nielson at para 15.

  4. 4

    Nielson at para 22.

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