In Saxon Woods Investments Ltd & Ors v Costa [2026] UKSC 21 the Supreme Court confirmed that a director who intentionally delayed the sale of a company and deliberately concealed that from the board was in breach of his duty under section 172 of the Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006) to act in good faith to promote the success of the company. The company and its investors had agreed to work towards an exit by the end of 2019. It was not sufficient that the director sincerely, subjectively believed he was acting in the company’s best interests by delaying the sale. A director’s duty under section 172 applies to their conduct as well as to their subjective belief, i.e. they are required to act, not merely to think, in good faith.
Courts will continue to respect the business judgment of directors and will not substitute their own view on what would best promote the company’s success, so to that extent, the test in section 172 is subjective. However, the Supreme Court underlined that this does not mean that an individual director can implement their dissenting view by any means, however covert or disloyal, the director thinks necessary. The director’s conduct will be judged by objective standards.
This decision provides important guidance on the standard of conduct required of a company director when they genuinely disagree with their fellow directors as to the best route for achieving success for the company.
Background
The case concerned a shareholders’ agreement, between Saxon Woods and Spring Media Investments Limited (the Company), pursuant to which the Company and each of its investors agreed to work in good faith towards achieving an exit via a sale of the Company or a sale of its assets by the end of 2019. The Company’s Chairman, Mr Costa (who was also a substantial investor in the Company through a Luxembourg company), had effective control of the proposed sale process with the assistance of an investment bank. Mr Costa pursued a strategy to delay the sale as he believed a later sale would be likely to generate a better financial return. He deliberately concealed this from the board; his approach was summarised by the trial judge as, "they wouldn't like it if they knew now, but they will thank me in the end." Unfortunately, in 2020, COVID hit, the Company was badly impacted, and the prospect of a profitable exit was destroyed. The value of Saxon Woods’ shareholding in the Company fell significantly and it subsequently brought a claim for unfair prejudice against Mr Costa maintaining that he caused the Company to breach its obligation to work in good faith towards achieving an exit by the end of 2019.
Section 172(1) CA 2006 provides: “A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole.”
High Court and Court of Appeal
At first instance, the High Court held that Mr Costa’s actions amounted to unfair prejudice, but he was not in breach of the section 172 duty because he sincerely believed that delaying the sale would result in a higher purchase price (i.e. a wholly subjective test was applied). The Court of Appeal disagreed and held that Mr Costa had breached the duty; to act in “good faith” a director must act honestly towards the company in accordance with the test for dishonesty in Ivey v Genting Casinos (UK) Ltd [2017] UKSC 67. This required an objective assessment to determine whether the individual’s conduct was dishonest according to the “ordinary standards of decent people” (see our earlier article on the Court of Appeal decision Director’s duty to act in the best interests of a company: Honesty really is the best policy). Mr Costa appealed.
Supreme Court decision
The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed Mr Costa’s appeal and upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal was correct to find that a breach by Mr Costa of his duty under section 172 was made out on the facts; his conduct was manifestly disloyal to the Company, and he acted in bad faith towards the Company.
In his appeal, Mr Costa argued that the requirement of good faith in section 172 governs a director’s thought process rather than his conduct. Therefore, if a director genuinely believed that a particular course for the company was the most likely to promote its success, the director was free to adopt any conduct to ensure the company followed that course, regardless of whether an observer would objectively regard such conduct as bad faith. In response, Saxon Woods argued that the requirement for good faith extends not only to a director’s thinking, but also to their conduct in pursuing what they believe to be the best course for the company to take. The Supreme Court agreed with Saxon Woods.
The Court reached its conclusion by examining the statutory framework of directors’ duties under the CA 2006, acknowledging that the relevant provisions codify rather than supplant the principles established at common law, so it was appropriate to look back at those. Central to its analysis was the fiduciary obligation of loyalty which the Court regarded as “baked in” to section 172, and the conclusion that, although not explicitly mentioned in section 172, the duty to promote the company’s success required directors to act collectively and not to “covertly or otherwise subvert the management of the company’s affairs by the board as a whole.”
Previous law had shown that the courts did not shrink from applying an objective test to determine whether a fiduciary’s conduct fell short of the rigorous requirements of the duty of loyalty – it was never enough for the fiduciary just to say that he genuinely believed that it did not. A court will start by accepting the individual judgments of the board, or of a dissenting director, provided their belief is, as a matter of fact found to be genuine. To that extent the test is subjective, but an individual director does not obtain carte blanche to seek to implement their dissenting view by any means they think necessary. The Court further commented that it strained credulity to think that the interpretation of section 172 advanced by Mr Costa could have been intended because of its consequences, “Far from promoting corporate success in the modern world, it would be a recipe for chaos and paralysis in corporate governance, and destructive of the collegiality of the board of directors as a whole which all stakeholders in limited companies are entitled to expect.”
The Court also confirmed that overlapping breaches are no bar to a section 172 claim — the same covert conduct could equally offend section 171's requirement to act within a director's powers, but that did not exclude it from the ambit of section 172.
Although it reached the same conclusion as the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court’s analysis differed. The Court of Appeal focused its analysis upon whether Mr Costa had acted dishonestly, applying the objective test in Ivey. However, the Supreme Court concentrated on the requirement for good faith rather than dishonesty on its own, even though dishonesty may form part of the question of good faith. The Supreme Court held that where the defendant already owes a fiduciary duty of loyalty, “the question is whether that duty has been breached, and while dishonesty may be evidence of that, the duty itself supplies the relevant analytical framework; it is unnecessary to elaborate it by reference to the Ivey case.”
The Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeal’s order for an unconditional buy-out by Mr Costa of Saxon Woods shares, with the exact value (as at the end of 2019) to be determined at a later hearing.
Key takeaways
This is the first time the Supreme Court has directly construed section 172 CA 2006. The decision confirms that section 172 will be considered objectively by the courts, and a director's genuine, subjective belief that they are acting in the company's best interests will not save them if they strike out on their own against the board's collective decision simply because they prefer their own strategy.
The Supreme Court made clear the importance of collective board decision making which the framework in the Companies Act underpins – here it was not disagreement with the agreed strategy that was the issue, it was the concealment of the pursuit of a different strategy – the solution was for the director to seek to persuade his fellow directors of the correct course of action.
Similarly, the decision underlines that delegation is not an invitation to rewrite the strategy – here the other board members had effectively delegated their responsibility to the defendant director to carry into effect the agreed sale process.
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