In its third judgment on the FRAND defense, the German Federal Court of Justice (BGH) has further clarified how claims for injunctive relief based on standard-essential patents (SEPs) are to be assessed under EU abuse of dominance and German patent laws (Judgment of 27 January 2026 – KZR 10/25). The judgment confirms the BGH’s conduct-based approach to abuse of dominance: an SEP-holder abuses a dominant position only where it refuses to license on FRAND terms to a genuinely willing implementer. Where that willingness is missing, neither competition law nor proportionality will shield the implementer from an injunction.

The judgment also firmly rejects the European Commission’s (EC) call for a rigid, sequential application of the framework developed by the European Court of Justice (CJEU) in Huawei/ZTE, and, for the first time, extends the willingness-to-license analysis to the proportionality defense under German Patent Act.

Key takeaways

  • Willingness to license is decisive: An SEP-holder’s request for an injunction will amount to an abuse of dominance under Article 102 TFEU only if it refuses to conclude a FRAND license despite the implementer’s ongoing and genuine willingness to do so. Willingness must be demonstrated throughout negotiations, not merely asserted at the outset.
  • No prior FRAND assessment of the SEP-holder’s offer required: Courts may evaluate the implementer’s conduct without first determining whether the SEP-holder’s offer is FRAND-compliant. This directly contradicts the EC’s position as amicus curiae.
  • Security must follow promptly: Once a counteroffer is rejected, the implementer must provide adequate security without delay. Maintaining a token deposit over an extended period (especially where it bears little relation to the implementer’s own valuation) is strong evidence of a delay strategy.
  • Proportionality is not a fallback for unwilling licensees: An implementer engaging in delay tactics will generally be unable to rely on the proportionality defense under the German Patent Act to resist an injunction.
  • Part of a broader European trend: The BGH noted that courts in the Netherlands and England as well as the Unified Patent Court (UPC) have likewise endorsed a flexible, conduct-focused reading of the CJEU’s Huawei/ZTE judgment and rejected a rigid checklist approach.

Background

The case concerned a patent declared essential to the EVS (Enhanced Voice Services) standard. The SEP-holder had committed to license on FRAND terms under the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) rules. The defendant marketed standard-compliant mobile devices without a license and invoked the FRAND defense to oppose claims for injunctive relief, recall, destruction, damages and disclosure.

During appeal proceedings before the Munich Higher Regional Court the EC intervened as amicus curiae, arguing, for a strict, sequential application of the Huawei/ZTE framework. That approach was rejected at appeal and has now been rejected again by the BGH.

The BGH’s reasoning

Notion of abuse of dominance

At the heart of the judgment is the BGH’s conception of abuse in the SEP context. Building on previous case law (FRAND-Einwand I and II), the BGH reaffirmed that the enforcement of an SEP, even by a dominant undertaking, is not abusive per se. An abuse arises only where the SEP-holder refuses to grant a licence on FRAND terms, and only where there is a corresponding willingness to license on the part of the implementer. Those two elements are treated as analytically inseparable: a refusal to license presupposes a willing counterpart. If the implementer’s conduct shows that it is not genuinely prepared to enter into a FRAND license, the normative foundation for an abuse of dominance collapses: without a willing licensee, there is simply nothing to refuse.

No strict sequential application of Huawei/ZTE

Against that backdrop, the BGH rejected the notion that courts must first assess whether the SEP holder’s offer is FRAND compliant before turning to the implementer’s behaviour. Article 102 TFEU, in the court’s view, does not impose an obligation on SEP holders to present a fully calibrated FRAND offer at the outset of negotiations. What matters is whether, taken as a whole, the SEP holder is ultimately willing to license on FRAND terms and whether the implementer engages in that process in good faith.

Huawei/ZTE is thus treated not as a rigid procedural script, but as setting out general principles designed to prevent hold up and hold out. Courts remain free to focus on the economic substance of the negotiations, rather than mechanically ticking off formal steps.

Willingness to license

Applying those principles, the BGH had little difficulty finding that the defendant could not be regarded as a willing licensee. Willingness, the court stressed, must be continuous, consistent and expressed through concrete conduct. Delays, tactical reversals and merely symbolic gestures are all capable of negating an initial declaration of willingness.

The court assessed the defendant’s behaviour cumulatively: months long delays in responding to license offers; failure to engage with a proposed confidentiality agreement for eight months; shifting demands between lump sum and running royalty structures; and a security deposit fixed at EUR 10,000 for years (around one percent of the defendant’s own most recent counteroffer of USD 1 million). Taken together, these elements amounted to a textbook delay strategy aimed at prolonging unlicensed use of the technology.

Once that conclusion was reached, the legal consequences were straightforward. An implementer pursuing such a strategy cannot be characterised as a willing licensee. In those circumstances, the SEP holder’s pursuit of an injunction cannot amount to a refusal to license, let alone an abuse of a dominant position.

Proportionality

The most novel aspect of the judgment is the BGH’s treatment of proportionality under § 139(1), sentence 3 of the German Patent Act. For the first time in an SEP case, the court held that proportionality does not operate independently of the competition law analysis.

Where an implementer has undermined its own FRAND defense by failing to demonstrate genuine willingness to license, it will normally be precluded from relying on proportionality to resist an injunction. Allowing otherwise would, in the BGH’s view, upset the balance struck by Article 102 TFEU between competition law and intellectual property rights, by effectively reintroducing a failed FRAND defense through national patent law.

On the facts, the defendant had developed a workaround and could continue supplying devices without the patented feature. Any remaining commercial disadvantage did not amount to an unjustified hardship capable of outweighing the SEP holder’s entitlement to injunctive relief.

Comment

The result in this case is unsurprising given the defendant’s negotiation conduct. The broader doctrinal signals, however, provide mixed messages.

On the one hand, the judgment reinforces coherence and predictability: abuse in the SEP context remains anchored in the concept of refusal to license, and implementer willingness remains its indispensable counterpart. That approach aligns Germany with courts in other leading European jurisdictions.

On the other hand, the decision leaves limited room for scrutiny of the SEP-holder’s behaviour at the early stages of negotiations. By allowing courts to bypass any assessment of FRAND compliance altogether, the BGH reduces the legal pressure on SEP-holders to table clearly FRAND compliant opening offers. In cases where an initial offer is materially out of line, an implementer’s caution may be commercially rational but legally questionable. SEP holders face significantly reduced pressure to make genuinely compliant initial offers.

Furthermore, practical details around the security obligation remain unsettled. While the BGH confirmed that security must be provided promptly, it offered no guidance on the appropriate amount or form. Divergent approaches from across the Higher Regional Court of Munich, the Regional Court of Munich I and the UPC Local Divisions underscore the need for further clarification and it is perhaps disappointing that the BGH refused to refer any questions to the CJEU, particularly where the EC had expressly pushed for a different interpretation of the existing case law on the interplay between Article 102 TFEU and SEP injunctions.

Finally, by linking the proportionality defense so closely to willingness to license, the BGH effectively collapses two distinct legal defenses into one. Delay tactics now risk defeating not only the FRAND defence under Article 102 TFEU, but also any residual protection under national patent law. With three BGH judgments now on the books, the German framework is clear in direction but far from complete. Pending additional clarity, implementers would be well advised to treat each step of the negotiation process as potentially decisive for the outcome of SEP injunction proceedings.

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