This article was co-authored by Michelle Isaac.

The existence and preservation of legal professional privilege in investigations remain a vexed issue. Several recent Federal Court of Australia decisions have considered whether legal professional privilege applies to reports commissioned during an incident or investigation.

Introduction

Legal professional privilege is a substantive common law immunity, not just a rule of evidence.

At common law, legal professional privilege protects confidential communications between a lawyer and their client created for the dominant purpose of obtaining legal advice or for use in existing or reasonably anticipated litigation. The capacity in which the lawyer acts, including whether they are providing independent legal advice rather than commercial or management advice, is relevant to establishing privilege.

“Dominant purpose” means the ruling, prevailing or most influential purpose. It is not enough that the legal purpose is serious or even important; it must predominate over all other purposes. The inquiry into the organisation’s purpose is objective and is determined on the totality of the evidence.

Legal professional privilege may attach to investigation materials where an organisation needs confidential legal advice about suspected wrongdoing, its potential liability or its response, or where litigation is underway or reasonably anticipated. A lawyer may be engaged to provide legal advice informed by a fact-finding process conducted by the lawyer or an independent expert engaged by the lawyer. Privilege may protect both the advice and investigation materials.

A claim of privilege may be challenged on the ground that the lawyer was not acting for the dominant purpose of providing legal advice or for use in litigation, particularly where an in-house lawyer undertakes the investigation. The lawyer’s employment arrangements and the circumstances of the investigation may bear on that question.

The Federal Court has considered these principles in several recent decisions. This article considers the Full Court of the Federal Court’s decision in Medibank v McClure, and the very recent decision involving privilege claims in the litigation following the breakdown of the Kyle and Jackie O show.

Medibank v McClure

Medibank was the subject of a cyber breach in 2022. In a class action against Medibank following that breach, Medibank claimed privilege over reports prepared by Deloitte and by cybersecurity firms. The reports were all commissioned through Medibank’s external lawyers. Deloitte Risk Advisory (Deloitte) was engaged to undertake an external review and prepare a “Post Incident Review” report, a Root Cause Analysis report, and a report required by the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA).

The primary judge~~[2025] FCA 167~~ accepted the evidence of key decision makers that the Deloitte reports would inform legal advice. But this purpose did not dominate over Medibank's other purposes, namely its publicly stated intention to learn from the incident and share those learnings, and its regulatory compliance obligations to APRA. The primary judge held that the Deloitte reports were not privileged.

However, the primary judge found that the cybersecurity reports were privileged, as they were created for the dominant purpose of providing Medibank’s lawyers with technical cybersecurity assistance, to enable them to advise Medibank.

Medibank sought leave to appeal the primary judge’s findings about the Deloitte reports. In Medibank Private Limited v McClure [2026] FCAFC 38, the Full Court of the Federal Court refused leave to appeal, and confirmed that the primary judge was correct to find that the Deloitte reports were not privileged.

Justice Lee~~Justices Wigney and Hespe agreed with his Honour’s reasons~~ stated that an investigative report may “be commissioned in circumstances where everyone involved sincerely believes that legal advice is a central purpose, but the objective circumstances show that the report is also being brought into existence to serve substantial regulatory, governance, public assurance or operational functions.” Lee J at [41] The court’s task is not to ask whether those other functions “contradict” the witness evidence, but to ask what those functions reveal about purpose.ibid

Lee J stated that the dominant purpose test is "evaluative and hierarchical". The question is whether the legal purpose prevailed over the others, not whether it merely existed and was not negated. At [65]

His Honour also stated that the inquiry into dominant purpose cannot ignore institutional complexity. At [48] A major public company responding to such a crisis will act via multiple structures, processes and persons. At [47] The dominant purpose test requires attention to all the surrounding circumstances, including contemporaneous communications and the practical role the documents were expected to perform. At [26] Therefore, evidence from senior officers may not be determinative of the corporation’s objective purpose, when the objective circumstances show that the legal purpose did not dominate the other purposes. At [37] - [38]

The Full Court also acknowledged that while a court should not readily discount the involvement of lawyers in the communications, a court must consider substance rather than form. At [62] Although the engagement of Deloitte was structured in legal terms, the Deloitte reports were brought into existence to do more than provide the factual substrate for legal advice. At [63] They were also intended to serve important governance, regulatory and “public facing” purposes, and were therefore not privileged. At [63]

However, each case turns on its own facts, as demonstrated by the recent decision of Henderson v Commonwealth Broadcasting Corporation Pty Ltd (Legal Professional Privilege) [2026] FCA 1632, where claims for privilege over investigation documents were upheld.

Following an on-air argument in February 2026 between Jackie Henderson and Kyle Sandilands (the co-hosts of the “Kyle and Jackie O Show”), Ms Henderson’s lawyers sent the broadcaster a complaint letter, raising issues under the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (NSW) and the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), and for breach of contract and defamation. It stated that Ms Henderson would no longer present with Mr Sandilands and required an alternative "day part". On 3 March 2026, after investigating and taking legal advice, ARN Media resolved to have CBC (its subsidiary and radio licence holder) terminate the contract with Ms Henderson and her company for repudiation. Ms Henderson and her company (the applicants) subsequently brought proceedings alleging that CBC took adverse action in breach of s340 of the Fair Work Act by terminating the contract for reasons including Ms Henderson exercising, or proposing to exercise, workplace rights.

Both parties challenged the others’ claims for privilege over certain documents. His Honour also rejected the respondents’ arguments regarding privilege claims over Ms Henderson’s documents. Jackman J inspected the documents in question, consistently with the principle that the Court should not be hesitant to exercise the power to inspect disputed documents. Grant v Downs[1976] HCA 63; (1976) 135 CLR 674 at 689 (Stephen, Mason and Murphy JJ) and in Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation[1999] HCA 67; (1999) 201 CLR 49 at [52]

The respondents’ claims to privilege were supported by affidavits from a partner of the law firm acting for CBC and ARN, and the Chief Legal Officer and Company Secretary of the group of companies having ARN as their ultimate holding company. Rather than simply referring to “dominant purpose”, some of the claims in their affidavits were couched in terms of “the purpose” or “purposes” of the documents as being to seek legal advice. His Honour considered their evidence was thus equivalent to evidence of “the sole purpose”, allowing for some minor or collateral purpose without falling below the “dominant purpose.” At [8] and [9]

The applicants contended (among other things) that the communications and documents which formed part of the investigation into the incident were not created for the dominant purpose of obtaining external legal advice.

The applicants noted that on 21 February the Chief People Officer of the ARN Group emailed the CEO and the Chief Content Officer, proposing the need for an investigation into the events of 20 February, but external lawyers were not engaged by the Chief Legal Officer and Company Secretary until 24 February. They argued this indicated that the dominant purpose of the investigation was not to obtain legal advice.

The applicants argued that the email from the Chief People Officer disclosed a purpose other than the purpose of facilitating legal advice. In respect of purpose, it stated, among other things:

“This process would need to be focused on strengthening the workplace culture and environment, ensuring behavioural expectations are clearly understood and upheld, and supporting a respectful, psychologically safe and high performing team.
….
The investigation is not intended to be punitive. It is about understanding what has occurred, hearing all perspectives, and ensuring appropriate and considered outcomes that support our team, the talent themselves, our business and our audience.”

Jackman J acknowledged that those passages did suggest substantial purposes on the Chief People Officer’s part which were independent from obtaining legal advice. However, he considered that those statements were reflective of her responsibilities and priorities as Chief People Officer. Although she proposed and participated in the investigation, she did not claim to have made the ultimate decision to proceed with the investigation. Her email noted that the investigation would “need the backing of the Board and management”, and she expressly sought the views of the Chief Executive Officer and the Chief Content Officer on her initial proposal.

His Honour considered that the Chief People Officer’s “…personal conception of the purposes of the investigation at the initial stage of proposing the investigation is far from determinative.” He accepted the uncontroverted affidavit evidence of the Chief Legal Officer and Company Secretary, that the purpose of the investigation was to obtain legal advice. He considered that the Chief Legal Officer and Company Secretary was more likely to have been aware of the views of those who were ultimately responsible for the decision to undertake the investigation in terms of the purposes of the investigation. He noted:

“The hierarchy of decision-making may be a significant factor in assessing the question of fact as to the purpose for which documents are brought into existence”. At [20], citing AWB Ltd v Cole (No 5)[2006] FCA 1234; (2006) 155 FCR 30 at [44(2)] (Young J)

The applicants also contended that some of the documents were not privileged, as they were unsent drafts and therefore were not communications between client and lawyer. Jackman J noted that an unsent draft or a set of notes will be privileged if brought into existence for the dominant purpose of seeking or providing legal advice. He referred to the authorities cited by Young J in AWB v Cole which establish that:

  1. legal professional privilege protects the disclosure of documents that record legal work carried out by the lawyer for the benefit of the client, such as research memoranda, collations and summaries of documents, chronologies and the like, whether or not they are actually provided to the client; and
  2. subject to meeting the dominant purpose test, legal professional privilege extends to notes, memoranda or other documents made by officers or employees of the client that relate to information sought by the client’s legal adviser to enable him or her to advise, whether or not they are actually communicated to the lawyer. [2006] FCA 1234; (2006) 155 FCR 30, At [44(8)- (9), citing among others, Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance Pty Ltd(1997) 188 CLR 501; Dalleagles Pty Ltd v Australian Securities Commission(1991) 4 WAR 325; Trade Practices Commission v Sterling[1979] FCA 33; and Saunders v Commissioner of Australian Federal Police(1998) 160 ALR 469

He rejected all the applicants’ arguments, holding that the documents in question were privileged. His Honour’s conclusion was also bolstered by his own inspection of the documents in question. At [21]

His Honour then considered whether privilege in the documents had been waived. The test for waiver is whether the conduct of the client is inconsistent with maintenance of the confidentiality the privilege is intended to protect. Mann v Carnell[1999] HCA 66; (1999) 201 CLR 1 at [29] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Callinan JJ). The Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia has recently confirmed that the concept of inconsistency is not confined to conduct by the privilege holder that involves an express or implied assertion about the content of a privileged communication. It can also arise where the privilege holder puts a subject-matter in issue in proceedings, by making positive assertions whilst maintaining that communications on the subject-matter remain confidential. Mastercard Asia/Pacific (Australia) Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission[2026] FCAFC 37; (2026) 315 FCR 256 (Mastercard) at [66] (Perram, Wheelahan and McElwaine JJ).

His Honour accepted that the relevant test is “…whether the party entitled to the privilege makes an assertion, express or implied, or brings a case, which is either about the contents of the confidential communication or which necessarily lays open the confidential communication to scrutiny, and by such conduct an inconsistency arises.” Citing DSE (Holdings) Pty Ltd v Intertan Inc[2003] FCA 384; (2003) 127 FCR 499 (DSE) at [58] (Allsop J);  Commissioner of Taxation v Rio Tinto Limited[2006] FCAFC 86; (2006) 151 FCR 341 at [61], and Macquarie Bank Limited v Arup Pty Ltd[2016] FCAFC 117 at [30] (his Honour noting the caution of the Full Court that the statement of Allsop J in DSE is not to be treated as a statutory formulation). However, the question is not whether the privilege holder has put that person’s state of mind in issue but whether that person has, directly or indirectly, put the contents of the otherwise privileged communications in issue. At [33], citing Commissioner of Taxation v Rio Tinto Limited[2006] FCAFC 86; (2006) 151 FCR 341 at [52], [61] and [65] (Kenny, Stone and Edmonds JJ); New South Wales v Betfair Pty Ltd[2009] FCAFC 160; (2009) 180 FCR 543 at [58] (Kenny, Stone and Middleton JJ); Macquarie Bank Limited v Arup Pty Ltd[2016] FCAFC 117 at [28]–[30] (Middleton, Robertson and Gleeson JJ); Mastercardat [50].

The applicants alleged that by terminating the Contract, the respondents had engaged in adverse action in contravention of the Fair Work Act.

The respondents’ defence put most of those matters in issue. They denied that the reasons for termination included reasons proscribed by s340 of the Fair Work Act, particularising that the reason for termination was that the applicants had indicated they would no longer do what they had been engaged to do, and that the ARN Group should not continue to pay the applicants the same compensation for a different form of radio show.

The evidence from the CEO and board members was that the exercise or proposed exercise of workplace rights by Ms Henderson did not form part of their reasons for terminating her contract but related to the fact that moving her to a different radio segment would not command the same value as the morning radio show.

The applicants’ argument in respect of waiver was that the respondents’ evidence indicated that the relevant decision-makers acted on legal advice, and that the decision-makers deployed a legal strategy.

This argument was unsuccessful.

His Honour held that the mere fact that the legal advice may have contributed, or did contribute, to the decision to terminate Ms Henderson’s contract does not put the contents of the legal advice in issue, nor does it necessarily lay open the confidential legal advice to scrutiny. ~~At [62]~~His Honour noted that obtaining and relying on legal advice is an unremarkable feature of large commercial disputes, and obtaining legal advice on the termination of an important contract was necessary to enable the respondents’ directors and officers to discharge their duties of care, skill and diligence. His Honour also rejected the applicants’ argument that it was necessary to have access to the legal advice to understand what the legal strategy comprised.

His Honour also commented on the debate between the parties about the effect of the reversal of the onus of proof under s361 of the Fair Work Act. He held this had no material bearing on the question of waiver. This was because “…the question is not whether the privilege holder has put that person’s state of mind in issue, but whether that person has put the contents of the otherwise privileged communications in issue.” At [68]

Takeaways

The practical takeaways from these cases are that early involvement of lawyers is advisable in a crisis. However, this may not, by itself, be sufficient to attract privilege. Bare assertions about purpose will not suffice. A court will objectively consider all the surrounding circumstances, including the organisational complexity and hierarchy of decision-making, to see what they reveal about purpose.

In addition, requiring investigation reports to serve multiple purposes carries a high risk that the legal purpose may not be found to dominate. If the dominant (or indeed sole) purpose for an investigation is to obtain legal advice, or for use in anticipated litigation, this should be clearly stated.

Widely circulating legal advice, or putting the contents of legal advice in issue by referring to it in public statements, is likely to give rise to a waiver of privilege. However, the Henderson decision usefully confirms that the mere fact that legal advice contributed to a decision does not, by itself, put the contents of that legal advice in issue.

Future articles in this series will consider other issues relating to investigations, including the impact of AI, and how to address conflict of interest issues.