This article was co-authored with Richard Donaldson and Maria Lai, with research assistance from Brooklyn Daniels, Pascale La Hei and Hamoudi Al-Saghir.
Key takeaways
Think of a statute like a work of non-fiction. You can navigate directly to the section you need, and in practice, lawyers often do, but you will generally get more out of it if you start from the beginning. The opening provisions of a statute, its objects clause, its definitions, its interpretation provisions, equip you to read everything that follows. Miss them, and you risk reading the operative provisions in isolation from the framework that gives them meaning. And do not stop at the four corners of the Act: the bookcase in which the chapter sits and the wider environment in which that bookcase sits, international obligations, second reading speeches, explanatory memoranda are all part of the context that gives the text its meaning.
When reading any Commonwealth Act, the Acts Interpretation Act is the reference guide to have open alongside it. Its provisions apply unless there is a contrary intention and provide practical tools that shape how every Act is to be read. For example s 2B supplies definitions with general application across all Commonwealth legislation; s 13 clarifies what material forms part of an Act, including long titles, preambles and structural headings; s 15AA requires that the interpretation best achieving the Act’s purpose is to be preferred; and s 15AD confirms that examples in legislation are not exhaustive and may extend a provision’s operation.
Purpose is not a tiebreaker to be reached for when the words are ambiguous. As the High Court confirmed in Palmanova Pty Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia [2025] HCA 35 (Palmanova), it is the organising framework of the whole task, consistent with s 15AA of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) (Acts Interpretation Act) which requires that the interpretation best achieving an Act’s purpose or object is to be preferred. Purpose did not supplement the textual analysis, it led it.
But purpose does not only expand meaning. As the High Court confirmed in Laming v Electoral Commissioner of the Australian Electoral Commission [2025] HCA 31 (Laming), the objects of a provision do not exist in a vacuum, that is, they must be read alongside the provisions that qualify or limit how those objects are to be achieved. In Laming, the objects of transparency and accountability in electoral communication did not support a construction that would expose a notifying entity to penalties multiplying with each view of a post, because s 321C(3) expressly provided that Part XXA was not intended to detract from the ability to communicate electoral matter. Purpose constrained as much as it illuminated.
Introduction
Statute: ‘An Act passed by Parliament. The term was originally used to refer to the legislation enacted in any one session of the British Parliament, being then divided into chapters to identify the various Acts of Parliament […] ’Encyclopaedic Australian Legal Dictionary (online at 28 October 2025) ‘statute’.
That reference to ‘chapters’ is worth pausing on. It is not merely a historical curiosity, it hints at something important about the nature of statutes and how they are best read. All stories are different but often the events that unfold in a story will be tied together by a plot and stories will generally follow a discernible structure. Similarly, each Act has an underlying purpose(s) or object(s), and statutes also generally follow a discernible structure (e.g., may be broken down into volumes, parts, divisions, sections, sub-sections, paragraphs etc.; may introduce a short title; may contain a dictionary, etc.).
Think of a statute less like a novel and more like a work of non-fiction, a detailed reference work, perhaps, or a guide to a particular area of the law. Like any good non-fiction book, you can navigate directly to the section you need, and, in practice, that is often exactly what lawyers do. But you will generally get more out of it if you start from the beginning. The opening provisions of a statute, its objects clause, its definitions, its interpretation provisions do not just introduce the text, they equip you to read everything that follows. Miss them, and you risk reading the operative provisions in isolation from the framework that gives them meaning.
However, do not stop at the four corners of the Act. Just as a book sits in a bookcase alongside others that share its subject, a statute sits within a broader legal landscape: the scheme of the Act as a whole, the constitutional and international context in which it operates, and the extrinsic materials, second reading speeches, explanatory memoranda that reveal what the legislature was trying to achieve. It is that full picture, text, context and purpose together, that gives a provision its meaning. The discipline of approaching statutory text in that deliberate, contextual way, asking not just what a provision says, but what it means in light of the whole, is what lawyers call statutory construction or statutory interpretation.
Contemporary approach to statutory construction
The High Court in Palmanova Pty Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia [2025] HCA 35 (Palmanova) sets out the modern approach to statutory construction in Australia.In May 2026, the High Court of Australia handed down two decisions relating to statutory interpretation:Deripaska v Minister for Foreign Affairs [2026] HCA 14(considering the application of s 15A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) and ss 13(1)(a) and 13(1)(c) of the Legislation Act 2003 (Cth) to determine whether regs 14 and 15 of the Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011 (Cth) could be read down to have a constitutionally valid partial operation); andMayfield Development Corporation Pty Ltd (ACN 154 495 048) v NSW Port Operations Hold Co Pty Ltd (ACN 163 262 351) & Ors [2026] HCA 12(considering the ‘Crown immunity’ principle of statutory construction). These two cases will be considered in further detail in a future article.
Before turning to what the High Court said, it is worth briefly setting the scene, because, as with any good non-fiction chapter, the principles make more sense once you understand the story behind them. Palmanova, an Australian company, had purchased an artefact from a gallery in Colorado. The artefact was said to have originated from Tiwanaku, an ancient city the ruins of which now lie in Bolivia. The artefact was shipped to Australia in 2020 and, upon arrival, was intercepted by customs officials and subsequently seized by an inspector appointed under the PMCH Act: Australia’s legislative implementation of its obligations under the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property.
Palmanova successfully applied to the Federal Court for an order that the object was not liable to forfeiture under s 14(1) of the PMCH Act. The Commonwealth appealed, and the question ultimately before the High Court was whether s 14(1) could render a protected cultural object liable to forfeiture upon importation into Australia, even where it had been unlawfully exported from its country of origin before the PMCH Act commenced. In other words, could the Act reach back to catch conduct that predated its own commencement?
The High Court held that it could. The provision did render such an object liable to forfeiture. In reaching that conclusion, the reasons of Gageler CJ, Gordon, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ (joint reasons) articulated the following statement of principle, which has since been widely cited as the contemporary touchstone for statutory construction in Australia at [4] that:
‘Statutory construction is the process of attributing meaning to statutory text. The construction of a statutory provision begins and ends with the statutory text understood in context and in light of the statutory purpose – being what the provision is designed to achieve in fact – insofar as that purpose is discernible from the statutory text and context. In the construction of a provision of a Commonwealth statute, the meaning that would best achieve the statutory purpose so discerned is to be preferred to each alternative meaning.’ Palmanova Pty Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia [2025] HCA 35, [4] (Gageler CJ, Gordon J, Jagot J, Beech-Jones J). Palmanova has since been applied in numerous federal and state decisions. E.g. Sydney Children’s Hospitals Network v FZP [2026] NSWCA 203 at [34]. (emphasis added)
The joint reasons in Palmanova at [5] referred to this as the ‘modern approach’ to statutory construction:
‘as was explained nearly 30 years ago in CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd in a statement repeated and endorsed many times since: “(a) insists that the context be considered in the first instance, not merely at some later stage when ambiguity might be thought to arise, and (b) uses ‘context’ in its widest sense to include such things as the existing state of the law and the mischief which, by legitimate means ..., one may discern the statute was intended to remedy”. Use of extrinsic material in the construction of a provision of a Commonwealth statute is guided but not governed by a non-exhaustive list of categories of material statutorily recognised to have potential to illuminate the statutory context.’Palmanova, [5[ (Gageler CJ, Gordon, Jagot, Beech-Jones JJ).
In a similar vein, this modern approach is encapsulated in the following explanation from SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34:
‘The starting point for the ascertainment of the meaning of a statutory provision is the text of the statute whilst, at the same time, regard is had to its context and purpose. Context should be regarded at this first stage and not at some later stage and it should be regarded in its widest sense. This is not to deny the importance of the natural and ordinary meaning of a word, namely how it is ordinarily understood in discourse, to the process of construction. Considerations of context and purpose simply recognise that, understood in its statutory, historical or other context, some other meaning of a word may be suggested, and so too, if its ordinary meaning is not consistent with the statutory purpose, that meaning must be rejected.’SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34; (2017) 347 ALR 405; 91 ALJR 936,[14] (Kiefel CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ), citing Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355; [1998] HCA 28, [69]–[71]; Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Cmr of Territory Revenue (2009) 239 CLR 27; [2009] HCA 41, [47]; and CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 384, 408; [1997] HCA 2.
The modern approach to statutory construction is consistent with s 15AA of the Acts Interpretation Act which provides that:
‘In interpreting a provision of an Act, the interpretation that would best achieve the purpose or object of the Act (whether or not that purpose or object is expressly stated in the Act) is to be preferred to each other interpretation.’
Unless there is a contrary intention, the Acts Interpretation Act applies to all Acts, legislative instruments, notifiable instruments and other instruments. Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth)ss 2, 46(1);Legislation Act 2003 (Cth)s 13(1). Section 15AA of the Acts Interpretation Act is a mandatory provision. See e.g.,Vincentia MC Pharmacy Pty Ltd v Australian Community Pharmacy Authority (2020) 280 FCR 397; [2020] FCAFC 163, [48] (Perry and Stewart JJ).
Court decisions have precedential value in relation to the interpretation of the specific provision under consideration, however, it is important to remember that decisions are not substitutes for the text of the legislation, and that in particular:
‘It would be an error to treat what was said in construing one statute as necessarily controlling the construction of another; the judicial task in statutory construction differs from that in distilling the common law from past decisions.’ McNamara (McGrath) v Consumer, Trader and Tenancy Tribunal (2005) 221 CLR 646; (2005) 221 ALR 285; (2005) 79 ALJR 1789; [2005] HCA 55,[40] (McHugh, Gummow and Heydon JJ).
It is with this understanding that this article provides a high-level overview of the contemporary approach to statutory construction, and general principles of statutory interpretation through examples of their application in recent court decisions.
Acts Interpretation Act
If statutes are the chapters, the Acts Interpretation Act is the reference guide you should read before opening any of them. Beyond s 15AA (discussed above), the following provisions of the Acts Interpretation Act are particularly relevant to the practical task of statutory construction and are worth keeping in mind when reading any Commonwealth Act:
- s 2B – which contains definitions that apply (subject to a contrary intention) to all Acts. Unlike definitions in other pieces of legislation, which typically apply only to that particular Act, these definitions have general application across Commonwealth legislation. Key examples include ‘document’, ‘land’, ‘penalty unit’, ‘person’, ‘record’ and ‘writing’;
- s 12– which provides that every section of an Act has effect as a substantive enactment without introductory words;
- s 13 – which sets out the material that forms part of an Act. Under s 13(1), this includes all material from and including the first section of an Act to the end of the last Schedule (or, if there are no Schedules, the last section). Importantly, s 13(2) also brings within the Act: the long title; any Preamble; the enacting words; and any heading to a Chapter, Part, Division or Subdivision appearing before the first section. However, under s 13(3), ‘alt text’ that only indicates the effect of an element of the Act and is accessible only in electronic versions does not form part of the Act. The Note says that ‘[t]his text may, for example, aurally indicate the effect of a graphic image in an Act to assist users of the website who have visual disabilities’;
- s 15A – which provides that every Act shall be read and construed subject to the Constitution and so as not to exceed the legislative power of the Commonwealth, and that where a provision would otherwise exceed that power, it shall nonetheless be valid to the extent it does not;
- s 15AB – which provides for the use of extrinsic material in the interpretation of an Act. The application of s 15AB of the Acts Interpretation Act was considered by the High Court in Palmanova; and
- s 15AD – which provides that if an Act includes an example of the operation of a provision, the example is not exhaustive and may extend the operation of the provision.
Select 2025 cases involving statutory construction
Palmanova
Having introduced the facts and outcome of Palmanova above, this section examines how the High Court applied the modern approach to statutory construction in reaching that conclusion. As the joint reasons demonstrate, the process was not simply a matter of reading the words of s 14(1) of the PMCH Act in isolation, it required a careful and sequential engagement with the text, the broader context of the Act, and its underlying purpose.
1. Appreciating the context of s 14(1) of the PMCH Act involves situating the PMCH Act in its international and constitutional setting, and locating the provision within the scheme of the Act so situated
The joint reasons emphasised at [6]-[7] that context must be considered even where the statutory text appears clear. As the joint reasons stated at [6]: ‘Understanding context, including so much of the context as might be revealed by extrinsic material, ‘has utility if, and in so far as, it assists in fixing the meaning of the statutory text’. Focus on the statutory text is not to the exclusion of extrinsic material that has the potential to assist in fixing its meaning.’ The joint reasons identified that the task of appreciating the context of s 14(1) involved ‘situating the [PMCH] Act in its international and constitutional setting and locating s 14(1) within the scheme of the Act so situated’.Palmanova, [6]—[7].
On the international and constitutional context, the joint reasons noted that the PMCH Act was enacted in anticipation of Australia acceding to the UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property (the UNESCO Convention). Most relevantly, Art 7(b)(ii) of the UNESCO Convention contains only one temporal limitation: the date of import of the cultural property into the requesting State, not the date of its export from the country of origin, such that ‘[n]either the date of the property’s theft nor the date it was exported is relevant’.Palmanova. [8], [13].
Article 15 of the UNESCO Convention further makes clear that States Parties may enter into bilateral or multilateral agreements for the recovery and return of cultural property irrespective of when it was exported. The Second Reading Speech confirmed that the purpose of the Act was to protect Australian cultural heritage and to extend protection to the cultural heritage of other nations, enabling Australia to accede to the UNESCO Convention. The Minister’s reference to the concern of the Act being ‘to draw a line across history to ensure that in future years transfers of important and valuable cultural objects from one country to another take place in a legal and orderly fashion’ was, as the joint reasons would later hold, a line drawn by reference to the date of importation into Australia, not the date of exportation from the country of origin. The Explanatory Memorandum was to similar effect.Palmanova, [14],[15],[17],[18],[58].
Turning to the scheme of the Act, the joint reasons examined the long title, which ‘replicates in statutory form the broad legislative purpose identified in the Second Reading Speech and the Explanatory Memorandum’, the structure of Part II (headed ‘Control of Exports and Imports’), the definitions in s 3, the indictable offence in s 14(2) to which Ch 2 of the Criminal Code (Cth) applies, and the enforcement regime in Part V. Of particular significance was s 41 of the PMCH Act, which constrains enforcement powers so that they may only be exercised in relation to a protected object of a foreign country after the Commonwealth has received a request from the government of that country for its return. Nothing in s 41 limits such a request to objects exported from the foreign country after the Act came into force, a consideration that told strongly against Palmanova’s construction.
2. Non-exhaustive list of categories of extrinsic material at s 15AB of the Acts Interpretation Act guides but does not govern the construction of a provision
With regard to s 15AB of the Acts Interpretation Act, the joint reasons in Palmanova cited this provision in relation to the proposition: ‘Use of extrinsic material in the construction of a provision of a Commonwealth statute is guided but not governed by a non-exhaustive list of categories of material statutorily recognised to have potential to illuminate the statutory context.’
In a separate judgment, Edelman J identified a superficial tension between the common law modern approach to statutory construction, by which text, context and purpose ‘all inform each other and together shape the meaning of the provision’, and s 15AB(1) of the Acts Interpretation Act, which might be read as requiring a stepped, iterative approach by which the literal meaning of words is assessed before extrinsic materials are considered.Palmanova, [77]—[78].
However, his Honour concluded at [78] that in practice there should ‘rarely, if ever, be a need for such a stepped approach’ since s 15AB(1)(b)(i) already reflects the modern approach by making all context relevant in the first instance, and since ambiguity includes latent ambiguity that cannot be eliminated without reference to extrinsic materials. His Honour observed that s 15AB was introduced in 1984 as a facultative provision and that the discretion to refer to extrinsic materials ‘now generally extends beyond the stepped, iterative process of s 15AB(1) to apply the modern approach to statutory interpretation, as applied in this case by the joint reasons’.
3. Arriving at the preferable construction of s 14(1)
Having situated the PMCH Act in its international and constitutional setting and located s 14(1) within the scheme of the Act, the joint reasons turned to the central question of construction: did s 14(1)(a), properly construed, apply only to a protected object exported from a foreign country after the commencement of the Act as Palmanova contended, or to any protected object regardless of when it was exported as the Commonwealth contended.Palmanova, [47] – [65].
The joint reasons identified the temporal reference point of s 14(1) as the act of importation,Palmanova, [65]. made clear by s 14(1)(c). All three criteria in s 14(1)(a), (b) and (c) must be satisfied at the same time, Palmanova, [48]. and it is the present act of importation that furnishes the reference point for the other two.Palmanova, [48]. On that basis, the joint reasons gave three independent reasons, each sufficient on its own for rejecting any limitation in s 14(1)(a) based on the timing of the export from the foreign country.
First, Art 7(b)(ii) of the UNESCO Convention, the international obligation which ss 14(1) and 41(1) together implement contains no temporal limitation by reference to the date of export from the country of origin.Palmanova, [53] – [54]. Its only temporal limitation concerns the date of import. To read a further limitation into s 14(1)(a) by reference to the timing of export would undermine, rather than facilitate, Australia’s compliance with that obligation.
Second, Art 15 of the UNESCO Convention expressly contemplates States Parties entering into bilateral or multilateral agreements for the recovery and return of cultural property irrespective of when it was exported.18 Section 14(1), in combination with s 41(1), provides the statutory mechanism to implement any such agreement; constraining s 14(1)(a) to post-commencement exports would narrow that mechanism.Palmanova, [55].
Third, and perhaps most practically, s 41 of the PMCH Act, which requires a request from the government of the foreign country before enforcement powers can be exercised, itself places no limitation on the objects that may be the subject of such a request. Construing s 14(1)(a) as confined to post-commencement exports would therefore render any request in respect of a pre-commencement export unable to be acted upon: an outcome that strongly tells against that construction. Palmanova, [56].
The joint reasons then held that the Second Reading Speech and Explanatory Memorandum reinforced those conclusions.Palmanova, [57].
Finally, the joint reasons addressed the syntax.Palmanova, [60]. The primary judge had placed significant weight on the use of the present perfect tense in s 14(1)(a) (‘has been exported’), treating it as indicating a temporal connection between the past act of exportation and the present that would be rendered otiose if the provision applied regardless of when the export had occurred.Palmanova, [40]. The joint reasons disagreed. The use of ‘has been’ indicates no more than that the completion of the act of exportation in the past has some relevance to the present, namely, that the same object now being imported is the object that was previously exported. No further temporal limitation as to when that export occurred could be derived from the tense alone. The text of s 14(1) therefore involved neither surplusage nor redundancy.Palmanova, [60] – [65].
To return to the analogy with which this article began: the Court did not simply open the book to s 14(1) and read the words on the page. It read the whole chapter, situated it within the bookcase, the scheme of the Act, its long title, its structure and then looked to the wider environment in which that bookcase sat: the international obligations under the UNESCO Convention, the Second Reading Speech, and the Explanatory Memorandum. That is the context. That is the purpose. And it is precisely what the modern approach to statutory construction requires.
4. Analysis and take aways
A notable feature of the joint reasons is the sequence in which the analysis unfolds. Before engaging with either the text of s 14(1) or the syntax of its tenses, the joint reasons open the preferable construction section at [47] by stating the purpose of s 14 as expressed in the long title: ‘to support the protection by foreign countries of their heritage of movable cultural objects’. All three independent reasons for rejecting Palmanova’s construction then derive from that purpose. The question at each step is not simply what the words mean, but which construction better serves what the provision is designed to achieve.
This stands in deliberate methodological contrast to the approach of the Full Court majority below, which had treated the text as so ‘clear’ as to make material extrinsic to the Act ‘unnecessary to consider’.Palmanova, ([6], quoting the Full Court at [27]). The joint reasons rejected that framing directly. Whilst affirming the correctness of the Full Court’s construction, they emphasised at [6] that understanding context, including context revealed by extrinsic material, ‘has utility if, and in so far as, it assists in fixing the meaning of the statutory text’ and that ‘[f]ocus on the statutory text is not to the exclusion of extrinsic material that has the potential to assist in fixing its meaning’. The correct answer and the correct method are not the same thing.
The syntax was dealt with last, and consciously so. Quoting the principle that context and purpose ‘are surer guides to [a provision’s] meaning than the logic with which it is constructed’, Palmanova, [60]. the joint reasons treated the tense analysis as a matter to be addressed once the contextual picture was complete and found that it was, in any event, consistent with the construction already supported by purpose.
The practical implication is significant. Purpose is not a tiebreaker to be reached for when the words are ambiguous. As the joint reasons make clear, it is the organising framework of the whole task, consistent with s 15AA of the Acts Interpretation Act which requires that the interpretation best achieving an Act’s purpose or object is to be preferred. A provision whose words might appear to support one reading on their face may, when read in light of the Act’s purpose and, if relevant international setting, point firmly in another direction. The primary judge’s tense-based reasoning in Palmanova was not unreasonable in isolation, it was thoughtful and carefully constructed, but it was ultimately displaced because it read the text without sufficient regard to the wider story the Act was telling.
Laming v Electoral Commissioner of the Australian Electoral Commission [2025] HCA 31
Laming concerned the regulation of electoral matter (i.e. electoral advertising material) in the digital age. Andrew Laming, a then-member of the House of Representatives, posted electoral matter on a publicly accessible Facebook page called ‘Redland Hospital: Let’s fight for fair funding’ on three occasions: 24 December 2018, 7 February 2019, and 5 May 2019. On each occasion, he failed to include the required ‘particulars’: his name and the town in which he lived in the post, as required by s 321D(5) of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) (Electoral Act). Each post was seen by a small number of people: six, eight and fourteen respectively. Laming v Electoral Commissioner of the Australian Electoral Commission [2025] HCA 31.
At first instance, the primary judge (Rangiah J) found three contraventions, one per post and imposed penalties totalling $20,000. The Electoral Commissioner appealed, and the Full Court found at least 28 contraventions, holding that a contravention occurred each time a post was viewed by a different person, and increased the total penalties to $40,000. The High Court restored the primary judge’s construction, holding that s 321D(5) is contravened once per non-compliant post, not once per view.Laming at [59].
The narrow question of statutory construction was whether s 321D(5) of the Electoral Act, a civil penalty provision requiring a ‘notifying entity’ to ensure that certain ‘particulars’ are notified in ‘electoral matter’ is contravened once for each failure to include those particulars (provided the electoral matter was communicated to at least one person), or once for each and every occasion the electoral matter is communicated to a person.
Gageler CJ, Gleeson and Jagot JJ (the majority) began, as in Palmanova, with context and purpose before engaging with the text. But Laming illustrates an important dimension of the modern approach that Palmanova did not: purpose does not always push towards a broader construction. Here, purpose operated as a limiting force.
The Commissioner’s argument was essentially purposive: more contraventions equals greater deterrence, and greater deterrence better achieves the objects of the Act (free and informed voting). The majority accepted that deterrence is one object of the civil penalty regime. Laming at [20]. But held that the expressly stated objects of s 321D ‘do not exist in a vacuum, as s 321C(2) and (3) expose. The assumption that the provisions seek to achieve their expressly stated objects at any price is particularly inapt for these provisions.’
The majority accepted at [20] that ‘the imposition of a civil penalty for contravention of s 321D(5) is intended to deter non-compliance so that the expressly stated objects of s 321D, as identified in s 321C(1), may be achieved’. However, it determined that a ‘per view’ approach was not necessary to achieve meaningful deterrence. Two contextual considerations were decisive:
First, at [21], the majority held that the regulation of ‘electoral matter’ ‘involves a quintessential form of political communication’ and that freedom of political communication is ‘an indispensable incident of the principle of responsible government’. This was ‘the critical context in which s 321D is to be construed’. Laming at [21]. It explains, as the majority noted at [22], why s 321C(3) expressly provides that Part XXA is ‘not intended to detract from the ability of electoral matters to be communicated to voters’. At [23], the majority observed that it was ‘understandable that the Parliament would confine the number of contraventions to the number of times a notifying entity failed to comply with s 321D(5)’, noting that any broader construction could expose notifying entities to penalties based on contraventions ‘numbering in the hundreds, thousands, or millions depending not on the notifying entity’s failure to comply with s 321D(5) in respect of its intended recipients or audience, but on the mere happenstance of re-transmission’.
Second, and consistent with s 321C(2) and (3), the majority held at [25] that those provisions ‘speak against the respondent’s approach of assuming that the greatest number of potential contraventions, carrying the greatest maximum penalty, is an object of the legislation or the best way in which the legislation might achieve its goals’.
The majority concluded at [30], that ‘with these important matters of context in mind the proper construction of s 321D(5) is apparent’ and held that s 321D(1) requires proof of a past event: that the ‘electoral matter’ ‘was imparted, transmitted, given to, conveyed to, or expressed to a person’.Laming at [33]. Once that condition is satisfied, ‘s 321D(1) has no further function. Its function, of identifying when s 321D(5) may apply, is performed’.Laming at [33]. The majority described s 321D(1) as performing a ‘gateway function’ such that ‘the fact of the “electoral matter” having been communicated to a person is a requirement that must be satisfied for s 321D(5) to apply, and no more’.Laming at [33].
Turning to s 321D(5) itself, the majority observed at [35] that the table uses ‘communication’ as a noun, ‘to describe a thing’. A sticker, a pamphlet, a Facebook post: each is a ‘communication’ in this sense, being a thing ‘capable of performing a communicative function’. The majority held that ‘on the terms of s 321D(5), it is the notifying entity’s failure to ensure that the particulars are notified as required which constitutes the contravention’ and that ‘such a failure can only occur before an act of communication’.Laming, [36]. Nothing in s 321D(5) attaches to the downstream act of each person viewing the post.
The majority addressed the Acts Interpretation Act arguments.Laming, [43]-[44]. On s 15AA, the majority accepted that the interpretation best achieving the Act’s purpose is to be preferred but held that ‘the expressly stated objects of s 321D do not exist in a vacuum, as s 321C(2) and (3) expose. The assumption that the provisions seek to achieve their expressly stated objects at any price is particularly inapt for these provisions’.Laming, [43].
On s 23(b) of the Acts Interpretation Act (providing that words in the singular include the plural), the majority held that this would not in any event be material, because even if s 321D(1) referred to ‘persons’, the plural would include the singular, and s 321D(1) would be satisfied by a communication to a single person. The result was one contravention per non-compliant post, not one per view. Both the majority and Edelman J agreed on one further point of broader significance: considerations of deterrence should generally be irrelevant in the interpretation of the scope of a civil penalty regime.Laming, [28], [127]. Edelman J dissented, taking the view that the majority’s construction gutted the effect of the Digital Amendments and that the intention of Parliament had been to treat each act of communication to a separate person as a separate contravention, consistent with how the progenitor provisions operated for physical pamphlets.Laming, see [97] – [120]. His Honour called for Parliament to amend s 321D to make this clear.Laming, [130].
Laming therefore offers a valuable complement to Palmanova for the article’s central thesis. Both cases apply the same modern approach: text, context and purpose – but with different results. In Palmanova, purpose drove the Court toward a broader construction of s 14(1). In Laming, purpose, properly understood in its full context, including the constitutional setting and the limiting terms of s 321C(3) constrained the reading of s 321D(5).
The lesson is not that purpose always enlarges a provision’s reach. It is that purpose must be understood in its whole setting, including the provisions that qualify or limit how the Act’s objects are to be achieved. As the majority put it, the objects of s 321D do not exist in a vacuum.
Conclusion
Each statute is a chapter in a larger library. Reading the words of a provision in isolation, without its opening provisions, its structure, its objects, and the wider context in which it sits, is like opening a reference work to a random page and assuming you have the full picture. You do not.
The cases considered in this article illustrate this vividly, and from two different directions. In Palmanova, the High Court read s 14(1) of the PMCH Act not by focusing on the present perfect tense of its opening words, but by situating the Act in its international and constitutional setting, understanding its purpose, and asking which construction best served it. The text, once read in that full context, pointed clearly in one direction. Purpose and context were not a supplement to the textual analysis; they were its foundation.
Laming showed the other side of the same coin. The same modern approach, applied to the regulation of electoral matter in a digital context, produced a narrower construction. The objects of s 321D of the Electoral Act did not exist in a vacuum. The constitutional backdrop of free political communication, and the express terms of s 321C(3), meant that a construction exposing notifying entities to penalties multiplying with each view of a post would have achieved the Act’s objects at a price Parliament had not sanctioned. Purpose constrained as much as it illuminated
Together, the cases make the point this article has sought to convey. Statutory construction is not about finding the right words on the right page. It is about reading the whole chapter, understanding the bookcase in which it sits, and appreciating the wider environment from which it draws its meaning.
The Acts Interpretation Act is an indispensable part of that exercise. Unless there is a contrary intention, it applies to every Commonwealth Act and provides the practical toolkit for approaching any provision: s 2B supplies definitions with general application; s 13 confirms what material forms part of an Act, including long titles, preambles and structural headings; s 15AA mandates that the interpretation best achieving the Act’s purpose is to be preferred; and s 15AD confirms that examples are not exhaustive and may extend a provision’s operation. These are not merely technical rules. They are the standing instructions for reading statutes in the way this article has described.
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