This article was co-authored with Shaun Buckton and Anna Hobson.

On 17 June 2026, Justice Lee of the Federal Court of Australia handed down the decision in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Bekier (Penalty Judgment) [2026] FCA 756 (the Penalty Judgment). This followed his Honour’s recent decision in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Bekier (Liability Judgment) [2026] FCA 196 (the Liability Judgment).

Our previous article providing our commentary on the Liability Judgment is available here.

Justice Lee noted the seriousness of the misconduct and ordered significant civil penalties and periods of disqualification against Mr Bekier, the former Managing Director and CEO of Star, and Ms Martin, the former Company Secretary and Chief Legal and Risk Officer.

The Penalty Judgment is a strong affirmation of the importance of robust corporate governance practices and culture, as well as the severity of the consequences for failing to maintain them. As his Honour noted at [287]:

“… corporate governance failures seldom arise because information is entirely absent. More commonly, they arise because “the watchman sees the sword coming and does not blow the trumpet”; or because warning signs are insufficiently pursued; or because obvious questions are left unasked. The duty imposed by s 180(1) exists to guard against precisely those failures…”

Penalties and disqualification periods imposed

Mr Bekier (CEO and Managing Director) received a pecuniary penalty of $700,000 and was disqualified from acting as a director of a company for a period of 6 years.

Ms Martin (Company Secretary and General Counsel) received a penalty of $400,000 and was disqualified for a period of 7 years.

Key takeaways

Corporate governance

The Penalty Judgment is a stark warning for corporate wrongdoers. His Honour stated at [178]:

“…Senior executives of… public companies conducting enterprises pregnant with risks more broadly, must understand that failures of the kind established by the contraventions may attract substantial personal consequences…”

His Honour noted that while the findings in the Liability Judgment did not involve personal enrichment, the gravity of the conduct was nonetheless severe, involving “sustained and serious failures” of corporate governance by the most senior officers of the corporation (at [164]).

The importance of the defendants’ seniority and positions was repeatedly emphasised. His Honour considered that Mr Bekier’s role as Managing Director and CEO “materially aggravates the seriousness of the conduct”. As the most senior executive, he was required to take all reasonable steps to ensure the Board was comprehensively informed of the risks and obligations concerning Star (at [165]).

The discretionary considerations also focused on the broader nature of the failures of corporate governance when assessing the seriousness of the conduct. At [177], his Honour stated:

“Several of the relevant discretionary considerations therefore point strongly towards substantial penal orders. The conduct extended over a significant period. It involved more than one failure rather than some isolated lapse of judgment. The contraventions occurred while Mr Bekier occupied the most senior executive office within the corporation. The departure from the standards expected of a Managing Director and Chief Executive Officer of a casino operator was serious.”

Similar principles were applied to Ms Martin, emphasising the unique obligations of her role as Chief Legal Officer (at [233]):

“One of the central responsibilities of a Chief Legal and Risk Officer within a publicly listed corporation is to resist the institutional degradation of standards concerning risks and compliance with the law. A dysfunctional corporate environment does not diminish the obligations of a senior legal officer. If anything, it heightens them. The more pervasive the failures of governance and culture become, the greater the obligation upon those entrusted with legal and risk responsibilities to insist upon compliance with legal obligations and proper standards of corporate conduct.”

Contrition and remorse

As his Honour emphasised in the Penalty Judgment, a primary function of pecuniary penalties and disqualification periods is deterrence, both specific (to deter the wrongdoer from contravening the law in the future) and general (to deter other potential wrongdoers who might otherwise seek to engage in similar unlawful conduct).

Defendants who demonstrate insight into their wrongdoing do not require a significant civil penalty and disqualification period to deter them from committing wrongdoing in the future. See [93]:

“…the relevance of remorse or contrition lies not in punishment for its absence but in its possible bearing upon the level of specific deterrence required. A demonstrated appreciation of wrongdoing may provide some foundation for concluding that a lesser sanction will nevertheless achieve deterrence. Conversely, where such evidence is absent, the Court may be left without any basis for reaching that conclusion.”

His Honour was critical of the lack of evidence from the defendants demonstrating any “…developed insight into the seriousness of the contraventions…” (at [73]).

It is important to note that contesting liability and putting ASIC to proof is not an aggravating factor that the court will use to impose a higher penalty. However, in the absence of a defendant displaying insight into their wrongdoing (even after negative findings are made against them), a court may consider there is a need for specific deterrence, and consequently a larger penalty is required.

Defendants in regulatory proceedings need to be aware that, if evidence of insight into wrongdoing is not provided at the penalty stage (perhaps to leave open an appeal on liability), considerations of specific deterrence may weigh more heavily, resulting in more significant penalties and disqualification periods being imposed than might otherwise be the case.

The importance of parity

The parity principle loomed large in his Honour’s judgment. The principle provides that defendants who commit similar contraventions of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (the Corporations Act) in the same factual circumstances ought to be treated alike.

The principle was usefully summarised at [123] of the Penalty Judgment:

“…Drawing on the considerations identified above, the proper inquiry is whether any difference in outcome is objectively rational and fair, so that no justifiable sense of grievance may arise. That formulation is important as it avoids both extremes. It rejects the idea that settlements with some are irrelevant to the position of others. But it also rejects the proposition that earlier agreed outcomes somehow mechanically cap or dictate the penalty to be imposed on those whose cases are different in material respects.”

Differences between defendants can and should be taken into account when setting penalties, and relevant distinguishing factors can include “role, seniority, objective seriousness, number and nature of contraventions, degree of knowledge, directness of involvement, admissions, co-operation, saving of public resources, insight, contrition, personal circumstances and the total effect of the proposed relief” (see [128]).

The parity principle assumed significance in the Penalty Judgment because ASIC had previously settled with Mr Hawkins and Mr Theodore, the former Chief Casino Officer and Chief Financial Officer of Star and had invited the court to make orders reflecting those settlements. Mr Hawkins was ordered to pay a penalty of $180,000 and was disqualified from managing corporations for a period of 18 months. Mr Theodore was ordered to pay a penalty of $60,000 and was disqualified for a period of nine months.

ASIC sought larger penalties and disqualification periods against Mr Bekier and Ms Martin ($1,300,000 and 8 years, and $1,100,000 and 7 years respectively).

His Honour had to resolve this disparity and impose pecuniary penalties and disqualification periods that would deter future wrongdoing without giving rise to a justifiable sense of grievance. This led his Honour to impose penalties and disqualification periods moderately less than what was sought by ASIC.

Costs

His Honour adopted a broad-brush approach to assessing liability for costs, finding that the court should not apply an arithmetical approach to determining the percentage of ASIC’s costs that Mr Bekier and Ms Martin were responsible for.

Having regard to ASIC’s success in establishing multiple serious contraventions against Mr Bekier and Ms Martin, which were vigorously defended by both defendants, his Honour required Mr Bekier and Ms Martin to be jointly and severally liable for 45% of ASIC’s costs.

This should emphasise to defendants their potential cost exposure when defending proceedings brought by a regulator. Even if they are one of multiple defendants, if there is a degree of overlap in the contraventions alleged against each defendant (as was the case here), an unsuccessful defendant may be liable for more than just a proportionate share of the regulator’s costs. This is especially so where the regulator is successful against some, but not all, defendants.

Given the costs of complex litigation of this kind, these costs orders can substantially exceed the pecuniary penalties typically imposed against individuals.

Conclusions

The Penalty Judgment demonstrates the serious consequences for senior executives who fail in their duty of care, skill and diligence. Justice Lee’s Penalty Judgment also provides valuable consideration of the key principles guiding the civil penalty regime, particularly the role of deterrence and the importance of parity.

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