In the Q1 2025 edition of International Restructuring Newswire, our colleagues offered an English perspective on liability management exercises (LMEs) occurring in the United Kingdom.
These tactics are occurring in the United Kingdom and Europe more broadly downstream from leveraged buyouts and extensive private equity activity that was maximised by a low-interest rate environment. The change in economic cycle is now leading highly leveraged companies to turn to LMEs to restructure their capital structures.
LMEs utilise the flexibility in contracts agreed between debtors and creditors and creditors inter se to reprioritise debt claims to the benefit of participating creditors. In overseas markets, these flexible contractual arrangements originated in high yield bond documentation and were initially and continue to be favourable to debtor companies as negotiated by them or their private equity sponsors. See Vincent Buccola and Greg Nini, ‘The Loan Market Response to Dropdown and Uptier Transactions’ (2024) 53(2) Journal of Legal Studies 7.
A key benefit is the contractual right to transfer collateral to unrestricted subsidiaries (i.e. those outside the borrower group of companies). This is referred to as the ‘drop-down’ and gained infamy in the restructure of the United States clothing retailer J. Crew. See Jared Ellias and Narine Lalafaryan, ‘The Global Law of Debt’ (Research Paper No. 21/2025, Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge, December 2025). The German building company Pfleiderer GmbH has also recently demonstrated how the designation of a subsidiary as an unrestricted subsidiary and subsequent transfer of collateral can be paired with a ‘double dip’, Bianca Boorer and Adel Awak, ‘Pfleiderer bondholders organise in response to carve-out’, 9fin (January 9, 2026). which is when creditors lend new money to an unrestricted subsidiary that then on‑lends all or some of the proceeds back into the restricted group with the participating lender ending up with:
- a direct claim against the unrestricted subsidiary; and
- an indirect claim through the intercompany loan both supported by guarantees or security, as permitted by the documents.
Australia has seen low interest rates and an uptick in leveraged buyouts. A notable example was the Brookfield take-private of the Healthscope Group in 2019, which is now the subject of the same change in economic cycle. However, our local contractual arrangements have remained tighter for debtors with less margin for LMEs due to continued market adherence to the standard form documentation of Asia Pacific Loan Market Association (APLMA). This may be the result of a limited, less diverse creditor pool, including high-yield bonds remaining a rarer feature of the capital stack.
This article has been prepared in anticipation of LMEs becoming a component of the restructuring toolkit in the Australian market. The key players are already here in Australia which suggests that wider adoption of contractual flexibility is just downstream. Banks and other lenders operating at this end of the Australian market therefore need to be aware of these tactics and should have regard to the legal issues that may be relevant to prevent disadvantage.
Our focus is the use of the ‘drop-down’ by companies outside of the zone of insolvency. This is necessary to demonstrate the point that these transactions are susceptible to reversal even if undertaken before the hardening periods that operate in respect of the voidable transaction claims that can be brought in accordance with section 588FF of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).
This article is therefore premised on the existence of a ‘drop-down’ mechanism in a facility agreement governed by Australian law and/or entered into by an Australian obligor (or an obligor subject to the jurisdiction of Australian insolvency law) and considers the following legal issues:
- whether contract law could protect a disadvantaged creditor; or
- whether the transaction could constitute defrauding the disadvantaged creditor under section 37A of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) and State equivalents.
Framing of the mechanism and tightening features
Before delving into the analysis, we note that in reviewing operative ‘drop-down’ clauses in European high-yield ‘cov-lite’ documentation they can have the following associated features:
- a right to designate existing or newly established members of the corporate group as an unrestricted subsidiary;
- a basket that allows the debtor to move a funds up to a certain value to an unrestricted subsidiary without breaching financial covenants;
- a limitation on the types of assets that can be transferred to an unrestricted subsidiary; and
- a restrictive asset sale or affiliate transaction covenant.
The risk of a debtor utilising the ‘drop-down’ could be limited by prohibiting the designation of unrestricted subsidiaries and tightening the asset disposal covenant. However, despite the controversies associated with the ‘drop-down’ since J. Crew, the mechanism has remained in loan documentation albeit with some variations. For instance, creditors have agreed on:
- a limitation as to the size of the basket according to the last earnings period;
- a limitation as to the transfer or sale of intellectual property or business units;
- restricting the asset sale or affiliate sale covenant to purchases for fair market value and with a minimum 75% cash consideration; and
- requiring disposal proceeds to be applied in debt reduction.
The below analysis considers whether the inclusion of these features may address any applicability of the considered Australian law.
Contractual analysis
A ‘drop-down’ mechanism may attract principles of contract law that provide a cause of action to a disadvantaged creditor. Depending on the contractual arrangements and the nature of the dealings between the parties, this activity could found claims for breach of the following:
- the implied obligation to act reasonably in relation to contractual rights that are capable of significantly affecting another party’s rights;
Mineralogy Pty Ltd v Sino Iron Pty Ltd (No 6) [2015] FCA 825; 329 ALR 1 at [1027]. - the implied duty of cooperation, under which each party is obliged to do all that is reasonably necessary on its part to enable the other party to obtain the benefit of the contract;
Secured Income Real Estate (Australia) Ltd v St Martins Investments Pty Ltd (1979) 144 CLR 596 at 607–608.\and - a limited implied duty of good faith, noting this only applies with respect to ‘relational contracts’ that is unlikely to include financing documentation.
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Barker (2014) 253 CLR 169 at [107].\
The drafting and construction of the ‘drop-down’ mechanism would inform a Court’s consideration of whether these duties and obligations may have been breached by the borrower. This includes whether there are any fetters, conditions or constraints attached to the mechanism, including an express obligation to exercise powers in ‘good faith’ or ‘reasonably’ in the contract or any specific features of the ‘drop-down’ such as a basket limitation or an asset sale covenant.
While protective principles exist in the United Kingdom and United States, noting the latter has an implied duty of good faith applicable to all contracts, these have not yet been directly tested in the context of a ‘drop-down’ transaction and therefore no insights can be gleaned from offshore as to how they may be interpreted in an Australian context. However, there are claims that continue to be filed in these jurisdictions as LMEs become increasingly deployed by sponsors and borrowers and it is therefore necessary to watch this space closely.
Statutory analysis
Disadvantaged creditors could also have the availability of statutory recourse. Section 37A of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) (Conveyancing Act), including its State equivalents, is not reliant on the occurrence of bankruptcy or insolvency and can therefore apply at all points in time and to a range of transactions.
37A Voluntary alienation to defraud creditors voidable
1. Save as provided in this section, every alienation of property, made whether before or after the commencement of the Conveyancing (Amendment) Act 1930, with intent to defraud creditors, shall be voidable at the instance of any person thereby prejudiced.
3. This section does not extend to any estate or interest in property alienated to a purchaser in good faith not having, at the time of the alienation, notice of the intent to defraud creditors.
Key aspects of the provision have been construed as follows:
-
Meaning of ‘alienation of property’– the word ‘alienation’ in section 37A should be given “the widest possible application” as it “encompasses every conceivable means whereby property might be removed from the reach of a person’s creditors”;
Hall v Poolman [2007] NSWSC 1330 at [550]. -
Meaning of ‘intent to defraud creditors’ – the term ‘defraud’ means “delay, hinder or defraud”;
Marcolongo v Chen and Another (2011) 242 CLR 546 at [19].\ -
Meaning of ‘creditors’– “ … “creditors” … has been held on more than one occasion to mean present or future creditors, so that if a person fears that his or her activities may generate creditors and puts property out of the reach of such possible persons, the transfer of the property can be attacked under the section …”;
Chen v Marcolongo (2009) 260 ALR 353 at [180]. -
The requisite ‘intent’– an “actual and real intention”
Marcolongo v Chen and Another (2011) 242 CLR 546 at [24]\to defraud has been rejected, and it has been found “that it was unnecessary to show that the debtor wanted creditors to suffer a loss or that the debtor had a purpose of causing loss: it was necessary to show the existence of an intention to hinder, delay or defeat creditors and in that sense to show that accordingly the debtor had acted dishonestly …”;Ibid at [32]. -
Interpretation of dishonesty– “the intent to defraud to which s 37A refers involves dishonesty, albeit that that dishonesty may be constituted by an intent to delay or hinder creditors without involving “a desire to ‘cheat’ or ‘swindle’ those prejudiced”;
Saba v Plumb and Another (2018) 19 BPR 38,401\ -
The requisite intent need not be the sole or dominant one– the High Court has determined that the provision “does not postulate a mixture of motives from which there must be extracted what is identified as a predominant intent to defraud”;
Marcolongo v Chen and Another (2011) 242 CLR 546 at [57].Inferences of intent – it is recognised that it will be “easier to infer a dishonest intention if the conveyance were voluntary than if it were made for consideration” ~~(2011) 242 CLR 546 at [25].~~and the Courts have recognised further situations in which they are likelier to infer the requisite intent including where:- The alienation is made for no consideration by a person in financial difficulties;
See Cannane (D M) v J Cannane Pty Ltd (in liq) (1998) 153 ALR 163 at [13]. - The alienation is made in haste or proximately to one or more events indicating financial stress on the part of the transferor.
See PT Garuda Indonesia Ltd v Grellman (1992) 107 ALR 199 at 208.\
- The alienation is made for no consideration by a person in financial difficulties;
-
Can apply to more than the debtor– it has been found that others who act “collusively” with a debtor may be held accountable under the provision,
Hall v Poolman (2007) 215 FLR 243; [2007] NSWSC 1330 at [550].and that a fraudulent transfer “need not occur solely by reason of acts by the fraudulent debtor”.Zreika v Royal (2019) 271 FCR 65 at [303].\
As per subsection 37A(3), extracted above, the provision does not extend to any estate or interest in property alienated to a purchaser in good faith not having, at the time of the alienation, notice of the intent to defraud creditors. In cases in which a borrower is transferring collateral to an unrestricted subsidiary, this exception is unlikely to be available.
An analysis involving section 37A must therefore focus on the period leading up to the relevant alienation, and consider all the surrounding circumstances that speak to the mind of the transferor at that point in time. These inquiries should also focus on the discovery of facts that indicate intent and whether the alienation was carried out in order to ‘delay, hinder or defeat’ claims that could be made by existing or future creditors.
In overseas markets, the ‘drop-down’ mechanism has been designed to effect the transfer of collateral in order to obtain further financing. While existing lenders may be called upon to provide that further financing, there will invariably be other creditors disadvantaged by the activities (otherwise the participating creditors could consent to variations to the existing facility agreement without having to enjoin the ‘drop-down’). If those circumstances were to occur in Australia, it is arguable that the borrower could be engaging in activities to ‘delay, hinder or defeat’ the claims of non-participating creditors.
To ultimately determine the applicability of section 37A, this would require factual inquiries into the drafting and construction of the ‘drop-down’ mechanism, how and when the mechanism was negotiated and agreed between the parties and whether the disadvantaged creditors contemplated the effect of the relevant clauses. A stricter asset sale covenant, or other associated features to tighten the mechanism, may be a counterweight to any risk of the applicability of the provision. That said, dishonesty is still dishonesty and even consideration may not sufficiently deter a claim under the provision.
If successful, a claim under section 37A would reverse the ‘drop-down’ mechanism. It is worth noting, however, that additional remedies may be necessary in circumstances in which the transferred collateral was used by the unrestricted subsidiary to grant security rights to new or existing creditors.
Conclusion
Academic research in the United States and United Kingdom has focused on the effectiveness of LMEs. A recent study questioned their utility with more than 80% of the analysed transactions resulting in defaults (including formal insolvency appointments) within three years. Mark J. Roe and Vasile Rotaru, ‘Liability Management’s Limited Runway: Corporate Restructuring Today’ (January 20, 2026) <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=6103369>(accessed March 9, 2026). It could be that these are just a passing fad that are only delaying the inevitable or they could become an entrenched part of the restructuring toolkit.
As interest rates remain elevated in Australia, sponsors and debtors will continue to face challenges and turn to considering restructuring options. Such options may depend on the allowances available in the transaction documents. If Australian banks and other lenders are involved in transactions that already contain a ‘drop-down’ mechanism or it is proposed in future, this article is intended to provide awareness of the avenues that could thwart an attempt to disadvantage or seek redress after the activity has occurred.
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