Scrutiny of Foreign Subsidies in Europe
The European Union’s Foreign Subsidies Regulation (the FSR) aims to combat distortions of competition on the EU internal market caused by “foreign” – meaning non-EU – subsidies. It imposes mandatory notification and approval requirements for acquisitions of businesses with significant sales in the EU and large EU public tenders. It also gives the European Commission (EC) extensive powers to launch ex officio investigations.
Companies operating in the EU, or planning to invest in the EU or to participate in EU public tenders, that have received “foreign financial contributions” (FFCs) from non‑EU countries must be ready to supply the information required under the FSR. Some companies also need to consider how best to evidence the attribution of financial contributions to entities across the corporate group as well as manage transfer pricing and governance issues and prepare justifications for those FFCs most likely to distort competition in the EU.
What counts as a Foreign Financial Contribution under the FSR?
Financial contribution under the FSR is an extremely wide-reaching concept that covers any form of direct or indirect value transfer between companies and non-EU governments or any public or private entity attributable to a non-EU country.
Examples of FFCs include direct grants, loans from State-owned banks, tax incentives (e.g., exemptions/reductions), R&D funding, government contracts (regardless of whether they have any nexus to the EU), and grants of exclusive rights without adequate remuneration.
It is important to distinguish between FFCs and foreign subsidies under the FSR. FFCs may include (i) any transfer of funds or liabilities, (ii) any foregoing of revenue, or (iii) any provision or purchase of goods and services, provided by a non-EU country – whether through central, regional or local government, a foreign public entity or by a private entity whose actions are attributable to that country. In contrast, a foreign subsidy is a narrower concept: it covers only those FFCs that confer a benefit on the recipient which would not normally be available on the market and that is specific to one or more companies or industries.
It is the existence of FFCs, rather than the existence of foreign subsidies, that determines whether notifying parties must file, which makes the scope of required disclosure particularly broad. However, the EC may take remedial action only in relation to the foreign subsidies themselves.
The EC’s Investigative Tools
1. Mandatory Pre-Authorisation Tools
Companies engaging in (a) M&A activity or (b) a public procurement procedure in the EU triggering the FSR thresholds must submit a notification and await EC approval.
a) Filing Obligation for M&A Transactions
Jurisdictional thresholds. Transactions must be notified to the EC when the following (cumulative) thresholds are met:
i. Turnover threshold: The EU turnover of the target (in case of acquisitions), the joint venture (for creation of an EU JV), or one of the parties (for mergers) was €500 million or more in the last financial year; and
ii. Financial contribution threshold: The undertakings concerned (i.e., the acquirer and the target, the merging parties, or the JV and its parents) were granted more than €50 million in financial contributions from non-EU governments or State-owned entities in the three years preceding the conclusion of the agreement, the announcement of the public bid or the acquisition of a controlling interest.
Scope of reporting. The Implementing Regulation (IR), which sets out the scope of the notification obligation, specifies that an FFC must be notified only if it equals or exceeds €1 million. However, a varying level of detail is required depending on the nature of the FFC. If an FFC falls into the category of so called ‘foreign subsidies most likely to distort the internal market’ (namely, rescue and restructuring subsidies, unlimited State guarantees, certain types of export financing or subsidies directly facilitating a concentration), detailed information about each subsidy, its purpose, underlying documentation, etc. must be provided.
The vast majority of FFCs, however, do not fall within this category and only need to be reported in aggregated form in a summary table, for which more limited information is required. Moreover, such FFCs must be reported only for those non-EU countries where the estimated aggregate value of all reportable FFCs (i.e., those equal to or above €1 million) granted by that country in the three years preceding the conclusion of the agreement or the acquisition of a controlling interest reaches at least €45 million.
In addition, the IR provides a very short (and strictly interpreted) list of FFCs that benefit from a reporting exemption (and therefore do not count towards the €45 million total). These include contracts for goods and services concluded on market terms (excluding financial services), and certain general tax measures.
Investment funds: exemption and scope of reporting. The IR introduces an exemption for investment funds under which – subject to certain conditions – they are not required to disclose FFCs received by their non-acquiring funds, significantly reducing the scope of reporting.
Funds that fall within the scope of the exemption must notify all reportable FFCs granted to the notifying party’s control group, namely: (i) FFCs to the investment company and the group to which it belongs; and (ii) FFCs granted to the acquiring fund (including limited partner contributions and FFCs received by portfolio companies). While passive investments by limited partners only need to be reported in an aggregated form, attributable co-investments in the acquisition of the target, are treated as subsidies directly facilitating a concentration and therefore require detailed reporting (see Q26 in the EC’s Q&A on the FSR).
Timetable. On paper, the FSR notification process and timetable broadly mirrors the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR) timetable: an initial 25-working-day review period (akin to Phase I) followed (if necessary) by an in-depth 90-working-day review, which may be extended by 15 working days if commitments are offered (similar to Phase II). However, in practice, the processes diverge in several important respects. Notably, there is no formal clearance decision at the end of the initial 25-working-day period, and the initial review phase cannot be shortened. Moreover, given the different focus of the assessment, the actual review timelines often do not align.
While the EUMR assesses the effects of a concentration on competition in the relevant markets, the FSR examines whether a foreign subsidy distorts the internal market. As a result, even where the same transaction is reviewed under both regimes, it may raise concerns under one but not the other – leading to potentially misaligned timelines.
b) Filing Obligation for Public Tenders
Jurisdictional thresholds. Companies must notify their FFCs to the EC when participating in public tenders in the EU if the following (cumulative) thresholds are met:
i. Contract value: The contract value is not less than €250 million. For tenders divided into lots, notification is required where the aggregate value of the lots applied for is not less than €125 million; and
ii. FFCs: The bidding party (including its subsidiaries, its parent company and its main subcontractors or suppliers) has received aggregated FFCs of not less than €4 million per third country in the three years prior to notification.
Bidders that have received aggregate FFCs of less than €4 million per third country must instead submit a declaration listing all FFCs received and confirming that they fall below the notification threshold.
Scope of disclosure. As with M&A notifications, only FFCs with an individual value of €1 million or more must be notified. The €1 million threshold in the IR applies to each individual financial contribution granted by a single third country to each notifying party. FFCs granted to different notifying parties must not be aggregated for this purpose. The EC has also confirmed that FFCs granted by different third countries to the same party should not be aggregated either (see Q&A DG GROW). In addition, only FFCs granted in the three years prior to the notification must be disclosed.
Regarding the level of detail required, as with M&A notifications, only FFCs falling within the categories of foreign subsidies most likely to be distortive (namely rescue and restructuring aid, unlimited State guarantees, certain types of export financing and foreign subsidies that enable an unduly advantageous tender) require detailed reporting.
Other notifiable FFCs, i.e., those not considered most likely to be distortive, should be presented in aggregated form. These aggregated disclosures must be provided only for those countries where the estimated aggregate amount of all notifiable FFCs granted in the three years prior to the notification is €4 million or more. Further exceptions apply (mirroring those for M&A transactions), meaning that certain types of contributions do not need to be included in the summary table at all and do not count toward the €4 million threshold.
Where companies submit a declaration stating that they have received no notifiable FFCs, they must still provide a summary description of the public procurement procedure, information about the notifying parties, and a list of all the FFCs received. FFCs valued below €1 million but above the amount set in the EC’s State aid de minimis Regulation (currently €300,000) may be reported in aggregated form. Moreover, if the total amount per third country over the preceding three years is below the de minimis threshold, such FFCs do not need to be included in the declaration at all.
Timetable. In the context of public tenders, the EC’s preliminary review lasts 20 working days, extendable by 10 working days. An in-depth review must be completed within 110 working days from receipt of a complete notification, with a possible extension of 20 working days in exceptional circumstances.
Failing to report FFCs or benefiting from distortive subsidies may lead to disqualification from a public tender.
2. General Tool for Investigating All Other Market Situations
The EC has broad ex officio powers to investigate any potentially distortive foreign subsidies. These powers allow the EC to examine support granted by third countries to companies up to 10 years before the investigation begins (but not more than five years before the FSR became applicable).
The FSR also grants the EC call-in powers, enabling it to request an ad hoc notification of transactions or public procurement procedures that do not meet the relevant thresholds but where the EC suspects that the companies concerned may have received foreign subsidies in the three years preceding the concentration or tender submission. The EC clarifies in the FSR Guidelines on the application of certain provisions of Regulation (EU) 2022/2560 of the European Parliament and of the Council on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market (FSR Guidelines) that call-ins will be used only where an ex ante review is warranted based on factors such as the competitive impact of the concentration or public procurement procedure, whether the activity is of strategic economic importance, and the likelihood of a distortion.
The FSR Guidelines also set out safe harbors, which effectively exclude from the EC’s call-in powers low-value public procurement procedures, subsidies below €4 million, and subsidies addressing certain extraordinary circumstances. In all cases, the EC may exercise its call-in power only before a concentration has been fully implemented or a contract has been awarded.
As of the time of writing, the EC has not yet exercised this power.
Assessing Distortion in the Internal Market
Unlike EU State aid law, where a distortion of competition in the internal market is presumed whenever a State grants a financial advantage on an undertaking operating in a liberalised sector, the FSR does not presume a distortion simply because a foreign subsidy is granted to a beneficiary active in the internal market.
Instead, each case must be assessed on its specific facts to determine whether a distortion can be deemed to exist. The FSR Guidelines set out a two-step assessment that the EC must follow:
- First, the EC examines whether the foreign subsidy strengthens the company's competitive position in the EU. Where the subsidy is not expressly directed at economic activities in the EU, the EC will carry out a more detailed analysis to determine whether it may nevertheless be used to cross-subsidise activities in the EU.
- Second, the EC assesses the impact on competition by considering whether the subsidy is liable to alter the company's competitive behaviour or market dynamics to the detriment of other operators.
The depth of the EC’s analysis will depend on whether the foreign subsidy falls into one of the categories most likely to distort the internal market, as listed in Article 5 FSR.
1. Subsidies falling under Article 5 FSR
Foreign subsidies falling within Article 5 FSR will normally be considered distortive, unless the particular facts of the case show that there is no negative effect on competition.
In such cases, the EC is not required to conduct a detailed assessment based on the indicators set out in Article 4 FSR. The beneficiary, however, may demonstrate that the subsidy does not distort the internal market in the specific circumstances. Furthermore, even if the EC concludes that the subsidy is distortive, the balancing test under Article 6 may establish that the subsidy’s positive effects outweigh its distortive impact on the internal market.
2. Subsidies not falling under Article 5 FSR
For subsidies that do not fall within Article 5 FSR, the EC will assess each case on its merits. It will use the relevant indicators set out in Article 4 FSR, as appropriate, to determine whether the subsidy has a distortive effect. The indicators listed in Article 4 FSR are neither exhaustive nor mandatory; the EC will select those relevant to the specific circumstances of the case.
3. Assessing distortion in the public procurement module
As explained in the FSR Guidelines, where the EC has indications that a foreign subsidy may have influenced the terms of a tender, its distortion assessment follows a two-step approach:
- First, the EC examines whether the bidder may have relied on the foreign subsidy in designing the terms of its bid and whether the bid appears unduly advantageous. This involves comparing the bid against those submitted by other tenderers as well as against the contracting authority's own estimates.
- Second, the EC assesses whether the advantage derives, to an appreciable extent, from the foreign subsidy rather than from other justifiable factors.
Balancing Test
Article 6 FSR introduces the so-called “balancing test,” under which the EC assesses whether a distortion in the internal market is outweighed by the positive effects of the foreign subsidy (akin to the “efficiency defence” under the EUMR).
In applying this test, the EC must weigh the positive effects of the subsidy such as contributions to EU policy objectives (e.g., environmental protection, digital transformation, job creation, or R&D) against the distortion caused in the internal market. Only positive effects specifically linked to the foreign subsidy under assessment will be taken into account. The EC will also consider the severity of the distortion and whether the claimed benefits could reasonably be achieved without the distortion.
Foreign subsidies that fall within the presumptively distortive categories set out in Article 5 FSR are less likely to have their negative effects outweighed by positive ones.
The application of the balancing test may lead to different outcomes. At the end of an in-depth investigation, the EC may adopt (i) a no objection decision; (ii) a commitments or redressive measures decision; or (iii) a prohibition decision preventing the concentration or the award of a public contract.
Redressive measures and commitments may be structural (e.g., unwinding an acquisition, divesting assets or reducing capacity or market presence), or behavioural (e.g., granting access or licences on FRAND terms, publishing R&D results, repaying the foreign subsidies with interest or modifying governance structures). Importantly, the application of the balancing test cannot result in an outcome less favourable than what would have applied had the test not been conducted.
The EC’s information gathering and enforcement powers
To support its investigations, the EC can gather information through requests for information, interviews with natural or legal persons, and unannounced inspections (dawn raids) conducted both inside and outside the EU.
Although the FSR does not establish a formal complaints mechanism, competitors are still likely to submit information to the EC regarding alleged FFCs received by companies active in their sector.
Whether triggered by a third-party submission or the EC’s own monitoring, any company receiving a request for information may face a substantial burden in collecting the necessary information and financial data. If a company refuses to supply information, the EC may base its decision on the facts available – which may be less favourable to the company than if it had cooperated.
If companies breach the standstill obligation by completing or failing to notify a notifiable concentration, the EC may impose fines of up to 10 percent of their aggregate turnover in the preceding financial year. The EC may also impose fines of up to 1 percent of global turnover and periodic penalty payments of up to 5 percent of average daily aggregate turnover per working day of delay, where companies provide incorrect, incomplete or misleading information.
Practical considerations
1. Data collection
Companies should implement systems for the collection of group-wide information on relevant contracts, grants of exclusive rights, tax incentives, and other forms of support on a global basis. Because the FSR requires information covering the preceding three calendar years, it is not advisable to wait until a potentially notifiable transaction or tender arises. Detailed data on FFCs is needed not only to assess whether a transaction or public tender triggers a notification obligation, it will also be required if the EC calls-in a transaction or tender below the thresholds or it launches an ex officio investigation – both of which are likely to be preceded by a substantial request for information or even a surprise inspection.
Identifying and quantifying FFCs over a rolling three-year period is resource-intensive. Working with our legal-tech team, we have developed a solution that centralises and automates information collection, significantly reducing the burden on companies.
2. Deal planning
Given the standstill obligation applicable to notifiable transactions, M&A documentation (including share purchase agreements, asset purchase agreements or similar) will need to incorporate a condition precedent for FSR notification and approval. Agreements should also include information-sharing and cooperation obligations, as well as provisions addressing potential remedies and other risk allocation mechanisms.
Because an FSR review examines all relevant FFCs – not only those connected to the transaction at hand – in rare cases the EC may identify remedies that differ from those required to address any competition concerns under merger control. Parties should therefore consider reflecting this in the SPA, including by accommodating the possibility of offering or accepting FSR-specific remedies distinct from merger control commitments.
So-called “hell or high water” clauses, often used by sellers in controlled auctions to maximise deal certainty, may carry broader implications in this context. Purchasers will need to consider the potential for FSR-driven remedies, such as the repayment of distortive loans or the divestment of assets acquired prior to the transaction – when agreeing to such provisions.
Because the FSR creates an additional layer of uncertainty as to whether a transaction can ultimately be cleared (and on what conditions), parties should also factor the FSR regime into their approach to break fees. In addition, the FSR should be reflected in the due diligence exercise and in representations, warranties and disclosure schedules, particularly regarding the target’s systems for recording relevant information and its historic compliance with the FSR. This will help purchasers understand the risk of any remedies linked to FFCs previously received by the target.
M&A transactions that require FSR notification will almost invariably also require merger control and, potentially, foreign direct investment approvals. However, despite the formal similarities between the FSR and EU Merger Regulation timelines, the procedural clocks may not run fully in parallel. The EC’s pre-notification focus under each regime differs, meaning the respective formal review periods may start at different times and lead to non-aligned clearance timelines. Transaction planning should take this into account.
Takeaways from two years of application
The first two years of FSR enforcement have been significantly busier than anticipated. By the end of December 2025, the EC had received nearly 300 M&A notifications, far exceeding its initial estimate of around 30 cases per year. To tackle the workload and ensure effective enforcement, the EC established Directorate K within the Directorate-General for Competition, comprising three separate units dedicated to enforcing the FSR-relevant M&A transactions.
On the procurement side, DG GROW, which has already received nearly 3,000 notifications and declarations, set up a dedicated unit in May 2025 to handle foreign subsidies in public tenders.
1. Notable case law and enforcement developments
On April 9, 2024, the EC launched its first ex officio investigation under the FSR public procurement module, which targets an Asian wind turbine manufacturer and examines conditions for the development of wind parks in Spain, Greece, France, Romania and Bulgaria (see Speech by Executive Vice President Vestager on technology and politics at the Institute for Advanced Study). The EC opened an in-depth investigation in the case on February 3, 2026.
Later in April 2024, the EC carried out a dawn raid at an Asian company’s premises in the Netherlands and Poland as part of a second ex officio investigation. The company subsequently filed an appeal in May 2024 seeking an interim injunction and annulment of the EC’s decision. In its judgment of August 12, 2024, the General Court dismissed the suspension request and confirmed that the EC is entitled to request information from any undertaking conducting commercial activities in the EU. The ECJ upheld that position in March 2025, rejecting the company’s appeal and request for interim relief.
In February 2025, the EC raised concerns regarding a tender for nuclear reactors in the Czech Republic. Although the contract had been awarded to an Asian company, the EC opened a preliminary investigation following a complaint from a major European competitor.
In December 2025, the EC conducted a second FSR dawn raid, this time at the Irish premises of an Asian online shopping platform.
Reports suggest the EC intends to make greater use of its ex officio powers to investigate below threshold procurement procedures.
On September 24, 2024, the EC concluded its first Phase II (in-depth) investigation under the FSR merger regime, clearing the acquisition of assets of a Czech telecommunications company by a Middle Eastern buyer subject to commitments (see our briefing here). In November 2025, the EC concluded a second in-depth merger investigation, conditionally clearing the acquisition of a German chemicals and high-performance polymers producer by a Middle Eastern oil company.
Finally, DG GROW opened a new investigation in November 2025 into a tender for the expansion of the Lisbon metro system. The three previous in-depth investigations under the FSR public procurement regime were all closed without final decisions, as the participating companies ultimately withdrew their bids from the tender procedures.
2. Formal guidance
Although the FSR notification obligations have applied since October 12, 2023, formal guidance has emerged only gradually and in a piecemeal fashion. The EC adopted the IR in July 2023, setting out the procedural framework and practical aspects of the FSR regime. Around a year later, the EC published a Staff Working Document (see our briefing here), complementing earlier guidance issued in the form of Frequently Asked Questions published by DG COMP and DG GROW, as well as the EC’s FSR Brief summarizing initial enforcement lessons.
Further clarification arrived with the publication of the FSR Guidelines on January 8, 2026, which provide detailed guidance on the concept of distortion, the application of the balancing test and the EC’s call-in powers.
In parallel, in August 2025, the EC launched its first comprehensive review of the FSR. This review will consider, inter alia, potential amendments to the Implementing Regulation and strongly advocates the introduction of a simplified notification procedure.